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PRELIMINARY 
ARTISTS, CRITICS, AND PHILOSOPHERS 
Few quarrels, it is said, are more bitter than family quarrels, 
and few jealousies more profound than those between parties 
who have, without always recognising it, some important 
yiv14. *awe in common. The very intensity of the interest in an 
end/ produces an intensity of interest in the means to the 
end, so that when intellectual or other differences about 
means arise/ they are apt to swamp all sense of common 
interest in the common object or good. We have only to 
think of the frequent violence of religious, or of political, 
4) opinions/ to furnish ourselves with ample illustration of 
this truth. 
Three parties there are who may be said to have an 
interest, whether recognised or not, in the fact of aesthetic 
experience /They are the artists, the critics, and the aesthetic 
theorists the theorists being either philosophers or psycholo- 
gists, or both. It is indubitable that these three groups do 
have in common the fact of interest in aesthetic experience. 
On the other hand, their respectively different relations to 
this fact tend to obscure their community and their family 
relatedness to one another. It is not, as with those whose 
interest is mainly political, or religious, a matter of different 
opinions about means to a common end. It is rather a 
matter of different relations of different minds to the same 
%=*( object. Very roughly, the artist desires to feel an aesthetic 
experience by making something beautiful, the critic desires 
to recognise it through beautiful art -objects, and the 
I I will leave out the lover of `natural beauty' till Chapter, which is 
reserved for him. This exception holds good throughout, and may be 
made quite without prejudice to the question of `$atural' beauty. 
rq. A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
philosopher= desires to comprehend it. These interests are 
indeed so patently different that, in spite of the community 
of object between them, the artists, the critics, and the 
philosophers might be content to follow each their own paths 
were it not for a certain interrelation between their respective 
activities, concerning which a good deal of confusion, and 
often of resulting jealousy and friction, is apt to arise. As in 
these quarrels it is the philosopher who most frequently finds 
himself attacked, it is necessary,(before. entering upon any 
discussion of aesthetic philosophy)Lto remove, as far as may 
be, entangling and prejudicing misunderstandings. 
The philosopher is sometimes attacked by the artist as an 
interfering meddler who tries to teach him (the artist) his 
business, by laying down_ a priori laws about matters con - 
t.:647 cerning which-he is unfit to judge. The artist $as also been 
known to attack the critic for very much the same reasons, 
. whilst the critic finds fault with the philosopher for ,meddling 
with his affairs. Let us investigate the grounds of these 
quarrels between artist and critic, artist and philosopher, and 
critic and philosopher. 
The artist's complaint against the critic arises chiefly 
from temperament. The artist is creative, and in the glow 
of achievement he naturally tends to feel angry with the 
critic when the latter regards his work coldly or adversely. 
`What right has this fellow', he ma say, `to find fault with 
me when he is (it may be mself incompetent to compose 
a sonata or write a sonnet or a play, or put paint decently 
upon canvas ?' The artist's complaint is natural, requires no 
explanation, and/ is likely to vary with the smiles or the 
frowns of the critic. 
With the philosopher, the artist as such has naturally less 
commerce. Artists may have their own philosophies, but if 
and when they run across philosophers who chance to be 
interested in the philosophical problems underlying the 
= I shall take the philosopher here as the type of aesthetic theorist. His 
relation to the psychologist will be discussed below. 
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artist's work and experience, they often find tktii- jargonp i 
incomprehensible, mod if not wholly incomprehensible, z 
either dull or wrong- headed. Artists there are, of course, 
who possess a flair for abstract inquiry. But the artist, qua 
hh 
artist, is concerned with makin , and not with pulling tug& / w '5 
to pieces in abstract inquiry. Abstract inquiry, the artist 
tends to think, is a tedious business compared with the 
excitements of creating. If we are to theorise, let us do it 
quicklykand relevantly to the matter in hand, without 
introducing vague generalisations which can help nobody. 
The artist's opinion of the philosopher is not of great 
importance, just because the artist's job is to produce art, 
and not to define or to attack philosophy (or indeed to 
discuss it at all). The artist is forgiven all irritabilities of 
temperament if only he does create well what it is in him to 
create. The crit4 opinion of the philosopher (we need not Iv 
here consider the critic's relation to the artist) is, on the 
other hand, more important, because, although the critic 
deals on the one hand with works of art, the critic is also a 
writer or a speaker, and deals in ideas about art. He thus 
approaches, if he does not at some points cover, the same 
ground as the philosopher. 
That the interests of the critic and the philosopher very 
often overlap, I am going to suggest. But the critic is by 
no means always aware as he ought to be of the close Awls 
relation of his calling, on the one side of it, to philosophy. 
He has been known, as we said, to attack philosophy. 
There is a critic of a certain type who is only too ready to 
ask, Why should we analyse our experiences of beautiful 
things at all? Why should we not be content with our 
feelings and emotions about beautiful things? Is not each 
beautiful thing unique, and so elusive that it stands by 
itself? And is not the attempt to set up abstract standards 
or general principles only a revelation of ignorance of pia-- t 
uniqueness of each beautiful thing? Is philosophical analysis 
not a- -case of_murdering to dissect? 
) 
P 
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This point of view is very clearly expressed by Walter 
Pater in the preface to his Renaissance. "Many attempts ", he 
says, "have been made by writers on art and poetry to 
define beauty in the abstract, to express it in the most 
general terms, to find some universal formula for it. The 
value of these attempts has most often been in the suggestive 
penetrating things said by the way. Such discussions help 
us very little to enjoy what has been well done in art and 
poetry, to discriminate between what is more and what is 
less excellent in them, or to use words like beauty, excellence, 
art, poetry, with a more precise meaning than they would 
otherwise have. Beauty, like all other qualities presented to 
human experience, is relative ; and the definition of it 
becomes unmeaning and useless in proportion to its 
abstractness. To define beauty, not in the most abstract but 
in the most concrete terms possible, to find not its universal 
formula, but the formula which expresses most adequately 
this or that special manifestation of it, is the aim of the true 
student of aesthetics. 
" `To see the object as in itself it really is', has been justly 
said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever." And he 
who does this distinctly, who can experience vividly, "has 
no need to trouble himself with the abstract question 
what beauty is in itself, or what is its exact relation to truth 
or experience -metaphysical questions, as unprofitable as 
metaphysical questions elsewhere. He may pass the all by 
as being, answerable or not, of no interest to him." We may 
cite again a more recent writer. = "Into vague generalisations 
about `Art' this is in any case no place to go. At best very 
little can be said that is worth sayinjbout things as different 
as a cathedral and a sonnet, a statue and a symphony." 
The same writer in another passage speaks z of Hegel's 
theory of tragedy as "one more instance of the rashness of 
metaphysicians who venture into regions where their 
speculations can for once be checked." These are certainly 
= F. L. Lucas, Tragedy, p. 14. 2 Ibid., p. ç/ 
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Charges against philosophy. We shall return in a moment or 
two to consider how seriously pr how little seriously -they 
are to be taken. ' 
The philosopher, then, is attacked by the artist and the 
critic. If the philosopher in turn can be said to attack at all 
(apart from defending himself or retaliating) his attack is 
more of the nature of an assumption of a certain common 
ground or subject- matter between himself and the critic. 
He seldom presumes -and as philosopher he has never any 
right to presume -to interfere positively with the critic's 
business of intuitive judgment, even although he may be 
heard to murmur that he wishes that some art -critics sew- OT « "" / 
...tiulgs had a little more philosophy in. them. 
The philosopher's attack, I have suggested, is of the 
nature of an assumption, and it is this assumption which is 
resented by the artist and the art- critic, chiefly by the latter. 
The assumption which is made by the philosopher is that 
he has some right to theorise about art and about aesthetic 
experience generally.= The critic is so far justified in his 
resentment in that this assumption has sometimes in fact 
been made by philosophers who have obviously been 
possessed of little first -hand experience of beautiful things. 
In this matter it is of vital importance to be clear at the 
outset. It is of vital importance to be clear that generalisa- 
tions about art and about aesthetic experience can only be 
justified when they are based upon experienced immediate 41 
aesthetic intuition. Without aesthetic intuition off individual 
beautiful things, generalisations about aesthetic experience 
are "but words and breath'.'. Critics are right when they 
resent `high / priori' ways of thinking and speaking of art. / It may be possible to use the concept of beauty as the 
completion of a system' of philosophy, as some philosophers 
have done; it may b possibl even for the metaphysician to 
define beauty more or less correctly, out of a very general - 
and vague sort of experience. But this kind of thing, even 
' Including, once again, the possible aesthetic experience of nature. 
B 
-11 
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in the hands of genius, is not worth a great deal, unless it 
is grounded in experience of many beautiful things, and many 
sorts of beautiful things. Aesthetic hypotheses have this in 
common with scientific ones, that they must be tried and 
tested and adjusted to suit the variegation of particular 
fact 
'cs 
: o . Aesthetic generalisations 
must always - be Fagm tt t tine they must be hypotheses aa,skti to be tested by experience, until by degrees the body oß' 
aesthetic theory grows into as coherent a system as we cane- 
make it, There must be the continual movement, familiar r 
in science, from the individual facts to generalisation, and 
from generalisation back again to individual facts. And so on. 
In this connection there is a common misunderstanding 
between artists and critics on the one hand, and philosophers 
on the other hand, which is typified in the use of the word 
`must'. The philosopher is often heard to say, `The artist 
must do so and so.' This sounds exactly as if the philosopher 
were laying the law down to the artist. But the philosopher 
is using the term `must' not in a normative sense, not in the 
sense of some categorical imperative, but rather as describing, 
as far as he can see, what does in fact happen .iac the best W//4 
- ±sneer. The philosopher is puzzled ; he talks aloud ; he 
asks himself questions. `What is the explanation. of this ?' 
he asks. And after reflection he answers, `This is the explana- 
tion ; this is what the artist must be doing.' Of course the 
philosopher's discoveries through analysis might be, after 
many days, of practical value to the working artist. But 
that is another matter. The philosopher's business is to 
know, not to prescribe, and it is an injustice to think that, 
because he uses the word `must', he is laying down the law. 
Having emphasised, then, that the business of the aesthetic 
philosopher is intellectual analysis and construction, and 
that, in order to analyse and construct to any purpose, he 
must also have first -hand acquaintance with beautiful 
JutF 1144.1- 
if c.4,.44:4 4.4 
a,.l..: 1, 
---..- 
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things, we may now return to meet the objections, already 57 
cited/ to the philosopher's making -the attempt /at all to Cu-4 7 
analyse beautiful things. 
The most direct -and perhaps the final- answer that 
can be given to the question, Why analyse? is that we have 
a fundamental urge to do it, that we usually do it badly, 
and that if done at all it ought to be done well. Everyone 
has notions about what art or beauty is, even although these 
notions never become expressed in words. We do not merely 
feel, we think also. And it is unanalysed notions and precon- 
ceptions which, entering into our feelings about beautiful 
things, more often than not mislead us and induce false 
attitudes towards them. If we are to have preconceptions at 
all -and we can never avoid having them -then it is surely 
better, if opportunity offers itself, that we should take a 
little trouble in trying to acquire true preconceptions for 
future occasions. These true conceptions are worth acquiring 
for their own sake, for the sake of their truth, but it is almost 
certain that in the end they also help us to appreciate 
more truly. 
Leaving the second point for the present, let us consider 
the first, and in relation to that part of Pater's statement 
(given above) which denies that definitions do help us to 
use words like beauty, art, etc., with more precise meaning. 
It is surely plain falsity that, in general, definitions do not 7 
aid mental precision. Pater's point/ however/ is that, in 47 " r 
particular, it is beauty and its like which cannot be defined, 
because beauty is essentially an individual thing, and not 
a general concept. But although this io true, and although ; 
it may also be true, as Pater says, that beauty is in some 
sense relative to us, yet the fact that there are certain kinds 
of objects which many people agree in calling beautiful, 
and certain kinds of mental experience called aesthetic, is a 
sign that there is some quality -the aesthetic quality - 
common to all the particular instances. Whether or not this 
quality is relative to our minds, the whole history of criticism 
20 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
shows that it is, in some sense, describable, a describable 
quality. It is precisely this quality which it is the object of á aesthetics to discoveß To say that we must 
define beauty, not in the most abstract, but in the most 
concrete terms possibleeis to overlook the very nature of 
definition ; it is to refuse to define at all. This is, of course, 
a procedure which is open to anyone who pleases, but he 
wail 
who adopts it, if he is to be consistent, must be content 
ykj and must entirely refrain from talking of it, from even Ail (/j murmuring the words "art", or "beauty ". Even to murmur / )/"art", "beauty ", is to commit oneself to the supposition 
that there is some general "abstract" idea to which the 
words refer. Pater himself is -in his own individual way- 
s`¡,µ ) undeniably an expert in the business of enjoying art, and 
he is always fascinating when he is acting what Oscar Wilde 
callèr "the Critic as Artist ", when he is, through his own 
medium of artistic prose, making us feel beauty. (It may 
be questioned whether he is at these times a good critic.) 
The rest of the time he is continually violating his own 
principles and talking "abstractly ". He has, strictly speaking, 
no right even to call his book Studies in Art and Poetry, 
because the terms "art" and "poetry" are abstract terms 
and therefore (to him) "meaningless ". If it be replied, 
"Yes, that is all very well, but you know perfectly that 
Pater meant, not `art' and `poetry' in the abstract, but 
particular works of art and particular works of poetry ", we 
may answer again, "Yes, but why call them all by the name 
of `art' or `poetry'? The terms must have some general 
meaning and they are without doubt hopelessly `abstract'. " 
It is fortunate that Pater does violate his own principles, 
that his practice is better than his precept, for his generalisa- 
tions are often illuminating. But it is a pity that he should 
have encouraged in himself and in so many of his admirers 
the old and muddled idea -so stupid as to be unworthy of 
attack, were it not for its prevalence -that to define is to 
I' 
/,t W. i rsl Íu4 
( 
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destroy, that to try to form a clear general conception of 
anything is to do something which is much inferior to the 
act of direct perception. To generalise is neither inferior, 
nor is it superior, to perceiving ; it is simply different. It has 
a different aim and a different function, a function which 
has a directly theoretical -a,ia, and which has, indirectly Ól)" 
perhaps, practical effects. 
The . same things are true of the quotation given from 
Mr. Lucas. It is no doubt the case that it is difficult to make 
general statements about things as different from one 
another as cathedrals, sonnets, statues, symphonies, and it 
is true that the difficulty of making generalisations tends' to 
produce vagueness in the generalisations; that good 
may appear vague because they are abstract 
and difficult to understand. But, once again, has the word 
`art' no meaning? Surely cathedrals and sonnets and 
statues and symphonies are, in at least one important respect, 
more like one another, than they are like coal - heaving, sel Iv 
in su ar, or taxi- driving. It is that which they have in 
common, in which the philosopher is interested. 
We have been saying that criticism involves abstraction. 
It m4howeverbbe denied that the critic in any sense deals 1 -1 
in abstractions, that his function is to discuss theories. 
There are (indeed/several views of the aims of criticism %. ¡ l 
which it may be as well to enumerate now - without 
attempting neatness or detail of classification- before 
going on to speak of the relation of criticism to aesthetic 
philosophy. 
The simplest kind of criticism, perhaps, is what is some- 
times known as `signpost' criticism. Its aim is merely to 
point out what is good and what is bad in art. This has a 
useful function, largely the function of a guide -book or a 
good newspaper ; it tells the uninitiated what to seek and 
what to avoid. It is hardly likely to be found by itself. 
Another kind of criticism is what may be called `technical' 
criticism; it is the kind of criticism which interests artists 
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and those who are concerned with the processes of the 
actual building up of works of art. It is the kind of criticism 
to which, disc ussing- ±i^g comments on composition, 
c,L.A.4444, ¡ on the balancing of lines, planes, and volumes, on tactile 
(1.49.41/3 and colour values, on the expression of depth. In poetry 
this class of criticism is concerned with things like the 
disposition of vowel- and consonant -sounds, or of assonance 
and rhyme and rhythm and metre. Music also has its own 
technical jargon. `Technical' criticism is necessary and 
valuable in that it directs attention to the structural elements 
in art and their relation to the whole ; without any such 
'` ) 
Iti 
/ accurate discrimination appreciation would be a vague 
- 
p' 
and nebulous thing. `Historical' criticism (including what 
might be called `biographical' criticism) is another kind of 
criticism. This endeavours to evaluate works of art by 
showing them to be expressions of general classified tendencies 
in the history of art and also perhaps of circumstances in 
the artis private -life. These again are, no doubt, of 
considerable value in helping us to understand the artist's 
point of view in its historical background. (They are part of 
what has been called, mainly in France, `scientific' criticism.) 
On the other hand, there is the danger that the historical or 
biographical critic may place what interests him historically 
before what is of intrinsic artistic importance. 
There is, again, `artistic' criticism, described in Wilde's 
essay, The Critic as Artist, to which we referred in speaking 
of Pater. This is perhaps better known generally in this 
country and abroad as "impressionistic" criticism. Impres- 
sionism is-in-intention really a development of `signpost' 
criticism, with the great difference that the `signpost' 
becomes an impressionable living artist who records his 
impressions of Ale, work of art, and who does not merely 
record them, but expresses them so intensely that a new, 
and literary, work of art is produced. The critic records his 
`adventures of the soul' in a lyric which in its own way 
may rival (as also it may not rival) the original object of 
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appreciation. The main trouble with this kind of criticism 
is that it is apt to :... . The better the 
artist such a `critic' is, the more he may detach our attention 
from the original and fix it upon his own product. (Pater's 
lyric over La Gioconda is the obvious example which comes 
to mind.) This may sometimes be very pleasant, and the 
end may justify the means. But it is not what we want when 
we go out to find criticism. It is like a geologist who should 
ask for a stone and be offered cakes and honey. In criticism 
the weekly newspaper signpost is better than this. 
But indeed of criticism we ask something more than is 
given by any or all of the four kinds I have enumerated. 
All criticism implies good `taste', implies competence of 
aesthetic intuition. But this is not all that is required. Nor 
is technical or historical and biographical knowledge, or 
the gift of literary expression, an adequate supplement. 
Philosophy is required also. The interest of the critic is, of 
course, in -individual worliof art, and, as we have said, 
no amount of eneral knowledge is the least use as a sub-. 
stitute for thi But surely it is also the business of the com- 
pletely equipped critic to give reasons, if required, for the 
faith which is in him? I do not suggest that he must always 
be doing so, or that he is mainly concerned with theory. 
But he should be able to do so his should be a `thinking 
study' of art. He can point, or he can talk round the issue, 
or he can sing as the poet sings. But as the complete critic 
he is, if he merely does these things, a comparative (not a 
complete) failure, for though he has likes and dislikes, 
though he may know what is good, he has no idea why. 
He is not interested in the question. All good critics must 
put to themselves from time to time such questions as, Why 
is this or that good? Why is this technical device to be 
preferred to that? Why is this or that historical development 
important? Such questions directly involve others, such as, 
What is the meaning of good, or of bad, in art? What is the 
difference between the `beautiful' and the `ugly', between 
6-4 C)24 ti 
u1-4"^ 
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the `great' and the `trifling', between the `tragic' and the 
`comic', between the `classical' and the `romantic'? And 
these are -however little this be realised by critics them- 
selves -most emphatically philosophical questions. 
This is not to say that criticism is the same thing as 
aesthetic philosophy. Rather criticism implies (and, of 
course, is implied by) aesthetic philosophy. The difference 
is perhaps one of the focus of interest. The critic as such may 
be compelled, willy -nilly, to enter into philosophy, but his 
main interest is in individual works of art. The aesthetic 
philosopher, on the other hand, though he should be com- 
petently acquainted with as great a variety of works of art u 
as possible, is, as philosopher, interested ,Lin the general/! "1 
theory. It ought not to be necessary to add that his interest 
in general theory carries with it no sort of implication that 
he denies that each work of art is in a real sense particular, 
individual, and unique, or that he is so completely foolish 
as to think that artists will successfully produce works of art 
from theories alone. It ought not, I say, to be necessary to 
add this. But in view of obstinate misunderstandings/it is ¿! j 
necessary to do so. 
Out interest here will be aesthetic philosophy. But what 
of psychology? In discussing aesthetic philosophy it is 
impossible to avoid continually bordering upon psychology. 
As aesthetics is sometimes -wrongly, I think -identified with 
psychology, a word or two as to their relations may be in 
place here. 
Psychology is concerned with mental processes and to /1) 
some extent with physiological processes/ so far as these Ai 
have a bearing on mental processes and mental problems. 
(The subject- matter of aesthetic psychology is, broadly 
speaking, our processes of mind when we have aesthetic 
experience.) There are, as we know, two general methods of 
investigation which can be employed in psychology, one of 
them is direct/ or internal( observation, or introspection, iV 
and the otheil is the external observation of behaviour. 
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Both these methods may be used either in a freer, or in a 
more restricted and pr /scribed, way. The introspecting 0 i 
subject may offer a running description of his experiences,' 
or he may be asked to answer certain specific questions, 
carefully planned by the psychologist. Similarly, behaviour 
may be simply observed as it occurs, and recorded) or it Av 
may be studied under definite y experimental conditions. 
A good deal of investigation has been carried out in these 
various ways in the psychology of aesthetics. Most stress has 
perhaps been laid upon experimental aesthetics, where the 
conditions controlled so that the experimenter is 
able to tabulate more accurately the results obtained either - 
from introspection or from observation. This field of experi- 
mental aesthetics is a wide one and round the subject there 
has sprung up a considerable literature. What should be the 
relation of this experimental aesthetics to philosophy? 
One part of the answer seems to me obvious. It is that 
aesthetic philosophy should take everything it can make 
use of from the results of experiment. An aesthetic philosophy 
which refuses to consider what psychology offers1(it must `0 
indeed be blind and prejudiced. But two qualifications x t /14-1 
be made. (a) One is that philosophy has a right, and a 
duty, to be sceptical. It must be critical of that which 
psychology offers to it. There is no possible objection to 
the principle of experimentation / - experimentation is 
difficult to manage, and the results of experimentation in a 
subject like aesthetics are perhaps not always so significant 
as its advocates sometimes imagine. Experiment may be 
conducted with some profit when the experimenter is con- 
cerned with experiences of simple colours and sounds, 
and the results obtained have undoubtedly as I shall try,( k_ -.- 
to show, in helping us to discérn some of the ri 
less complex characters of aesthetic experience. But it is 
a mistake to think of these simple experiences of colour and 
sound as typically aesthetic experiences. To understand 
aesthetic experience properly we have to go to the more 
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complex examples of it, to the experience of works of arti 
of pictures, symphonies, poems, cathedrals. And in these 
cases, where the aesthetic experience is at its fullest and 
richest, the arrangement of experiment becomes most 
difficult of all. I do not in the least suggest that it is impossible 
to arrange experiments in such cases, or that it is unlikely 
that the technique of experiment will be greatly improved 
as time goes on. But it is certain that any mature aesthetic, 
experience is a vastly complex concrete whole, and that the 
necessary isolation of elements, the selection of fundamental 
aspects to be tested, is extremely difficult, so difficult that 
it has probably not, up to the present, been successfully 
achieved. Further, this selection can only be arrived at 
aft er a very carefully reflective -and philosophic -study of 
private and personal aesthetic experiences as complex 
concrete wholes. In other words, experiment implies 
hypotheses, and hypotheses are the outcome of reflection 
upon direct, pre -experimental experience. And it is particu- 
larly the business of aesthetic philosophy to form hypotheses 
and to scrutinise the hypotheses behind all experimental 
work. One's general impression is that experimental 
aesthetics has tended to suffer from a too great eagerness 
to `get results' and that a more philosophic scrutiny of 
fundamentals is needed before really significant experiments 
can be devised. Aesthetic experience is so peculiarly sus- 
ceptible to the danger of piece -meal treatment. 
The results of the experimental psychology of aesthetics, 
then, must be received critically, though open -mindedly, 
by philosophy, and aesthetics cannot for this reason be 
identified with a part of experimental psychology. The 
second remark= (b) which may be made, is that aesthetics 
cannot be identified with psychology (or with any part of it) 
because psychology is concerned with processes of mind, 
whilst the field of aesthetics contains more than this 
f 
Aesthetics is concerned also with objects and products. 
= See beginning of last paragraph. 
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it concerns the things which we call beautiful, ugly, sublime, 
poi ridiculous, and so on. With these objectsspsychology 
could, by the definition of its nature, have nothing to do. 
The nature óf objects is, however -in a certain sense the 
proper subject- matter of philosophy : it is called ontology. 
So again there arise problems of the relation of object to 
the subject. These again fall outside psychology, but they 
are the very sphere of `epistemology', or the theory of 
knowledge. Logical questions there are, too, in aesthetics, as 
when it is said that tragedy is the expression of the `universal'. 
Investigation in aesthetics, again, is essentially philosophical 
in that it treats these various problems not as separate, not 
as strictly speaking isolable, but as in relation to one another. 
The chief and the fundamental aim of philosophy -in 
aesthetics or anywhere else -is truth. But philosophical 
aesthetics, like other philosophy, may in the long run affect 
our feelings practice. I have tried to show that 
the critic, i he is to be a complete critic, must call upon the 
aid of philosophy. Not only the intellectual explanations of 
the critic, however, but critical appreciation itself, may in 
the end be affected by philosophy. For aesthetic experience, 
as we have said, is not mere feeling ; it is knowledge. And 
into knowledge there enters at any moment a vast complexity 
of assumptions and presumptions and past judgments. This 
needs little, if any, argument, since we all admit that 
aesthetic appreciation may be trained, and training means 
the direction of attention upon essentials which are in turn 
determined for us partly by analysis.. As in the realm of 
perception we `see' the snow to be cold, so in the realm of 
aesthetic experience we may be said to 4ee -the thing in this 
or that way, because of a certain history, a certain training, 
a certain tradition, which is partly determined at every 
point by some sort of reflection. And if the reflection has 
been profound and thoroughgoing and true, surely the 
actual vision will be clarified? Pater is mistaken when he 
assumes that the only aim of trying to define is to help us to 
-- 
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enjoy better( for . definition, where possible, is a good in 
itself. It is overwhelmingly probable, however, that Pater is 
not only wrong in this assumption, buis also wrong when 
he says that definitions help us very little to enjoy the best 
things hi art and poetry. Definitions, to repeat, are no 
substitute for taste, but surely definitions, when they have 
become assimilated into our minds, must in some sense, and 
j. 'time, qualify the thing we call taste? 
If this is true of appreciation, why should it not be true 
even of art -production itself? Of course, as we have said, 
the artist does not act in this or that way because he (con- 
sciously) thinks that atheory demands it. But surely even the 
artist, like the critic, is influenced by theories? We tend to 
7 J accept grudginglylthat the artist can ever be helped 
I by theories. And yet //we are very ready to admit that his 
work is apt to be influenced by bad theories. For example, 
t Wordsworth. But if bad theories affect, so may good theories 
affect. Why not as good theories as can be found. 
Let us rid ourselves, then, of lingering prejudices. It is 
high time to be quit of irritating and elementary confusions 
about functions. There is no reason in the world why artists 
and critics and philosophers should not live peaceably and 
profitably together under the wide roof of heaven. As for 
aesthetic philosophy in particular, it is possible, necessary, 
good in itself, and probably, after many days, aesthetically 
useful. Let us see for ourselves what its problems really are.' 
I For the general scheme of this book, and for suggestions to readers, 
see note in Preface, p. . 
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1. METHODS OF APPROACH 
There are at least three possible ways in which one may 
begin an inquiry into the problem of aesthetics. One may 
begin by attempting to define `beauty', or by considering 
the experience of the creative artist, or by analysing what 
is called the `aesthetic experience' which may arise when 
XI 
G, we contemplate works of artland/ perhaps(when we con- 
template natural objects. 
Each of these ways has its advantages and no one of them 
is without drawbacks. It is important= that the problems 
of beauty, and of artistic creation proper, and of aesthetic 
contemplation, shotild be distinguished ; and any procedure 
which begs the question by taking it for granted that any 
of them is identical with, or is reducible to, either or both 
of the others, is to be condemned. It is also true that however 
we begin- whether by defining beauty, or otherwise -our 
choice of a starting -point is bound to reveal our intellectual 
preferences in aesthetic theory. On the other hand, we must 
17 start somewhere, and/ so long as we realise that our plan 
will have to justify itself, it does not greatly matter where 
we begin. The starting -point is, relatively speaking, in- 
different ; for thought is a system with implications not in 
orie, but in all/ Temporal sequence is not of 
L /4 great importa ce logicallyJa y, though psycho- 
(, I logically, in its effect on the writer or ex. the reader, it may 
be of some little importance. 
The method I propose to adopt here is to start with 
some general considerations about aesthetic experience, and 
to postpone th %nvestigation of the problems of 
art and of beauty. This procedure may give, as has been 
said, a hint of future general conclusions about beauty and 
perhaps about art. But that will not matter. Our initial 
explorations can settle nothing. They can only raise problems, 
I See A. C. A. Rainer, "The Field of Aesthetics," Mind, XXXVIII, 
No. 150. 
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however categorically la may, for brevity's sake, , 
+e- lie- expresseeh I propose then, in this chapter, to make some 
very general and provisional statements about aesthetic 
experience. In the next three chapters we shall discuss the 
implications of an important idea which will come into 
prominence almost at once -the idea, namely, of 'expres- 
sion'. Later we shall endeavour to define art and beauty,' 
and to give mealtitrg to the idea of beauty by a consideration !'n 
of some of the chief problems which are raised by art, and, 
to some extent, by `nature'. 
Let us begin, then, with aesthetic experience, remembering 
(to repeat) that each statement we make now can only be 
shown to be true or false by means of a much more detailed 
This/takes time to carry out. rf emu. '+^`"' 
-Go / 
4 At_ 
II. SENSATION, PERCEPTION, IMAGI f*Tr!flfl AND AESTHETIC 
EXPERIENCES 
i 
The term `aesthetic' is derived from e« 
with the 'senses'. Can we say that the derivation of the word 
`aesthetic' has any importance? Can we say that aesthetic 
experience is already perceptual experience /`(4 d g- 
Certainly we cannot say that `aesthetic' experience is 
I Let me say here, in order to avoid possible future confusions, that the 
view of beauty which I shall defend will be that beauty is perfect 
expressiveness. This is a different view from one very commonly held, 
that the `beautiful' is the serene, the well -proportioned, that which 
makes an immediate appeal on account of its harmoniousness and 
balance. I shall not deny that all these qualities may, and perhaps in 
some sense do always, enter into concretely beautiful things, or that there 
is a kind of concrete beauty which does make immediate appeal on 
account of these qualities. But I do not believe that beauty can with 
profit be defined in this way, and I shall argue for a view of beauty as 
expressiveness, which confines it not merely to such serene objects as 
the Apollo of Belvidere or the Aphrodite of Melos, but which may include 
also much of what is at first sight adjudged to be ugly, and which 
certainly does include much that is `difficult'. But see below Chapter VIII, 
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merely perceptual experience. To say this would be to 
overlook an obvious distinction which we make, even in our 
quite unreflective moments, between simply perceiving 
a thing in the ordinary sense, and having an `aesthetic' 
experience of a thing. The term `aesthetic' (or derivatives 
of it) is, of course, sometimes trse n to sensation 
or perception; the first part of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
has this kind of thing as its title and subject, and there are 
in current use such terms as `coenaesthesis' and `anaesthesia'. 
But when we ordinarily talk of an `aesthetic experience', or 
of an `aesthetic' person, we are certainly referring to much 
more than sensational or perceptual qualities. When we see 
Antony and Cleopatra, or listen to Beethoven's Seventh Sym- 
phony, we may be perceiving and having sensations, but 
in calling these experiences `aesthetic' we are referring to 
something more, and /something in certain ways more 
important. But granting all this, can we still say that all 
aesthetic experience is perceptual experience, though not 
only perceptual experience but something more as well? 
To this, there is an obvious barrier. It seems fairly clear 
that we may have the kind of experiences which are usually 
supposed to be aestheti when we are not actually perceiving. 
Suppose, for example, read the lines 
"In the golden glade the chestnuts . are fallen all ; 
From the sered boughs of the oak the acorns fall, 
The beech scatters her ruddy fire ; 
The lime hath stripped to the cold, 
And standeth naked above her yellow attire...." 
I am here having an experience of something about which 
the poet is writing, which is certainly not' a perceptual 
experience. I am, it i t uue seeing% and reading, and, if the 
poem is read aloud,`ïC ,g' the words and this is a per- ; 
ceptual experience which accompanies iny other experience 
of apprehending that of which the poet is writing. The 
words, again, are no doubt of first -rate aesthetic importance, 
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as we shall have reason to see. But ignore for the time being 
the reading of the words and concentrate on the apprehen- 
sion of the "golden glade" itself. That is not literally per- 
ceived, but imagined. And yet our apprehension of it 
would usually be called, I suppose, an `aesthetic' experience. 
' 1 So /too it would generally be said that the vivid remember- 
ing, or possibly the vivid constructive imagining, of an art 
like music (e.g. to a man like Mozart) can be an aesthetic 
experience. The same is true of landscapes, or picture of 
them. And so on. - 
Suppose, then, we modify an original question still 
further, and ask now whether aesthetic experience is always 
(at least) either perceptual experience, or imaginary per- 
ceptual experience, or both? It is clear that it is a possibility 
that it might be either or both. Sometimes, for example, we 
listen to music, sometimes we `imagine' it only. Sometimes, 
as in oetry, we have before us things which we `perceive', % ' 
(i.e. words, and t ings e.g. pictorial images) which we 
A `imagine' or `image'. L .a el this triereir all that we f ,j doA, Should we be right in answering our question in the 
list444444f affirmative? 
Before attempting to give an answer, let us note two 
things in passing about the use of the word ` imagi .tion'. / 
_.... . 
(Imagination is an ambiguous word, and we shall have 
much occasion later to use it in a different sense from that 
in which it is now being used, a sense in which it will form 
part of the 'eased- differentia of aesthetic experiences from 44.4"J 
other experiences. Let us therefore distinguish between they( ,(' (`e 
two -yes by speaking on the on hand of magma and on aµ44. tI4 the other hand of imagimnrglcan of *imaginative . This is 
arbitrary but convenient. The other remark concerns the 
phrase "imaginary perceptual ex erieena e". his, in our 
new terminology, means image X pert p ua experience.)' 
The word .`perceptual' is in a sense superfluous, but it has 
been put, 
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emphasises. the assumption that what we 
apprehend when we image is not a different kind of world, 
e.g. ,a world of images made of `mental' or `psychical' stuff, 
,,(, buts the same kind of world as the world which we perceiver 
aastla ttjall h ughe act of m y e se ec- 
tive and constructive so that we may and do imagée con- 
tinually what has not, na aret u1d. n^t,. beeiv 
actually perceived)The theory of the, status of images is 
of course a difficult question which one ought not to prejudge. 
But perhaps without doing so I may be allowed to state 
that sense -perception is here being taken as the type of 04...4,4. 
experience which is iblootryw a part ogaesthetic experience ; Auth 
it is therefore emphasised. It is enough to say that when we 
imagine that of which the poet is speaking, or if we image 
music or pictures, we must image as if we were perceiving. 
III. IS THERE A BEAUTY OF PURE CONCEPTS? 
We may now return to opr question, Is aesthetic experience 
always at least either perceptual or imaginal experience f 
(or both) ? It is fairly clear that a very large proportion of 
aesthetic objects contain as an essential part of them 
a perceptual or imaginal side. We have only to think of the 
arts, with their various media -of words, of colour, of 
marble, of bronze, of musical sounds, of the movements of 
dancing. But can we not have aesthetic experience of things 
which have no essentiaperceptual or imaginal aspect, of a 
moral character, for example, or of a mathematical proof, 
or of a scientific or philosophical system? May not a mathe -. 
matical proof be beautiful? Or a moral action, or moral 
character? 
This is a difficult question to answer. It might be said,, 
of course, that when anyone claims that his experience of 
mathematics (or of a moral character) is `aesthetic', he is 
simply mis- describing his experience. He might be making 
-Eeme mistake analogous to the mistakes people sometimes 
i 
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make as when they speak of the satisfaction of ravenous `i7 
hunger as `beautiful'. There is no doubt that the terms 
`beautiful' and `aesthetic' are much misused. 
But this method of outright denial could hardly be applied 
here, since the claim that mathematics (for example) pos- 
sesses beauty is frequently made by persons of discrimina- 
tion, judgment, and taste, who are frequently familiar with ag.o 
those aesthetic experiences which do contain perceptual 
elements, such as experiences of any of the arts. The con- 
tention would be difficult to disprove here in any case, 
because we have not as yet discovered what the essentials 
of any aesthetic experience really are. One way out, it is 
true, would be possible, if valid. This would be to assert 
that whenever there occurs an (alleged) aesthetic experience . 
of the kind mentioned there are present also perceptual and 
imaginal elements. 
Of course neither mathematical proofs as such nor moral 
character can be literally objects of perception, actual or 
imagined. They can only be conceived. But in `figuring them 
out' to ourselves, as the phrase goes, we picture them, and 
may it not be our pictures which are aesthetically ex- 
perienced? A mathematical proof is actually expressed in 
symbols, and though the symbols themselves, as mere marks 
or noises, need not be aesthetically satisfying, the symbols, 
as expressive of meaning, may be/4s expressive, e.g., of q/ 
pleasing conceptual unity, symmetry, coherence. Again, 
we do, metaphorically, think of a character as `well - 
balanced', or `rounded'. May it not be this imaginal 
embodiment rather than any system of concepts which is 
judged `beautiful'? 
This is possible ; and if it is always so there is no difficulty. 
But it is sometimes contended that systems of pure dis- 
embodied concepts may be apprehended aesthetically. 
What are we to say to this? 
Speaking purely for myself, I cannot claim to have 
experienced more than a certain limited amount of satis -'_ 
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faction in such things. Whether the- satisfaction that some 
mathematicians claim to experience ought to be called 
aesthetic or not I do not know. It may be that there isjhere , 3 
or there confusion because of the common elements of 
structure in the two cases, the structure being (wrongly, as 
I should argue) identified with the `beauty' instead of being 
taken (as I should urge) to be expressive of values. But all 
this at the present stage is rather uncertain, and it seems 
clear enough that we have no positive right to deny here 
that such experiences may be `aesthetic', and may be 
experienced as intensely as a Shakespearean play, or a 
symphony by Beethoven. The Prince Consort used to say 
that a mathematical proof affected him in the same way 
as a movement in a piece of music. And Mr. Russell speaks 
somewhere, I think, of the rapture of pure mathematics, 
which is a kind of escape from the imperfections of ordinary 
life. In similar phrases Schopenhauer writes of aesthetic 
experience. 
But whilst it would be dogmatic to deny that there can be 
aesthetic experiences which contain no sensuous or imaginal 
element, I shall content myself in this book with exploring 
those aesthetic experiences which do contain, as an integral 
a." / 
7 
part of them, perception or imagination, or both. Aesthetic 
k..viy,1 to,' experience without perceptual parts to its content may 
certainly exist, but without the life of perception the vast 
bulk of what is called aesthetic experience would vanish into 
emptiness. Of the arts, not a vestige would be left, and of the 
beauty of nature but a small fragment.' 
"Poetry is not written ", said Mallarmé,I "with ideas;. / 
it is written with words." In a purple passage Mr. Santayana 
writes :3 "The Parthenon not in marble, the king's crown 
not of gold, and the stars not of fire, would be, feeble and 
prosaic things." "Nor would Samarcand be anything but 
/Quoted from Lytton Strachey's Introduction to Ryland's Words and 
Poetry. 3 The Sense of Beauty, p. 78. 
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for the mystery of the desert and the picturesqueness of 
caravans, nor would an argosy be poetic if the sea had no 
voices and no foam, the winds and oars no resistance, and 
the rudder and the sheets no pull." 
If, then, we are to concern ourselves with the aesthetic 
experience, which is at least a perceptual or imaginal 
experience, we may proceed to ask, What of its specific 
differences? (We have already said that there are differences 
-that the term `aesthetic' is not to be taken here as identical 
with `perceptual' or `imaginal'.) Let us, for brevity's sake, 
concentrate on the differences between aesthetic experience 
and ordinary perception, leaving out of the picture for the 
time being the .imaginal side (which is secondary) . 
IV. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, AND EXISTENCE OR REALITY 
Two closely connected ways in which aesthetic experience 
is distinguished from ordinary perception stand out. The 
first (a) concerns our interest in the relation of what we 
perceive aesthetically, to existence or reality,2 and the second 
(b) concerns its relation to our practical needs and interests.3 
(a) In aesthetic experience we are not interested in the 
relation of what we perceive to any independent reality 
or existence outside what we are perceiving. In aesthetic 
experience the distinction between existence and non- 
existence in this sense, between reality and non -reality, 
does not in fact arise for us. We are interested in what 
appears. We are interested in the Macbeth or the Wolsey 
or the Hamlet of the plays: aesthetically we do not care a rap 
whether or not any of them actually existed outside the 
plays. Ordinary perception, on the other hand, is contact 
with a ragged -edged fragment of the world, which is con- 
2 The Sense of Beauty, p. 68. 2 Here taken as identical. 
3 These distinctions are the familiar impedimenta of aesthetics, and were 
stressed by Kant, who also held that aesthetic judgment is not concerned 
with concepts, 
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tinually implying things outside itself. The tree which we 
ordinarily see is a `real' tree which is causally connected 
with a world which, in time and space, stretches far beyond 
our perceptions. The tree seen aesthetically is an appearance, / 
interesting in itself, anrin its own way perfectly complete. ,:j / A 
Bosanquet writes : "Man is not civilise dll,``aesthetically, till he j!l 
has learnt to value the semblance above the reality." It is 
true that he adds "It (the semblance) is, indeed, as we 
shall see, in one sense the higher reality -the soul and life 
of things, what they are in themselves."' The meaning 
contained in such a proviso is indeed important; for aesthetic - 
experience does, as we shall see,' give rise to claims - 
perhaps justified -of insight of a special kind into the most 
`real' kind of reality. Nevertheless, the original statement, 
that aesthetic experience is not concerned with the `reality' 
of objects' outside the circle of present experience, holds 
good. If aesthetic experience does in any sense `reveal' 
reality, it reveals it `out of itself' as it were, and not through 
its pointing to an existence beyond itself. The realm of 
aesthetic experience is a kind of self -contained world of its 
own : what it reveals is enough. If these statements sound 
obscure, let them stand now. They will trouble us often 
44,1 enough. 04.14 
V. AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AS CONTEMPLATIVE L' 
e' 
a 4.4 
The second point (b) is closely connected with the first. 
It is that in aesthetic perception we are primarily spectators, 
and that our spectatorship is not coloured by the needs of 
practical action as is ordinary perception. Our ordinary 
perception of the external world is of a world in which we 
have to act, and perceptual interest in things is interest 
conditioned by that need to act. IFn a sense I am in ordinary 
lifeithe spectator of a tree, it is as something I must avoid 
when I walk along. Aesthetic experience in large part takes 
Three Lectures on Aesthetic, p. io. 2 See below, pp .14 flixyp 
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over the highly qualified world presented to it through 
ordinary perception, but it adopts a new attitude to the 
world, the common world of trees and fields, of solid, hard, 
coloured, resonant objects, of spatio -temporal relations. It 
stops to contemplate it. 
Now to say this is not, in the first place, to say anything 
which tells us very much about aesthetic experience. For 
there are contemplative experiences which are non-aesthetic. 
We may contemplate philosophically, or scientifically; we 
may even (perhaps) contemplate `practically', i.e. in the 
sense of having some practical result ultimately, though not 
immediately, in view. We do this, for example, when we 
spend time in simply looking at 'a puzzle before attempting 
to touch it. But none of these kinds of contemplation is, as 
such, aesthetic. Once again, as before, we have to be very 
qualified in our statements, and -t say that aesthetic ex- 
perience is at least contemplative: and it becomes incumbent 
upon us to state the difference between `aesthetic' contem- 
plation and other kinds of contemplation. In the second 
place, it must be observed that in saying.: that aesthetic (or 
any other) experience is contemplative, we are not saying 
that it is a merely passive experience, that it excludes 
activity. Certainly contemplation involves activity of both 
body and mind. What is meant, negatively, by contempla- 
tiveness is that our activities are directed rather to appre- 
hension of an object than to adjustment of ourselves to it 
or of it to us. The tree interests us as an object in itself, not 
as something to be steered past or to be cut down. 
What then differentiates aesthetic contemplation from 
other kinds of contemplation? The . difference may be 
indicated very roughly by pointing out that in aesthetic, 
as distinct from other kinds of contemplation, the object is 
so regarded that the very arrangement of the perceptual 
data as we apprehend them seems in itself to embody some 
valuable meaning, something the apprehension of which 
moves, interests, excites us. The full significance -both for 
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experience and for theory-of this special kind of attitude 
can of course only be understood when we are familiar 
with, and when we comprehend, the whole of the aesthetic 
attitude. It is the basis of that which we call aesthetic 
`imagination'. I At present we can only proceed haltingly,( I' 
by using negatives and by simply pointing to the experience 
itself. The negations have already been used ; aesthetic 
contemplation is not sustained by scientific, nor by philosophic 
interests. We do not contemplate aesthetically in order to 
solve theoretic problems. Nor is it sustained by practical 
and biological interests. "Biologically speaking, art is a 
blasphemy. We were given our eyes to see things, not to 
look at them. "2 And, positively, we can point to approxi- 
mations to the contemplative aesthetic experience itself by 
instancing certair familiar and striking experiences. What 
happens when, suddenly and unexpectedly, we see the real 
world reflected pictorially in a convex mirror, or when, as 
we stand on the brow of a hill, the mist suddenly lifts and 
we see the country below us flat yet three- dimensional as in 
a picture, or when, perhaps in search of new sensations, 
we stand on our heads and see a new and fascinating world - 
what happens at these times is something at least very like 
an aesthetic experience. In such moods we contemplate, for 
the sheer interest of what they seem to say to us, the sensuous 
and formal characters of what we see. And this contem- 
plativeness, with its positive and negative characteristics, 
thus illustrated from the visual sphere, seems to be an 
adjective of all aesthetic apprehension. 
We have just said that in visual aesthetic experience we 
contemplate, "for the sheer interest of what they seem to 
say to us, the sensuous and formal qualities of what we see ". 
"Of what they seem to say to us." In aesthetic seeing there is 
already more than seeing : in what is seen there is meaning 
of a very special kind. Aesthetic seeing is, in other words, 
' Which is, as has been said, distinct from mere imaging. 
= Roger Fry, Vision and Design, p.47. Chatto & Windus. 
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the kind of seeing which is called imaginative seeing. This 
special quality of `imaginativeness', properly understood, 
contains perhaps the most important differentia of all between 
aesthetic and other experiences. But, once again, its full 
meaning cannot possibly be conveyed in a few sentences, for 
it is the very life itself of aesthetic experience. We must, 
however, attempt to describe briefly the first conditions of 
imaginative aesthetic apprehension. 
Aesthetic experience is perception, but something more. 
On the one hand, we apprehend the perceptual data ; we 
listen to the sounds in their relations, we apprehend the 
coloured shapes - lines, planes, and solids -and our interest 
in them is not, as we have said, interest in them as existing 
things, it is interest in appearance. On the other hand, our 
interest is interest in appearance for the sake of a meaning, 
a significance, a value, which . could not be contained 
literally in a mere sesuans- appearance, but must in somei 
sense transcend it. , what is presented Qu As 0im0 
to us in perception is an essential part of the whole content, 
and if we lose sight of it the aesthetic experience dissolves. 
It is essential that our attention should not wander by 
a process of mere free association to other objects or 
experiences which the perceptual objects may suggest, 
though this is not to say that association may not play an 
important part in aesthetic experience. If, on looking at a 
picture, our minds are led away from the picture into some 
pleasant memory which it suggests, if, on listening to a 
symphony, we allow our thoughts to wander from the music, 
to indulge in pretty pictorial fancies, we .may be sure our 
experience has, for the time being, and thus far, ceased to 
be a purely aesthetic one. As Bosanquet might put it, our 
`feelings' must be relevant to the perceived object. On the 
other hand, the arranged forms of the picture or the statue 
or the music are for our minds more than merely arrange- 
rnents. of perceived patterns. For one reason or for another, 
for reasons which we shall have to - discuss in the chapters 
42 A STUDY 'IN AESTHETICS 
which follow, the perceptual data have come to `embody' 
valuable meanings : pictures and statues and symphonies 
yield a delight and a pleasure which is certainly in part 
sensuous, but is never only so. It is certainly for pleasure or 
enjoyment of a sort that we go to picture galleries or concert 
halls, or to the theatre to see great tragedies. But no aesthetic . 
theory which identifies such satisfaction with the mere 
sense -pleasure of a perception could be worthy of con- 
sideration. Such a theory might account -though in fact it 
is almost certain that it does not -for the `aesthetic pleasure' 
in simple colour- or sound -combinations. But a theory of 
aesthetic experience must also account for those aesthetic 
experiences which seem to shake the very foundations of 
our being. The temple is a pile of stones, the symphony a 
conglomeration of sounds, the dance a set of movements. 
But these possess meanings for aesthetic contemplation 
which it is beyond words to describe. It is beyond words to 
describe them not merely because they may appear profound 
as life itself, but because they are in their essence untrans- 
latable, being just the embodied meanings of stones, sounds, 
movements. To understand the nature of this embodiment 
in its untranslatableness is to understand the essence of 
aesthetic. 
Mr. Clive Bell's well -known phrase "significant form 
if we may use it without committing ourselves to the whole 
of his interpretation of it- unites in conception the aspects 
of meaning and of perceived forms. It is just the function 
of what we call esthetic `imagination' or `imaginativeness' 
to unite,`hese aspe_sts? fiTh apprehension "What 
quality ", asks Mr. Bell,' `is shared by all objects that 
provoke our aesthetic emotions? What quality is common 
to Sta. Sophia, and the windows at Chartres, Mexican 
sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese carpets, Giotto's frescoes 
at Padua, and the masterpieces of Poussin, Piero della 
Francesca, and Cezanne? Only one answer seems possible- 
= Art, p. 8. Chatto & Windus. 
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significant form. In each, lines and colours combined in a 
particular way, certain forms and relations of forms stir 
our aesthetic emotions. These relations and combinations 
of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving forms, I call 
'Significant Form' ; and `Significant Form' is the one quality 
common to all works of visual art." And, we might add 
(reserving the right to interpret the phrase for ourselves), 
common to all works of art whatsoever. 
VI. PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, 
AND SOME PROBLEMS RAISED 
We may now suggest a provisional definition of aesthetic 
experience. 
When an object of perception- whether actual or 
QeQ imagina perception or both -is contemplated `imagina- 
tively', that is, so that it appears in its very qualities and 
forms to express or embody valuable meaning, and when 
that embodied meaning is enjoyed intrinsically, for its 
own sake, and not for its practical, or cognitive, or exis- 
tential implications, then the contemplation is `aesthetic' 
contemplation, and thels*a ect we may call an `aesthetic' H. 
object. // 
This provisional definition is intenti lly very general. t n. 
It is meant to include the minima as well as the maxima 
of aesthetic experience, the aesthetic apprehension of a 
colour or of a wild rose as well as the apprehension of, say, 
Bach's complete Goldberg variations. In the latter experience 
doubtless much more is required of imagination than in 
the former. In it, the demand for imaginative synthesis is 
immense. But the difference, it would appear, is one of 
degree rather than of kind, and our definition attempts td 
mark out what is essential in all aesthetic contemplation, 
though there is no attempt as yet to define accurately its 
constituents. 
Some of the issues which are raised by this general account 
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have already been touched upon. There are many others; 
it is impossible to allude to them all, but a few may be 
simply mentioned in order to show the complexity of our 
problem. 
In the first place, is our definition not too `subjective'? 
Does it not put the whole stress on our contemplation and 
none, or too little, on the object? Is the question of the 
`objectivity' of beauty thereby prejudiced? Shall we have 
to suppose that `beauty' is nothing .. . but the `imputation' 
of our own feelings? Is aesthetic experience discovery, or is it 
merely projection? In aesthetic experience have we to do 
merely with an appearance (to a mind) and with nothing 
more? What then happens to our `standards' of aesthetic 
taste? In the second place, a question is set by the first 
phrase of the definition. Can any object of perception be an 
aesthetic object, or is this true only of certain kinds of 
objects, i.e. `beautiful' objects? What is the relation of 
aesthetic experience, to beauty? And what is beauty? Again, 
it may be thought by some that we are in danger of laying 
too much emphasis upon the `imaginative' experiences, 
which may be suggested by what we perceive, and too little 
on pure sense or on pure form. Or, again, whence arises 
the extraordinary importance of aesthetic experience in the 
higher levels of human life? Again, do we make no distinc- 
tion between art and nature? And what of the ugly, the 
comic, the sublime? Can these be classed as aesthetic 
experiences? Do they fall within the range of our definition? 
Again, more generally, what of the `unity of variety', which 
is so often taken to be the criterion of the aesthetic object? 
Further, is the aesthetic experience an `esoteric' and 
`aristocratic' experience? Something which isolates us from 
the rest of the common world? Something which lifts us 
to a heaven of pure bliss? Is aesthetic experience sui generis? 
Or is it just a special kind of `ordinary' experience? And, 
finally lour most random list, and-Het-the least important, 
how does the phenomenon of aesthetic `meaning' take place? 
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What is aesthetic `embodiment' or `expression', and what is 
its difference, if any, from other kinds of ̀ expression' ? 
These are a few of the problems which arise more directly - 
or more indirectly -out of our provisional account. Many 
others, we may be quite certain, lurk horribly in the back- 
ground. On some or all of them we must touch in what 
follows, upon some lightly, upon some more firmly, upon 
some, it is to be feared, even heavily. 
Let us begin by discussing the term `expression'. 
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I. SOME COMMON USES OF THE TERM `EXPRESSION' 
The term `expression' is used in many senses, some of them 
extremely vague. I do not propose to attempt the tedious 
task of trying to enumerate them all. But we may notice 
a few of them in order better to understand what is the 
special characteristic of `aesthetic' expression. 
We may begin by following Croce in excluding from fur- 
ther consideration such use, or abuse, of the term `expression' 
as is exemplified when we speak of the effect being an 
`expression' of its cause.= To speak of the falling barometer 
as the `expression' of humidity in the atmosphere, or the 
height of the Exchange as the `expression' of the depreciation 
o currency, is not specially illuminating or helpful, and the 
meaning is probably much better expressed in causal terms. 
Again, to speak of fever as the `expression' of the state of the 
blood is an unnecessary circumlocution. In this case there 
is perhaps slightly more reason in the use, because the 
fever -heal, as tested by means of a thermometer, is the ex- 
ternal manifestation of a state of the blood inside the body - 
although if we argue in this way we ought to say that the 
falling barometer too is an external and physical sign of 
something which is not directly apparent in the `outside' 
world. But these are both trivial instances. 
The term `expression' means, literally, a `pressing' or 
`squeezing out'. But in any sense at . all relevant to our 
discussion it is obvious that the phrase must be accepted not 
literally but merely as a vivid metaphor, and even then 
a metaphor to be used with caution, a metaphor perhaps 
to be rejected in the end as dangerous. Expression, we shall 
argue, implies `embodiment' of some sort in a `body'. This 
is the `out' aspect. And in some sense something other than 
the `body' must be `embodied'. This will represent roughly 
what is `squeezed out'. The `squeezing' part of the metaphor 
must be taken with a very large dose of reserve indeed. 
I See Croce, Aesthetics, p. 95. . 
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But taking the metaphor for the little that it is worth, and 
for no more, one kind of what which is embodied or revealed 
in the outside world will be stà.tes of mind. The kind of 
thing of which Darwin writes in his The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals provides a good instance with 
which to begin. We can say, without entering at the moment 
into the question of the biological function of bodily expres- 
sion of emotion, tl:at bodily attitudes and movements do, 
in some sense, `express' emotions. A man in danger of 
death from the horns of a bull screams and runs, or he 
remains transfixed with terror. His screams, his running, 
or his trarixation, in some sense `express' his emotional 
state. Similarly the blush expresses shame or embarrassment, 
clenched fists, anger /and so on. Tnere may be causal efficacy 
at work, but there is expression as well -in the sense that 
the outer states reveaVto us the inner ones. 
There is another sense in which `expression' is used, a 
sense which is not exclusive of the last, but which refers to 
a different aspect of the matter. I mean the use of the term 
`expression' when it means release of some inner4(mental 
or bodily or both )Cten lionJby means of external behaviour. 
When I become irritable through overwork (or underwork), 
or if inhibitions prevent normal release of some impulse, 
I may act explosively. I may `express' myself by strong 
language or hard exercise or unjustifiable abuse, according 
to my temperament. Or, when feeling perplexed, I may, 
if I am a lady, and am like the love- embarrassed young 
lady of Bitester (or one of the young ladies), get great relief 
by slapping my sister. We `express' and so `get rid of' dis- 
turbing feelings. This, as we have just said, is not an entirely 
new sense but partly overlaps the first, though it stresses 
a rnew aspect of it. 
A further development of the same thing is that sort of 
expression which is carried out for the satisfaction of some 
conscious desire. Thus if I am anxious about the derivation 
of a word, and go and look it up, my activity is `expressive', 
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in the sense that it is an external process (involving of course 
more) which satisfies my desire to know. This is again in 
common currency, and it is, again, not exclusive of the, 
other senses. Only it refers primarily, not to the revelation 
of an inner state, nor to the relatively haphazard relief of 
a tension, but to the more consciously rational satisf g 414 Pg's 
of a desire. 
A still more advanced and developed type of expression 
is so- called self -expression, i.e. where an action or set of 
actions is clearly regarded not only as the satisfying of a 
profound desire, but as somehow also embodying or 
externalising a self. In its simplest forms this `self -expression' 
may be little more than satisfaction of self -display /which 
may show itself in crud gestures or in the production of 
crude monuments which have no very intimate or subtle 
relation to the self which is expressed, though they serve 
to draw attention to that self. An example of the latter would 
be the gifting of an expensive and ornate public building 
with the name of the donor prominently inscribed. At the 
upper end of the scale of self -expression are those externalisa- 
,tions which bear both striking and subtle relation to the self.` j( 
Thus the self is said to be `expressed' in moral conduct, or 
in the making of a garden or a house, or in the practice of 
an artflike dancing. The term `self -expression" is of course 
vague!; there are values other than values of the self expressed. 
But for the moment we are concerned with current usages 
rather than with definitions. 
(A special case, something akin to this last use of ̀ expres- 
sion', would be the ` Einfühlung' or `Empathy' of mental and 
bodily states in an object. In aesthetic experience our mental 
and bodily states, it is sometimes said, in some sense seem 
to `get into' the object (and therefore to get out of us into 
the object). The symphony is `tender', `strong', `tense', 
`excited'. How far this is true or ne - we shall inquire in 17 
the next chapter. 
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II. EXPRESSION AND AESTHETIC EXPRESSION. PLAN 
There are some senses in which the term `expression' is used. 
Are ter-- ss-- senae_n£t -aesthetic expressions, or does 
the definition of the aesthetic require to take into account 
other and different factors? On one theory, the theory of 
Croce, the expressions on which we have been speaking are 
not truly expressions ; I for Croce the only true kind of 
expression, the only expression there is, is aesthetic expres- 
sion, anc#4ice are for him not aesthetic expressions (and are 
therefore not expressions at all). 
This is partly a matter of terminology, and partly not. 
We may agree or disagree with much of Croce's theory and 
with much of his terminology : in point of terminology it 
seems to me more convenient to include as expressions those. 
`expressions' in the popular sense to which we have referred. 
But that is a minor matter. What is not a minor matter is 
that aesthetic expressions may be (among other things) 
expressions in a finer, in a subtler, in a more accurate - 
though also in a less literal and in a more imaginative-. 
sense than, say, an `expression' which is a mere relief of 
tension or the mere satisfaction of some desire. I shall argue, 
in fact, that it is so. But to justify this we must describe, as 
clearly as we can at this stage, what aesthetic expression, 
really is, and what are its necessary conditions. Let us try 
to do this, still confining ourselves for the present mainly to 
the consideration of examples of bodily manifestations, as 
these are more literally and less disputably `expressions' in 
the general sense of the worccthan are the objects perceived 
as outside the body (say, shapes and colours and sounds) 
with which developed aesthetic expression has so much to do.. 
To these we shall return in the chapters which follow. 
What, then, are the characteristics of aesthetic expression 
the knowledge of which enables us to differentiate `bodily 
I Aesthetic, Ainslie's translation, pp. 95 -96. 
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expressions' /which are `aesthetic', from bodily expressionsi . 
which are not? There would appear to be two main problems_ 
involved. The first problem (a) really includes several . 
closely allied ones. It includes the problem of the general 
conditions of aesthetic experience, of the meanings which 
the mind brings to its perception of objects, and of the, 
relation of these meanings to the perceived object. The 
second problem (b) concerns the fitness of the characters 
possessed (literally) by the perceived object to suggest to 
mind a harmonious system of meanings w o 
we call beautiful. In both these problems there is (c) a fun- 
damental question involved, namely, How do perceived 
objects comekto appear to convey to mincrat allrneanings yw 
which they do not literally in themselves possess? How 
do colours appear 'cheerful'? How does music appear 
`yearning'? 
To the second and third of these problems I shall return 
in the chapters which follow. The first group of problems 
is our main concern now. And the discussion of them will 
consist, not in the discovery of any new aesthetic principle, 
but in the development of the provisional account of, 
aesthetic experience which has been given in Chapter £ì - 1_ 
This is what we should expect, for the difference between 7 
a non -aesthetic object and an /aesthetic object( depends 
primarily = on the presence of imaginative activity in 
relation to the latter. So, bodily expressions being, as such, 
aesthetically neutral, what is required primarily to give.. 
them aesthetic character is some relation of them to aesthetic. 
imagination. This is the differentia of aesthetic expression 
for which we are looking, and it is no new thing. Let us 
now try to put it .a little less bluntly and more finely, by . 
going over and developing our original provisional definition 
of aesthetic experience.z We said there in effect that in 
Not exclusively, as I have just said. The perceived object also must.. 
fulfil certain conditions in order to satisfy. But this for the present I am 
ignoring, in order to concentrate on the primary and fundamental fact 
of imaginativeness. _ Above, p. 
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_order that . _ _ s 
must be contemplated imaginatively 
for its own sake, '- must be contemplated imaginatively as 
an embodiment or expression, and that the embodiment is 
embodiment of valuable meaning. Let us consider further 
the three main notions : (I) the object apprehended in 
aesthetic experience, (2) imaginative contemplation, (3) embodi- 
ment of value. 
III. THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
(I) In aesthetic perception what is the object contemplated? 
The answer is, a perceived- object -appearing -to /express- 
4r- embody -a- somewhat (to be specified later) . The 
hyphenation is important. The aesthetic 'object is not a 
mere perceived object on the one hand, nor is it a disem- 
bodied somewhat on the other. It is a union of both : the 
what appears as inseparable from itstbodÿ Thus there is 
a contrast between aesthetic expression and the other 
`expressions' of which we have spoken. In these other 
expressions the body side is cognised as being in external 
relation to the what which is `expressed'. Sometimes, it is 
true, there is, in these cases, a very intimate connection 
between the nature of the body side and the nature of the 
what which is `expressed'. The instinctive expression of the 
emotions of anger and fear, for example, are - callyrevealing 
manifestations of inner states of body and mind. In this we 
approximate to the kind of expression which may be called 
`functional' expression, which is clearly related to what is 
often known as `functional beauty'. To a discussion of this, 
and of `natural' expression and so- called `natural' beauty, 
we shall return later.' Sometimes, on the other hand, there 
is not much connection between the what and its body, or 
at least not much connection immediately obvious. There is 
little obvious connection,, between the slapping of her 
' See below5 and also 3 g'7Q',F 
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sister and the perplexity of the lady of Bicester, nor is there 
much between my action of turning the leaves of a dictionary 
and my mental curiosity. But whether there is intimate con- 
nection or not, it cannot truly be said that in the manner 
in which we ordinarily and in practical frame of mind 
contemplate such `expressions we really imagine and 
enjoy the what as if it were actually there in the body. The 
expressions are ordinarily taken as signs, anddsigns only. 
That is why there is some point in the position which 
denies the name of true expression to anything but aesthetic 
expression. For, in aesthetic experience, we do imagine the 
/_what_to be there. Aesthetic experience is experience of an . 
aesthetic object, and the aesthetic object is a true embodied 
unity, consideration of which things are, as we shall see later, 
of importance. The aesthetic object is an imagined unity 
of a what, or content, and akbodyt in the entity we call 
concretely an `embodiment'. We simply cannot, as we shall 
see, regard the what apart from the body without changing 
the nature of the what: and for the same reason the embodied 
what did not of course exist before the embodiment. 
IV. IMAGINATIVE CONTEMPLATION 
(2) In aesthetic experience the aesthetic object (or what 
be called the aesthetic `unit') is imaginatively contem- 
platedyndis enjoyed for its own sake and not for the sake 
of an'"éxtiinsice. By saying that the aesthetic unit is 
imaginatively contemplated I mean simply, as I have just 
said, that we apprehend embodiment as embodying in its 
very qualities and forms(valuable) meaning. But the point 
now is that we contemplate, and take pleasure in our contem- 
plation. This imaginative contemplation takes us a step 
higher than the biological level: it may be called `hyper - 
biological'. A truly instinctive expression, as of anger or 
fear, is not `ccónterelated' either .the agent or by the 
animal spectator, e.g. by the victim of the anger. The 
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victim is afraid : the aggressor acts, spontaneously. But 
with human beings a different situation may arise. The small 
boy stamps his foot with rage : a little later, perhaps, he 
becomes interested in, notices, and enjoys his action ; he 
contemplates it, finds it an enjoyable expression, and 
repeats it- probably with modifications. His expression 
begins to aim at higher standards for itself.= The first stamp 
is instinctive, the second has the seeds of an aesthetic 
expression in it. So the instinctive jump for joy may be 
repeated deliberately (again probably with modifications), 
and may later become the basis of an aesthetic activity, 
namely, the dance. Again, man may build, or he may sing, 
from instinct or from instinct modified by imaginative 
contemplation and enjoyment. Hear Shelley : "A child at 
play by itself will express its delight by its voice and motions ; 
and every inflexion of tone and every gesture will bear 
`exact relation to a corresponding antitype in the pleasur- 
able impressions which awakened it. It will be the reflected 
image of that impression. And as the lyre trembles and 
sounds after the wind has died away, so the child seeks, by 
prolonging in its voice and motions, the duration of the 
effect, to prolong also a consciousness of the cause. In 
relation to the objects which delight a. child, these expressions 
are what poetry is to higher objects. "2 
The aesthetic unit is contemplated, and is enjoyed for its 
own sake. It is felt to be valuable in itself, apart from any 
external factors : it is not aesthetically valued (to repeat) 
because it increases knowledge or has practical results, or 
even because it may communicate valuable experiences 
from one person to another -though the latter desire may 
often enter into acts of expression, and has indeed been 
made by some the central motive of expression.3 
I See below, p.'bcv,, tjf/ 
2 Defence of Poetry. ` . 
3 See below, p. /0141/ 
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The fact that the aesthetic object is at once an object of 
interest and is yet apprehended `disinterestedly' (as it is 
sometimes, unfortunately, put) and the importance of a c/i,[e, 
due balancing of these two factors /was -eITFes.s.e.1., a good 1, I 
many years ago, by Mr. Edward Bullough, in the term 
`psychical distance'. `Psychical distance' implies a certain 
"'projection" of the contents of subjective experience I- 
into the objective world. The contents are no longer felt j 
as merely part of personal, subjective life, but are contem- 
plated as objective. We become detached, as it were, and ¡ 1 
in this way are able to appreciate lit aesthetically, although, 
if the detachment be overdone, and the "distance" be too 
great, the subject is not able to come in contact with its 
object and to experience it. For aesthetic experience there 
is one correct `distance', and only one, for each person and yj 
each thing. To quote Mr. Bullough :2 "Distance is produced `e 
in the first instance by putting the phenomenon, so to speak, 
out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to 
stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends - 
in short, by looking at it `objectively', as it has often been 
called ; by permitting only such reactions on our part as 
emphasise the `objective' features of the experience, and by 
interpreting even our `subjective' affections not as modes of 
our being, but rather as characteristics of the phenomenon." 
`Distance ", Mr. Bullough thinks, is both a factor in art 
and an aesthetic principle- indeed, he inclines to regard 
it as the most important and fundamental principle of 
aesthetics, 
The conception must be acknowledged as valuable and 
important. It does not seem to me to have the all- importance 
The phrase I use is full of confusion, but the context makes clear,. 
I think, what is meant, namely, bodily and mental contents. 
British journal of Psychology, V, 94._ 
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which Mr. Bullough gives to it, or to be, in itself, the basis 
of a comprehensive account of aesthetic experience. And 
when Mr. Bullough says that there is only one correct 
distance for each person and each thing, and that this 
occurs where there is "the utmost decrease of Distance 
without its disappearance ", I his statement, I think, should 
be accepted with reservation. It is probable that there is 
not merely one distance which is correct, but that `correct' 
distance may lie anywhere between certain limits of nearness 
and farness. The guess might be hazarded tha in what is 
called `classical' art and the `classical' attitude the distance ,L ) 
tends to be greater, whilst in the art-and t e attitude - 
we call `romantic't tends to be lesser. It is possible, I think, 1 
that Mr. Bullough's account can be made to cover this 
provision. ( "There is one correct distance for each person and . 
each thing. ") But it seems wise to state the theory in relative 
rather than in absolute terms It is perfectly safe to say 0 
that aesthetic experience ceas when the distance is either 
too great or too small. If we content ourselves with this, the 
metaphor of distance is useful and helpful.2 
' British Journal of Psychology, V, gq.. 
2 The extreme difficulty of achieving the `right' psychical distance is 
illustrated in experimental work by Bullough and others on `types' of 
apprehension. Four `types' are distinguished. They are (i) the "objective" 
type; (ii) the "physiological" or, better, the "intra- subjective" type; 
(iii) the "associative" type; and (iv) the "character" type. These were 
discovered by Bullough through experiments on the appreciation of 
simple colours and colour combinations,'.b t were a4ee. confirmed in two 
sets of experiments, one by C. S. Myers and C. W. Valentine on individual 
attitudes towards tones, * the other, by Myers, on individual differences 
in listening to music.t The classification, of its kind, seems to be fairly 
fundamental. The objective type (i) involves an impersonal, intellectual, 
critical attitude towards the object, and bases appreciation upon, e.g., the 
purity, saturation, luminosity, etc., of colours, the roundness or the 
blending properties of tones, or the technical devices and qualities of 
music. The physiological or intra- subjective type (ii) bases appreciation __ 
upon the personal mood and the organic modifications involved. The 
associative type (iii) emphasises the power of the object to call up 
* British Journal of Psychology, VII, 68 ff. t Ibid., XIiI, 52 ff. 
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VI. THE DIFFICULTY OF `DISTANCING' SOME BODILY SENSA 
Let me illustrate the importance of recognising `distance' 
as a factor in aesthetic experience by citing a criticism 
which Mr. W. T. Stace makes/in a book entitled The Meaning h 
associations or memory- images of past experiences. The character 
type (iv) predicates moods or characters, e.g. cheerfulness or sadness, 
of the object (as opposed to the physiological type, which thinks of 
colours and tones as `cheering' or `saddening'). 
Only one of these types is, according to Bullough, properly aesthetic 
at all, in the sense of being properly `distanced'. This is the `character' 
type. Bullough ranges the types according to their aesthetic importance 
as follows, dividing the `associative' type into two sub -classes : (a) char- 
acter, (b) fused* association, (c) objective, (d) non -fused association, 
(e) physiological or intra- subjective type. In this classification (b) may 
in fact often be identical with (a), as, e.g., when yellow -green associated 
with envy comes to mean envy. But it is very difficult to range the 
others in order, for they are not types of aesthetic apprehension at all 
and are chiefly useful in showing what aesthetic apprehension is not. 
If we confine ourselves here to the single characteristic of `distance', / j,( 
(c) is far too distant, and (e) is not distant enough; (d) is outside the pale ^ / 7. of consideration.!`! 
` 40.44/ Such experiments are, of course, full of snares: The above may 
represent types of apprehension, but they do not stand necessarily for 
types of persons, `aesthetic' and `non -aesthetic'. Types (c) to (e) may 
represent stages on the road to aesthetic apprehension. Or they may 
represent temporary moods. Or the subject's report may be misleading 
and for more reasons than one. To be more specific, the intra- subjective 
type may really be simply an earlier stage of the character type : e.g. we 
feel cheerful or sad, but have not reached the stage of projecting our mood 
into the object. Or perhaps, not being in aesthetic frame of mind, we 
simply recognise the cheerfulness or sadness as being caused by the 
object. Or our reason may step in and restrain us from the palpable 
absurdity of saying that inanimate things possess moods. It was found 
in the experiments that the physiological type did, in fact, approach to 
the character type, and that the subject sometimes found it difficult to 
say ex post facto whether the colour was `cheering' or `cheerful'. His 
judgment might depend upon whether he, the subject (and he might be, 
on general grounds, an `aesthetic' person), was thinking truly 'aestheti- 
cally' or was trying to justify his experience intellectually. In esthetic 
experience the object may, without raising any problem appear 
* For a discussion of gé rireevf,füsióíi; see below.glssi 
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of Beauty,' upon theories like Professor Alexander's, 2 which 
base art upon an instinct. Alexander argues that the exercise 
and ' enjoyment of the instinct of construction for its own 
'ake is aesthetic. Mr. Stace disputes the contention that 
exercise and enjoyment, for its own sake, of an instinctive 
-activity can constitute the differentia of the aesthetic. 
He cites the instance of the exerciseefor its own sake, of 4? I 
the sexual instinct, especially when employing methods of 
contraception. He argues that such activity is not, in itself, 
aesthetic. Neither, it may be inferred, is construction 
exercised and enjoyed for its own sake necessarily aesthetic. 
But sexual activity3 at 4eae+ (I shall not discuss con- 
struction here) -.mar fail to be aesthetically expressive in 
part at least because one important condition is not fulfilled, 
the condition, namely, that the perceived object must be 
contemplated as an object, so that its objective characteristics 
are apprehended by the imaginative mind as expressive. 
This condition ity not be easy to fulfil in the case of 
an activity such as that of sex, regarded as an activity 
yielding simply sense -satisfaction. And what is true of sex 
would be true in general of those other bodily sensa (such as 
those of toothache or of smelling) which are so `near' to the 
experiencing of them that it is only by a determined effort 
that we distinguish between our experiencing and its con - 
literally to have the most curious qualities ; but it is difficult sometimes to 
make this sound rational afterwards. Finally, the most aesthetic persons, 
e.g. artists, are interested in technical questions, in the relative `values' 
of colour, in composition, execution, etc. Myers indeed found* that the 
most musical persons were also the most critical, making many technical 
observations. This is perfectly natural, and does not in the least imply 
that such persons are non- ̀ aesthetic'.4311t -ait these things show that the 
usefulness of such classifications is strictly limited. 
Op. cit., p. 35. 2 In Art and Instinct. 
s- This is, of course, very different from active sex -love, which involves a 
very complex attitude to the body- and -mind of a person, in which the 
sensuous sex- element is fused with a much larger whole of non -sensuous 
content. 
* British journal of Psychology, XIII, 58. 
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tent. It may be difficult in such cases to escape from the 
defects of membership of the ` Intra- subjective'= Type. In 
addition to this, such sensa may possess, even when, with 
some effort, they are contemplated, extremely little structure 
or form which can be contemplated as expressive. It would, 
however, be the former reason rather than the latter which 
would tend to cut them out from the realm of possible . 
aesthetic objects. It is important to say this because some 
writers 2, do tend to exclude from aesthetic experience, 
because they are `formless', all sensa, those in terms of which 
We perceive the world external to the body as well as those 
in terms of which we are aware of our own bodies. They 
say that only forms, and not sensa, such as colours and sounds, 
can be apprehended aesthetically. But it seems to be the 
case, first, that completely formless sensa are non -existent, 
and second (what is more important) that the sensuous 
aspect of objects may in itself ,yield distinct aesthetic 
experience, though in the higher types form is probably` 
always the more important factor. The reason, therefore, 
that sexual activity is difficult to conceive of as an aesthetic 
object is its frequent lack of distance rather than its frequent' 
relative `formlessness'. 
T e statements about sex -activity, however, cal-1-'6111Y, 
be appr 'mately true, can only express tendencies. In the 
first place, s ual experience does not merely contain bodily' 
sensa as its obi ts. It is perception, not mere sensation.' 
Bodily sensa are also tities in terms of which outer forms -' 
the bodily forms of the partner in the sex- relationship -are 
discriminated. The sensa . iate information about an' 
object whose forms ,and qualitie may be expressive, like 
anything else. Again, if we are to ac :.t the testimonies of 
á writer such as D. H. Lawrence, for exa' ' .le, we shall see 
that it is not only not impossible that physic ex- activity 
itse]ÿhould both be contemplated as an object, b V . at it 
elf can possess great intricacy of form as a highly corn -x 
= See above, footnote, p. -eer Sb -b See below, p.-ee6" 
44p 1P 
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object. I ditions exist in any given case, t . s no 
reason in the world al a ' ' ou d not, as án 
Object, be richly ex. ' - of bodi y _ That it can 
express of er than bodily ones is not here in ci t ati,Qn.) 
VII. EMBODIMENT OF VALUE 
(3) The aesthetic unit is an embodiment of value. There 
is an obvious and verbal sense in which it is `embodiment of 
value'. I.e. it is embodiment which is of value, which 
possesses value (of some kind) for'.us. But the aesthetic 
object is an embodiment of value in a much more significant 
sense, a consideration of which raises important aesthetic 
problems, though in a simple form. The embodiment of 
value in the aesthetic object is of such a nature that the 
value `embodied' in the perceived object or `body' is not 
literally situated in `the body'. The `joy' expressed in music 
is not literally in the succession of sounds. The perceived 
object appears to imagination to express values, so that the 
values seem to emanate from the perceived object which 
somehow appears to contain them. The music appears in 
itself to contain joy. To imagination there is fusion of value - 
meanings with a perceived object, and if fusion breaks down, 
the aesthetic object or embodiment disintegrates. But the 
value- meanings, once again, are not literally in the perceived 
object, so that in some sense the values must be conceivable 
as distinct from their body. E.g. a dancer may experience 
the values of a particular joyyor tenderness, or conflict, /1 
and may then be said (in some crude, inaccurate sense) to 
express or embody such joy or tenderness or conflict in a 
dance. Our problem in the chapters which follow will be 
to hold these two sides of the problPYYI together, to discover 
what is meant by saying (inaccurately and incompletely) 
that a distinct or independent or `free' value is embodied, 
whilst keeping in mind that freedom and embodiment are 
antithetical notions. 
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VIII. FORECAST OF THE THEORY OF VALUE TO BE ADOPTED 
The what which is imagihàtively- fused into 'embodiment is; 
we have been saying, a Value or values: I' do not at this 
point propose to discuss the general nature of value; "'which - 
is embodied'. that will form the main topic óf Chapter Five.' 
But it may possibly save misunde tánding if I state quite 
baldly, and 'without defeüeë ̀or justification,'' that the theory 
of value which is-implies is One -which 'i{iakes value in °'its 
essential nature quite objective to experiencing mind, to 
cognition, to desire, to .enjoyment. _Ii31;aesthetic experience 
we are in fact always concerned with the experience -of- 
value, and not with'tsbíiceivable values out of `all relation 
to appreciating mind. But cognition, desire., and feeling 
must be regarded as falling On the side 'öf valuation, and 
not of value. The view of va'hie d itself which I- shall 0 
will be the view that value is the fulfilment or'the'frustration 
of tendency; diad'o 'the most important' kinds of which` is 
'teleological tendency; fúlfilment being positiVe,. "frttstration 
negative, rue. 4 'shall treat Trfáiñly, -and unless otherwise A-7 
stated, of positive value; änd shall,-if the context requires it, \ ¡ 
indicate its nature thus : válúe `t.£'; `-t.f.' standing for fr" 
tendency fulfilment. Teleology will regarded as some- 
thing which -does'jnót in its essence imply conscioúsness, at 
any rate finite constióúsness. Anti two exemplifications of 
teleology (and' therefore of value) which-will' be fouiid' td be 
of great, though not of exclusive4mportance in Milian life 
and aesthetic experienc % will be : the ' valúes" (z) of our own 
bodies and (b) of our minds. Finally, it may be noted that 
the fulfilments and frustrations of -one bodies and our minds 
take place always in , whose tendency - 
fulfilling- or "frustratirïg- objeëts äì-e òftén nnr fiêctively, and 
mistakenly, :. e - . To put 
' Some readei may prefer at this juncture to read the parts of Chapter 
v ` 
bj 
V concerned ith the definition ofvatüe.'` 2-See -4,e ^ 
eC-Q el ,Ars 
sZ 
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it otherwise, teleological tendencies frequently (though not 
always) require definite and clear -cut objects in order that 
they may be fulfilled. Tendency to eat requires food, 
tendency to maintain normal temperature of the body 
requires warmth and exercise, tendency to think requires 
problems, and so on. These I shall call the `terminal 
objects' (symbolised by '0')I of value. And `terminal 
objects' of values are often wrongly taken to be valuate- -:z' 
in themselves. We think, for example, of the food or the 
warmth as einpterrneives good or valuable, 14.'La-di-4 ; "4-4- 
IX. PROBLEMS OF THE SUCCEEDING CHAPTERS. A WARNING 
Having touched upon the three important notions (cited 
on p.,96), we may now pass on to state the problem of the 
next chapters. We have taken it that, broadly speaking, 
any object perceived `imaginatively'1 is an aesthetic object. 
This, though true as far as it goes, is not a complete statement. 
for not any existing perceived object is, as it stands, fully 
aesthetically satisfying or beautiful. It may require alterations 
-omissions, selections, additions, unification -before it can 
satisfy the critical aesthetic precipient. This question, that 
of the construction cf beautiful wholes, we shall return to 
in Chapter ( . Leaving it on one side for the time being, 
let us now concentrate on the other question (raised on 
p. oo), the question, How do perceived objects comet .Ato 
appear to convey to min(at all /meanings which they do 
not themselves literally possess? Tl his general question will 
include problems of the expressiveness of sense data and of 
forms, and of the direct and indirect ways through which 
the expressiveness may take place. Our general question 
then is (to repeat), How do perceived characters come to 
appear to possess, for aesthetic imagination, qualities which. 
To use the symbol -TA: would involve confusion with the `1' of 
T,F. 
Ìv 
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as bare perceived facts they do not possess? How does 
body, a non -mental object, come to 'embody' or `express'; 
for our aesthetic imagination; values- which it does not 
literally contain at all? Why should colours and shapes and 
patterns, sounds and harmonies and rhythms, come to mean 
so very much more than they are? 
In this chapter we have confined ourselves 4a.aiailafr as far 
as possible, and for reasons . stated,: to the consideration of 
examples, of those perceived objects which are `expressions' 
(in the ordinary, accepted, rióre general sense), in' the 
material of our own bodies, to bodily manifestations of the 
emotions, to gestures, to facial expression, and so on. But 
it would not fairly present our problem were we to confine 
ourselves to these. For they form rather a special case, 
and the question, How does `body' cone to `embody'. 
{etz can be met by a special answer, the answer, namely, 
that our bodies express fuñclionalt our inner states of body 
and mind. As Darwin showed, the external 'manifestations 
of emotion have an intimate biological relation to the needs 
of the organism in certain situations. So that; when we 
apprehend aesthetically a gest`üre or a facial expression of 
anger, we are apprehending something in which the value - 
content is in .xl fact in a most special' relation to the 
`body'. Our aesthetic experience is not made any the less 
`aesthetic' thereby, . for / we imaginatively apprehend the 
content as `in' . the body, 4 its being already (in some 
merely approximate sense). `there' does not detract from the 
aesthetic quality of our experience of it. Yet is but one 
special case, and we must cast our net mo widely. We 
must consider cases in which there is no such functional 
relation of body to content, cases like the colours and sounds 
and the patterns of these which are perceived as existing in 
a world external to living and functioning bodies. These 
things form a large part of the materials of the `arts'. 
In making this exploration it will be convenient to 
distinguish between two aspects of perceived objects, (a) their 
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sensuous aspects (e.g. colours, sounds, smells), and (b) their 
formal aspects (e.g. lines, volumes, melodies, harmonies). 
We shall, further, consider main ways in which (a) and 
(b) come to appear as expressive, (i) by their direct effects 
upon us, and (2) by the effects of association,w clime 
r 1 I II 
And 'uattw i' a -pr a (I) (a) and (b) will form the 
main subject of the next chapter, and (2) and -Eg} (a) and (b) 
of the chapter which follows. 
This is the planXwe shall adopt. But it is necessary to 
issue a warning. When4art of the plan has been completed, 
we shall only have been discussing some of the principles 
involved in the simplest sorts of aesthetic apprehension 
which in themselves do not possess a very high significance. 
There may be aesthetic quality in a curve or an autumn 
colour, or even in the sweetness of a St. Martin's wind. 
But, generally speaking, it is only when such data form part 
of more complex unities (as in a landscape or a work of art) 
that they become really important. The supplement to the 
next two chapters, therefore, can only be found in the later 
part of the book. And it will be necessary to remember 
that when sense data or forms do become parts of larger 
complexes their meaning becomes transformed thereby. Al- 
though, then, we must, of necessity, take our investigation 
step by step, let us not assume that a full and complete 
understanding of aesthetic principles is possible without an 
understanding of aesthetic objects and aesthetic experience 
in their fullness and their completeness. 
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I. NARROWER AND WIDER USES OF THE TERM `EXPRESSION' 
IN AESTHETICS 
We have, so far, considered some main general principles 
of aesthetic expression. Our aim in this chapter will be to 
try to understand one way in which the two aspects of all 
perceived objects, namely, their sensuous, and their formal, 
characters, can come to appear as aesthetically expressive. 
There appear to be sever- al-pessibe ways in which aesthetic 
expression may come into being, in which `body' may come 
to `embody' aesthetically valuable meaning. The first, which 
I have labelled the `direct' way, we shall consider here. It 
arises through the `direct' effect upon us of sensa and forms. 
I wish to make it clear that I am using the terms 'expres- 
sion' and `expressive' inclusively, to apply both to sensa and 
to forms, and to modes of expression which arise `directly', 
as well as those which arise `indirectly' or through associa- 
tion. This is the more necessary because some writers use the 
term `expression' in a more, others in a less, inclusive sense. 
Bosanquet and Croce, so different in many ways, belong, 
I think, to the former category. Writers whose preoccupation 
is with the actual processes of art and the production of art 
forms, writers like Mr. Roger Fry and Mr. Clive Bell, 
,least tend to attach too little importance to the sensuous 
element= and to the effects of association. Their emphasis 
tends to be upon pure fornand upon what they conceive 
form in itself immediately expresses to the competent 
spectator. 
is seen in the common use of 
the term `expression' as referring, not to `direct' formal 
or sensuous appeal, but to associations, or to the meaning 
of the subject- matter which a work of art is supposed to 
be `about'. Thus, a work of art is said to be `expressive' 
if it derives its appeal from extra -aesthetic sources. Mere 
`illustrative' painting or mere `Programme' music would 
= See below, p. 
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be examples of this. Mr. Santayana,= although he must not 
be held guilty of the baser crimes involved in this kind of 
usage, uses the term `expressive' to apply only to the appeal 
through association. For Mr. Santayana neither sense data 
nor forms can be expressive, for `expression' is wholly a 
function of association. We get thus in his scheme three 
distinct kinds of beauty/ material or sensuous beauty, formal 
beauty, and expressive (associative) beauty. This is partly a 
matter of words : "It would be pedantic, perhaps, anywhere 
but in a treatise on aesthetics to deny [to simple sensa and 
forms] the name of expression ; we might commonly say 
-that the circle has one expression and the oval another. 
But what does the circle express except circularity, and the 
oval except the nature of the ellipse? Such expression 
expresses nothing: it is really impression. "z It is, however, 
as it happens in this case, not merely a verbal matter. For 
it is something of a question whether Santayana does not 
in part vitiate his treatment of beauty by his separations 
of the three elements, although he does to some extent 
provide his own corrective at the end of his book. Again, 
his limited use of the term `expression' seems to me to arise 
from an inadequate analysis of the conception. These criti- 
cisms are, of course, mere dogmatism, and to be accepted aka 
would need the proof which I cannot here explicitly offer. 
My main point is simply to assert, as against Santayana 
and any others, an inclusive use of the term `expression', 
to assert, for example, that circles and ovals (as well as 
colours and sounds and tunes and harmonies) can in them- ,c 
/ 
, J 
selves appear as expressive, and that association is only 
one a fi4o.:.g_a n1ur° ;- processes which account for ex- 
pression. If the implications of this be kept in mind, there 
will be no antithesis between `formalism' and `expres- 
sionism' as theories. For form as such will be `expressive'. 
In The Sense of Beauty. _ Ibid., p. 84. 
3 On this see Mrs. Katharine Gilbert's excellent. essay, Studies in Recent 
Aesthetic, p. 116 sq. 
,-°----- 
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In actual practice, no doubt, sensa always imply forms and 
vice versa, and aesthetic effectsLare complicated, not only, "" 
by association, but, as we have already said, by relations of 
parts to the meanings of larger and more complex wholes. 
With these important facts continually in mind we are now 
committed to examining the aesthetic values of the parts- 
or, if preferred, the elements, which themselves are inade- 
quate, imperfect, and not very significant, little wholes. Let 
us begin with sensa. 
4r`ytc'J 
II. WHETHER SENSA CAN-POSSESS AESTHETIC SIGNIFICANCE 
We must first be clear that sensa do play a real part in 
aesthetic experience. This has been denied by `formalists' 
like Mr. Fry and. Mr. Bell. "Our emotional reactions ", says 
Mr. Fry,' "are not, I say, about sensations. This may at 
first sight appear paradoxical because the arts seem to be 
peculiarly preoccupied with agreeable sensations, with 
relatively pure colours and pure sounds. But it is not difficult 
to see that, however valuable a predisposing and accompany- 
ing condition of aesthetic apprehension such agreeably pure 
sensations may be, they are not essential, nor have we any 
difficulty in distinguishing between our response to sensa- 
tions and our response to works of art." Or again,2 "in 
literature there is no immediately sensual pleasure what - 
ever." In Mr. Bell one finds similar attacks on colour.3 
"Colour in itself ", he says, "has little or no significance. 
The mere juxtaposition of tones moves us hardly at all. As 
colourists themselves are fond of saying, `it is the quantities 
that count'. It is not by his mixing and choosing, but by the 
shapes of his colours and the combinations of those shapes, 
that we recognise the colourist. Colour becomes significant 
only when it becomes form. "4 The same kind of arguments 
might be applied, pari passu, to sounds. 
"Some Questions in Aesthetics ", in Transformations, p. 3. Chatto & 
Windus. - a Ibid., p. 4. 
3 E.g. Art, p. 237. Chatto & Windus. 4 Ibid., p. 236. 
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Now the school to which these two distinguished writers.. 
belong has been remarkable for the way in which it has 
shown, not only in the theory, but in the. practice of art, . 
how such a sensum as colour can become vitally expressive 
of plastic form. But Mr. Fry and Mr. Bell do, it seems to me, 
in their preoccupation with the plastic importance of 
colour, fall into the mistake of underrat ng the sensuous, . 
and the aesthetic, value of colour. Mr. Fry, speaking of 
sounds, says= that in most works of art agreeable sensations 
form the texture of the work, but that it does not follow 
from this that agreeable sensations are necessary, because, 
in modern work, sounds harsh and disgreeable in themselves 
may enter into the texture of what is pronounced aesthetically .
agreeable as a whole. There are, however, several fallacies 
here. Mr. Fry's argument is that relations transform the 
effects of disagreeable sounds and that it is their relations 
which make them aesthetic. We may agree to the first 
chart, that relations transform the effect of sounds in them- 
selves. And we may agree that the transforming effect of 
relations gives new aesthetic meaning. But we go too far if 
we suppose that because `relations' are important the `terms' 
have no importance, and therefore that sounds do not really 
contribute' to aesthetic experience. Again, Mr. Fry seems 
to imply that sensations (or sensa as philosophers to -day 
call them) cannot themselves be aesthetic because disagree -, 
able sensations may form the material of works of art. Thus 
the individual colours which Monet uses to build up his 
aesthetic effects may be disagreeable, though the whole 
gives aesthetic satisfaction. Mr. Fry appears to assume that 
`disagreeable' and `aesthetic' are mutually contradictory. 
This is very questionable ; and even if it were true, it would . 
still only show, what we have agreed upon, that relations 
do transform, and that in some cases the whole of the aesthetic 
effect is due to the relations, and none to the terms.. But to 
this we have, very definitely, not agreed. It is simply impos- 
t Transformations, p. 4. 
rim Az.1-/ 
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sible to separate terms and relations in this way, and to say 
that everything is due to mere relations. If colours and 
sounds in relation can be aesthetic, the colours and sounds 
are still real factors having real effects, though in relation 
and not in themselves. To deny the existence of the effects 
of sensa in a work of art, as Mr. Fry does when he says that 
there is no immediate sensual (sensuous) pleasure (aesthetic 
appeal) in literature, is surely the plainest falsehood. In 
poetry the speaking of a beautiful voice is not merely "a 
favourable predisposing condition" ;= it is a real and essential 
part of the effect. 
Our concern now is not with sensa as parts of larger 
wholes, but with sensa regarded as far as possible in them- 
selves : and we have been trying to remove an a priori 
objection to their being considered as aesthetic objects at all. 
III. THE RELATIVE AESTHETIC IMPORTANCE OF THE VISUAL 
' AND THE AUDITORY AS COMPARED WITH OTHER SENSA 
It is possible to range sensa on a kind of scale, having at 
one end of it those sensa, such as colours and sounds, which 
are clearly and indisputably objective to and distinct from 
the sensing of them, and having at the other end sensa such 
as organic sensa, which are easily confused with the sensing 
of them. I am not suggesting that the latter are in fact 
indistinguishable, but only that it is more difficult in practice 
to distinguish, e.g. between the ache of a tooth or a muscle - 
joint- tendon strain, and the experiencing of it, than it 's 
to distinguish between a colour and the seeing of it. Jn O 
such a scale sensa such as those of smelling, tasting, and 
touching, would occupy an intermediate and somewhat 
ambiguous position. 
As in developed aesthetic experience the discrimination 
of form plays such an important part, it is natural and right 
that the objects of the two `senses' whose discrimination of 
= Transformations, p. 5. 
Ior-7.:4000-""-. 
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form is most highly evolved, namely, vision and hearing,' 
should receive in aesthetic practice and aesthetic writings - 
the lion's share of attention. But the aesthetic importance of 
vision and hearing is due also to another fact, hinted at in 
the last chapter, the fact that sights and sounds (and their 
relations) can most readily be contemplated as objects. That, 
we said, is an essential condition of all aesthetic experience. 
But whilst this is true, and whilst it is the case that visual 
and auditory sensa are the entities in terms of which visual 
and auditory forms are apprehended, and visual and 
auditory forms are of almost supreme importance in art, 
it does not follow that visual and auditory sensa are the 
only ones which can yield aesthetic experience. It is e ly .7a ^^ 
that visual and auditory sensa are much more easily contem- 
plated, and that the forms and patterns they assume are 
far richer, more complex, more subtle, than those, say, of 
tasting and smelling. It is a matter of degree. Tastes and 
smells, or organic sensa, are certainly more difficult to 
contemplate objectively. They may be pleasurable, but it 
is not easy to apprehend them as expressing meaning. And 
of course the forms and patterns which they can assume, even 
to a,n epicure in sensations, are immeasurably poorer than 
those of colours and sounds. And so the possibility of their 
expressing meanings is correspondingly less. With these 
provisions let us follow common custom, and concentrate on 
the visual and the auditory. 
IV. THE CO RELATIVITY OF SENSA AND FORMS 
We are now concerned with visual and auditory sensa 
regarded in themselves, and as far as possible uncompli- 
cated by relations to complex aesthetic wholes, or to formal 
Touch is in a peculiar position. It is immensely important in coming to 
know the external world, and has therefore probably more significance 
at that stage, e.g. in the case of children or blind persons. Normally it 
acts more as an adjunct of visual apprehension, through tactual imagery. 
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/actors. This latter state of affairs is, of course, impossible 
to find in fact because of the correlativity of matter and 
form. Suppose we take as our sensum a single long -drawn 
note of a flute, or a single patch of colour. In one sense these 
are not `forms', but of course they have form. In the first 
place each is one ; it.. has the form of unity. Again, the 
lengthening out of the note in time, is form, and that form 
may introduce an element of expressiveness distinct from 
that belonging to the sound itself. Or, penetrating into the 
quality of the sound itself, we may apprehend form in the 
timbre of the note, or perhaps in its loudness or its pitch. 
It is difficult to say how far form can directly be discerned 
here, for of course we are biased through the possession of 
/ extxia e3- extra -aesthetic knowledg7 When we allege that' 
the apprehension of a difference,, say, between a note of the 
same pitch played by a flute and by a clarinet is the ,( / 
apprehension of a difference between the form or structure 
of the two 'notes,. we may be importing some such extra- 
aesthetic knowledge into our experience. But probably not, 
so far as the broader differences are concerned. We seem to 
hear some of their formal, differences, e.g. a greater `reediness' 
of tone in one as compared with the other. So, again, a loud 
note appears, to have some audible' vibratory differences 
from a soft one, or a low note from a high one. Butto come 
i back) however simple -or complex -it be, the note has 
always the form of unity. 
Perhaps sounds with their timbre, pitch, and volume are 
more complex than colours. It appears, anyhow, easier to 
discern formal differences between sounds than is the case 
with colours. Colours, if they are different, seem to be 
different in an indefinable qualitative way. Each finest shade 
of difference is a colour difference. These differences may of 
course be conditioned by forms : colours are spread out 
upon surfaces the variation of which may affect the tone, the 
' Using `audible' in its comprehensive sense. 
2 I am speakirn popularly. 
7,77' -.sarm"°'" 
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saturation, the intensity. The luminosity and the `textures' 
of colours are dependent upon the forms of surfaces. But 
the sheer indefinable qualitative differences of colours -of 
violet from orange, of red from green -bulk possibly more 
largely in the total colour experience than do the sheer 
indefinable qualitative differences of sounds. This, if it is 
true, may be due to the biological history of the development 
of the ear. (Possibly it is not true.) 
However these things may be, in both cases there is a 
residuum of sheer irreducible qualitative differences between 
different sensa, and it is this with which we are concerned. 
V. THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SOUNDS AND COLOURS 
The physiological effects of sounds and colours are interesting. 
I should be guilty of irrelevance were I to enter into a dis- 
cussion of them -apart from the question of my competence 
to do so. It is with what sounds and colours may mean to us, 
rather than, with their physiological effects and the processes 
by which they come to be perceived, that we are concerned. 
But it is interesting, nevertheless, and quite important for 
aesthetics, to remember that sounds and colours do have 
physiological effects, and that our aesthetic experience of 
them .' be due in part to this. 
The organic effect of sound is said to be more remarkable 
than that . of colour : this has been explained in terms of 
biology, with which, however, we need not concern our- 
selves. The fact is also cited that the development of the 
auditory functions was a differentiation out of the primitive 
`shake- organ'. These `shake -organs', whose function was to 
re- establish equilibrium by means of reflexes, divided later 
into two organs, the organ of hearing, or the cochlea, and 
the organ of equilibrium, or the semi -circular canals. It is 
' also pointed out that, "anatomically, the auditory nerve 
not only goes to those parts of the brain whence the motor 
inervation emanates, and to the reflex centres in "fhb. 
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cerebellum, but passes close by the vague or pneumo- gastric 
nerve, which rules the heart and the vaso -motor functions. 
We have, then, it is suggested, multiplied reasons for the 
singular effect of sound on motor reactions, and on the other 
organic functions which have so much to do with feeling 
and emotion. Every sound -stimulus is, therefore, much more 
than sound- sensation. It causes reflex contractions in the 
whole muscular system ; it sets up some sort of cardiac and 
vascular excitation."' Whether all these inferences are 
true or not there is little doubt about the stirring effects of 
noises and sounds -upon us over and above their mere 
sensuous quality. Possibly then effects are greater than those 
of visual stimuli. "We dance to sound rather than to the 
waving of a baton or rhythmical flashes of light." z The 
great emotive effect of sounds may conceivably be the 
fact upon which the Greeks based the judgment (to us 
difficult to accept) that their music was the highest of all 
their arts. 
But colours, too, have their direct physiological effects. 
Some of the stimulating or depressing effects of certain 
colours may be due to associations, but others are certainly 
not. Some colours in themselves awaken, as everyone 
knows, spontaneous signs of interest in the young child, or 
the young animal. Again, it is not possible to explain the 
exciting influence of red by reference to association. Valen- 
tine3 cites the case of a man blind from the time of his 
birth to the time when a cataract was removed. To this 
A. s man red was immediately pleasing, whilst yellow made 
him feel exceedingly sick. We must agree that here no 
association could possibly explain the matter. Again, the 
stimulating effect of colours on human beings can be tested 
by such instruments as the pneumograph and the sphygmo- 
graph. By means of these and other instruments it is found 
that, just as a high or a loud note is more stimulating than 
+ogee Puffer, Psychology of Beauty, p.l. e. 1., p. ¡6g. 
3 Experimental Psychology of Beauy, p. 12. 
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a low or a soft one, so colours at the `warm' end of the 
spectrum are most stimulating.= The undoubted effects of 
sheer colour, especially on some persons, is proved . by the 
fact that it has been thought worth while to construct an 
instrument called the `colour -organ' with a keyboard by 
means of which `chords' of colour are `played' upon a screen 
consisting of folds of soft material. The effects are said to 
be impressive. Some of them, no doubt, are due to the 
forms, the rhythms, the flowing shapes and patterns which 
the colours assume in being `played'. But the sheer stimulus 
of the colours no doubt plays an important part. 
VI. EXAMPLES OF THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF SIMPLE SOUNDS 
AND COLOURS 
The physiological effects of sounds and colours are facts' 
about which the experts can tell us a great many interesting 
things. Our business, however, is ' not with these facts as 
such, but with the further question whether sounds and 
colours can be apprehended as aesthetically expressive, and 
if so, how? First, the fact. Do sounds and colours appear 
as expressive? 
It seems quite certain that they do. The apprehension of 
sounds and colours may be, of course, just the apprehension 
of facts, as when in our ordinary practical frame of mind 
we hear the door -belle ring, or see the table as a brown 
patch against the background of a yellow and red carpet 
and cream walls. But sometimes the apprehension of sounds 
and colours involves the apprehension of more than this ; 
it.involves the apprehension of values. 
Take sounds first. -Sounds may appear as `cheerful', 
`melancholy', `steadfast', `eerie', `pathetic', `sad'. In our 
experience they do indubitably appear sometimes to 
`express' these qualities, which we may summarily designate, 
= Experimental Psychology of Beauty, p. i3. 
2 A door -bell can be terribly expressive ! 
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as `values'. They speak to us. The trumpet has a martial 
quality, 
"The trumpet's loud clangour 
Excites us to arms." 
The drum has the emotive quality of thunder, the flute, 
"The soft complaining flute 
In dying notes discovers 
The woes of hopeless lovers, L 
Whose dirge is whispered by the warbling Mute." 
'The notes of the clarinet hesitate with an appealing pathos, 
the French horn is a buffoon. And so on. 
As sounds `speak', so in their own ways do colours. 
Orange may appear to express high- spiritedness, good cheer, 
blatancy; blue, simplicity, restfulness, or reserve; green is 
fresh and naïvely cheerful ; red is alluring. It has been 
suggested' that the peculiar rather unpleasant character 
which some (certainly not all) pink sometimes appears to 
possess may be due to its suggestion of pretence. Here is a 
colour which seems to be trying to be pretty, and yet is too 
feeble to support its claim. Or it may appear feeble because 
pink is red watered down. 
VII. Two REMARKS 
About these illustrations of the apparent `expressiveness' of 
sounds and colours two remarks may be made. One is 
that the effects of association will always be present and 
that they will contribute to the value which the sounds and , 
colours appear to have. In the ear. of pink this may be ""'7' 
very clearly so. We may associate pink with sentimental 
persons, with their dresses and .t] it decorations and their/4:7 
chocolate boxes. And the very notion of pretence itself is an j 
imported one. Again, as the lines just quoted from Dryden 
show, the expressive qualities which sounds appear to 
By Mrs. Gilbert, Studies in Recent Aesthetic, p. 164. 
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possess are normally enriched by a cluster of associations. 
The trumpet and the drum have martial associations. Yet, 
though in fact these associations always do come into play 
in our apprehension of colours and sounds, it is certain that 
there is a residue of non -associative meaning. It is indeed 
probable that in many cases the colours and sounds have 
come to possess the associations through their intrinsic 
suggestiveness rather than by the reverse process. Their 
effects cannot be entirely due to association. A certain kind 
of crude pink comes to have vulgar associations because 
something in pinkness itself jars upon 'us, jars probably 
upon our organisms. The trumpet and the drum come tb 
have martial associations because their quality, as appre- 
hended through our organisms, suggests in itself `martial'' 
meaning. 
The other remark which may be made is that the values 
which these entities appear to express cannot properly be 
described in the crude words we use in pointing them out. 
The meaning which appears to be expressed must be taken 
in its relation to the sense datum. In relation its character is 
modified. If pink is `feeble' or `vulgar', it is not feebleness or 
vulgarity in general, but `pinky- feeble' and `pinky- vulgar'. 
Or if violet or blue expresses delicacy or mystery, it is not 
delicacy or mystery apart from blue, but `blue -mystery' or 
`violet- mystery'. Again, the `martial' value of the trumpet 
and the drum must be imagined as embodied in the sounds. 
VIII. How EXPRESSION OCCURS 
The fact that sounds and colours, appear to possess these . 
and other values is, then, an indubitable fact' of experience. 
How does this come about? We know that in themselves the 
colours and sounds literally possess none of these qualities. 
How do they come to appear to possess them? 
The answer is simple but important. First, when we say 
that the colours and sounds literally possess none of the 
c6-rN,;-.4-J 
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values cited, we are thinking of colours and sounds as bare 
distinguishable data of cognition. If our minds simply 
-apprehended--and did nothing else -it is highly probable 
that sounds and colours could never come to appear to 
possess valuable meaning at all. But sounds and colours, 
though they can be regarded by an abstraction as data of asien, are really, to our concrete experience, much 
more. Or, at least, they can be more. They an please us, 
i4 ti they can beco the terminal objects (t.o.Yof values t.f.: iic/iA 
in our own bodiA trumpet- or flute -sound, or a powder- 
blue-these are facts, but they can become, just because of 
their qualities, and the stimulation by their qualities of 
successful functioning in our organisms, sources, or at least 
causes, of value- experience.Springy green can act as a tonic. ' 
And further, sounds and colours, though they are the data of 
auditory and visual sense- organs, involve more than auditory 
and visual process. They involve, i a l cIe e, other á 
processes and other sensa, kinaesthetic and organic/ These 
other processes likewise may be stimulated and fulfilled 
(or they may be thwarted). Not only the special sense -organs, 
but the whole body, may be soothed or stirred. We may 
experience a general sense of well- being, or of joie de vivre. 
So that what appears at first sight to be the apprehension 
of a bare sound or colour turns out to be the enjoyment of 
, the enjoyment arising 
from the experience of the sensory and organic processes 
involved. 
The enjoyment arises from the experience of the sensory 
and organic processes involved. The fulfilment of these 
processes is, according to the theory I am assuming, the 
true value (t.f.), the sounds and colours being merely (a%4., 
1 L pb 14600Z ` 
C 
3/At any rate, when they are intense or prolonged, or apprehended with 
some interest. It may be that there are no kinaesthetic sensations, and 
perhaps no organic ones, when .a colour is flashed for an instant on a 
screen. But such cases, having little if any aesthetic value, hardly interest 
us here. 
,A4. cd- li- r ILL. "-÷4-4 . 
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causes, terminal objects (o). But we are not, normally, in 
aesthetic experience thinking about our bodies, but rather 
about the sounds and the colours. These are, in perception, 
taken as existing in the world external to the body. Now, 
though these objects are, in the sense just stated, but causes 
of the occurrence in us of values, we do not, aesthetically, 
regard them as causes, but as themselves `expressing' values. 
Our question is, How do the values get there? The only 
possible answer can be that we put them there -in imagina 
l 
tion. They are not reperly apprehended as belonging to ce. 
the organism. The focus of interest is in the external object, 
and to the external object they become imputed. Likewise 
their hedonic effects upon us, though they belong, analytically 
and abstractly regarded, to the subject- and not to the 
object -side, are in aesthetic experience apprehended to 
some extent as if they were hedonic properties of the/ 
external thing.. In other words, not only the terminal 
òbject of value, but value itself, appears in aesthetic 
experience to characterise the object. And not only value, 
but even some of flak a.14ies -ef valuatioi /It is no use saying. / /( i i 
prosaically that ,values cannot inhere in sound or colour :. / 
most philosophers would be ready to admit that. The point 
is that for aesthetic imagination they certainly do so. For 
the poet, the flowers do "paint the meadows with delight ".. 
Our moods become objectified. High- spiritedness, good 
cheer, blatancy, are imputed to the orange colouring. ;. 
simplicity, restfulness, or perhaps a shrinking reserve, to 
blue. When our blood is stirred and we feel martial, we . 
call the trumpet's note martial. For the queer shivers it 
gives us, we say that the flute `complains' ; or that it is 
unearthly. In cases of simple, even crude, aesthetic experience 
like those just mentioned, there may be a certain vacillation . 
in the imputation; Bullough's subjects, it will be remem- 
bered, sometimes found it difficult to say whether a colour 
(.or a note) was `cheering' or `cheerful'. There was a certain, 
instability as between the `character' and the `physiological' 
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types. But in more developed, more complete aesthetic 
experiences, where the interests are strongly felt, it is 
probable that the imputation is carried out with less un- 
certainty. To mature aesthetic imagination a complex of 
valuable meanings appears without effort as in the symphony 
or as in the picture. 
In all this it is, no doubt, easy to go too far. Because 
qualifications of our bodily and mental processes do appear 
to characterise objects outside the body, and because these 
external objects are, in such aesthetic experiences as we 
have been considering, the focus of our attention, we may 
be led mistakenly into thinking that awareness of our own 
bodies and minds vanishes, that we, as it were, hurl ourselves 
by main force (of imagination) at things. But consciousness 
of ourselves, `immediate experience', can neverLprobably 
disappear. It is a matter of degree and focus. We focus upon 
the external things, but the total content ikour function- 
ing- bodies- and -minds -in- relation -to- these- things. Imputation 
takes place, but we do not impute everything. We might say, 
in a metaphor, that things are coloureckby our relation to /74 i c 
them. But to this subject we shall return. 
rY 
IX. FORMS. THEIR COIRELATIVITY WITH QUALITIES i AND 
THEIR AESTHETIC IMPORTANCE 
We know that formless sense data are non- existent. In 
apprehending colours or tones we are always apprehending 
something which is a unity, .which is really a complex of 
such factors as tint, intensity, saturation, pitch, timbre, 
volume. Or, again, when we apprehend a patch of colour, . 
say the uniform blue sky, the very fact of its approximately 
equal stimulation of the different parts of the retina is a fact 
of form. It is homogeneity. Yet though form is never absent, 
there remains an irreducible residuum of immediately 
perceived qualities to which we can attend. 
An entirely analogous argument applies to forms. Form, 
/Z . 
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which is not the form of a matter, has no existence, for form 
is just arrangement, plan, structure, ()Is something. Yet form, 
like matter, can be distinguished; we can attend to the 
arrangement, plan, structure. In practice we can do this 
best where the sensuous interest is not too insistent. Thus 
spatial structure can best be apprehended where the colours 
are not too attractive, whilst structures of sounds are best 
apprehended when our attention is nöt diverted by the 
entrancing qualities of the tones. We apprehend the structure 
of an organ -fugue better if the `fancy' stops are avoided. 
Again, the strut re of a pure rhythm may be apprehended 
perhaps best by tapping of a stick /where the sounds have / 
a minimum of intrinsic interest. 
It is a question whether the expressiveness of forms 
`directly' (or apart from association) is more potent than the 
expressiveness of simple colours and sounds. It is a fact, 
of course, that in our developed aesthetic experience of the 
arts, form is very important indeed, and whether or not it 
exceeds in importance the expressiveness of sense data, it is 
certainly more easily described. But we have to remember 
that sometimes the complication of forms involves also a' 
complication and enrichment of sensuous appeal. And 
further, the expressiveness of forms is, in fact, in a work of 
art, undoubtedly very much enhanced by acquired mean- 
ings through association. An+ Even with some effort, it is 
difficult to ignore this. If we confine ourselves to the expres- 
siveness of pure formit may be that forms have just as I) i 
little, perhaps less, significance, than have colours or sounds: 
On the other hand, rhythms and the structures of simple 
tunes probably possess more powerful appeal than the appeal' 
/ i of single sounds. But all this is not very important; it is a matter of experience, rather than/,principle. 
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X. REASONS FOR NOW TAKING THE EXPRESSIVENESS OF FORMS 
TOGETHER WITH THAT OF-SENSE -D trA Gra..44-'1 
I propose now, instead of treating of the expressiveness of 
pure forms apart from sensuous expressiveness, to treat of 
the expressiveness of forms together with the expressiveness 
of the sense. -which are bound up with the forms. 
Logically, perhaps, we ought to follow our previous pro- 
cedure and to consider first the expressiveness of pure 
form apart from sensiclata. But in aesthetic effect this 
amounts to so very little that it need only be mentioned. 
It may be possible, for example, on looking at a small 
object flashed for an instant on a screen to apprehend its 
shape with a minimum of sensuous experience. But this is, 
aesthetically, quite an unimportant case. In significant 
aesthetic experience the apprehension of spatial forms 
would seem always to involve a consid rable complexity 
of kinaesthetic and organic experience. It is doubtful, for 
example, whether the aesthetic value of a very small cameo 
carved on a ring would be very great if we saw it only for 
an instant. In the first place, such an object requires atten- 
tion and attention takes some time. Secondly, in taking 
time we explore the detail of the object, probably enlarging 
it imaginally, or fancying., ourselves extremely small, so 
that we can touch and move over its contours. And in the 
third place, its value will partly arise, in all probability, 
from its associative meaning. Its making involves skill and 
delicacy; it is small, and this arouses a certain tender 
emotion. And so on. All these factors are additional to the 
instantaneous visual apprehension of the form) So again, 
as regards auditory form, it is hard to conceive ofdir aesthetic 
experience which does not involve sensuous values in 
ad+clitin -te the =apprehension of structure. The appre- 
hension -even of the structures of rhythms and tunes has a 
-great sensuous "aloe which cannot be ignored. 
alizit 
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So, in treating of the aesthetic expressiveness of forms, we 
sensuous values. (We shall still try 
to exclude associations as far as possible.) It will also be of 
additional advantage now to include over again considera- 
tion of the expressiveness of sense. Metal because it will 
supplement what we had to say about sensuous expressiveness 
in the previous section. There, having to limit ourselves to 
the expressiveness of simple colours and sounds, we could 
not consider their fuller significance. This fuller significance 
is seen only in the concrete apprehension of forms. 
XI. EXAMPLES OF FORMAL EXPRESSIVENESS 
As before, let us begin with the facts. There is little doubt, 
I suppose, that visual and auditory forms can be expressive, 
though their `direct' expressiveness is always hard to name, 
and it is always impossible to escape from the effects of 
associations, _ r*, infantile ones. Still, it is possible, 
by an effort of abstraction, to discern some of them. On the 
visual side we have lines, planes, and solids. Straight lines 
express the `values' of directness, unwaveringness, what can 
only be called, in rather feeble language, rectilinear efficiency. 
Horizontal lines suggest -and not, I think, through associa- 
tion only -stability and balance ; vertical straight lines in 
a picture- or a landscape or a building suggest a different 
kind of stability. They do not rest upon anything along 
their length, but rise vigorously, containing the principle of 
their own stability. (I am thinking here, of course, mainly of 
lines bounding upstanding solids.) 
Curves possess expressiveness, both on account of their 
curvature, or, if delineated (and we allow `association' with 
the activity of delineation), on account of the varying 
thickness of the lines in which they are drawn. A line 
graduating from fine to thick may suggest vigour and 
vitality. Some curves suggest grace, or fluidity, or, again, 
vigour. Others suggest uncertainty and hesitation. When we 
Asco/- Aid 
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take into account the gesture- significance that lines may 
sometimes have, it explains some people's dislike of straight 
lines, whilst it also explains some of the pleasure we may 
get in curves. Lines appear to flow, and a pleasing trajectory 
is that of flowing,änd unstrained gesture. 
The significance of lines becomes altered when they are 
clearly regarded as boundaries of planes and solids. Planes 
and solids have aesthetic value which is certainly not 
reducible to the aesthetic value of their boundaries : this is 
a fact which is sometimes overlooked by some of the 
`Empathists'. In plane figures and solids our attention is 
properly directed upon these more inclusive wholes as 
wholes. Pure circles, ellipses, squares, rectangles, and the 
various polygons are not highly interesting forms, but they 
may certainly be expressive in a simple way. It is difficult, 
once again, to say what a circle or an ellipse expresses. 
The circle seems perhaps to possess a certain serenity and 
peace. It is the most perfect and self -contained whole, 
seeming in its very form to spring forth from its own centre. 
It is not thrilling, but it is in its limited way satisfying. 
The ellipse, again, is expressive of the value of a certain 
order, more interesting than the order of the circle, its 
circumference being an order of continuous and even - 
flowing change. More than this it is difficult to say. Again, 
four -squareness expresses the values of strength, stability, 
order, self -containedness. 
When the square becomes part of a three -dimensional 
cube we get, specially if it is a large cube, as in a building, 
a particularly satisfying shape of the simpler sort, returning 
equal for equal threefold. It has captured the imagination 
of the writer of Revelation. "And the city lieth foursquare, , 
and the length is as large as the breadth : and \he measured 
the city with the reed, twelve thousand furlongs. The 
length and the breadth and the height of it are equal."' 
The dimensions, again, of solids are most important material 
= Rev. xxi. 16. 
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in the work of the architect. Take away the plinth from 
your temple and it loses half its dignity of'ftect. The sheer 
size of the ancient monuments of Egypt expresses sublimity. 
The vast heights of the Gothic cathedral, their straight 
columns, - pointed arches, and complicated volumes of, 
dim -lit empty spaces -all these have their meanings to the 
aesthetic percipient. 
There is no need to go over the ground in the case of 
sound -forms. The simplest cases are perhaps those of 
rhythms and tunes. Compare the expressiveness of the 
rhythm of a dead march with that of "The Road to the 
Isles" or of a jazz tune. And compare "Nellie Bly" with the 
"Old Hundredth ", with "Rule Britannia ", with the opening 
melody in the second movement of Beethoven's "Fifth 
Symphony ". Rhythm, melody, counterpoint, harmony -to 
the expressiveness of forms of sound it is difficult to set limit. 
XII. How FORMAL EXPRESSION OCCURS. BRIEF STATEMENT 
AND CRITICISM OF `EMPATHY' 
These are the facts : once again we ask, How do these 
perceived objects come to appear expressive? The general 
answer we shall expect to be the same as that which was 
made about the expressiveness of sense data. But the subject 
has been given so much attention by the exponents of the 
theory called `Empathy' that we must devote a short space 
to considering one or two important aspects of this theory. 
The Theor o LEinfühlung (translated Empathy%,by Professor 
Titchene) applied by Lotze and Vischer to general 
aesthetics and by Lipps to psychology* is grounded in 
certain facts, or certain alleged facts, ofrception, princi- 
pally the facts of the motor -processes involved in perception) 
and of motor and tactual images. A stone or a steam -roller 
looks heavy. This fact is due partly to a revival of.t]ta.past b./ 
motor experience, partly to actual present motor attitudes, 
and partly to images of ourselves acting. Again, size is 
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apprehended by movements of the eye, by incipient .move- 
ments of hand and finger, leg, or the whole body, or by / 
images of these. In apprehending rhythm we tend to beat 
time, in watching the acrobat sway(we sway ourselves, in X J 1 
the excitement of watching a football match . we may 
clutch or kick our inoffensive neighbour. In general, excited 
perception involves as a rule both motor imagery and actual 
movements, or/ at least, if not overt movements, dispositions 
to move, shiftings of muscular tensions, and so on. That 
our motor attitudes do vary in varying circumstances can be 
substantiated by self -observation of the different attitudes 
we take up before different pictures, si when we move about q 
a picture gallery from picture to picture. Or we may com- 
pare our attitudes during different items in a concert /or 1 
as we suddenly shift our attention from, say, classical to 
baroque architecture. 
These are the facts on which empathy is based. The 
theory of empathy is that these activities of ours tend to be 
merged with the qualities of the perceived object: they are 
`felt into' the object. When, in looking at the column, it 
appears to `stand straight up', `to raise itself', to remain 
self -contained in erect tension, this is really a projection of 
my own muscular= experiences of tense upstanding. Or 
when the mountain appears to rise, this is an idea "started 
by the awareness of our own lifting or raising of our eyes, 
head or neck, and it is an idea containing the awareness of 
that lifting or raising"._ But it is more than this. This is 
"merely the nucleus to which gravitates our remembrance 
of all similar acts of raising or rising which we have ever 
accomplished or seen accomplished, raising-or rising not 
only of our eyes and head, but of every other part of our 
body which we have ever perceived to be rising. And not 
Merely the thought of past rising but the thought also of 
future rising." 3 
= Lipps indeed argued that it is mental ideas, and not muscular sera 
which are projected. But we need not go into this. 
z Vernon Lee, The Beautiful, p. 64. 3 Ibid. 
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So again in the apprehension of more complex forms, as, 
for example, the Gothic cathedral, the complexity of stresses "3 
and weightssand resisting supports and the systems of X /, 
line -directions is felt, it is said, because of our past and / 
present motor experiences and images. 
On the question whether there is a perception of one's 
own activities being projected, there appears to be some 
doubt. Karl Groos speaks as if we were conscious of our 
"inner mimicry". Lipps, on the other hand, contends that 
we have no sensation of muscular effort in aesthetic experience 
itself. On the whole, opinion seems to side with Lipps in this 
matter. Empathy, it is said, is not sympathy, or `feeling 
along with'. When we become athare of ourselves having 
motor and allied experiences, or when we discern any process . 
of projection, we have ceased to empathise. To this point 
we shall return. 
If ̀ empathy' simply means what we have called `imputa- 
tion then i t is an acceptable enough theory. But in fact 
`empathy' needs to be salted before being taken. For one 
thing the theory is too specialised ; it lays too much stress 
on the motor element in perçeption, and in two ways. 
In the first place, the empathists appear to assume often 
that movement is essential in all apprehension of form. 
But there is no sufficient reason, as has been suggested, for 
supposing that movement occurs in the instantaneous visual 
perception of a comparatively small sensum. This objection, 
however, is not important because, as we have seen, it 
hardly affects the aesthetic case/ ut even if it be granted /1/11' 
that in aesthetic experience movement is always present, 
surely, in the second place, visual objects are a little solider, 
a little steadier, than would appear from the writings of-a- )4 Ai '"444 l74.1%, tririrrlier...Like-Vernon Lee? Her world is a strange world, and 
it may be doubted whether her account of it is even 
authentic. For would not many of these movements of which 
she speaks contradict one another, making for aesthetic 
chaos and disunity? Of the far -off mountain we are told 
1-4414", 
- 
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that she sees "a narrow and pointed cone, perhaps a little 
.toppling to one side, of uniform hyacinth blue detaching itself 
from the clear evening sky, into which, from the paler 
misty blue of the plain, it rises, a mere bodiless shape. It 
rises. There is at present no doubt about its rising. It rises 
and keeps on rising, never stopping unless we stop looking 
at it. It rises and never has risen."' The lines strive, they 
endeavour, they arrive, they arrest each other. The whole 
business is "like the parabola of a steadily spurting foun- 
tain". Now there is no doubt that in some particularly 
vigorous moods parts of things may look like this, particu- 
larly if we interest ourselves in the direction of lines. But 
surely not every part? For then we should have aesthetic 
contradictions. And surely not always? And surely this is . 
not all? A steadilurting fountain is sometimes enter- 
taining, but may get tedious, and we turn to 
other things in art or nature with a sigh of relief. . The 
aesthetic value of the mountain is -is it not ? -considerably 
more complex than it would appear f m icing.. ,.....L 
hat are we to say, for example, of the 
value of its colour? Or of it associations? The importance of X 
motor elements would, in act, appear to vary very greatly 
from time to time. Compare, for example, the difference 
between our motor attitude to some of the Giotto frescoes 
in the Arena. Chapel at Padua/ with Michelangelo's i/,_ 
paintings on the roof of the Sistine Chapel, or with the 
`Discobolus' of Myron, or with the `Laocoön'. 
Again, although empathists admit the existence of 
images, the do not always realise two things, first their 
importance and second, the subservience of movements 
and images of movements to the apprehension of wholes._ 
(I) If, for example, I perceive aesthetically a jar or a circle 
or a mountain, it is possible that movements or incipient 
movements or muscular adjustments always take place. 
But these must be comparatively unimportant compared 
Op. cit., p. 72. 
1 
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with my images -for example, my tactual images of4eelin / / 
the continuous smooth surface of the vase, of moving my 
tinger or an imaginary pencil round parts of the circum- 
ference of the circle, of my imaginary tracing of the curves 
of the mountain. 
(2) But neither movements nor even imagined movements 
are anything like adequate to account for my experience. 
For my images do not completely supplement my bare 
schematic movements. They are themselves bare and 
schematic. If I introspect my experience of apprehending a 
vase I cannot discover that I do more than give imaginary 
little exploring touches or strokes here and there, in order 
to realise more vividly . the shape and surface and texture. 
Both actual movements and images presuppose my appre- 
hension of the form as a whole, not certainly in all its detail, 
but still, as a whole. It is an established fact that I can 
apprehend a visual form flashed instantaneously on a 
screen, -se --that there is no possibility of eye -movements xr4 
taking place. Probably also there is no time for other 
muscular movements or adjustments to occur. Even when 
such do occur it is no proof that apprehension of form 
cannot occur without them. Indeed, the burden of proof - 
and it would appear an impossible burden -really lies with 
those who believe movements to be essential to the percep- 
t tion of forms. In fact it seems clear that it must be apprehen- 
sion of the form which determines the movements (and 
images) and that the reverse cannot possibly be true. As 
Myers puts it : "There is indeed reason for believing that 
eye- movements are rather the result than the cause of our 
estimation of small spatial magnitudes, and that the primary 
basis of such estimation is to be sought in the sensibility of 
the cerebro- retinal apparatus and not merely in that of 
the muscular apparatus of the eye. "= That the mature 
apprehension of forms undoubtedly involves the assimilation 
of past apprehensions makes no difference, for the very 
= Experimental Psychology, p. 53. 
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recognition of forms implies that it is this form rather than 
that which is already perceived./ It is the jar, then, or the 
mountain or the circle, as units, which we apprehend, and 
the kinaesthetic and other sensa which are involved in the 
enjoyable exploration of these are supplementary, are 
logically secondary, and have their meaning only as filling 
up the detail of generally apprehended wholes. My enjoy- 
ment of my imaginary tactile exploration of the surface of 
the vase -an exploration which normally would always be 
partial and incomplete -is supplementary, is an important 
supplement to my seeing of the vase as a single continuous 
whole. It is only the presupposition of the singleness and 
continuity which integrates my tactile and other sensagwhich 
otherwise would be detached and unrelated. 
Recognition of these facts makes us independent of cer- 
tain criticisms regarding eye- movements which are rather 
damaging to a consistent theory of motor empathy. Itused 
to be thought that the beauty of some shapes could be 
partly accounted for by the fact that in looking at them the 
eye moves in continuous and pleasing curves. Now we know 
that in such cases the eye often, if not always, moves in 
jerks. For a theory which puts its trust in the pleasure of 
`empathised' muscular sensations in the eye this is a serious 
objection. And it is hardly comforting to point out that the 
jerkiness or otherwise of eye- movements is of little importance 
because there are no joint sensations in eye- movements and 
its rolling tactual sensations are comparatively slight. 
For this is just equivalent to saying that eye-movements- 
of whatever kind -matter very little at all. But if we alter 
our tune altogether and say that eye movements are instru- 
mental to the more detailed apprehension of form (by 
bringing images of different areas of the object on to the 
fovea) we put eye- movements (and other movements) in 
their proper and useful place. Eye- movements, tactual 
movements, muscular movements, and organic sensa, real 
On this see also Stout's Manual, Third Ed., p. 165. 
) 
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and imaginary, are, to repeat, rough and schematic, are 
subservient to the apprehension of a given whole and are 
throughout controlled and unified by the apprehension of 
the whole. The enjoyment of these bodily processes forms 
part of and enriches a larger whole of experience which is,, 
vivid mental awareness and enjoyment of objects. I am 
not, then, arguing that empathy of bodily states and of 
images is not important in aesthetic experience, for it is. 
But it is, logically speaking, subservient and of secondary 
importance. 
Empathy, then', is satisfactory up to a point. But owing 
to its association with a somewhat limited and narrow 
interpretation of aesthetic and ordinary perception, it is 
better, I think, to avoid the term. The word `imputation' is 
on the whole preferable. In using it we are bound by no 
tradition to concentrate too exclusively on bodily -or even 
mental- factors. Anything appropriate to the aesthetic 
whole 'can be imputed, associated images of any kind, 
ideas, meanings- things which far transcend bodily or 
mental states. Again, `feeling into' is a muddled conception, 
whereas `thinking into' is certainly very much less so. 
`Feeling into' suggests that only our own states can be 
imputed, which is an unjustified assumption. Again, how 
can we `feel into'? I cannot really `feel' a movement or 
anything else into a mountain or a vase, though I can quite 
well think it there when it is no /and this is really what is 
meant by `thinking into'. We must not, of course, interpret 
`puto' as if it meant self -conscious thinking, and here the 
term `feeling' has pehaps some faint advantage. But thinking 
need not mean conscious cogitation. Thinking may mean 
`taking as'. It is not stretching words to say that some 
drunkards think they see pink rats. Thinking `rising' into a 
pillar is in the same case, though,_; Prhapc x4641 
; 
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XIII. PROBLEM OF THE AWARENESS OF OUR OWN STATES IN 
AESTHETIC Exrichrs5TNG 
A further word may be added here regarding the question 
already raised as to how far we are in aesthetic experience /- 
conscious of our own processes, including4mputation. It is A i 
not at all clear that it is so necessary' as some empathists '1 
think, to say that we are unconscious of our organisms in 
aesthetic experience. In the controversy between complete 
`projection' and `inner mimicry' we are not really obliged 
to take one side or the other. In aesthetic experience the 
focus of attention is upon the object, and our experiences. 
of such movements and enjoyed organic processes as we 
have/ do rcnd to become imputed to the object of interest. 
But the is no reason, as I have already suggested, for 
saying that we must be entirely oblivious of everything 
except that which is in the focus of attention, that we must, 
in particular, be entirely oblivious of our own bodies as such. 
Our experience of our bodies may be marginal, but that 
it does enter as object into genuine aesthetic experience 
seems to be testified to by introspection. I can quite well 
be aware marginally of my own slight movements and of 
the images of finger and hand movements when I am 
aesthetically apprehending the jar. Or I can enjoy the 
music and `feel' it, though marginally, in my organism. 
It may be that in some intense aesthetic experiences our 
interest in the object is so held and fixed that conscious- 
ness of our organisms disappears. It is rather questionable. 
But in any case it is not so always, and not so for everyone. cisvev44, 
For most persons a measure oforganic excitement is aiiroar (/ 0/7 
present, and I do not think we have any right to say that 
this is an anti -aesthetic symptom. We can be aware of more 
an one thing at a time All that is required is that, As 
osaricli et puts it, our `feelings' shall be relevant to a per- 
ceived object.= Or, once again, they `colour' what we 
= Three Lectures ,n Aesthetic, p. 000. 
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perceive. They colour without disappearing as feelings.. 
The meadows are painted with delight, and we dolight in the i 
!%l4tt - 44 c. d.¢ / f dos' 
XIV. A CONSIDERATION OF SOME OF THE TERMS THAT HAVE. 
BEEN USED 
In describing aesthetic expression we have happened on a 
number of terms which have slightly different, but con- 
verging, meanings. It may be useful to compare, in a few 
sentences, the meanings of such, terms and phrases as 
Empathy, Distance, Projection, Imputation, Imagination, object - 
appearing-to- express -value. There is, again, Santayana's 
pleasure- objectified= (or Pleasure as the quality of a thing). And 
there is Bosanquet's question, `How can a feeling get into 
an object ?' 
In general, these words and phrases refer to the same sort 
of thing. One might divide them into two classes perhaps, 
though the division is not quite perfect. One class would 
contain those words and phrases which describe or question 
about the process by which an aesthetic experience is pro- 
duced, and the other would contain those which describe 
more or less the plain fact ' of aesthetic experience. In the 
latter class we might put Imagination and the- object -appearing- 
to- express- value. All the rest would belong (more or less) to 
the first class. 
The term `Empathy' we have criticised principally on 
account of its limited meanings and the obscurity of the 
phrase `feeling' into' as a description. Bosanquet's question, 
How does a feeling get into an object is legitimate because it 
is a question, and not an answer. Bosanqùet is asking for 
the explanation of something which -clew --in factJoccur 
in aesthetic experience. The music does seem to express 
`feeling', and, if it does, the feeling must appear in the object. 
' The Sense of Beauty, p. ¢q. sq. 
2 Three Lectures, p.-. 
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But to ask how this happens is very different from offering 
'feeling into' as an explanation. 
As We have seen, ,`Imputation', if interpreted properly, is 
a sounder term to use than Empathy. It is, again, a better 
term than `Projection', which is more metaphorical. 
`Imputation', too, more readily contains the idea of imagina- 
tive fusion than does `projection'. The term `Distance' is, 
again, metaphorical, but its meaning has been explained so 
clearly that this disadvantage vanishes : and Distance does 
symbolise a fact of great importance in aesthetic experience. 
Interpreted broadly it may be said to include the idea of 
Imputation, and almost the idea of Expression. But it does 
not, I think, replace Expression; there is much more in 
Expression than is meant by the term `Distance'. Imagination 
and Expression are terms which alone seem able to contain 
the richness of meaning which any adequate account of 
aesthetic experience should include. 
The phrase, `Pleasure- objectified' is good as far as it 
goes. But it is bad in so far as it suggests to superficial 
observation, first, that aesthetic experience is a matter of 
mere pleasure, and, second, in that it prejudges the question 
whether pain or unpleasure may not be involved in aesthetic 
experience. Again, Pleasure- objectified' is in itself a phrase 
to which it is extraordinarily difficult to attach a meaning. 
Put as a question, on the model of Bosanquet's question, 
it is permissible ; as an answer, hardly. But `Pleasure - 
objectified' is good in so far as it stresses the value- aspect of 
aesthetic expression (though it is far better to say that the 
object appears to express value than that it appears to 
express pleasure) . A limitation of most of the phrases, except 
the two just mentioned, is that they do not suggest that it 
is values which are expressed. 
Z 
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XV. TRANSITION 
95 
We have now concluded our slight 'sketch of the principles 
of the `direct' expressiveness ofsense. data .and forms, that is, 
expressiveness considered as far as possible as distinct from 
association. But this distinctness has been most difficult to 
maintain, for the 'simple reason that in the world we know 
our experience is ` one and continuous and it is therefore 
impossible . to stop short with bodily meanings. The ex- 
periences of our bodies, or, if preferred, the bodily meanings' 
which are imputed to objects, are fused and intermingled 
with a tissue of associated meanings, to whose boundaries 
and implications it is impossible to set limits. We are not 
bodies only, nor are bodily things our only objects.. We are 
bodies -and -minds ; and, because minds are the minds of 
bodies, and bodies the bodies of minds, the things of the 
body and the things perceived through the body are charged 
with significance, with valuable significance, with a whole 
world of valuable meanings. These are nothing less than the 
whole inheritance of life. To the consideration of some 
problems concerning these wider valuable meanings we may 
now turn. 
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I. Two REMARKS ON ASSOCIATION 
In the present chapter we shall make much use of the 
concept of `association'. Before beginning the discussion, 
let me make two general remarks. 
(I) I intend that the term `association' shall be used here 
in the widest possible sense. It will be taken to include 
Associations `tied' and `free', by contiguity in time and in 
place, by similarity, by contrast (or by `continuity' in 
Ward's sense).' It will include associations common to 
many persons and associations personal and private, 
associations natural (as `grass' and `green') and associations` 
artificial (as many word- or colour -symbols with their 
meanings) or associations now become conventional by use 
(as the Cross, the Lamb, the Fish). Several of these classes, 
of course, overlap. I am not trying to classify them, but 
am trying simply to indicate that no possible mode of 
association (not even personal and private ones) 2 is to be 
excluded without reason from the class of `associations'. 
(2) `Association' is a term used in psychology; it should 
hardly be necessary to point out, however, that what is 
associated is not therefore mental. The mind possesses the 
power of retentiveness, synthesis, and so on, but its contents 
fall on the objective side. The objects may be mental (as 
when one fear suggests another), but they need not be. 
II. FUSION, ÀD AESTHETIC FUSION 
the contents of the associative processimwst, as in ilrc 
be relevant' (in the 
described sense) to the object in the focus of attention. 
It might perhaps be thought correct to say that the contents 
Must. be `fused' with the focal object, i.e. relevance might 
be taken as meaning the same thing as what in psychology 
is called `fusion'. If green, for example, appears to be cheerful, 
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it is because cheerful associations have become fused with the 
present percept. We saw, indeed, how Myers,' Bullough, z 
and others also emphasise the aesthetic importance of fusion, 
meaning by fusion, fusion in the ordinary accepted sense. 
Now this may be, up to a point, all very well when we 
are dealing with simple entities like colours and sounds. 
With some possible qualifications3 it may be said that there 
is not much restriction of the things wick which, under 
some circumstances, a simple colour or sound may be 
aesthetically relevant. In such simple cases almost anything 
can be relevant to anything, and there is little or no aesthetic 
determination or exclusion. In this case fusion and aesthetic 
relevance are one, because anything, or almost anything, is 
relevant. When we come to consider more complex objects 
(like works of art), however, we find ourselves 'compelled 
to distinguish between psychological fusion and aesthetic 
fusion (or aesthetic relevance) because associations which are 
perfectly and completely fused in the psychological sense 
may jar upon a delicately constructed system of aesthetic. 
meanings. They may make for ugliness and not beauty. 
Although to speak here of the work of art, its unity and its 
beauty, is to anticipate future discussions, the distinction 
so important that it cannot be avoided in any treatment 
of `indirect' expressiveness. 
Fused associations in the ordinary psychological sense are 
associations of whose source we are not explicitly conscious. 
They are assimilated associations(though in saying these 
things it must be kept in mind that there are degrees of 
fusion and assimilation. Fusion and assimilation are illus- 
trated in the process known as apperception. When, for 
example, the snow `looks' colds or soft, the associated, 
cutaneous images of `cold' and `soft' are fused in a process 
technically sometimes known as `complication' with the 
"Individual Differences in Listening to Music ", British Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. XIII. 2 Op. cit. 
3 For a fuller discussion of this subject, see1 / 3 
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present visual experience of the -snow. So that its coldness 
and its softness are perceived by common sense as character- 
ising the snow just as certainly as its `visual' quality of 
whiteness is perceived as characterising it. 
The fact of the enormous importance of apperception in 
ordinary experience is enough to absolve us from any 
possible criticisms in the future of exaggerating its place in 
the special case of aesthetic experience. What we actually 
sense,4 a minute proportion of what we apperceive. This is 
illustrated, if illustration be necessary, by the case of 
reading. "Erdman and Dodge proved that the eyes in 
reading do not move constantly and smoothly over the line, 
but go by a series of short movements with rests between." 
The individual letters are discernible only when the eyes 
are at rest. "It is quite easy to determine from the length 
of the line and the number of rests the number of letters 
which are read atsingle glance. It was found that this was 
considerably greater than the number that could fall at one 
time on the area of the retina sensitive enough to permit 
them to be read. The other letters must, it is evident, he 
supplied by association from the material gathered in 
earlier experiences." I 
Aesthetic fusion, on the other hand, as its name implies, 
is fusion determined primarily by aesthetic needs, and not 
primarily by cognitive and practical ones- though these 
may, of course, be implied and contained in aesthetic 
experience. Where the 'aesthetic focal object is to any 
degree complex the tot al object becomes a unity, an 
organisation, a system, of embodied valuable meanings, 
which prescribes what shall, and what shall not, enter 
into it. A simple colour or sound may, as we said, fuse 
aesthetically with almost anything, but not a picture or a 
poem or a sonata. Aesthetic fusion is determined by a norm, 
the norm of aesthetic satisfaction, the norm of what objec- 
tively we call beauty, and before an idea can be accepted 
Ì Stout, Manual, Third Ed., p. 48. 
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in an aesthetic system, it _must fit in with the system, it 
must not distract, it must be aesthetically harmonious, it 
must be truly relevant. If we were seeking for defined laws 
in aesthetics, we might say here that there is a close analogy 
(though only an analogy) between the organisation of the 
aesthetic object and the organisation of a sentiment which, (r 
in Shand's words, "tends to include in its system all 411e /k 0-x 
emotions that are of service 'to its ends, and to exclude all 
those which are useless or antagonistic ".I 
Fusion in the general psychological sense (which Ì will 
call for short `psychological fusion') is thus quite distinct 
from aesthetic fusion or .aesthetic relevance. The two may, 
or may not, go together. Thus an aesthetically relevant or. 
aesthetically fused association may occur, and it may qualify 
the focal object in such a way that we, are not explicitly 
conscious of the source of the association. There is here, 
`fusion' in both senses'. Or there might be psychological . 
without aesthetic fusion. Or it might be t-iat an association 
which is aesthetically fused or aesthetically relevant is not 
psychologically fused. This is notably the case in an art like 
poetry. Poetry is expressed in words and words suggest 
images and ideas, and in poetry we may be explicitly 
conscious of both the words and the ideas or images with 
which they are associated. The two must be aesthetically 
relevant. They must form parts of a single harmonious, 
system. As A. C. Bradley has. it, "The meaning and the, 
sounds are one ; there is, if I may put it so, a resonant 
meaning or a meaning resonance." z But they need not be . 
psychologically fused. 
Very generally speaking, then, psychological fusion may 
or may not occur, but aesthetic fusion must, or the object 
thus far fails as an aesthetic object. Once, again, to say these . 
things here is really to anticipate, but anticipation is hardly. 
avoidable. 
I The Foundations offCharatter; Second Ed., p. 62. 
"Poetry for Poetry's Sake ", Oxford Lecturesrpz, 
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III. EXAMPLES OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SIGHTS AND SOUNDS 
We have seen, in discussing the expressiveness of sense data 
and forms, how associations tend to come crowding in. 
Ín aesthetic experience, as has now been repeatedly 'said, 
they need not be discerned as associations, but analysis can 
discover some of them. In the visual sphere colours and 
shapes suggest many values ; green suggests fresh `springinessA A 
or the owner of a green dress, or safety, or the coldness of 
ice, or "green -eyed Jealousy ". Blue may suggest the sea ,or 
the midday or the mid -right skies. Perhaps if blue appears 
`cold', `reserved', `distant' this is in part due to the coldness 
and the distance of the sky. Yellow may suggest sunshine, 
or daffodils, or primroses; or jaundice. Such'nieanings depend 
partly upon individual history, partly upon associations 
common to all, and partly (always) 'upon context. The 
textures of visual appearances again have their associations ; 
velvet is `soft', `sensuous', `delicate' ; steel' means `hardness'. 
Ít is `icy', and `glittering', `unsympathetie, `impersonal'. 
Lines and shapes have meanings ; vertical litres and shapes 
are like tall upstanding sentinels, dignified, self -contained, 
asking nothing; taking nothing. The 'tall' trees 106k down 
upon one with lofty disdain. Horizontal lines are associated 
with rest, with sleep, with width, càlnmess, peace. Curves 
are like persons, `shallow' or `reserved', `feeble' arid` `mean- 
ingless', `rich', `round', `voluptuous'. For a concrete instance 
let us take one of Jensen's delightful creations,' a large, 
shallow- bowled spoon with sinuous handle. The lines are 
Smooth, easy, liquid, flowing; the handle is deliciously 
Curved, like the tail of a leopard. And strangely; without 
contradiction, ->the leopard's tail is finished With little raised 
nodules like small grapes. It is a queer mixture of a leaf 
and a leopard. The texture is grey and dull like river mist, 
and it is lit with soft lights shining out of it like the moon 
out of a misty sky. The sheen is like white -grey satin: the 
IO2 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
bowl is delicately shaped with over -turning fastidiously 
pointed fronds ; it is restrained and shallow, yet large enough 
to be generous. The lines are fine and sharp with clean 
edges. Thus described, such a concatenation of qualities 
may sound absurd and incongruous. But if you hold the 
spoon in your hand, you feel it as a kind of poem which in a 
strange way unites all these, and many other, values into a 
single whole. You feel as you see it that you are living in a 
gracious world, full of loveliness and delight. 
I will not go on, tediously, to try to give examples of 
associations which sounds may have. As a matter of fact 
it is very much more difficult to do so. Sounds have an 
immense direct emotional effect (for whatever reasons) and 
it has been suggested that perhaps their direct organic 
effects are greater than those which the eye mediates. It 
can be said, in very general terms, that the harmonious 
bodily processes .set up by sounds affect the whole tone 
and level, not only of physical, but of psycho -physical life. 
And conversely we may say with confidence- again, for the 
present using very general terms -that music may be the 
expression of profound human experience. But it is astonish- 
ingly difficult to say, in non -mu ical terms, why or how 
Beethoven's //Seventh Symphony4 comes to be humanly 
great. 
In giving examples of associations I have not attempted 
to mark off private and subjective associations -such as the 
association of a colour with a certain person or political 
party -from associations which are relatively more common 
to all of us (such as the sky with blue, or the primrose with 
yellow). A `general' or `objective' or `common' association 
has no intrinsic aesthetic advantage over a subjective or 
individual one. If everyone sees in blue patches something of 
the qualities of the heavens, that is not to say that it is 
more aesthetic to see sky -value in blue than it is to fuse 
with blue some pleasant private association of a blue dress, 
or to see a sort of painfulness in it (due to, say, associations 
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with a surgeon's eyes). The sense datum is equally `expres- 
sive' whether it expresses a valuable experience which is 
shared by almost everyone, or whether it expresses a 
valuable experience which is quite private and individual. 
On the other hand, the objective or general association may 
have a greater social value when it is employed in a work 
of art. A work of art may be, primarily and fundamentally, 
expression; but in most if not all cases it also involves 
communication, and if the artist is to communicate, the 
data which he chooses must be so arranged that the 
associated meanings to be called up are as common and 
universal as possible. Of course no rules can be laid down 
as to how far an artist may objectify his own particular and 
private experiences, for the charm of his work may consist, 
in its individuality and even in its idiosyncrasy, but he 
must make as plain and clear as possible the meaning of his 
idiosyncrasy, otherwise he is not speaking of his peculiar 
experiences in a common language which can be understood. 
He fails to convince. 
IV. PROBLEMS OF THE WORKING OF AESTHETIC FUSION 
We said above= that "with some possible qualifications it 
may be said that there is not much restriction of the 
things 4414 which under some circumstances a simple sound 
or sound may be aesthetically relevant. Consequently, in 
such cases psychological fusion amounts in practice to very 
much z the same thing as aesthetic fusion. .4444 li do 
on the surface at least, to be qua ations1ke 
colours. . - le for example, tom a drab brown, 
or a sickly pink, or a s i = teen, ith clean clear 
freshness? colours may have bee ted with 
this "klnd of value, and psychological fusi may take p 
P.¡see.qr 
2 Not precisely, for aesthetic fusion may occur without psychological 
fusion, as we have seen. 
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but it might, we can 
that aesthetic fusion wou 
whilst psycho 
well imagine, be exceedingly unlikely 
std seur: hT e opposite qualities, 
cálly, and used, would jar á 
a l t rd sharmony would be experienced. 
The exception iskmore apparent than real. Aesthetic 
fusion is difficult, or impossible, because in such cases the 
colours are not really simple colours at all. It is not merely 
brown, or pink, or yellow- green, which will not fuse with 
certain `cheerful' associations. It is brown already expressive 
(perhaps in ways both `direct' and `indirect') of drabness, 
pink of sickliness, yellow -green of dirtiness. These systems 
of embodied values, and not merely simple colours, are given. 
to start with, and it is because of the domination of these 
systems that the contrary values are refused entrance into the 





o common aesthetic experience. 
The domination of a system of embodied values will 
determine aesthetically the inclusion or the exclusion of 
associations. If, in the above cases, drabness (etc.) is not 
dominant, and associations of cheerfulness are stronger, the 
cheerful associations will, of course, oust aesthetically the 
content of drabness. In this case the colours will no longer 
appear `drab', `sickly', `dirty'. They will appear, cheerful. 
If they are `reprfsented' in a picture, they will probably 
be so transformed both in their actual texture, and in the 
luminosity of their colouring and through their context, 
that instead of appearing depressing (or depressed) they 
will appear radiant. They will look, in fact, different colours. 
This difference in the `look' of perceived objects due to 
association is not in the least unusual or exceptional, as is 
seen in the analogous case of the `staircase' diagram. The 
same picture now looks a staircase, now an overhanging 
cornice, with an entirely different `feel' and meaning in 
each case. And presumably if one wanted to draw the 
er found in the 
fry . 1, mt..-/- /4.44 `` ` , q,14í vC4 
a-40- 
td-et e-/-7,..4..4 a 
f ,,,,) / vi6e-d H.,.. vag-C..-e° w t-`-e. 1-4*.dz-`-.. 
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diagram as definitely either one or the other one would alter 
it slightly. 
The importance of the predominance of one or another 
system of values, and of its effect upon the `seeing' of 
objects, 
object which possesses sentimental associations. Here is a 
memento. It is an old Victorian sugar -bowl which belonged 
to, my grandmother, of whom I was fond. It would usually 
be judged to be ugly, clumsy, vulgar, fat, ornate, and it is 
associated with a period which some think to be 4itkia.lifteol 
.49y-tikoso-aelieetivest But in my mind it is associated with my 
grandmother, with old tea -parties and white- capped old 
ladies and firelight of long ago. These are pleasant memories.. 
But this association of the sugar bowl with them isfof course, 
, as such, aesthetic. It is not `relevant', as yet, to[form of, 
the bowl.. Now suppose I cease to think of the associations . 
and concentrate on the bowl. The memories are out of the 
focus of my present co nsciousness (though they tend to be, 
called up), but their effect is there, for I find myself loving 
the. `ugly', old thing. Indeed, as now. I see it, it is no longer 
ugly, but beautiful -at least to some extent. How can this 
be? It is, I think, as before, simply the effect upon present 
perception of meanings experienced in the past. I see the 
thing differently, the curves. now seem delicious and 
avoittioweivs, the ornament is lavish!c xeh I love it because it 
ice. Its reflected lights are pleasantly, 
.ghostly, its capaciousness is generous with the generosity of. Rvo- the past. I do not necessarily think these things as I look, 
though they may enter the fringe of my consciousness. It is 
the object with its shape and lights which I contemplate.: 
But the object is transformed. And -what is very pertinent 
if I could paint it, following my selective vision, it would. 
appear to others no longer as a Victorian horror, but as _a. 
thing of charm and beauty. So, in like manner, may the.' 
very wrinkles of an old coat. or dress, or the bruises and 
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Tnsformed even in their very shapes, as they are seen 
imaginatively. 
V. SANTAYANA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSOCIATIONS ON 
THE `FRINGE' 
The aesthetic importance of the dominance of objects on 
the `fringe' of consciousness has been very clearly put by 
Mr. Santayana. His language is, I think, sometimes unfor 
túnate, owing to his limitation of the term `expression' to 
associative expression : for Mr. Santana associative 
expression is an `embellishment' of sense data and forms, 
which are not themselves expressive. But, ignoring this 
t' possible mistake, we may agree with him when, speaking 
of Honier, he says :1 "That the noble associations of any 
object should embellish that object is very comprehensible. 
Homer furnishes us with a good illustration of the constant 
employment of this effect.... There is no dearth of the 
tragic in Homer. But the'tendèncy of his poetry is neverthe- 
less to fill the outskirts of our consciousness with the trooping 
images of things no less fair and noble than the verse itself. 
The heroes are virtuous. There is none of importance who 
is not admirable in his way. The palaces, the arms, the 
horses, the sacrifices, are always excellent. The women are . 
always stately and b'e'autiful. The ancestry and tl'ie history 
of every one are honourable and good. -The whole Homeric 
world is clean, clear, beautiful, and providential, and no- 
small part of the perennial charm of the poet is that he 
thus immerses us in an atmosphere of beauty; a beauty not 
concentrated and reserved for some extraordinary senti- 
ment, action, or person, but permeating the whole and 
colouring the common world of soldiers and sailors, war 
and craft, with a marvellous freshness and inward glow." 
In another interesting passage, speaking of the way in which 
rarity and price add an expression of distinction to the 
1 The Sense of Beau0, p. 205. 
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sensuous beauty of gems, he writes :1 "I believe economists 
count among the elements of the value of an object the 
rarity of its material, the labour of its manufacture, and 
the distance from which it is brought. Now all these qualities, 
if attended to in themselves, appeal greatly to the imagina- 
tion. We have a natural interest in what is rare and affects 
us with unusual sensations. What comes from a far country 
carries our thoughts there, and gains by the wealth and 
picturesqueness of its associations. And that on which 
human labour has been spent, especially if it was a labour 
of love, and is apparent in the product, has one of the 
deepest possible claims to admiration. So that the standard 
of cost, the most vulgar of all standards, is such only when 
it remains empty and abstract. Let the thoughts wander 
back and consider the elements of value, and our apprecia- 
tion, from being verbal and commercial, becomes poetic 
and real." Again, he speaksz of the expressiveness "of 
moonlight and castle moats, minarets and cypresses, camels 
filing through the desert ". Such images get their character 
from the strong but misty atmosphere of sentiment and 
adventure which clings about them. "The profit of travel, 
and the extraordinary charm of all visible relics of antiquity, 
consists in the acquisition of images in 'which to focus a 
mass of discursive knowledge, not otherwise felt together. 
Such images are concrete symbols of muck latent experience, 
and the deep roots of association give them the same hold 
upon our attention which might be secured by a fortunate 
form or splendid material. "3 
In aesthetic experience there is always both a focus and 
a margin. This is perfectly obvious to the merest beginner 
in psychology, for in this respect aesthetic experience is like 
any other. But it has not always been realised by the purists 
i or formalists, by those for whom all associated meanings are 
anathema. The trouble is that such purists take `association' 
I The Sense of Beauty, p. 213. 
z Qp -it., p. 211. 
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to mean aesthetically un- fused, or irrelevant, association, and 
in their very right desire to avoid admitting these into 
aesthetic experience they deny the effect of association 
altogether, and in so doing denude their focal objects of a 
very large part (though not all) of their aesthetic meaning. 
VI. THE AESTHETICI EXPRESSIVENESS OF WORDS 
t . t /a 4a, In most of the ozases we have considered, the focus of atten- 
tion is upon the perceived object, and the fringe or margin 
is occupied by images. This is not always so, however. 
It is not always so in the case of an art like poetry, as has 
been already said. In poetry our attention may be directed 
to the meanings (images, etc.) of the words, whilst the words 
'themselves fall into the background, or form a complement 
of sound. We may now briefly consider the aesthetic relation 
of words to their meanings. 
The aesthetic expressiveness of words may be said to 
be derived in several ways. It may be derived (I) directly, 
or through the direct effects of their sensuous and formal 
qualities; (2) (a) indirectly, through associations (psycho- 
logically fused or not) suggested by their sensuous and 
formal qualities (2) (b) indirectly, through their (psycho- 
logically) fused association by convention with fixed and 
definite meanings; (2) (c) indirectly, through (psychologi- 
cally) unfused association by convention with fixed and 
definite meanings. In all these cases, in order that aesthetic 
expressiveness should occur, it is of course necessary (whether 
or not psychological fusion occurs) that there should be 
aesthetic fusion. Take (2) (c) for example. Words as mere 
pointers are not aesthetic entities. They are only a special 
instance of symbols of 'which mathematical symbols are 
another instance. If in ordinary speech we use the phrase 
'asleep on a chair', we are merely referring to a group of 
facts, and the words have no interest in themselves, being 
purely instrumental to the indication of the facts. But when 
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we read Mr. Yeats' The Ballad of Father Gilligan, how- 
delicately beautiful, how poignantly expressive the very 
sounds become ! They become fused, aesthetically, with their 
meanings. 
"He who hath made the night of stars 
For souls, who tire and bleed, 
Sent one of His great angels down 
To help me in my need. 
"He who is wrapped in purple robes 
With planets in his care, 
Had pity on the least of things 
Asleep upon a chair." 
Examples of (r) would be any words we delight in as 
sounds and forms of sounds. It is certain; that the aesthetic 
,value of words is never merely their sound value, but these 
values can be sufficiently striking to enable us to put in 'a 
separate class words in which intrinsic forms and sound - 
values are marked. In this class would come words, spoken 
expressively, like Acroceraunian, Chorasmian, Kubla Khan, 
plangent, tinsel -slipper'd feet, amaranth. The purest -but not 
necessarily the most striking- examples would probably be 
those taken from some unknown foreign language, for there 
conventional associations would be at their minimum. 
(2) (a). Here it is relevant associations -whether com- 
pletely psychologically eoael or not-of the sounds and . 
forms of words which give them their enhanced value. One 
invariable value associated with the spoken word is the 
value of the human voice, which in its turn embodies a 
çomplex of the values of human personality and character. 
The music of the orchestra may have more variety of 
resource; the organic thrill which it produces is probably= 
greater ; but the speaking human voice may move us . in a, 
way/which.the orchestra can never do. And in .this respect,, 
too, the spoken word may have an. advantage even over. 
song. The direct musical. values,_ of song are, of, course, greater. 
and more various than those of the music of words, but 
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what is gained in musical value is very often lost in human 
expressiveness. Consider phrases like "O my son Absalom, 
my son, my son Absalom ! would God I had died for thee, 
O Absalom, my son, my son !"I and 
"O Cromwell, Cromwell, 
Had' I but serv'd my God with half the zeal 
I serv'd my king, he would not in mine age 
Have left me naked to mine enemies." 
Or 
"Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints, whose bones 
Lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold." 
Or 
"O Lord, how great are thy works ! and thy thoughts are very 
deep. 
A brutish man knoweth not : neither doth a fool understand this.)' 
Here the aesthetic value lies very largely in the associative 
expressiveness of the depths of human experience through 
the human voice. Anguish, sorrow, vengeance, inspired 
contempt -all can be impressed into the music almost of 
monotone. Nothing can be more poignant in this way than 
the spoken word. 
Again, the sounds of words may embody through 
Association the values (other than those just mentioned) 
of the things which the sounds suggest. The phrase "The 
unplumb'd, salt, estranging sea" suggests in the very 
resonance and length and fullness and contrasts of its sounds - 
-as distinct from the conventional meanings of the words - 
the qualities of mystery and distance and depth and 
estrangement. Words like `desolate', `spindrift', `gruesome', 
`awful', `delicately', `swift', `sharp', `mystery', `eternity' 
possess each in themselves qualities which not only give 
organic pleasure, but which attract and fuse together 
aesthetically appropriate images. `Gruesome' is a hollow, 
menacing sound, `swift' in its passage from the `s' to the 
T 2 Sam. xviii. 33. 
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`w', its long- drawn -out `f', and its explosive `t' suggests a 
projectile approaching, smoothly and swiftly passing -then 
gone. The sounds inevitably express meanings. 
(2) (b) and (2) (c). About these little need be said. Words 
are, logically, pointers. They point, by convention and 
agreement, to meanings. But in poetry (and elsewhere) 
they may cease to be mere pointers and may themselves, 
as noises, become fused aesthetically, and often psycho- 
logically, with their meanings, so that they "appear to embody 
their meanings. Words such as `death', `fire', `marigold', 
`daffodil', `love', tend in time to evoke in themselves the 
emotive apprehension of their meanings. The sounds do 
not in themselves, originally, tend to evoke these meanings. 
But having been by convention associated as pointer to 
object, sound and meaning become fused in one or in both 
senses. As a proof that this can take place we may cite the 
familiar case of dislike of a . proper name because of its 
association with a person long forgotten. 
In poetry, the art in which the expressive use of words is 
most typical, it is probably impossible to discover cases in 
which expressiveness in allkays mentioned is not to some 
extent present. If words are not used aesthetically, but are 
mere `pointers', it is obvious that we can discover instances in 
which expressiveness in none of these ways is present. But 
this is mere tautology, for the aesthetic use is definitely 
specified. Yet there is an approach to this even in poetry, 
as when words are used as conventional symbols pointing 
to an object (an image) which is interesting for its own sake. 
In such a case words become, as Shelley has it, a sort of 
`trath arent medium'. Through words we see, in imagina- 
tion, beautiful things. When Matthew Arnold writes 
"And as afield the reapers cut a swath 
Down through the middle of a rich man's corn 
And on each side are squares of standing corn, 
And in the midst a stubble, short and bare - "z 
= Defence of Poetry. 2 Matthew Arnold, Sohrab and Rustum. 
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Or Wordsworth, 
"Let... 
The swan on still St. Mary's Lake 
Float double, swan and shadowit"I 
we see a picture clearly before our mind's eye : the sound- 
value of the words is not of very great importance, nor are 
the associations, derived from the suggestiveness of the 
sounds themselves/ or from convention. The words, indeed, 
become relatively unimportant. Yet even here they cannot 
be excluded. Words are the fundamental medium of poetry 
and even although images may sometimes occupy the focus 
of our attention, the word -sounds, with all their expressive- 
ness, must at least be harmonised with the images. It is 
impossible to think of any single instance of a description 
in poetry where the beauty is wholly due to the objects 
described. If the image is beautiful, the poet, it would seem, 
naturally tends to ' use fitting words. Even when we take 
hi an instance where the poetic value is low - 
"His jacket was red, and his breeches were blue, 
And there was a hole where the tail came through "z 
-the lilt of the words is expressive of the joke. Our state- 
ment, then, that there is an approach in poetry to the use of 
words as pointers, must be taken literally; it is only an 
approach. 
seen 
very clearly. Onomatopoeic words, for example, are words 
whose actual sounds suggest the objects they no 11ym- 
bolise by convention. Thus `whistle', `thunder', `baír their 
melancholy, long, withdrawing roar suggest their associated 
objects through their sounds. But [(z) above] they also 
possess direct sound- values. And [(2) (b) and (2) (c)] their 
agreed and conventional meanings come in. Take, as 
another example, so- called `nonsense' rh 'rues. Here we 
1 Wordsworth, r -ow Unvisited. 2 Coleridge, The Devil's Thoughts. 
`INDIRECT' AESTHETIC EXPRESSION 113 
have (i) the direct values of the sounds (e.g. `runcible' 
`gimble', `borrowgrove') ; (2) (a) associations arising out of 
sound values (e.g. `slithy', jabberwock'). And we have 
[(2) (b) and (2) (c)] conventional suggestions (e.g. `brillig'- 
brilliant ; `slithy' -shiny and lithe ; `gimble'- gambol and 
nimble; `mimsy' -dim and mossy). 
VII. SURVEY AND PLAN 
In this chapter and in the last we have discussed the chief 
factors in aesthetic expressiveness. We have seen that 
through the instrumentality of our minds and bodies a great 
complexity of values is gathered together relevantly to 
perceived objects. But the objects which we have considered' 
have been objects of a very simple and abstract sort, colours; 
sounds, simple forms, words. These are, as we know, aesthetic 
erbjeres if to imagination they appear to embody value. But, 
being slajeet which have been chosen rather on account of 
their lack of complications than for any other reason, they- 
do not in themselves, as we said at the outset, yield aesthetic 
experience of a very significant or important kind. ín actual 
fact these comparatively simple entities are not really 
aesthetically satisfying. When we are in aesthetic mood' 
Our excitement tends to elaboration and complication and 
completion of what is partial and imperfect, and to supple 
mentation of one perfection by its opposite, uniting theme 
in turn in a larger, more complex whole which ,is- ,alee" ,r-t. Aesthetic experience is really a process of growing; 
life which only reaches' rest and satisfaction in an object 
sufficiently complex to be interesting to a vital mind -and- 
body,,et unified. Although the entities which we have: A 
considered are in themselves always form and matter, and 
never mere matter ;: they axm, matter in relation to larger and' 
more complex wholes. These larger, more complex, more 
significant, wholes, are the things we call works of art - 
aind it is partly from the imaginary dissection of works of 
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art that we have obtained our material for discussion. (It h- 
been insisted, ad nauseam, that elements taken by force out of 
their context cannot possess the same meaning as elements 
in their context.) But now, having seen what expressiveness 
means in simple, limited, and not very important aesthetic 
objects, it will be our duty and our pleasure to discuss 
some problems of the aesthetic objects which really matter, 
the problems, i.e., which arise out of consideration of 
works of art. 
In the work of art there will appear as important one 
SC144 fundamental principle which as yet has only been arelyx 
mentioned. I mean the principle of unity. The entities we 
have considered have each their unity -of- complexity, it is, 
true. The direct and indirect values expressed in any single 
word must be very considerable in numbers, and they . are 
not a mere aggregation. They are a harmonious system 
which forms, together of course with the word-sound in 
which they are embodied, a single unit of content. But this 
principle of the unity of complexity- which need not 
assume great importance in dealing with entities like colours 
or sounds (or words)- becomes extremely important when 
we come to consider the work of art. In the work of art we 
have presented to us a vast complexity of separate items 
which are yet somehow united to constitute a single unified 
whole which makes direct appeal. This unification is so 
important that the principle of variety-in -unity (or unified 
variety) has often been made the central doctrine of 
aesthetics. If we are right, this claim to first place cannot 
be ceded, for in speaking of first principles we have put_ 
`expression' in the premier position. But unity-of- variety 
must find a place in the theory of art, and in the theory we 
are developing its place i relation to expression must be í'^ determined. This question cannot properly be decided, 
however, until we have said something of the work of art 
itself. 
To the problem of the nature of the work of art we shall 
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turn our attention in Chapter Six. The next chapter will 
be concerned with a brief statement regarding the gature 
of value, its apprehension, and its bearing on the aesthetic 
problem. I have suggested that in the aesthetic object there 
is expressed value. It now remains to give an account of 
what we mean by value and its appreciation, in order that 
we may be able to see better how far the meanings (and the 
unified meaning which is `beauty') which are revealed in . 
aesthetic experience are objective -if objective they can in 
any sense be said to be. - 
CHAPTER FIVE 
VALUE, VALUATION, AND BEAUTY 
I. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE STATUS OF VALUE 
II. VALUES AS ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO MIND 
III. CRITICISM OF THIS VIEW : VALUATION AND VALUE/ 
IV. POSITIVE VALUE AS FULFILMENT OF TENDENCY 
V. PROFESSOR LAIRD'S VIEW 
VI. BEAUTY, VALUE, AND THE MIND 
VII. BEAUTY, SATSIFACTION, AND 'PLEASURE 
VIII. CRITICISM OF THE VIEW THAT THE AESTHETIC OBJECT EXPRESSES 
CONCEPTS 
IX. A NOTE ON `AESTHETIC EMOTION' 
APPENDIX 
(a) VARIATIONS OF STRESS UPON O. AND T.F. IN THE VALUE - 
SITUATION 
(b) HOW THESE ARE EXHIBITED IN THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
(c) IMPUTATION AND `RELEVANCE' 
I. ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF THE STATUS OF VALUE 
In the present chapter. I do not propose to attempt to 
discuss the problem of value in its detail. Full discussion 
would entail a book and not a chapter, for there is a very 
large literature on the subject. I shall chiefly try to state, in 
the earlier part of the chapter, one point of view= as shortly 
and clearly as possible, in order that our main discussion 
¿on the specifically aesthetic problem may be resumed with 
as little interruption as may be. For these reasons only 
a few proper names will appear. In the latter part of the 
chapter I" shall discuss some applications to aesthetics of the 
conclusions arrived at in the first part. 
There are three possible views of the status of value. 
One is that value is essentially a quality of things belonging 
to them independently of all relation to experiencing mind. 
.Another is that value is mental, and is .a quality of mind or 
mental states only. The third is that value consists in a 
relation between mind and non -mental objects. Examples . 
of all these three views can easily be found, but the 
-second of them is nowadays not very fashionable, so 
that the .real living issue lies between the first and the 
third. . . 
The first is, roughly speaking, a view which is assumed 
by common sense and which is held to -day by philosophers 
like Professor More, Professor Laird, and, more recently, 
by. Dr. Olaf Stapledon in his book, A Modern Theory of 
Ethics. I say `roughly speaking' because the common sense 
assumption that value is in things (e.g. that value is in the 
food or the beautiful sky) cannot be said to be identical at 
least with the views of Mr. Laird or Mr. Stapledon: nor 
are the views of the three philosophers I have mentioned 
identical. But they all do have the one important element 
in common. The third view has been held in recent times 
a The view which :has been so far assumed, and which was outlined 
above, pp. -47..: 
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by such thinkers as von Ehrenfels and Meinong, Alexander, 
Hobhouse, R. B. Perry, and very many others. Here again 
there is a good deal of variety of opinion regarding the 
particular aspect of mind involved. Sometimes it is said to 
be desire, sometimes it is feeling, sometimes it is mental 
dispositions, or `presumptions', or `assumptio ; sometimes 
it is called `interest'. But all the thinkers who old the third 
view are agreed that value can not belong to an object in 
itself: value is object -in- relation -tc -mind, or, it may be, 
a mental process awakened by some object. 
In discussing our problem we must begin by admitting 
that some values may be indubitably mental. Whether or 
not value is in essence dependent on or independent of 
cognising mind, will not affect the question : this will become 
clearer later. Of mental values, the values of knowledge, of 
volition, of friendship and love are obvious examples - 
though, of course, all these mental values require objects. 
It may in fact be that the highest values which we know 
are mental, and that the Summum Bonum consists of mental 
activities or of some organisation of mental activities. 
Whether this is really so or not we need not discuss, for our 
problem, quite definitely, is not, What is the supreme value 
or good? Nor is it, What are the characteristics of mental 
values? Our main problem is, What is the essential nature of 
value -any value? Does value essentially depend for its 
existence upon a mind? Or can an object, or an objective 
processbe said to possess value entirely on its own account, 
independently of all experiencing mind or minds? 
II. VALUES AS ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO MIND 
Let us take a simple instance. It is a cold day and I come 
shivering into a room where burns a bright warm fire. 
I spontaneously say, `Good !"How lovely !"What genial 
warmth !' and I spread my hands and body luxuriously 
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before it. Here is a simple value -experience. = Wherein 
inheres the value which is the object of my value- experience? 
Unreflective common sense may say that the geniality, 
the `goodness' of the warmth is in the fire, just as unreflective 
common sense may think of gold or diamonds as intrinsically 
precious. But the slightest reflection, even of unreflective 
common sense, casts dòubt upon this assumption. It is 
equally difficult to think of the fire's `goodness' as existing 
by itself, as to think of gold and diamonds as being 
precious apart from someone's use of them. Common -sense 
reflection -and philosophic reflection -is inclined to con- 
clude, then, that the value or `goodness' of the warmth arises 
through some relation of the fire's warmth to us. But such 
a conclusion is only a beginning. For what kind of relation 
to us? And what us? Is it in the relation of the heat of the 
fire to our experiencing mind? To our desire? To our 
pleasure? Or is it in the relation to our organism? An answer 
which is very often given by philosophers is that already 
referred to, that value somehow arises in relation, and only 
in relation, to our mental processes. If I do not experience' 
the heat in any way, if I do not cognise it or desire it, or 
feel it as pleasant, its peculiar quality of value seems to 
vanish into nothing. 
We are, then, very easily led to the conclusion that 
experiencing in some sense constitutes value. The conclusion 
seems so natural and inevitable /that even the argument that 
in knowing value we cannot `make' i5because in knowing it, 
it must already be given for us to know, 
convir cés, e s 
,n S \ATP Are nhh adopt a new pi.ocedure and make 
a new variation. We now say, not that mind's cognition,. 
desire (etc.) constitutes its object as valuable, but that value 
belongs (not to the object but) to the 'complex mind -in- 
relation -to- object. So that any difficulty of mind's `making' 
The value here is positive. For brevity's sake I shall take `value' as.. 
meaning positive value, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
H f 
t-v-a y 
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the thing it cognises is partly overcome. The value belongs 
to the whole. The whole, and nothing less, possesses value. 
And if we say this, we are of course obliged to say, too, 
that when we think we are valuing anything which is 
completely independent of mind, we are in error. What we 
value is not the warmth (nor is it simply our own enjoyment 
of it). The true -though concealed or 'recessive'-object of 
our valuation is our -experience -of -the- warmth, or the 
warmth -as- experienced. And this total object is truly 







In this case, then, the mind's relation to an object (0) 
constitutes a value, but it does not constitute O as valuable. 
For mind's process itself is a part of what is valuable. Vet 
the whole, S -O, is a true object of valuation. a ii v 14.--E 
III. CRITICISM OF THIS VIEW : VALUATION AND VALUE 
This account may be consistent as far as it goes. But is it 
the true analysis? Consider the case more closely. Is it the 
heat of the fire in relation to our experiencing which we 
value? Is its relation to our experiencing an essential factor? 
Surely it is not. What we really value is neither the heat 
of the fire in itself nor our cognition (nor our desire or enjoy- 
ment) of the heat of the fire, but, simply, a process of our 
organism caused by the fire. It is not the fire in relation to 
, mind which is significant, Deeds j, from the point of 
view of the problem of value, but fire in relation to organism. 
I am, as they say, `frozen stiff' : my body needs warmth 
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for the fulfilment of its functions. And my desire for warmth, 
and my cognition of and pleasure in warmth are experiences 
of bodily process. As the warmth `gratefully' penetrates my 
cold fingers and limbs I experience the restoration of my 
bodily functions. This is what I really cognise, want, desire, 
enjoy (though I may unreflectively think it is the fire itself, 
the cause)/ and the value consists, it would seem, in this y 
process of{ organic fulfilment. My enjoyment, it is true, is 
always present when I am aware of this positive value, but 
this is no more than saying that when I am aware of value 
I am aware of it, or that I cannot be pleasantly conscious 
of value without pleasant - consciousness occurring. It is . in 
no wise implied that this book which I see has a mental /k constituent because in order be an object of my awareness ñ J 
I must be aware of it. This is the essence, I think, of an 
argument of Dr, Moore in Principia Ethica. 
An even more convincing instance, perhaps, is that of 
definite relief from some bodily tension, as that, for example, 
b--Q of a distended fir. What is wanted in such a case, what 
is adjudged good, is just bodily relief and nothing else. 
It is not enjoyment of relief or even absence of (mental') 
unpleasure ; what is wanted is something entirely non= 
mental, belonging to the body, localised relief. Feeling 
,ss supervenes / Mr.. Laird says,' "When human beings think O 
about thei values, to be sure, they naturally consult their . 
feelings- naturally but not, perhaps, wisely. If they cherish ; 
vipers, it is surely the character of what they favour, rather.; 
than their amiable frame of mind, that really does concern; 
them." Pleasure and unpleasure, then, fall on the subject- 
and not on the object -side, on the side of valuation, . and 
not on the side of value. 
Valuation implies pleasure or unpleasure (let us ignore . 
unpleasure, as agreed) . But valuation is, of course, not mere 
pleasure, for such cannot exist by itself. The pleasure is part 
''We must not, of course, confuse the organic `pain' of tension (which is. 
a'sensum) with mental experience. 2 The Idea- af Value, p. 107. 
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of a psychosis, and valuation is a psychosis involving cogni- 
tion as well as conation and hedonic tone. Indeed, valuations 
may be divided into two grades, according to the level of 
complexity or otherwise of the cognitive aspects. If, on the 
one hand, the cognitive aspect is confined to a relatively 
simple state of awareness, with prominence of hedonic tone, 
there is one level of valuation. If, on the other hand, cogni- 
tion is highly critical and discriminative, as, say, when we 
analyse the different elements of value in an experience of 
music, there is valuation on a different level. The former is 
direct intuitive appreciation, the latter involves a rationale 
of appreciation. We cannot, of course, draw a hard -and- 
fast line between the first and the second, for the simplest 
cognition we know is to some extent discriminative, whilst 
critical analytical judgments are just a turning over, an 
examining and a discriminative retasting, of the intuitive 
experience. 
IV. POSITIVE VALUE AS FULFILMENT OF TENDENCY 
The theory that positive value consists in the fulfilment of 
needs of living organisms (or of higher entities, such as 
minds) has recently been ably expounded and defended by 
Dr. Olaf Stapledon in A Modern Theory of Ethics. My previous 
analysis is strongly influenced by the ideas in this work, 
with which I am in substantial agreement. Dr. Stapledon's 
view clearly has its precedents in Greek Ethics, but it is 
also very much coloured by the light of modern knowledge 
holds , that the affective aspect of an act of valuation is 
logically posterior to the cognitive and conative aspects 
of valuation. "Pleasure is consequent on conation. And 
conation (by which I mean a conscious activity) is consequent 
on a cognitive act of valuation which cognises the relation 
of the object to some behaviour- tendency. And the behaviour - 
tendency is itself essentially objective to any act of `espousing' . 
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it, or desiring its fulfilment. "' This theory is based upon 
the `hormic' psychology. The organism is conceived as a 
teleological system and its teleological structure is the 
presupposition of conation. "The presupposition of every 
act of conation, whether `blind' impulse or desire or fully 
self- conscious will, is a teleological activity or tendency 
distinct from the purely conative act itself. At the lowest 
level the activity is purely physiological ; the impulse, in so 
far as it is mental at all, is an acceptance of, or active espousal 
of, some activity of the body itself. Desire may set as its 
goal the realisation of some such purely physical teleological 
activity of the body. At higher levels the teleological activity 
may be psychical. The goal of desire, or of considered will, 
may be the fulfilment of some psychical capacity. But in 
this case, no less than in the others, the activity of tendency 
;whose fulfilment is desired or willed is strictly objective to, 
and logically prior to, the mental act of willing its fulfilment -. 
For there to be any conscious conation at all there must be 
awareness of a hormic drive or tendency, awareness vague 
or precise, true or erroneous. For there to be not merely 
`blind' impulse but explicit desire or will, there must be 
prevision, true or false, of the supposed goal of the activity- 
prevision sometimes of an immediate goal, at other times 
of a goal more remote." = Again, "Every conative act, then, 
consists in the acceptance or espousal of some cognised 
hormic activity or tendency; every case of feeling (pleasant 
or unpleasant) is consequent on the cognised success or 
failure of espoused hormic tendency. 
"We may conclude this psychological description by 
saying that : we feel because we `espouse a cause' ; we espouse 
the cause because we cognise it as a `cause', i.e. as a teleo- 
logical process of something within our ken ; and finally we 
cognise the teleological process as a teleological process 
because (apart from errors of cognition) it really is so. 
I A Modern Theory of Ethics, p. 51 -Op , p. 87-88. 
3 Ibid., p. 88. 
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It is important to note that the description of teleology 
which Mr. Stapledon accepts, the description, namely, of 
Mr. Broad, does not contain the term `mind'. Broad defines 
a teleological system as one which acts "as if it were designed 
for a purpose ",' but it still "remains a question of fact 
whether the system was actually the result of a design in 
someone's mind ". Artificial machines imply design, but 
organisms are teleological systems which seem to arise 
without design. The machine is a case of `external' teleology, 
the organism of `internal' teleology.a Stapledon himself, 
defines teleological activity as activity "which [whether or not 
it violates physical law] is as a matter of fact regulated in 
reference to a future state. In teleological activity events 
occur because they will produce or maintain a certain 
result." 3 Va.(,...e r4.4 k A... AAA .44.4.4,44.44 44 4144 014141 
The typical case of 
verettt, when some hormic tendency of the organism is 
fulfilled or thwarted. This is an entirely non -mental process 
and itself constitutes positive or negative value. This bodily 
process is what we cognise, conate, or espouse and feel to 
be pleasant or unpleasant, as the case may be. It is likewise 
with the case of mind. We know that mind has tendencies 
and needs and that the fulfilme t or thwarting of these 
brings pleasure or unpleasure. Sof.there are mental values, hnt 
and mental values, though mental, are just as objective 
to the act of their valuation. We can rejoice in our own 
intellectual or moral fulfilment. And as well as rejoicing in 
them, we can value them intellectually. We can think of 
them and judge of them and form philosophies about them. 
tw.ay We might go even farther and value our valuation of values. 
V. PROFESSOR LAIRD'S VIEW 
If value is not in essence mental, is not necessarily inclusive 
of a mental factor (though sometimes it may include it), 
The Mind and its Place in Nature, p. 61 sq. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.; p. 83. 
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we shall be tempted to go farther than we have gone, and 
to try out a generalisation which will include all physical, 
and not only organically physical, things. Such a generalisa- 
tion would be exemplified in the notion of "Natural Elec- 
tion", of which Professor Laird makes a great deal in his 
recent book, The Idea of Value. "Natural Election ", says 
Mr. Laird, following a hint in Montaigne, "is the principle 
of Non -indifference in nature. I take it to be evident that . 
if two things in nature are utterly indifferent to one another, . 
neither, in relation to the other, has any value at all. If, on 
the other hand, they are not indifferent to one another, it is 
likely, if not absolutely certain, that a value exists for one, 
or the other or for both of them, atleast of a relative kind."' 
By "indifference" Mr. Laird does not mean anything . 
peculiarly psychological, nor anything peculiarly biological, . 
although both of these may be included in the general. 
notion of natural election. The general idea which Mr. 
Laird has in mind is something like that of `attraction' in 
physics, or `affinity' between chemical bodies. The attraction 
$f iron filings by magnets is one of his favourite illustrations. 
But the principle of natural election is wide enough to be. 
inclusive 
-Ne.t man only, but cats, and, "if cats, why not beetles, and,, 
if beetles, why not potatoes, and, if potatoes, why not magnes 
and filings? Magnets do concern filings and, if it does not 
matter whether or not we are aware of our likings, why 
should it matter whether or not there are any likings at all? 
If things are concerned with, and take account of, one 
another, is not that enough? So far as I can see, it is a mere 
dogma that values are peculiarly characteristic either of 
men or of cats, Discussing the views of D. W. Prall3 and 
R. B. Perry, 4 he urges that, if "biology is admitted to. 
?Idea of Value, pp. 92 -3. 2 Ibid., p. 107. 
33''Ìm A Study in the Theory of Value, University of California Publications 
in Ph'losophy, Vol. iii, No. 2, 1921, pp. 215, 227. 
4 In ,teneral Theory of Value. - ., _. 
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`provide the context' for psychological interest ", if "natural 
election provides the context for biology ", "we should not 
stop short at life any more than we should stop short at 
mind ", 
Very likely Mr. Laird is right. There is no general or 
logical reason why we should stop short at living organisms. 
Physical 'affinities' and `attractions' (as Mr. Laird very well 
knows and would agree) are of course dangerous and obscure 
notions, and we are apt to run off the rails if we think too 
naïvely of 'affinities' between iron filings and magnets, or 
'attractions' between stones and the earth. But there is 
a growing open- mindedness to such notions (viz. -weir 
Mr. Whitehead's or Mr. Lloyd 1a 
Morgan . We certainly cannot dismiss them. Natural election 00444 
in a plain, straightforward sense certainly exists and is but. 
another name for natural law. We cannot, therefore, gainsay 
its truth. 
The question, however, is not of the first importance here, 
for in aesthetic experience we are concerned with values 
which can be appreciated. And though sub-organic 
natural laws, affinities, and attractions certainly exist and 
are to some degree known for what they are, they cannot 
be appreciated affectively by us in a direct way, though we 
may by means of anthropomorphic metaphors, and bodily 
analogies, and sympathy appreciate aesthetically some- 
thing which we take for them. The prime values for us, 
on which our appreciation not only of sub -organic entities, 
but of other organisms and of other minds, is based, are the 
values of our own bodies and minds,- whose processes we 
immediately- experience. Certainly we know, and can in 
varying degrees appreciate, more than these. But we do it 
through our immediate experience of our organic and mental 
I oe,p. 10 . 
yI mean, of course, `organic' in the more usual, and not in Whitehead's, 
sense. 
For a discussion of Immediate Experience compare a paper by the 
writer -Mi id, N.S. I/i 4. /SZ 
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processes and their values, which we know in a peculiarly 
intimate way. 
The values which we know through, and by means of, our 
own'are chiefly the values of other human beings, animals, 
and plants. By means of a very little sympathy and imagina- 
tion and power of analogy we may indirectly appreciate 
the intrinsic values of other human organisms and minds; 
with a little more, the mental and organic values of animals, 
and with a very great deal more, just possibly, the organic 
values of plants. Beyond that there is no intrinsic value 
which can be appreciated in anything approaching an 
adequate or literal way, if at all. If tendency -fulfilment of 
inanimate nature can be said to be appreciated at all, it is 
only through the use of the most imperfect analogies. We 
have, as has been said, no real notion of the `affinities' of 
magnets for iron, of positive for negative poles, of stones for 
planets. Still less can we `feel' them. Of course these are 
movements, and we know what movements in our own 
bodies `feel' like. But there must be more in physical 
`affinities' than that. And the more we cannot feel. We can 
and do, on the other hand, impute much which is not there. 
When we rejoice in "The keen unpassioned beauty of a 
great machine ", or in the tumbling water -falls, or in the 
trickling, babbling streams, or in the terrible expressiveness 
of thunder and lightning, or in the peaceful sunset sky, we 
are imputing values to these things which are derived from 
other more direct experiences of our own values and those 
-of other living beings. Certainly we rejoice in the waterfall 
or in the thunder; but it is their fused suggestion which is 
really significant for us. They do not in literal fact (or at 
least as far as we know) possess the values we apprehend 
`in' them. If it is aesthetic enjoyment we are seeking, good 
and well. If scientific truth, no. 
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VII. BEAUTY, VALUE, AND THE MIND 
If the account we have given is correct, the several values 
which appear to be imaginatively embodied or `expressed' 
in an aesthetic object, as when we see a picture or hear 
music or read a page, will be objective to the experiencing 
of them. What then of the beautiful object as a unified 
whole of expressed value, and what of its objectivity? 
Let us define beauty provisionally as the character in an 
aesthetic object of satisfying, complete, self-sufficient expres- 
siveness. The concrete meaning of this profound unity and 
satisfaction can only be understood of course through ex- 
perience of the serious work of art. But the definition is 
good enough, as a definition. 
What, then, of the status of beauty? Is it something which 
is as entirely objective to mind as are the values which are 
imaginatively embodied in the beautiful object and are its 
`parts'? The answer is on the whole `yes'. This does not of 
course mean that mental entities may not be imagined as 
part of the beautiful object. For mental values may be 
embodied, and are certainly as important as, if not more im- 
portant than, non -mental organic values. Nor does it mean, 
on the other hand, that beauty can be existent apart from 
all mind, for the values which are imaginatively embodied 
in the object cannot appear as parts of the object without 
the causal agency of mind. For (a) if the mind imagines or 
`imputes' values to the picture or the symphony which are 
not literally in it, then it is clear that mental agency or 
causality is involved. Imputation is a mental process ; it is 
"thinking into' or `imagining into' the object. And further, 
j the several contents of imputation, i.e. what the object is 
going to appear to reveal, cannot appear as fused together t , -Y 
in one object, here and now, apart from the mind's power of 
fusion, of association, of assimilation, and so on. Values may 
exist apart from the consciousness of them, but the object 
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cannot appear to : :. without the 
gift of (mental) imaginativeness. The values are still 
objective, but they are imagined-4w, and imagination is 
mental activity or agency. Arad-'(, what is true of the 
0041 jernbodied values which i - =u p the who is true of the 
N aesthetíe which isful. The aesthetic unity has 
Dby objective meaning which is due to the objective relations, 
_// or system, of its objective parts. But such a whole needs 
imagination, creative imagination, in order to be created 
or realised as a whole. We may conclude, then, that beauty, 
with all its contents, is objective, entirely objective, but is 
dependent on mind,as the cause ofits existence as a systematic 
whole of parts apprehended `in' a perceived object. 
We shall be in error, of course, if we suppose mind to be 
a sort of external causal agency sticking ready- presented 
objects together on a work of art like enamels on a mosaic. 
For the `objects' are not mere inert pieces, stuck together by 
mental cement. The objects are, to change the metaphor, 
molten objects, not striving together -by an applied cement, 
but adhering aid fusing and running together, taking on 
marvellous new fluid patterns wke,r-e. they touch. It is true 
that they do not do so literally. The metaphor is of limited 
value. The colours, sounds, forms, organic and ideal contents 
with which the artist deals, are, in themselves, distinct 
entities incapable of thus inter -aging. Imagination is 
certainly needed. But imagination is really dealing, not with 
inert fact -objects, but with a o' _ .f 
a thousand active impulses or needs of 
body- and -mind, impulses and needs which, being alive, 
demand fulfilment, which restlessly stretch out hungry 
tentacles to all possible -and often to impossibleI- objects 
of fulfilment. And, whilst the process of artistic production 
is going on, one fulfilment (say, through the production of a 
line ör a musical phrase) leads to other needs whose fulfilment 
The artist rejects no less than he selects. Artists "often add, but oftener 
take away ". 
13o A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
in turn leads to further needs, till at last we come to rest 
in a self -complete system of balanced fulfilments, a rest which 
can only be attained through the production of, or at least 
the participation in, such a perceived aesthetic whole. The . 
aesthetic imagination implies a body- and -mind sensitive 
even irritable -to the suggestiveness of perceptual data. 
Colour, sounds, and their forms awaken needs which 
only unlike, say, the eating of sweets) to a slight degree be 
fulfilled by the same aforesaid colours, sounds, and forms. 
For the larger part, demands are created for fulfilments of 
profounder needs. These needs are met through the mar- 
shalling together of a great complex of other fulfilling objects, 
the perception and imagining of which as a complex whole 
afford us mental satisfaction with its accompanying pleasure. 
Mind, then, in one sense, is the cause of the aesthetic 
object and its beauty. But only because it is sensitive to, 
and has the power of apprehending, living bodily and 
mental needs objective to itself, whose fulfilment demands 
the production or construction or apprehension= of a 
considerably complex perceived, ,gig' object. 
VIII. BEAUTY, SATISFACTION, AND PLEASURE 
Satisfaction, pleasant feelings, pleasant psychoses, perhaps 
pleasurable= emotionsrthese all bulk largely as the final - 
efficient causes of aesthetic activity, as we view this activity 
introspectively. They are perhaps the most important factors 
immediately present in consciousness. It looks as though 
we construct aesthetic objects for the sheer pleasure of it, and 
for no other reason. Although, however, the assertion here 
114-44- -i the negation is false. On the one hand, pleasure 
,Q c Lo c- air -be-a genuine motive to aesthetic endeavour. Pleasure, 
I Here taken as roughly equivaluent. But see below, p. 
2 I ignore the negative -tone aspect for brevity's sake. But I am thinking 
of hedonic factors generally. 
n 
V Q,a,. . v u pn-- 
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it is true, may fall on the subjectiv- side, on the side of 
valuation (though its existence is a i -n of the presence of 
objective value), but, as we have seen 
e 
iiiipentalit. And in the total -valuation of a /positive value/ 
there is contained pleasure. Pleasure is thus a component 
part of what is desired. Desire for pleasure is part of the 
motive of aesthetic construction. On the other hand, desire 
for pleasure is never the complete motive. `Pure' pleasure, 
as we know, is an abstraction. Actually, we construct 
aesthetic objects partly because this constructing is a fulfil- 
ment (which is also in fact pleasurable), and partly because 
the contemplation of the construct is an end wh. s_also 
the fulfilment of various needs. I the end, it is tendency- 
fulfilment, or value, which is the ultimate final- efficient 
cause of aesthetic processes or products, though conscious 
enjoyment of this value is, an essential part of all aesthetic 
experience. And, without this conscious aesthetic experience, 
as we have repeatedly said, the aesthetic object could not 
exist at all, for the aesthetic object is dependent upon 
imaginative mind as its cause in the sense we have described. 
Pleasure and joy, then, which are in some cases the im- 
mediately apparent causes, may be called integral, though 
secondary, parts of the final -efficient cause of aesthetic 
activity. 
We have been taking itlin our investigation so far, that the 
aesthetic object is always an embodiment of values. The 
significance of this will be seen perhaps even more clearly, 
in the light of our fuller understanding of value, if we now 
contrast it with the belief, often held, that the aesthetic 
object embodies mere= facts. 
= By `mere' and `bare' facts I mean simply facts which are not values. 
/ 
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IX. CRITICISM OF THE VIEW THAT THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
EXPRESSES CONCEPTS 
A great deal of mischief has been caused by this., There is 
the popular supposition that art (for example) is `expression' 
of facts, that painting just imitates, that poetry just tells 
stories. Hardly less confusion has been caused by some forms 
of the theory- sometimes more vague and poetic, sometimes 
more precise and philosophic -that in aesthetic expression 
are embodied fact -Universals, that art is a revelation of 
-reality or truth.= A philosophic statement of such a view is 
seen in the aesthetic theory of Hegel. 
The latest modification of this tradition is to be found in. 
Mr. W. T. Stace's recent work.2 Mr. Stace holds an interest- 
ing theory, namely, that beauty (for us it is sufficient to say 
here the `aesthetic object') consists in the fusion of an 
intellectual content, which he callsempirical non -perceptual 
concepts' "with a perceptual field, in such manner that the 
intellectual content and the perceptual field are indis- 
tinguishable from one another ; and in such manner as to 
constitute the revelation of an aspect of reality. " 3 
Empirical non -perceptual concepts, it may be explained, . 
are concepts which lie between universal and ' abstract 
categories (e.g. unity, existence, quality) and, at the other 
end of the scale, what Mr. Stace calls `perceptual concepts' 
concepts which have percepts corresponding to them 
(e.g. house, jealousy, roughness, hitting, to the left of). 
Empirical non -perceptual concepts, which form the content 
of the beautiful, are more universal than perceptual concepts, 
because they are abstractions which cannot be grasped 
together in any single act of perception, but are less universal 
.than the categories. Empirical non -perceptual concepts are 
nòt found in ordinary perception at all, but are the result 
But see Chapter . 
2 The Meaning of Beauty. Grant Richards. 3 Op. cit., p. 43. 
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of intellectual reflection : but as free concepts they enter 
into the special kind of perception which is aesthetic. 
Examples of them are evolution, progress, harmony, 
goodness, civilisation, law, order, peace, gravitation, 
spirituality. To these no single percept corresponds. But the 
fusion of any of them with a perceptual field constitutes 
aesthetic perception. 
It is, of course, impóssible to do justice to Mr. Stace's 
interesting book in a sentence or two, but the general typé 
bf thesis which Mr. Stace advances prompts one to ask 
generally whether any principles of conceptual classification 
are adequate to determine what shall, and what shall not, 
enter into an aesthetic object. If the categories and "per- 
ceptual concepts" are excluded, why not empirical non- - 
perceptual concepts also? Or, to put it in the opposite way, 
why not include all? In a rough sense it would seem that 
some at least of the concepts from any of Mr. Stace's three 
classes might be embodied. In a rough sense -&erne works of 
art may be said to embody `unity', or `jealousy', or `love' 
just as much as `progress' or `gravitation'. It is, indeed, 
difficult to see why `unity', for example, should be placed 
(for aesthetic purposes) in a different class from `harmony' or 
`law' or `order'. 
If we are right, it is the principle of value, and not Mr. 
Stace's, or any other possible: principle of the classification 
of concepts, which decides what can be embodied in an 
aesthetic object. No concept as such, of whatever kind, is 
by its own right worthy to enter in. It is as. `terminal objects''. 
(0) of fulfilment that concepts are embodied, or (as, e.g., 
in the case of `goodness' or `love') as values (f.) themselves., 
We make an artificial abstraction if we leave out of con -: 
sideration the relation of concepts to value. Value (t.f.) is 
the central explaining principle of embodiment. The 
concepts as such are not values, but they must be related 
to particular values before they can be embodied. 
Not' ly have mere concepts as such no right to enter 
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into the aesthetic object, but they could not possibly do so. 
They could not possibly get fused. Concepts are Italic, inert, 
abiding eternally in the place of the Forms'. And the 
conceiving of them could never bring them into relation 
with individual aesthetic objects. They must get into this 
relation not through conceiving, but through our desires, 
through all forms of our interests, based in their turn, once 
again,upon our tendencies, upon our hormic `drives'. This, 
to repeat, is /true motivation of aesthetic construction, and 
without it Sere would be the completest aesthetic sterility. 
On the question whether there are some concepts which 
can, and some which cannot, be embodied, it seems unsafe 
to dogmatise. The question involved is whether all concepts 
whatever can be related to values. It a.y -lam that such an 
abstract category as `existence' or `quality' or such a per- 
ceptual concept as `to the left of' is unlikely to be appreciated 
as a terminal object or as a value (t -f.). Yet We..44444443ay 
- L --I is perhaps not altogether fantastic to 
suppose sheer `existence', or any of the Platonic Forms as 
appearing to a metaphysically minded artist, as supremely 
satisfying objects (0). And if `existence', why not `house', 
or 'roughness'? 
X. A NOTE ON `AESTHETIC EMOTION' 
We have said that "Pleasant feelings, pleasant psychoses, 
and, perhaps, pleasurable emotions" occur as final -efficient 
causes of aesthetic production. Of feelings we have spoken. 
But what of emotion? Is there a special kind of, aesthetic 
emotion? Are there special emotions at all? To both of 
these questions the answer `Yes' is often given. We have, 
it is often said, emotions corresponding to every instinct, 
Vand we are toldd that there is a special aesthet. emotion. 
lOther people argue that there is no such thing hat there 
*ria 5. 
/ E.g. by Mr. Clive Bell in Art, Phoenix Library, p. 6. 
t E.g. by Mr. I. A. Richards in Principles of Literary Criticism, p, i t sq. 
p 
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are `special' emotions is either untrue or it is obvious, 
It is untrue if it is meant that each emotion is in some 
obscure way unique, sui generis, containing nothing in 
common with any other emotion. It is obvious if it is meant 
that each emotion, being a psychosis, is therefore concretely 
different from every 9the psychosis that some are very 
like others. The 1°cr °'1er seems to me the only really 14essilale K 
view. If we adopt it we need not trouble ourselves very much 
about whether there is a special aesthetic emotion or not. 
Of course there isn't and of course there is. There isn't, in 
that to have aesthetic experience is not to cast off human 
nature, and there is, in that aesthetic experiences as a class 
are noticeably different in many ways from any others. 
Emotion is a psychosis in which, through organic and 
conative- affective disturbance in relation to a particular 
object, there is experienced a certain degree of excitement. 
The concrete character of any emotion depends upon each 
of these factors and upon their relations to one another. 
If this is true, every single emotion will be concretely 
different from every other, though some emotions, resembling, 
others, may be classified roughly in certain groups. 
As regards aesthetic emotion, we may say in the first 
place that there is such a thing, since aesthetic experience 
' often, and perhaps always, involves sufficient excitement to 
be called emotion -psychosis. And aesthetic emotion s which 
are, thus, just aesthetic experiences with stress laid on their 
excitement- aspect, are different as a class from other emotions, 
in the same degree and to the same extent as aesthetic 
experience is different from non -aesthetic experience. mod, /4-4 
for reasons given, eaoh aesthetic emotion is different in 
some ways from every other. But to say this is not to say 
anything in the least remarkable, and one sometimes wonders 
at the -îuss. which has been , = o . =r emotional excitement, 
which, after all, is but a sympto 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FIVE 
(a) VARIATIONS OF STRESS UPON O AND T F IN THE 
VALUE -SITUATION 
Having discussed value and its em idbnent, it may perhaps 
be helpful to add here in an appendix a brief formal analysis 
of the value situation and of its various manifestations in 
aesthetic objects. 
We have said that what is embodied is primarily, though 
by no means exclusively, the values of our own bodies and 
minds. (Let us as before concentrate on positive values, 
taking the term `value' as here meaning positive value.) 
The values of our bodies and minds are fulfilments of needs 
or tendencies. Now, sometimes, the need is for some specific 
and definitely recognised object or thing which is outside or 
extrinsic to our own processes, as, when hungry or thirsty, 
my organism needs, and I cognise the object food or the 
object drink, and I behave in a manner conducive to the 
obtaining of it. Sometimes, on the other hand, there is no 
such specific or definite extrinsic object or thing clearly 
recognised. The need may be simply for the continuance or 
completion of the process, and this may be all that is wanted. 
Thus exercise of the body is, under some conditions, a value, 
and my organism's activity of exercise, or continued exercise, 
may be all that I consciously desire. In the one case a 
terminal object or thing which is extrinsic to the process 
itself, is consciously recognised. In the other case, if a ter- 
minal object is thought of at all, it will not be thought of as 
an external thing, but simply as the exercise, or the con - 
tinued exercise, or the completion of our own activity. 
These distinctions, though in a way obvious, may seem 
a little arbitrary. It máÿ be said that organisms ärid minds 
always have needs or objects outside themselves ; by them- 
selves they cannot live; The need for physical exercise and 
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for rest is the need for replenishment and repair of tissues,, 
and this is possible only through the existence of chemical 
substances distinct from the body itself. So, I suppose, with 
digestion. Mental fulfilments, too, imply the presence of a 
world of objects independent of them. 
All this is perfectly true, and, if we were considering 
mindless organisms merely, it would be unimportant, and 
perhaps false, to say that sometimes the terminal object is 
prominent and sometimes it is not. For all there would 
really be (on the above hypothesis) would be mindless 
organisms with needs and tendencies, in an environment 
more or less fitted to fulfil these needs and tendencies. 
Mindless organisms would not `seek' objects, as the mind 
seeks the things it desires, and the idea of prominence before 
consciousness, would be, of course, irrelevant. 
But in aesthetics we are not dealing primarily with 
mindless organisms, but with mindful ones, and with mind 
which consciously `espouses' (to use Mr. Stapledon's happy 
jargon) its own tendencies and those of its organism. And 
where mind enters in, `objects' of consciousness enter in too, 
and the matter of the relative `prominence' of a terminal 
object or of a process is no longer irrelevant. 
In a conscious organism, four possible kinds of value - 
situation may occur. Let us represent those aspects of any 
situation of which the mind is unconscious or is not 
prominently, definitely, or clearly conscious, by putting 
them in round brackets, and let r stand for `in relation to'. 
We then get : 
(i) (TFrO) 
(2) T F (r O) 
(3) T Fr O 
(q.) (TFr) O 
(i) This is exemplified by some such process as digestion, . 
or circulation, of which we are, or may be, quite unconscious. 
(2) This would include any tendencies of our bodies or. 
fa, 
0,- 
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minds of which we are conscious, and which are moving 
smoothly on and so fulfilling themselves, and where there is 
no extrinsic object bulking largely before our minds. Thus 
we may enjoy the activity of thinking, or of exercise like an 
swimming or walking. True, such activities are all, in reality, 
intercourse with an environment, and are not mere mind - 
or leg- wagging. But in the case I am considering the ex- 
ternal environment is not prominently before consciousness. 
(3) Here we are conscious both of a tendency being 
fulfilled and of a terminal object extrinsic to it, which is 
what we desire, and which is a cause of the fulfilment. 
Examples of this would be the enjoyment of eating food 
when we are hungry, when the interest in the food and the 
interest in our being satisfied are about equal. Other 
examples would be, getting warm before a blaze (where 
the blaze is an object of some attention) or mental exercise 
with the desire to solve a special and interesting problem. 
(4) Here the interest is so `objective' that we cease, or 
almost cease, to be aware of our own processes in our 
interest of the object which compels our attention. Thus 
some sudden disaster may awaken, and so hold our attention, 
that our eyes, symbolically, almost start from our head. 
(The tendency here might be one bi - the instincts 
of curiosity and fear and sympathy.) Or the boxer's attention 
is wholly fixed on the body of his opponent, especially on 
the place where he hopes to deliver his next blow. So, 
mentally, our attention is focused upon the fascinating 
problem. Or the desire of the lover is for his beloved. 
(b) How THESE ARE EXHIBITED IN THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
These are the ways in which the two aspects of the value - 
situation may be stressed. We may proceed to apply it to 
the aesthetic embodiment. Before doing this, however, it may 
simply be remarked that the aesthetic object, perceived or 
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imaged, is itself always a terminal object of value, or, 
perhaps better, it is a complex of terminal objects. This is 
shown by the mere fact that we are interested in it. We are 
interested in it because the contemplation of it, for various 
reasons, fulfils awakened tendencies in us. 
The formally possible ways in which (in the light of the 
above analysis) the value -situation may appear in the 
aesthetic object, are as follows : 
(i.) [(T F r O)] embodied by ways direct. 
(ii.) [(T F r O)] embodied by ways indirect. 
(iii.) T F (r O) embodied by ways `direct'. 
(iv.) T F (r O) embodied by ways `indirect'. 
(v.) T F r O embodied by ways `direct'. 
(vi.) T F r O embodied by ways `indirect'. 
(vii.) (T F r) O embodied by ways `direct'. 
(viii.) (T F r) O embodied by ways `indirect'. 
(i.) and (ii.).. These are, formally, possible. But they are 
not important for our present analysis, and are therefore 
enclosed in square brackets. Organic and mental processes 
of which we are wholly unconscious may be part of the 
necessary conditions for our having aesthetic experience at . 
all and their existence may colour the content of present 
experience. My digestive and circulatory processes, for 
example, are necessary if my organism is to continue to 
exist ; . they are therefore necessary if I am to appreciate a 
picture or a poem. And the state of my digestion or circula- 
tion may easily colour what I cognise. So, if/' there are 
mental processes of which I am totally unconscious, these 
may likewise affect cognised content, either `directly' or 
`indirectly' through fusion with some contentwhich they 
rrtay have affectedkn the past. But then so may many other . 
things affect cognised content -race, heredity, tradition, 
7 I am not concerned to 
saythaat 
*there are, or, if there are, what is their 
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education, class, prejudice. With these, however, we are not 
concerned here, for we are dealing with theetl-content CerN 
of what is embodied in the aesthetic object. Physical or 
mental processes, of which we are totally unconscious, 
have importance for us here only in a roundabout way. 
Our interest is in content of which we are in some degree 
conscious. 
Of course if we are in some degree conscious of the organic 
or mental processes, they become part of the content. But 
in this case they come under later headings. 
Examples of (iii.) would be the `rising pillar', the `flowing' 
circle. The `rising' and the `flowing' are derived from our 
organisms, and are processes enjoyed for their own sakes 
without necessarily any explicit consciousness occurring 
of an external terminal object which is (for example} 
literally `rising' or `flowing'. Other examples would be the 
`dignity' or `vigour' imputed to music, or the `courage' and 
`energy' imputed to a statue like the Colleoni in Venice. 
These all, as values vividly experienced, arise `directly' out 
of our organic and mental dispositions which become 
imputed. 
Examples of (iv.) would be similar values, only awakened 
through association. The sound of the horn might awaken, 
through association, imaginary experiences of the value of 
the exercise of hunting. Or the drum might suggest courage 
and other warfare- values. 
(v.) would be exemplified by representations of organic 
Jet` mental process with definite relation to some object. 
The c$uest of the Grail -good in the seeking and good in 
a. the finding; n y ,ikio le g f Ahca1tim Niobe 
y 
% mourning for her children, Ceres seeking for Proserpine, , Apollo for Daphne, all these would be illustrations- though 
ú. in several the value is negative rather than positive. 
(vi.) Hère, if the associations are psychologically infused, 
we might select as example any image of T F r O called up- 
explicitly before the mind through association. (It would 
It 
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have to be, of course, aesthetically fused, or relevant.) If, 
p Ti the other hand, the associations are psychologically 
fused, it is not so easy to give examples. For if an association 
is fused, it is not present before the mind in a clear -cut way. 
Now T F r O is a considerably complex object, and the 
realisation that O is the cause of the fulfilment of T F, and 
that T F is in relation to O, involves a fairly high degree 
of abstractly discriminative synthesis. Whilst this synthesis 
may, easily be possible in an aesthetic experience when 
directly apprehended, it could hardly exist so definitely in 
a psychologically fused experience. A T F r O in the past, 
fused with a present content, will affect its certainly. But 
T F r O will not appear explicitly in the present aesthetic fsr 
experience,[ É(4,4/ 6*-L, 
(vii.) Hale colours, figures, sounds, combinations of a 
sounds, ideas, all things or objects which are directly appre- 
hended as interesting in the aesthetic object, are represented 
by the symbols (T F r) O. The apprehension of these Os 
fulfils needs in us. 
(viii.) Here the suggestion of all interesting things or 
objects- psychologically fused, it may be, in varying 
degrees- enters in as a qualification of the focal object. 
In Mr. Masefield's 
` Quinquireme of Nineveh from distant Ophir 
Rowing home to haven in sunny Palestine, 
With a cargo of ivory, 
And apes and peacocks, 
Sandalwood, cedarwood, and sweet white wine. 
Stately Spanish galleon coming from'the Isthmus, 
Dipping, through the Tropics by the palm -green shores, 
With a cargo of diamonds, 
Emeralds, amethysts, 
Topazes, and cinnamon, and gold moidores" 
the charm lies not merely in the delightful objects named 
[which would be further examples of (vii.)], but in the 
142 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
qualities of the many more romantic things which they 
suggest. Or take the suggestiveness of a name like Samarcand. 
Perhaps some of the best examples of the suggestion of 
delightful objects, of exotic and fascinating things, are to 
be found in. Kubla Khan. 
(C) `IMPUTATION' AND `RELEVANCE' 
A further note on the word `imputation' may be in place 
here, even at the cost of some repetition, for the matter is 
important. 
In the first place, the imputation of the T Fs unbracketed 
must be accepted with reservations. We may in one sense 
impute vigour to the bronze forms of the equestrian statue 
we do seem to see `vigour' in the statue of General Colleoni. 
But we enjoy it through immediate experience of our own 
organisms. If the T F appears in the object, it is also 
experienced in us. We think vigour, for example, into the 
object, for we are interested in and are attending to it. 
But our experience is of a larger complex whole, including 
our own processes and states, even if only marginally, 
together with the object. This is the total objective in the 
aesthetic situation. The term `relevant' is therefore, as 
previously suggested, the safest and most comprehensive 
word to use. We experience T Fs relevant to the aesthetic 
object, and a whole complex situation, including our own 
states, is cognised by us. 
In the second place, the T Fs in brackets exist, of course, 
in us, and as emiltinria the aesthetic experience are relevant 
to the aesthetic object. But, as symbolised by the brackets, 
they are not attended to or made prominent in any way. 
The value -situation, then, is exhibited in these various 
ways, and with these stresses and emphases, in the aesthetic 
object. But it would be tedious and far too complicated to 
state every time under which form the value situation is 
being revealed. We may, therefore, for purposes of simplicity, 
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speak in general of value being embodied when we mean 
either that F r O) or T F r O, or (T F r) O, is embodied. 
This is strictly speaking inaccurate, for only T F is really 
`value'. But if we do clearly realise its inaccuracy, we may 
1 e.forgiven for using `value' in this inclusive way. We shall 
have avoided the fault of pedantry -in this matter, at 
any rate. 
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I. THE AESTHETIC PROBLEM RAISED BY FUNCTIONAL 
FULFILMENT 
In Chapter Four we discussed- the aesthetic expressiveness 
which occurs by the way of fused association, or, `indirectly'. 
The term `association', it will be remembered, was delibe- 
rately used in a very wide sense. Employed in this way it 
might, of course, be taken to include the association which a 
perceived function -fulfilling object naturally has with the 
idea of its function. If, for example, the shape of a bread- 
knife or an arm -chair or a racing motor -car at once suggests 
ideas respectively of cutting bread, of sitting comfortably, 
of speeding along, the suggestion, to our minds, by one 
thing of the other is of course a form-of `association' in our 
sense. I have, however, postponed until now the discussion 
of problems raised by functional suggestion. This has been 
necessary mainly because functional suggestion raises certain 
questions of value of which it would have been premature 
to treat before the last chapter on `value'. 
The problem, however, deserves separate attention. For 
one thing, what is sometimes called `functional beauty', or 
the `beauty of efficiency', is regarded to -day as of great 
importance. For another, the association determined by the 
relation of object to function appears, at least at first sight, 
to form an exception to the rule exhibited in the instances 
which were discussed in the first four chapters. In these 
instances, the work of imagination was found to be a 
necessary condition for the existence of the aesthetic object. 
If a yellow patch 44tseelly' suggests the qualities of sunshine, 
or of jaundice, or of a certain person, the fusion of yellow 
with the suggested quality is dependent causally, we have 
agreed, upon the imaginative mind. The conjunction of the`' 
body and the content could not possibly occur without 
the mind's presence. But with function- fulfilment it is -at 
any rate it looks -different. The relationship between the 
thing and its function is `there' already. True, we may know 
K 
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it, but it does not look as though aesthetic imagination were 
necessary. The knife does cut, the motor -car does speed; 
we are apprehending, not a mere construction of our 
imagination, but a fitness which is fact as surely as anything 
could be. The question, then, is, Are we right in supposing 
that in such a case imagination is a superfluity, is inert, 
that it does nothing? Is `functional beauty' just the bare fact 
of fitness, which only needs eyes, and no aesthetic synthetic 
imagination, to see it for what it is? 
Let us take the term `functional' broadly. Let us take it 
to, include both the artificial and the natural, a steam - 
engine or a sailing -ship or a coal -scuttle, I as well as the 
sheath of the lily, the form of a tree, the curving body of a, 
sea -gull in flight, or the movements of a race -horse or an 
athlete. We might perhaps include also under `functional' 
revelation any revelation of natural states and processes 
through their appearances, such as the revelation of wakening 
life in the sounds and smells and fresh green colours of 
spring, or If the revelation of a state of general well-being 
in growing things through their colours and shapes. But 
the clearest cases of functional revelation belong perhaps to 
the types first mentioned. 
II. THE KNOWLEDGE OF FUNCTIONAL FULFILMENT 
The knowledge of function is, in the first place, knowledge 
of fact. When we apprehend, say, the fitness of the shapes 
of a schooner for its function, we are apprehending an 
unquestionable fact. Here is a direct -revelation of a reality 
which exists entirely independently of our cognisance of it. 
(It is true that in order to cognise it we have to cognise it.) 
And Our cognition may be a cognition either of something 
which is obvious on the face of it to every adult human 
x Conceptual entities, like mathematical objects, are excluded by agree- 
ment, though these, as we have seen, may, possibly/ possess a kind of 
functional beauty. 
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being, or a cognition of something which cannot be cognised 
without a process of nseieus- learning. An example of the 
former would be the shape of the arrow or of the torpedo. 
Anyone can see that such things look as though they were 
made for movement. Likewise, negatively, I can see, without 
much difficulty, that a beer -barrel is a system of tensions in 
equilibrium in which the springiness and compressibility of 
the wood play an integral part. So when I notice, hanging 
above the doors of certain public- houses, a beer -barrel 
constructed out of red glass, I can apprehend at once the 
contradiction of function, and can almost hear, in painful 
anticipation, the splintering crack which would occur were 
the thing not a fraud. Functional revelation, on the other 
hand, may not be so immediately obvious. Anyone can see 
how the bellying sails, the leaning, straining masts, and the 
tautened sheets of the sailing -ship are fulfilling their func- 
tions. The steam or motor liner, however, demands more 
knowledge and a greater resource of imaging the hidden 
source of power. Only to the initiated, again, can the shapes 
of a very complex machine reveal its functions. A dredger or 
a tank or a grain- chute, when unfamiliar, may appear 
meaningless and ugly, though revealing economy and 
perfection to the expert eye. 
Yet, though cognition must always be present, and is 
less, or more, complex, we are, in these cases, in contact 
with indubitable facts. Are these facts which we know 
in themselves aesthetic facts? aesthetic imagination 
unnecessary? (. 
III. THE EFFICIENT THING VERSUS THE AESTHETIC OBJECT 
I suggest that it is not so, in spite of an extremely common 
idea which is current, that beauty is simply efficiency, and 
that the efficient is always per se beautiful. It is popularly 
thought, and often said, that the thing which does its job 
well is the model of everything it aesthetically ought to be. 
eµ 
r; 
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Steam -engines, Schneider Trophy winners, or racing motor- 
cars thus become the aesthetic idols of the day. Pictures and 
statues and `works of art' are, for such opinion, rather out 
of date. This has its counterpart in the moral sphere, in the 
shallow but equally self -assured philosophy, that goodness 
and beauty mean the same thing, each being identical with 
nothing more than `doing your work well'. In a very right 
reaction against the ornate, there is a tendency to go to the 
opposite extreme and to become mawkish about efficiency. 
As against this view one would urge that `functional beauty', 
or the `beauty of efficiency', must be imagined aesthetically, 
like any other aesthetic object, and that function -fulfilment, 
or efficiency, is never identical with beauty. Further, 
aesthetic expression of function is, it would appear, merely 
one among a number of possible expressions, and it demands 
supplementation frequently, though perhaps not always. 
IV. THE AESTHETIC APPREHENSION OF FUNCTIONAL 
FULFILMENT 
Functional beauty must be imagined like any other aesthetic 
object. When I apprehend the bare fact that this sailing 
ship, shaped thus, fulfils its function, I am in possession of 
an ordinary piece of knowledge, expressible in a proposition 
which has a universal for its predicate. This is not an 
aesthetic experience. When functional fulfilment is ex- 
perienced aesthetically, what we are experiencing is not 
merely the fact that this -body -is- fulfilling- (or can- fulfil -) 
its -function. What we are experiencing is, to start with, the 
functional fulfilment as- revealed -in- the -form -of- the -body. 
The content, functional fulfilment, is imaginatively fused 
with the body, is aesthetically fused. And what we are 
experiencing is, to go on with, not merely this, but the 
complex as exhibiting a kind of joy. In Mr. Santayana's 
phraseology, there is `pleasure objectified'. We apprehend 
then, not the meaning of a proposition in which a logical 
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idea of functional fulfilment is related to a particular body, 
nor even the revelation of a bare fulfilment in the body: 
.what we apprehend is delightful fulfilment, fulfilment full of 
delight, embodied in the body. If, for the poet, the meadows 
are painted `with delight', so the movement of the ship, 
"Leaning across the bosom of the urgent West," 
is a thing in itself_full of subtle joy. Or consider these won- 
derful rapid motion-pictures of the growth of flowers. Not 
only do we enjoy such fulfilments, but there appears to be 
a joy in the movements themselves. 
In the case of an object like a ship we know there is 
literally speaking, no joy existing in the relation of the shape 
to its function ; there is even, so far as the ship is concerned; 
no fulfilment. There is cause and effect. How then do 
fulfilment, and joy, `get into' the object? The fulfilment 
`gets' there, in the first place, because it is there, in the 
sense that the ship's forms were designed for its purpose 
(analogously, an organism looks as though it were designed 
for its purpose). In the second place, the ship's fulfilment 4 
-gets there' aesthetically, as we said, through the agency of % 
aesthetic imagination. r T t+ 
. , through the instrumentality of our .bodies- and /LA tut.'" 
minds. Part of the fulfilment that `gets into' the object is, 
not the ship's fulfilment, but ours. Part of the imputed: 
fulfilment is, not the fact for which the ship was designed,' 
but the fulfilment of our own .ortaaisms, which is made, `4-41 
`relevant' to the appearance of the ship. When, in looking: 
at a Greek Temple, we vividly apprehend the forces at work 
in the entablature supported by columns, we do to some, 
extent, as we have seen, project our -mxsenlar tensions and ; 014124 
images into the object. Or at least sometimes we do, and so 
far the empathists are right. Likewise in seeing the -ship' / 
1 we do in some _sense enjoy ow. organic fulfilments `in' the 
object. We enjoy them : hence the joy enters, as it were, 
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into the object. In a sense, we are the ship, we are the sea- 
gull. This is all familiar. As the muscular and .ogomic 
factors are projected, so is the accompanying joy projected. 
The `joy' is of course m inl ,the positive hedonic tone 
which accompanies our' fulfilments. As was said 
in the last chapter, we immediately experience and enjoy 
91+44 sM our auis s.; and hence arises appreciative enjoyment of 
things which lie beyond our organisms. 
On the whole, then, . we may say that, although we are 
apprehending a real functional fulfilment which is a fact 
(expressible in a proposition), we are bringing to our cog- 
nitive apprehension of it an imagination, a sympathy, and 
an empathy with their hedonic accompaniments, which not 
only unite the idea of the function to the appearance of the 01 
object, but which to some extent unite our .6aiiiiifs, and D/- 
4 
-444-41 
even our enjoyments, to that appearance. The object 
apprehended in the aesthetic experience is thus something 
much more than the fact of the function -fulfilment. And it 
is something obviously dependent upon the presence of 
mind as for its cause. The functional fulfilment of the ship 
may be a fact independent of my mental processes. So may 
some fulfilments of my organism. But 'the-appearance-of- 
the- ship - united - to- the-idea - of- the- function -united- to- my- 
erga iffn- fulfilling -itself' as a whole, dependegirt upon 
my synthetic imagination for its very existence. If, then, 
yellow- which -has -the -quality -of- jaundice -in -it is a complex 
due to imagination, so is the ship -aesthetically -seen. Func- 
tional expression, as an aesthetic object, is causally related 
to mind as are the other cases we have examined. And fusion 
of several entities is equally necessary. 
= Of course in apprehending functional beau y_hor ao ithetis-sa3uas 
The cure . of the ship's sails may 
have a general aesthetic value. But -ee 
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V. THE IRREGULAR CORRELATION OF EFFICIENCY AND. 
BEAUTY 
Efficiency, then, as a mere fact, has no aesthetic value ; for 
this it demands the presence of a body- and -mind. And for 
the body- and -mind it is not always . easy, or possible, to 
apprehend efficiency aesthetically. For one thing, much 
efficiency goes by unnoticed, and much efficiency is in itself 
uninteresting, just because it is efficiency, and we take it for 
granted. But it would be hard, I should think, to refute the 
view that anyysimple piece of efficiency might, so far as it 
could be embodied in a perceived or imaged object, be 
apprehended with some degree of aesthetic satisfaction, 
might be, in this sens be u iful. But even if this is so, it 
does not follow thatereto. complex objects, composed of 
parts each of which is efficient and aesthetically satisfactory, 
will always, as wholes, be aesthetically satisfactory. A factory 
(or a warehouse, or a piece of office furniture, or a dredger) 
may be a congeries of efficient units, each unit playing a part 
in the efficiency of a larger system, and each unit being, 
perhaps, aesthetically satisfactory. And yet the whole factory 
(etc.) may fail in aesthetic value. An aest etic object is 
organisation of parts, 'its organisation 
¿., ivát -d nomt lay- identical in type with the organisation of 
efficiencies which constitutes the complex efficiency of, say, 
a factory. The organisation of the aesthetic object is one 
,ter ha Le which es- itself apparent in a single percept or an image. = 
And the complex efficiency. of a great factory may simply 
not be aesthetically pat all. If we try to see it as 
It may be, as a complete whole, aesthetically 
And it may appear, however efficient it be in part and 
I If concepts and systems of them can be true aesthetic objects, it might 
be argued, that the complex conception of an efficient factory is an 
aesthetic object. But this is doubtful, and we may leave it here. 
ce".{Z414«.e-y 
K, 
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There is absolutely no 
necessary relation between a thing's being completely 
efficient in part and whole, and its being aesthetically 
pleasing in every aspect. Its efficiency- aspects may be 
aesthetically pleasing, but it has aspects other than these 
which may be the reverse of pleasing. I am sure that, even 
though the Corporation rubbish -cart may be an entirely 
efficient machine, it is, in its shape and colours, ugly. So 
office and domestic furniture may fulfil their functions 
perfectly, in every part, and yet remain monstrously ugly in 
some of their appearances. 
VI. THE RELATION OF FUNCTIONAL BEAUTY TO BEAUTY IN 
GENERAL 
Sometimes a system which is- efficient in all its aspects and 
as a whole happens to be aesthetically pleasing in most, Or 
all, of its non- efficiency aspects. A schooner or a suspension - 
bridge (or the Forth Bridge) is aesthetically pleasing both 
on account of its functional revelation and its general propor- 
tions. Sometimes, in efficient objects, these proportions are 
- lacking, and have to be provided by a conscious act of 
..<design. The architect, planning warehouses or banks, does, 
in fact, consider very carefully indeed the general aesthetic 
values of proportion, of relations of lines and planes and 
volumes. It is merely nonsense, and sentimental nonsense, to 
suppose (as is veryy often indeed supposed) that because 
a factory is built efficiently for its purpose, it must therefore 
be all beautiful, or, conversely, to argue that because this 
window appears disproportionately placed to the rest, 
therefore the factory is inefficient at this point. If beauty were 
. identical with efficiency, this would certainly follow. Every 
deckhouse on -a liner no doubt has its function, and is 
' I am, of course, anticipating later discussions in speaking of beauty and 
ugliness at this stage. Let them be taken as short for `aesthetically 
satisfying' and `aesthetically dissatisfying'. 
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placed where it is for a purpose. But its fitness for this 
purpose has little if anything to do with the beauty of the 
lines of the ship. It may involve real ugliness as a whole. 
Conversely, `good' proportions may make in some cases 
for inefficiency. 
The artistic designer takes into account not only function, 
but the general aesthetic values of proportion. He may dó 
more even than this. There are cases . where functional 
beauty is not only harmonised, in a creative act, with à 
general beauty of proportion, but naturally and rightly . 
blossoms into suitable ornament. When we speak of func- 
tional beauty we think often of craftsmen and their work 
rather than of machinery ; we think of hand -constructed 
chairs, hand -beaten spoons, bowls, candle -sticks, fire -irons, 
and so on. Now these no doubt fulfil their function well, 
or we should condemn them. And their beauty cannot 
adequately be judged apart from their fulfilment of function. 
But it is the variation and individuality which gives them 
the real beauty which thrills us, which thrills us as sheer 
efficiency scarcely does. You get a certain kind of utensil 
which is best made by machinery, which has its own plain, 
honest, though limited, functional beauty. But in the 
craftsman's work there is more. The craftsman making his 
sgaer -er-1 candle -stick t my makes an efficient article, 
Red --erg adjusts his proportions carefully. e goeson to A. 
embellish aid ername and how spontaneously and with Q .lam** 
what delight he does it! It goes without saying that in his igv,, 
delight lurks a danger, that he may let himself be led away 
to excess. We have the warning of the inveterate wood- 
carver before us. But true ornament is possible and legitimate, 
and is seen in the best craftsmanship. It is, at its best, a 
natural outgrowth of functional expressiveness, though it is 
distinct from it. 
Functional fulfilment, then, has its place as a datum for 
aesthetic experience, but only a place. There are two 
different senses in which it might be said that functional 
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fulfilment enters into all aesthetic experience. The first is 
hardl all aesthetic experience 
involves.e immediate appreciation of our own mental and 
bodily functions, therefore functional expressiveness always 
enters in. This is really invalid, however, because the 
functional expressiveness we are considering is the expres- 
siveness, not primarily of our own states, but of an object 
apprehended as distinct from the body. It is the efficiency 
of the ship, and not of our organisms, which is referred to 
when we talk ; ` . - ' 
The other sense has more meaning. It may be said, for 
example, that functional beauty enters into all the beauty 
of art. The picture or the poem or the symphony is a unity, 
is a perfection in which part fits in with part, in which the 
complex and difficult is unified in complex simplicity. All 
these are cases of functional fulfilment and efficiency. In this 
there is probably truth. The value of efficiency or functional 
fulfilment is one of the values which may (perhaps always) 
be fused into aesthetic objects like works of art. But it 
would, even in this case, be misleading and confusing to 
speak of all beauty as functional beauty, for `functional 
beauty' still has its specialised meaning. 
v/' 
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I. `AESTHETIC', `ART', `WORK OF ART' 
Thus far we have been dealing largely, though not exclu- 
sively, with the aesthetic expressiveness of relatively simple 
perceptual data, and we have often found ourselves definitely 
hampered through not being able to speak more fully of 
aesthetic objects in their more developed and complex 
forms -in a word, of works of art. From now onwards we 
shall be concerned mainly with problems of the work 
of art. 
The work of ä.rt is a more developed, more complex 
entity than the entities we have ee mainly discussing, and 
it has its own very definite problems. But it should not be 
thought that in beginning to discuss the work of art we are 
approaching anything which is fundamentally and essentially 
new in aesthetic principle. The making of the work of art 
does, as I shall try to show, involve activities which are not 
present in the aesthetic appreciation of an aesthetic object 
which is given.' But it is, on the other hand, really the 
fulfilment to the point of completion)by means of construc- 
tion, of the simpler expressions or embodiments of which 
we have spoken. An odd colour or sound or form may 
appear to imagination to express value, but such simple 
objects are unlikely to be completely satisfying to the 
vigorous aesthetic imagination. In fact, as we have already 
suggested, they may, if we are of certain dispositions, stir iñ 
us appetites which cannot be satisfied by anything less than 
a very complex process of construction, of modification and 
supplementation, which stops only at complete satisfaction. 
Such a construction possesses unity ; it has no `ragged edges' ; 
in it we can rest, and we are not tempted to stray out beyond 
its boundaries. The genesis and building up of this unity, 
which possesses the quality of `beauty', is now our problem. 
A word about terminology. The general term `art' is 
ambiguous. It may apply : (I) to the comparatively simple 
' See below, p. ono. 115--Is 
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activity of producing comparatively simple aesthetic objects 
(such as expressive gestures, shouts, or splashes of sound or 
colour) ; () to the product of (I) ; (3) to the production 
of mo e complex, unified, aesthetic objects, like pictures or 
poems; and (4) to the product of (3). T- tis- usage -wilt be 
e-g 
be called the `work of art'. And (4) only. Here I follow 41242 
common custom in terminology. Shouting may (sometimes) 
be `art' ; so is producing a picture `art'.. And the produced 
(4 
shout might be called `art'. On the other hand we should 
usually speak of the picture as a work of art, whilst we should 
not so name the produced shout. If this sounds arbitrary, 
it is convenient. And it has an importance beyond con- 
venience, because strange conclusions are sometimes arrived 
at through muddling art in the widest sense with the produc- 
tion of works of art, or through failing to realise the relation 
of the two. 
One more remark on a matter which is closely allied. 
We are calling every kind of artistic activity `art'. But not 
every kind of aesthetic activity. The term `aesthetic activity' 
includes the purely mental work of the contemplative 
imagination, and this would not ordinarily be called `art'. 
It is true that some writers do make `art' and the `aesthetic' 
coterminous. But this I believe, is erroneous as well as 
confusing, as I shall try to show. I shall argue for the view 
that the aesthetic includes art, that art is one form of general 
aesthetic activity, namely productive aesthetic activity.= 
II. THEORIES OF ARTISTIC 'MOTIVATION 
The awakening of desire for further aesthetic satisfaction by 
apprehension of some simple and aesthetically incomplete 
object is, we have said,2 one way in which artistic production 
may start. But it is only one way ; or, perhaps better, to 
describe artistic process thus motivated is to describe only 
r See below, p. -eee. 
, 
2 Above, p.-ees 
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one aspect of what may in fact be a much larger and more 
complicated affair. For the work of art may be, it would 
appear, the result of various motives. It is thought, for 
example, that arKat least very often, Is the elucidation of a 
subject- matter. The poet tells stories, or he sings of love, 
of nature, or even of rather general ideas like duty or 
immortality. Painters represent landscapes and human 
beings. And it is said that these or other things are the 
`inspiration' of art, that art must be `inspired' by subject - 
matter and (perhaps) that art is a kind of imitation. Again, 
it is alleged that the artist constructs his work of art because 
he desires to communicate something to others, or because 
he desires to make something permanent, or because he 
wants to `express himself'. Or it is said that art finds its real 
motive in some instinct -in play, or construction, or sex - 
or, again, that art springs `from the unconscious'. What we 
have to do now is to try to state what seems to be the truth 
about the central principle of art- construction, and to 
consider how the theories cited -or such of them as seem 
of importance -fall, into place or fail to do so. 
III. `INSPIRATION' 
Perhaps the notion about art which is most common to all 
theories, and which is most generally accepted, is that it 
must have `inspiration'. The notion is evidently an important 
one, and for this reason and because inspiration is usually 
rather vaguely conceived, it will be useful to begin with a 
brief consideration of what it may mean. 
The ancient sense of the word `inspiration' is well known. 
It is, of course, that the artist produces his work through 
the agency of some Being superior to himself, say, -a God 
(or Goddess), a Muse, or perhaps an Angel. Inspiration 
means `breathing into' ; it was the Muse or other Being, 
it was thought, who breathed the music or the poem, or 
whatever it was, into the artist's soul for his transcription. 
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Though this notion no longer has the potency it had, we 
still speak of a person's being `inspired' when he appears to 
utter things which seem to come not from himself, but 
from some agency or power beyond him. We speak of 
`inspired' speech or `inspired' action. Artists have often 
testified to the feeling that their best work seems to come 
from a source `outside' themselves. And in the sphere of 
religion the idea still has some importance. 
But what is, more prosaically, often meant by `inspiration' 
to-day is illustrated by quite a different interpretation of 
the metaphor of `inspiration' or `breathing into'. We say 
that Arnold was inspired, not by an Angel or a Muse, 
but by Oxford or by Rugby Chapel. We mean that these 
perceived objects stirred and stimulated Arnold into produc- 
tion. In terms of the metaphor, it is not another animate 
Being who breathes into the poet, but he himself, who 
breathes. What he experiences is like a fine mountain air, 
intoxicating him into song. 
On this interpretation, the term `inspiration' means the 
conscious apprehension of some object' which is such that 
an artistic process is set going. Inspiration is thus a kind 
of motivation. But it is only one kind. Motivation is a wider 
concept than inspiration, and we must consider it generally, 
keeping in mind the special question, Do the immediate 
conditions of artistic production include, as essential, the 
conscious apprehension of some `inspiring' object? Arts like 
painting and poetry are commonly supposed to :be inspired 
by an object; but others certainly do not seem to be so 
inspired. Or at least it is difficult to discover definite inspiring 
objects, definite `subject - matter' (outside the art itself) of 
a good deal of music and dancing, or of arabesque or 
architecture. Let us turn, then, to the general question and 
hope for light by the way on the special one. 
Includingpersons and events. 
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IV. ARTISTIC MOTIVATION THROUGH PERCEPTION, AND 
OTHER SOURCES 
What sets the artist going? In one sense everything. The 
cause of the artist's production includes a vast conglomera- 
tion of circumstances. It includes all the conditions of his 
past life, his state of body at the time, and his state of mind 
at the time, conscious or dispositional. It includes all the 
¿tu. circumstances giving rise to 4 inspiring object, which, 
strictly speaking, may imply the whole history of the universe . 
up to the time of the event. Most of these things, however, 
are not in the least interesting for the theory of art. We may 
let them alone. The things we are interested in are the 
immediate conditions which set the artist going and the 
conditions which keep him going once he has started. 
The basic fact about the aesthetically equipped person, 
which differentiates him from all other highly developed 
human beings, is a great sensitivity to the suggestiveness of 
the material which he perceives. This material is always 
tending to set his imagination working. The moralist may 
have a keen sense of moral values, the religious mystic of a 
Presence behind all phenomena; but for the artist, who is 
the type of the aesthetic person, it is values as embodied in 
444 c;04 perceived stuff which matter. To the artist, then, whose befily 
is disposed to be keenly alive to sensuous impressions, who 
is keenly discriminative of them, and whose mind is quick 
to apprehend the valuable meanings with which, to his 
imagination, the material appears to be charged, the 
material is a stimulant. It stimulates into activity needs 
which are experienced as `desires'. The needs demand 
0--4/ ( fulfilment (¢r the `desires', satisfaction) and they find it 
partially in the apprehension of the stimulating material. 
Thus the sound of `tuning up', or of a few odd notes of his 
theme played by a violinist before he begins his recital, both 
whets an appetite to hear a more satisfying sequence of 
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sounds, and, at the same time, partially fulfils this need. 
That fulfilment does, so far, occur, is indicated by the fact 
that we enjoy the notes which we hear. But if the preliminary 
skirmish whets and satisfies it whets more than it satisfies. 
Or it whets in satisfying. It whets desire for a fuller fulfilment 
and a fuller enjoyment. If the notes happen to be the notes 
of the first few bars of a trio, the notes played will demand 
the next phrase, and the next, and the next, and so on, 
stopping nowhere short of the end. Whilst the music is in 
progress we are at every moment becoming satisfied by what 
is given. But the very thing which satisfies us is itself a 
demand for more. Its expressiveness satisfies, but it is an 
expressiveness of instability, of the instability of experience, 
of life itself. Instability demands stability, but this is not 
found before the end. And when the end is reached, we see 
that it is not, paradoxically, the end,, but the process of 
reaching it -in other words, the lived aesthetic whole, 
which is satisfying. Aesthetic experience is not the stopping 
or ending of a process, but a life of appetite and satisfaction 
more intense than ordinary earthly life and rounded to 
unearthly perfection. 
The tendencies which are stirred, fulfilled, and stirred, 
again by the apprehension of this phrase or that, are of 
course tendencies both of the organism and of the mind. 
The values, i.e., are both organic and mental. And further 
as well as the direct production of these values, ere s 
`indirect' production, by the process of association. 
The same general statements are of course true of the 
arts other than music. They are true of painting, for example. 
The perception of a shape -say the shape of a cedar tree, 
stirs and partially fulfils certain bodily and mental needs. 
Its structure, its colour, its grace, its dignity, are pleasing. 
We may draw it, stressing this and eliminating that, the 
drawing making for a more vivid realisation of the values, 
its selectiveness making for their purification from irrelev- 
ancies. But the isolated tree, though satisfying, is inadequate, 
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unstable ; it must spring from its earth, it must grow in 
a setting. To show up the beauty of its volumes, its planes 
and its lines, we may, in our drawing, set it forward against 
the background of an old house. To emphasise its black - 
blue- green foliage, we make it stand out against the white-. 
washed . walls of the house ; to emphasise the severe grace 
of its form, we introduce other, more delicate, foliage in 
contrast. To balance the shadows of the house, we introduce 
an old wall in this corner or that. And so the picture grows 
from one fascinating instability to another, till it is complete. 
The whole is a unified embodiment of many values, which 
as a whole does possess stability and which is something 
in which we can remain, without temptation to wander 
outside its boundaries. 
This is the schemgof how a work of art may arise, starting 
off with the perception of some stimulating material. But 
the initial proce, s may be reversed. Instead of the need being 
wakened by the perception of material, artistic construction 
may be started in other ways. It may be started by an idea, 
or by some other object or event which is not material. 
Anything which stirs what we call `an emotion' may set the 
artistic process going. It may be a vague feeling of mortality, 
or of spring, or of the sublime, or of a general joie de vivre, 
or it may be some purely fortuitous circumstance, such as 
a fit of irritation. But very commonly the initiating agents 
are `inspirations', are conscious apprehension of interesting 
objects. The `inspiration' might be an example of a work of 
art in the artist's own medium. More probably it would be 
44-1414-41 something else. The painter need not be motivated in the y 
first instance - .. _ e. !"07J 
He 4a4ali be stimulated by music, by poetry, by ideas, by Arilt44 , 
persons, or by natural objects of a non -visual kind. So the 07 
musician need not be stimulated to compose only through 
auditory suggestion. Debussy has said, I believe, that "it is 
more profitable for a musician to watch a fine sunset than 
to listen to the Pastoral Symphony ". The musician may 
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thus be stimulated through vision. Or he may be stimulated 
through the medium of friendship (e.g. Elgar's Enigma 
variations), through ideas, or indeed through anything 
which interests and stirs him. Such interests may be very 
vague and undefined or they may be definite. 
We commonly say that such inspiring objects, whether 
vague or definite, `arouse emotion', and that emotion is the 
`dynamic' of artistic construction. Superficially, as we saw, 
this is true, but only superficially. If the `hormic' psychology 
is true, then what is awakened or stirred ,by the inspiring 
object is not primarily feeling or emotion, but need or 
tendency. Tendency is experienced as vague unrest, as 
desire which demands fulfilment and satisfaction. Fulfilment 
and satisfaction in this case can only be obtained through 
the production in some medium or other of a system of 
perceived objects which (through all the complicated 
processes involved in `expression') is found to fulfil and 
satisfy, in the very contemplation of it, the awakened needs. 
Thus sunset colours and forms waken in a Turner, needs 
which can only be fulfilled by means of selective painting. 
In a Swinburne they stir the need to make a system of 
harmonious, satisfying words which to the poet's imagina- 
tive mind somehow fulfil the needs awakened by the very 
different visual material of the sunset. In a Debussy the 
appetites whetted by perception of the sunset can, perhaps, 
be fully satisfied only through the production of a system 
of harmonious (and disharmonious) sounds. The apprehen- 
sion of the completed music, and that only, can for the 
musician fulfil and satisfy with full enjoyment the needs 
awakened by the self -same sunset, which is (approximately) 
common to all three artists, the painter, the poet, and the 
musician. 
Why should the same object initiate such very different 
processes? Why should a sunset] stir painting impulses in 
I. No doubt mit are all tired of the illustration. Yet sunsets do in fact 
appear to have stimulated real artists- sometimes ! 
G1 UcYt [ 
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one man, verbal impulses in nother, and sound -producing 
impulses in a third? T1possible answer to such a 
question -if it is an answer -is that the several artists are 
so made that this happens. The painter is so made that, 
when his needs are awakened, their fulfilment tends to flow 
out along the channels of his interests in colours and shapes, 
of his painting activity. Inspire the poet and he breaks into 
words ; harass the musician or fill him with woe and sorrow 
and tragedy, or with ra turous joy, and he will, under 
certain conditions, so é sounds that they express the 
profoundest values of his being. He may produce a symphony 
which stirs and satisfies and gives a special kind of pleasure, 
`musical' pleasure, to his -and our -hungry soul. The artist 
is made in that way.'1And each artist is made in his own 
particular wayrii What interests the painter, as such, may 
leave the poet cold. And vice versa. You can see it in their 
very bodies. Or you can, anyhow, see it in the body of the 
plastic artist. As Mr. C. R. W. Nevinson (with a natural 
prejudice in favour of his kind) has rather violently and 
pungently put it, "Very few literary men have a visual 
sense, or any response between their hand and brain. I 
am always able to know a literary man by his hands, which 
hang by his side for all the world like hibernating slugs. 
An artist [á plastic artist] can always be recognised by the 
movements of his hands, which are forming and drawing the 
ideas of his brain ".= Mr. Nevinson is a little biased, of 
course, and the external evidence, too, points in favour of 
the plastic artist. Perhaps if Mr. Nevinson could get inside 
the lottis of the painter. he would see, if not "hibernating 
slugs ", a depressing limpness like the limpness of deflated 
toy balloons. 
"Artists are made in that way." To say this is to say no 
more than to say that with which we started, namely that 
the basic fact about the artist is that his body- and -mind is 
peculiarly sensitive to t- trraierial v and to its 
= Letter to the New Statesman, March 29, 1930. 
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suggestiveness. The artist's vocation is to be specially aware, 
not of values in general, but of values embodied and (to him) 
embedded in material X or Y or Z. 
F UE 
Another side of the same thing may be noted. It is the fact, 
not so much that special organisms have special capacities 
for special materials, but rather that special materials make 
their own demands, and set their own marks and limits, 
upon aesthetic expression. It is vividly expressed in the 
following passage by Bosanquet. "Why ", he asks, "do artists 
make different patterns, or treat the same pattern differently, 
in wood -carving, say, and clay- modelling, and wrought -iron 
work? If you can answer this question thoroughly, then, 
I am convinced, you have the secret of the classification of 
the arts and of the passage of feeling into its aesthetic 
embodiment; that is, in a word, the secret of beauty. 
"Why, then, in general does a worker in clay make 
different decorative patterns from a worker in wrought - 
iron?" He goes on "... in general there can surely be no 
doubt of the answer. You cannot make the same things 
in clay as you can in wrought -iron, except by a tour de force. 
The feeling of the work is, I suppose, altogether different. 
The metal challenges you, coaxes you, as William Morris 
said of the molten glass, to do a particular kind of thing 
with it, where its tenacity and ductility make themselves 
felt. The clay, again, is delightful, I take it, to handle, to 
those who have a talent for it; but it is delightful of course 
in quite different manipulations from those of the wrought- 
iron. I suppose its facility of surface, how it lends itself to 
modelling or to throwing on the wheel, must be its great 
charm. Now the decorative patterns which are carried out 
in one or the other may, of course, be suggested ab extra 
by a draughtsman, and have all sorts of properties and 
interests in themselves as mere lines on paper. But when you 
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come to carry them out in the medium, then, if they are 
appropriate, or if you succeed in adapting them, they 
become each a special phase of the embodiment of your 
whole delight and interest of "body- and -mind" in handling 
the clay or metal or wood or molten glass. It is alive in 
your hands, and its life grows or rather magically springs 
into shapes which it, and you in it, seem to desire and feel 
inevitable. The feeling for the medium, the sense of what 
can rightly be done in it only or better than in anything 
else, and the charm and fascination of doing it so- these, I 
take it, are the real clue to the fundamental question of 
aesthetics." 
VII. CROCE'S VIEWS ON MATERIAL AND TECHNIQUE 
The material, then, is of central importance. It is the more 
necessary to stress this, even to harp on it a little, in that 
some of the writings of Croce have given rise to a wide- 
spread, and unfortunate, impression that material is not, 
aesthetically, of the first importance. This impression is 
certainly widespread. I do not think it is altogether justified, 
as I shall show. But it certainly exists. Its popularity is 
perhaps partly due to the fact that the apparent `spirituality' 
of such a doctrine is always likely to appeal, through its 
emotive associations, to dabblers in philosophy and art. 
But the impression that, for Croce, material embodiment is 
unessential, is not confined to popular opinion.2 It is the 
interpretation of first -rate experts like Bosanquet. 3 Perhaps 
because this matter is, though controversial, so important, 
I may be allowed to quote still further from Bosanquet. 
Bosanquet alleges 4 that Croce is so possessed by the idea 
that beauty is for and in the mind, that he forgets that 
Three Lectures on Aesthetic, p. 58 sq. 
2 Limited popular opinion, of course. 
3 Cf. also Alexander, Art and the Material, pp. to, 16, and 17. 
4 Ibid., p. 67 sq. 
GG 
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"though_ feeling is necessary to its embodiment, yet also the 
embodiment is necessary to feeling. To say that because 
beauty implies a mind, therefore it is an internal state, 
and its physical embodiment is something secondary and 
incidental, and merely brought into being for the sake of 
permanence and communication -this seems to me a pro - 
found error of principle, a false idealism. It meets us, how - 
ever, throughout Croce's system, according to which 
'intuition'-the inward vision of the artist -is the only true 
expression. External media, he holds, are, strictly speaking, 
superfluous, so that there is no meaning in distinguishing 
between one mode of expression and another (as between 
paint and musical sound and language). Therefore there can 
be no classification of the arts, and no fruitful discussion of 
what can better be done by one art than by another. And 
aesthetic -the philosophy of expression -is set down as all 
one with linguistic -the philosophy of speech. For there is 
no meaning in distinguishing between language in the sense 
of speech and other modes of expression. Of course, if he 
had said that speech is not the only form of language, but 
that every art speaks to us in a language of its own, that 
would have had much to be said for it. But I do not gather 
that that is his intention." He goes on to say that Croce's 
notion is "deeply rooted in a philosophical blunder ". The 
blunder is "to think that you can have them (things) corn- 
pletely before your mind without having their bodily 
presence at all. And because of this blunder, it seems fine 
and `ideal' to say that the artist operates in the bodiless 
medium of pure thought and fancy, and that the things of 
the bodily world are merely physical causes of sensa ion, 
which do not themselves enter into the effects he uses' 
I have cited Bosanquet and referred to Alexand to show 
that the impression which Croce has left on distinguished 
minds is a very clear and definite one. No doubt other 
examples might be found of its incidence. Personally I 
' n e itmd rt d tuns- p. 69. 
Z j1. / /í6 
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believe that it is extremely doubtful whether Croce really 
means a great deal of what he says, particularly in his earlier 
work, the Aesthetic. Croce is, of course, an idealist, and 
holds a special view of the ontological status of material and 
of its relation to minds. But apart from this it does not 
appear that Croce, on the whole, intends to deny the im- 
portance of embodiment in material as much as he seems to 
do in certain places. There are many passages which point 
in the opposite direction. 
It is true that Croce continually ignores the dependence of 
imagining upon perceiving, that he forgets,' in speaking of 
Leonardo's painting with his mind, that Leonardo's visual 
images could exist only in so far as constructed out of per- 
ceptual data. He fails to see that this is true of the images 
of words, or statues, or music, and that without the fact of 
what he cavalierly dismisses as mere `willing' -(to "utter 
by word of mouth ", to "take up the ... chisel ", to "stretch out 
our hands to touch the notes of the piano")-the word or the 
statue or the musical motif "within us ' could have no 
existence at all. In other words, what is imagined is the 
`material' : and imagination of the material is based on 
perception of the material. 
Nevertheless, if we may pass over what appears to be, in 
Bosanquet's terms, a "sheer blunder ", we shall find that 
Croce does continually insist on the necessity of embodiment 
-in his own sense. This is much more clearly and unam- jau,444 
biguously expressed in the Brevario3 than in the -14rsthrtir 1 
It is illustrated in the following extracts. "The content is 
formed and the form filled",4 the "feeling is figured feeling 
and the figure a figure that is felt ".5 Again, "a musical 
image exists for us only when it becomes concrete in sounds ; 
a pictorial image only when it is coloured ". It need not be 
actually declaimed or performed or painted, but "the words 
= Aesthetic (Ainslie's Trans.), p. io.. _ Ibid., p. 5o. 
3 Translated by Ainslie under the title of The Essence of Aesthetic. 
4 Op. cit., p. 40. - 5 Ibid. 
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run through our whole organism, soliciting the muscles of 
our mouth and ringing internally in our ears ; when music 
is truly music, it trills in the throat and shivers in the fingers 
that touch ideal notes ".= "If we take from a poem its metre, 
its rhythm, and its words, poetical thought does not, as 
some opine, remain behind : there remains nothing. Poetry 
is born as those words, that rhythm, and that metre. "2 Again, 
"How little ... does a painter possess of the intuitions of a 
poet and how little does one painter possess those of another 
painter ".3 Again,4. "Artistic imagination is always cor- 
poreal." It is a pity that such unexceptionable statements 
should be negatived in other parts of his writings by con - 
fusions and ambiguities arising from what certainly will 
appear to e4 present -day thinkers to be a false 
view of knowledge. 
The idea that `real' embodiment is an aesthetically 
irrelevant circumstances is seen perhaps with most force in 
Croce's views of artistic production. The making of the 
work is a practical, and not an aesthetic, activity; it is a 
"translation of the aesthetic fact into physical phenomena 
(sounds, tones, movements, combinations of lanes and 
colours, etc.) ".6 The translation exists merely for the pur- 
pose of making permanent the product of the artist's spiritual 
labour, and for the sake of communicating it to others. "The 
artist ... is a whole man, and therefore also a practical man, 
and as such takes measures against losing the result of his 
spiritual labour, and in favour of rendering possible or easy, 
for himself or others, the reproduction of his images ; hence he 
engages in practical acts which assist that work of reproduc- 
tion. "7 These practical acts he calls `technical'. 
I have said enough to show that, aesthetically, actual 
-embodiment is absolutely essential, and is not a mere means 
to communication, `reproduction', `translation'. If this is 
true, then technique, which is a means to aesthetic embodi- 
= The Essence of Aesthetic, P. 43. = Ibid., P. 44. 
Ibid., P. 49. 5 P. 51. n. P. 96. te-144;, 
4: 
1116-14C,u 
'3 Aesthetic, p. II. 
7 }bid:, P. 45- i.t^ /c`fel-1 
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" ment, will not exist primarily for the sake of `translation', 
`communication', `reproduction', but for embodiment. 
These other factors may also enter in as ends, and I shall 
..return to the subject shortly. But meanwhilelaesthetic 
embodiment is the prime aim of technique, and aesthetic 
embodiment is, aesthetically, an end in itself. 
VII. TECHNIQUE AND AESTHETIC VALUES 
And here there arises a question of some interest. Is technique 
itself merely a means to embodiment, or may it have in itself 
an aesthetic value? Again, does technical knowledge and skill 
affect or influence our appreciation of art, and, if so, how far? 
And how far and in what ways does technical knowledge and 
skill affect the work of the artist? Let us take these questions 
in turn. 
In the meaning of the term `technique' I include all the 
practical activity involving various degrees of skillwhich can 
be said to have any significant bearing upon the making of 
a work of art. The first question is, Is such technique merely 
a means to actual aesthetic embodiment, or can it possess 
in itself an aesthetic value? Can we say, as is said by a recent 
writer,' that in artistic production the artist does "not have 
an aesthetic experience at all ", because he is not "content to 
remain absorbed in rapt contemplation of the beautiful 
object "? Is the completed beautiful object the only aesthetic 
object? May not the process of making be an aesthetic object 
of its kind? 
It is, of course, perfectly plain that the object which we 
contemplate in the finished work is distinct frDyn the object 
we contemplate in the process of making. IrCthé latter case 
the object,-1.8.5 is just the process of making itself. And it is 
also necessary to recognise further two things. The first is that 
- both are contemplative activities, that the process of making 
A. C. A. Rainer, "The Field of Aesthetics ", Mind, Vol, XXXVIII, 
15o, p. 165. 
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is contemplated just as much, though in a different way, as 
the finished work. And second, we must remember that 
contemplation itself is not an inert or inactive state of mind 
but is discriminative, synthetic, actively imaginative. In the 
one case this mental activit Is directed towards a finished, 
or partiall finished, product t 'n the other case it is directed 
towards a practical process of production. 
We have, then, two kinds of objects of possible aesthetic 
contemplation : (i) a finished or partially finished product, 
(2) a practical process of producing. In the latter class it 
is useful, I think, to distinguish further between (a) that 
producing activity or technical process which immediately 
leads to the finished production, and (b) the technical 
process or processes more remotely connected with the 
finished production. Examples of the former would be the 
actual merle of laying on the paint, or of touching the notes 
of the keyboard, or of bowing in violin -playing. Examples 
of the latter would be the mixing of the pigments, or the 
preparing of the canvas, or the practice of mechanical 
exercises producing dexterity. Between (a) and (b) there can 
of course be drawn no hard -and -fast line. 
We have, then, (i) and (2) (a) and (b) as possible aesthetic 
objects. Are they ever actually aesthetic objects? As regards 
(I) there is no question. What, then, of (2) (a) and (b)? 
I. think we may say with absolute certainty (a) that to the 
working artist the technical process immediately leading to .. 
the production of the finished objecteor of a stage of it may 
sometimes be an aesthetic object. Whether it is so or not 
would appear to depend partly upon the stage of production 
of the art, and perhaps 1 the art. The actual playing of passages, the actual drawing or painting of important parts 
of the picture, are very likely to yield aesthetic pleasure. 
The roughing out or laying of a wash does not seem so 
necessarily to involve this. It is probably the case that the. 
. more immediately dependent upon technical excellence is _ 
For the at fist may stop to contemplate his work as far as it has gone. 
1 
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the aesthetic value of the actual finished work, the more 
inevitably will the technique itself tend to be aesthetically 
enjoyed. In playing or in painting the most important and 
interesting parts of the work, it is unlikely that the artist 
could produce the right effect without some aesthetic 
excitement, some enjoyment of.$íe-movements as expressive 
of grace and beauty. It is quite clear of course, as has been . 
said, that the technical `object' is different from the com- 
pleted object, and the aesthetic pleasure gained is rather 
analogous to the movements in dancing. I do not suggest that 
the focus of the artist's attention is upon these things : they 
must indeed be extra -focal because it is not (as in dancing) 
they which are the final object, but a product which is 
different from them. But they probably do, I think, enter 
into the content immediately before his mind. Would his 
work be vital if his immediate experience of producing of it 
were lifeless and cold and aesthetically neutral? 
(2) (b) As regards that part of technique remotely connected 
with the finished product, we can only say that it may some- 
times yield aesthetic pleasure, and sometimes it may not. 
There is no tendency to inevitability here. If there is aesthetic 
experience, it is possible that the values realised will be fused 
into (2) (a) and even into (t ), so that to the experienced 
artist the enjoyment of his own picture, and even of another's, 
will contain the fused values not only of actual painting 
activity, but of the general daily work and smells of the studio. 
It may be said that all this i &elevant to the finished work 
of art, and that what we contemplate in the painting or the 
sonata is just the colours on the canvas, and the music, and . 
not any of the values we have included under heading (2). 
But it depends. It is true that we do normally think of the 
painting or the sonata as the unit, and do not include the 
painter or the pianist in their efforts. But we may do so, and 
in the case of the pianist at least I think we frequently do. 
It is possible, that is to say, to get a different aesthetic 
experience from watching and listening to Schnabel play 
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than it is from listening to him with closed eyes. This may 
cause distraction from the music, upsetting our aesthetic 
stability, but it need not do so necessarily -though the 
dangers are great. Fusion is possible. If we do contemplate 
the two things fused together, our art- object will be more 
complex, i.e. Schnabel- sitting -at- his -Bechstein- playing -the 
Hammerklavier- Sonata, and not just the Hammerklavier Sonata. 
And, if we have sufficient technical knowledge, if, for 
example, we are pianists, the quality of the music itself may 
be enriched by watching. The mere vision of the player is of 
course in itself irrelevant to the music. 
I conclude, then, that technique may, under certain con- 
ditions, yield aesthetic experience in itself, both to artist and 
to spectators of the artist, and that the aesthetic values of 
technique may in some cases become united to those of the 
finished product. 
The next question was, whether, and how far, technical 
insight and skill may help to enrich our experience as 
spectators of the finished work of art. 
That it does enrich our experience is highly probable. 
What applies to the drawing of thh map of Sicily= applies to 
the aesthetic apprehension of works of art. If it is difficult to 
have an accurate apprehension of the contour of a region 
when we are not able to draw it, so it is difficult for us to 
appreciate the full value of the expressiveness of a material 
unless we ourselves have made some aesthetic experiments 
in the handling of it. In technical experimentation we dis- 
cover.' We discover what the materials and its aesthetic 
possibilities really are. It would be going much too far to 
say that without it there could be & aesthetic experience. 
But it remains true that technical experimentation tends to 
increase discrimination, and through it (other things being 
equal) aesthetic experience. 
The final question was, How far does technical skill and 
Croce, Aesthetic, pp. 8, g. 
-See Alexander, Art and the Material, p. 12 and passim. 
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insight affect the quality of the artist's work? In the first 
place it is quite clear that if he has poor technique his 
powers of communication and his chances of practical 
success as an artist will be impaired. But, what is more 
importan it is also probable (I suggest with some hesita- 
tion) that is power of imagining a finished product will be 
limited. If his hands are inflexible, it is unlikely that he will 
be able to visualise so perfectly, out of his own direct technical 
experience, how a rapid passage ought to be played. He may 
learn from listening to other players, but that is a different 
matter. If his workmanship as a painter is poor, he will 
tend to fail (again, so far as he is dependent on his own 
private experience) to visualise precisely how his picture 
should be painted. 
But the question how far technical powers condition the 
artist's aesthetic vision is difficult, and I can only ventilate it. 
We certainly could not go so far as to say that poverty of 
artistic imagination runs parallel with poverty of technique. 
The case of Blake or of any of the great Italian primitives 
makes this clear. It is difficult to say what vision and depth 
and greatness of vision really mean. I shall return to the 
subject later.' But they do mean something, and whatever 
they do mean, limitation of technique does not in itself 
appear to imply a definitely corresponding limitation of 
greatness or depth or intensity of vision. The depth and 
intensity and sincerity of Blake or (in a very different way) of 
Giotto are plain enough. And it is impossible to say that 
Blake or Giotto, given a more perfect technique, would 
therefore have been better artists. They might have been ; 
but also they might have ceased to possess the special charms 
of Blake and Giotto. Very often, as we know, with the 
greater technical competence of a rater age aesthetic vision 
diminishes. On the other hand, it would seem as though, 
other things being equal, lack of technique is an aesthetic 
defect and must limit vision. Would not Rembrandt, bereft 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































176 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
of his amazing technique, have been lesser, not only as 
technician, but as artist of vision? 
Wit 104. CLASSIFICATION OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
I 
n concluding this section of the discussion it will be useful !4,. think, if we distinguish the kinds or classes of aesthetic 
X""rt 
f2r experien (3ee p gcs 175 6 ).  
., °A four processes are aesthetic processes ; and the t 
p S 
term `aesthetic' should not be confined to (I) (a) and (b) 
[or to (I) (a), (b), and (2)] exclusively of (2) and (3) [or of 
(3) alone]. Again, the quality of aesthetic experience in 
(I) (a) and (b) and (2) is probably to some extent dependent 
on experience of (3). adi.4 J() A»f 4 
( 
OTHER THEORIES OF MOTIVATION : DESIRE FOR 
PERMANENCE 
We have been discussing, so far, the central motives and 
process of artistic production, and have seen how essential is 
the notion of the material. It will now be in place to review 
very briefly several of the different ideas already alluded to 
which have sometimes been offered as accounts of the 
motivation of artistic production. 
Our view has been, roughly, that in artistic production 
the artist desires to produet -a complex self -contained unity 
which will `embody' values, and in the perception of which 
a great complexity of awakened needs will be fulfilled. Such 
an account is at first sight, at least, something like that which 
gives prominence to the desire for permanence. The artist, it 
is sometimes said, desires to capture and enshrine the value 
of the fleeting moment and tó enhance it. Shelley's words 
express this idea : "Poetry is the record of the best and 
happiest moments of the happiest and best minds... . 
Poetry ... makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful 
in the world it arrests the vanishing apparitions which 
a/4- 4-4 
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haunt the interlunations of life, and veiling them, or in 
language or in form, sends them forth among mankind... . 
Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in 
man." = x 
This is probably true in some sense of all alit : there is 
desire, it may be feverish desire, to capture something` for 
the artist, and perhaps all the world, to dwell upon. The 
artist desires to build tabernacles on his mountain of trans- 
figuration. Nt.t.such an idea rather presupposes that there is 
already something which can be preserved, that the best and 
happiest moments which art expresses exist before expression, 
that expression is but translation into more solid material 
óf something already . given. But the work of art is not 
translation, it is construction : and it is creative construction. 
in the sense that in the completed whole there is contained 
more than existed before the construction. The best and 
happiest moments, so far as art is concerned, do not exist 
until the last word is said or the last bar played. Of course 
there are "best and happiest moments" before the work is 
created. But it is not precisely they which are `captured' but 
something different. The process of art, then, if it can be 
said to be motivated by desire to capture something, must be 
said to be so in the sense that it captures or discovers some- 
-thing which is not given to begin with, but which is found 
and grasped only after complicated artistic effort. 
IMITATION 
The fact that what it is desired to make permanent is not fully 
discovered until the completion of the work, may seem to be 
negatived by the fact that artists sometimes appear to 
imitate and so make permanent for themselves and others 
what they imitate. As imitation is even yet sometimes thought . 
to be a central motive of art, it will be worth while to ask . 
and to consider very briefly what its place may be. 
Defence of Poetry. 
M 
Are..ZV 
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jai D. In the first place, complete imitation is in any case impos- 
4441 
.ible. To imitate a tree completely would be to produce¡ 
another tree of wood and sap and leaves exactly like the first. 
Óaß `kit One mi . ' _ or a piece of furniture tx 
or a dress hardly a tree. = = , we 
usually mean representation in some medium, say colour 
spread upon a flat surface/ /he limitations 444,rx imposed are 
obvious. We cannot put in all the details ; the larger ones are 
represented and the smaller ones, are more or less vaguely 
indicated or left out. Again, selection is determined by the 
interests of the painter, interests which it is impossible to 
exclude, however much he will. Even slavish copying reveals 
that the painter is interes ed in everything indiscriminately, 
The true artist, on the d, gets meaning into his 
picture by virtue of his skill in selecting and inventing and 
constructing what is expressive aesthetically. Imitation is 
never thoroughgoing in true art. Imitation may bey some- 
times 
I 
a part of the process, but is never its essential principle. 
"Imitation is sometimes a part of the process." It is difficult 
to make imitation, even aesthetically selective imitation, an 
essential principle of all art, for the reason that some arts, 
e.g. music,, seem to contain very little of it, and others, 
.e.g. architecture, if they contain any, contain .hardly any at 
all. Yet imitation does sometimes play a part in artistic produc- 
tion. It appears to play some part in arts like painting and 
sculpture. And it is pertinent to ask, What exactly is its 
interest and importance? What is its rationale? 
There is unquestionably a sheer joy in imitation. There is 
joy in imitating any object as accurately as possible, quite 
apart from its intrinsic interest or beauty. Such imitation 
yields the pleasure of clear and accurate knowledge ; for 
indubitably imitation helps accuracy of apprehension of an 
object. The achievement of accurate imitation again gives 
sense of efficiency and power, to which, in some cases, may 
even be added a rather spurious delight in the deception 
which an illusory appearance gives. There must be a naïve 
THE WORK OF ART ' 79. 
pleasure in being able to paintApictures of curtains, or 
'dishes of fruit, and thus to deceive ether- naïve -minded 
persons like the kings in story- books. There certainly is such 
a delight, otherwise pictures that `look so real you could walk 
into them' would not arouse the perpetual interest which 
they do. 
This delight has in itself, as we have said, nothing to do 
with aesthetic experience. But when the things which are 
"'imitated' are themselves to some degree aesthetic objects, 
when they are, i.e., perceived objects which up to a point 
are aesthetically pleasing, then imitation may form part of an 
aesthetic process. Suppose it is an attractive piece of land- 
scape, or a character to be drawn by a novelist. The painter 
desires to apprehend the landscape more clearly and vividly 
because, as it stands it is to him up to a certain point, an 
expressive objec In order to apprehend it more clearly and 
vividly he begins to imitate it. But the landscape is only 
up to a point an expressive object, and in order to achieve 
something which is completely satisfying he has in his 
imitation to select -to eliminate, to stress, to add, to con - 
struct -a process which only properly ends, as we have 
seen, in the completion of a work of art. His `imitation' is 
á qualified one, though it is still so much of an imitation 
that his painted trees for example can (at least sometimes) 
be recognised as being drawn `from' real trees. 
The same is true of the novel. The novelist is fascinated 
-or many novelists are -by real people. They are his 
models, they have their limited and qualified and imperfect 
beauty, and he desires to represent 'them as he sees them. 
His `seeing' may be already so selective that he only has to 
drawl or imitate what he sees. Or he may more consciously 
select and construct. But his selection is determined, if he 
I am at the moment only considering him as a kind okdraughtsmah 
ae rh aginatis .. It is of course true that his medium is words, and 
that the sensuous value of words and of their relation to the novelist's 
images have their own problems. See ' 
14; A-f-tAi 
14;;10.44,-4, 
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is an artist, by the principles of aesthetic experience. And 
the `final cause' of his selective imitation is desire for com- 
plete aesthetic experience `in' an object. 
The problem of imitation does not arise in music in quite 
the same form. When imitation does occur in good music it 
Atends to be incidental, IQ-43g a diversion, and so to be of 
questionable value ; or it becomes transformed and fused 
with the rest, and is made an expressive part of the whole. 
Aesthetic expressiveness is thus, once more, the aesthetic 
justification for the existence of any imitation at all. This is 
true of the imitations which may occur in programme music. 
But programme music, of course, need not contain imitations 
in the crude sense of sound -imitations of sounds, say pastoral 
sounds or storms at sea. It may believe itself to be `imitative' 
in a much more subtle sense. It may be `inspired' by very 
many objects, and it may purport to express these, to 
express, e.g., persons, or scenes, or a philosophy of life. 
Of the first, Elgar's Enigma variations contain some of the 
best e*nples. Elgar warns his hearers that they are to 
listen to the music as music and not as programme, but the 
variations do, as is well known, depict personalities. The 
theory of what happens here is the same as before. The 
musician may, by touches of imitation here and there, 
suggest characteristics of his human subjects, but the essence 
of the process consists, not in any imitative reproduction of 
these, but in the production of musical forms which by the ,1,/ 
process of aesthetic embodiment completely fulfilithe Derr // ," 
ciemirs and needs awakened through personal contact with *"f 
the inspiring human beings. The hearer, in hearing, ex- 
periences roughly similar musically embodied values, but not 
the original objects of inspiration. This is true, generally, of 
all programme music which is music. The programme may 
be of love, of country scenes, of `Fate knocking at the door' I 
or of "Fate, the power that thwarts our aspirations towards 
' Beethoven, opening bayof Fifth Symphony. On one account. Another, I 
believe, contains reference to the notes of a blackbird -or is it a thrush? 
f 
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happiness, that jealously watches lest happiness should get 
the upper hand ... a power which, like a sword of Damocles, 
continually hangs over our heads ..." = But these are (if 
we are to believe what we are told) the inspiring objects 
and that only. The values we get are embodied in the music 
and are untranslatable. 
74+ DESIRE FOR COMMUNICATION 
Another motive which is often, very often, alleged to be of 
central importance in ,art- constructing, is the impulse to 
communicate. Within recent years Mr. Lascelles Abercrombiez 
and Mr. I. A. Richards have made it an important part of 
their aesthetic theories. Mr. Richards, for example, say# 
t`The arts are the supreme form of the communicative 
activity' Though he adds that the artist is not as a rule 
consciously concerned with communication, but with the 
business of embodiment. Nevertheless, the artist's "denial 
that he is at all influenced in his work by a desire to affect 
other, people, is no evidence that communication is not 
actually his principal object. "3 For Croce, on the other hand, 
art, being intuition, is in essence incommunicable. 
We may admit that, in a very strict sense, communication 
of aesthetic experience, and indeed of any experience, is 
impossible, without denying the force of the communication 
theory. Experience, and aesthetic experience, is no doubt 
personal and private, and no personal and private experience 
can ever literally be communicated to anyone else. It makes 
no difference to say that one .part of the total aesthetic 
situation is a perceived object which can be perceived by 
others. For the mere perceived object (even presuming that 
it is neutral as between different subjects and exists inde - 
Tschaikowsky, Introduction to Fourth Symphony. Letter to Frau von 
Meck of February 17, 1878. 
R The Theory of Poetry and other works. 
3 Principles of Literary Criticism, pp. 26, 27. 
l 
282 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
pendently of them) is not, as such, the aesthetic object; 
activity of the imagination is necessary. Yet, there are such 
things as analogy and sympathy. In one sense each mind 
lives within its own cell, but there is also a very evident 
sense in which minds do communicate, sympathise with, 
`enter into' one another's experiences. Accepting this 
common evidence, without going into the difficult question 
of the nature of communication, we may say that in some 
plain, rough- and -ready sense, we have things in common 
and that we do communicate with one another on many 
occasions. One of these occasions arises through the medium 
of art. If I am a competent listener, I can have experiences 
which are approximately similar to the experiences of the 
conposer, or to the experiences of other competent listeners. 
It is not meaningless to hold that we can compare INACV ef 
ourkexperiences. The same is true of poetry, painting,-and the 
other arts. Because (I am assuming) many people have 
approximately similar bodies and minds, and an approxi- 
mately similar store of experiences, the perceived work 
awakens approximately similar responses. It is of course 
true that the similarity is only rough and approximate. 
Mr. Richards has himself urged this in his analysis of the 
definition of a poem= where he distinguishes four thing$ 
which `the' poem may mean. And he has shown even more 
clearly in his later work 2 how amazingly uncertain the 
interpretations even of educated persons may be. 
Communication is, approximately, possible. Yet, though 
possible, is it essential? We may admit that artists possess, 
like all other human beings, social impulses. It is true that 
artists are sometimes unsocial or even anti -social, and that 
the idea of public approval, even of discriminating public 
approval, does not always count for very much with them:. 
Doubtless, even, there are artists who destroy their works 
upon completion of them. On the other hand, it is unlikely 
= Op. cit., Chap. xxx. 
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that artistic production often, if ever, takes place which 
does not contain some presupposition of some kind of audience, 
even if an ideal imaginary one. The artist who is con- 
temptuous of the public may have anything but contempt 
for some imaginary 'soul- companion who, he believes, really 
can appreciate the greatness of his work. The repudiation 
of desire for sympathy and appreciation is no sign of in- 
difference to it. It may even be the defence- reaction against 
indifference and reveal a profound hunger for appreciation. 
We should almost certainly be wrong if we were to say 
dogmatically that in any single instance the social factor is 
wanting. It need not be, as Mr. Richards says,- in the focus 
of the artist's consciousness. 
But though the impulse to communicate, to share, to be 
appreciated, may always be present; this is not to say that 
it is an essential motive or the essential motive of art. 
(Some arts, like acting, involve an audience, but this is 
another matter.) Rather does it appear to be of the nature 
of an inseparable accident. The impulse to communicate 
(etc.) may bulk more largely in art than in some other 
desires of human beings, e.g. the desire to acquire wealth, 
or the desire to outdo a rival. And desire to communicate 
may in most cases be a strong motive to clarify and perfect 
expression as far as possible. In some instances the desire to 
communicate may even be a sufficient initiating cause of 
artistic effort. But it does not account for the central and 
intrinsic process of art itself. Theoretically it is even con- 
ceivable that an artist completely devoid of social impulses 
might create a perfect work of art. Communication would 
then become what I believe Mr. Drinkwater has called 
`self- communication'. It is not to be doubted that such 
hermit -and hermetic -art Aaetrt. greatly . lack in the 
richness of content which comes from social ids. It 
might be insignificant, though perfect. I am only concerned 
to show that the -conception is not self -contradictory. 
It may be said t tf If communication is unessential, why 
) 
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should the artist employ a medium which is a(public one? 
Why should he not be content with his own private imagined 
aesthetic experiences? The answer to such a question has 
already been given. The artist needs to produce an arrange- 
ment of perceived materials, we have said, in order to 
satisfy himself fully. Even if he imagines, his imagination 
must be based on perceptual experience. The fact that his 
material is a public one is aesthetically a mere accident, 
though to say this is not to deny that the artist's life as a 
man is indefinitely enriched by all social contacts. 
XIII. INSTINCT, `THE UNCONSCIOUS', PLAY', SELF - 
REALISATION 
Other motives have been assigned as of central importance 
in artistic production. But they need not detain us. Among 
them may, be cited self -realisation, and various instincts 
(other than those discussed) such as play, construction, sex. 
Or art may be ascribed to the action of the unconscious, 
individual or collective. 
Of the theories which ascribe art to the `unconscious' 
I shall say very little here, for the problem is a large and 
difficult one. But it is perfectly clear that, although in this 
matter enthusiasm has sometimes led to excess, there has 
opened out in recent times a vast new field of investigation. 
Many hasty assumptions will no doubt have to be given up. 
Pictures of -the mind as a4 submerged iceberg, or as an 
underground chamber of horrors, reductions of all human 
motivation to repressed sexual impulses and complexes - 
these things will pass away in the natural progress of events. 
But normal and abnormal psychology is mainly through the 
instrumentality of the psychotherapists possessed of new 
implements for investigation of a new world. We may not 
yet have the technique, or the psychology, to proceed as 
quickly as we should like, but the principle of analysis and 
of its allied methods is/ . 
{.., 4144'4- r 
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Nevertheless, if we are to admit, as we must, the applica- 
tion. of the principle to works of art, and the creation of works 
of art, we ought to give our terms a very wide meaning. If 
we use the word `repression' it should be taken, not in a 
strict Freudian sense, but to cover any great and widely 
rooted tendency, or system of tendencies, which is not 
cognised, or is not clearly cognised, by the subject, because 
it cannot by d ee-t ways be harmonised with the system of 
conscious personality and conscious interest. We can say this 
without committing ouselves to the very doubtful notion of 
`the Unconscious', or even of `the i unconscious'. The notion 
will work perfectly well, I think, i we stick to the well -tried 
image of focus fading into a margin of whose contents we are 
but dimly aware. = 
Sometimes the `repressed' tendency or system of tendencies 
may be sea:lathing primitive, and (unjustly) tabooed. Some- 
times it may be something too subtle and highly - eloped 
for the subject to understand its nature, so that through lack 
of understanding, or through fears perhaps of violating some 
private or some social code of belief and behaviour, he 
either ignores it as much as he caner, if he cannot ignore it, 
misinterprets it as evil, or at least as awkward or embarrassing 
or foolish. On this view the unconscious (for us the `mar- 
ginally' conscious) includes impulses not only of sex, but of 
our deepest religious nature, that nature which may perhaps 
connect us with the larger Cosmos in ways of which we have 
no understanding. 
Obscure tendencies and interests exist, and we have enough 
evidence to show us that art in a very real sense may be an 
expression of them.2 Certainly the highest art affords` fulfil- 
ment, which is symbolic fulfilment -in the very special sense 
On this point see Dr. Broad's admirable treatment of the subject in 
Section C of The Mind and its Place in Nature. 
2 See, for example, Dr. Ernest Jones' Analysis of Hamlet, or Professor 
Livingstone Lowes' Study of Coleridge, or in general Mr. W. M. Thorburn's 
Art and the Unconscious. 
,r 
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in which aesthetic expression is symbolic expression -of ten- 
dencies, of yearnings and hungerings in our nature which 
we cannot fulfil by any deliberate policy. We cannot fulfil 
them by any deliberate policy partly because, as we hav'e 
said, they are difficult to harmonise, but partly also because 
we have not yet discovered what they are, and can perhaps 
only discover them progressively as we advance in wisdom - 
helped in our advancement through the influence of works 
of art. 
To say that art expresses powerful, profound, and subtle 
impulses of our nature of which we are as yet not fully aware, 
and perhaps never will be aware, is to say something of 
importance. But it is not to enunciate any new aesthetic 
principle. For these fulfilled tendencies which become 
embodied are, once again, just values. And what the psy- 
chology of the so- called `unconscious' can do is to provide 
1 
increasing evidence of what hese values really are. This of 
course is a matter of detail, upon which it is not our task 
to enter. 
Of the theory of instinct as the motivation of human life 
I need for just these reasons say nothing. The increased 
knowledge of the instincts has greatly altered our perspective 
of human life, and if art islas it is a perspective of life, then 
knowledge of instinct will o course throw its own light upon 
art. It is needless perhaps to repeat pious warnings of the 
dangers of excess here as in the theory of the unconscious. 
Highly specialised explanations of life or of art are alike to 
be distrusted. 
,,,The theory which makes art an outcome of the special 
impulse of play, for example, has been often enough dealt 
with by other writers. It is certainly not compatible with 
what we have said, except in so far as the need for play 
(and this applies to any other need whatever) may enter as 
an item to be fulfilled through artistic production. As for 
`self -realisation', if this be taken as the outcome of the instinct 
of `self -display', the same remarks apply as apply to the 
f 4...4. Gt., iv,1.4.c -lie d- «4.-1 lis* -t-e 1 
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instincts generally and as applied in particular to the account 
of communication. It is highly probable that some desire 
for self -realisation is always involved. The production of art 
is difficult, and to achieve it is satisfying both because it 
raises us in our own estimation, and, perhaps, in the estima- 
tion of others. Again, each artist has the gift of his special 
temperament : his creations are an expression of him and no 
one could produce quite the same things as he does. His 
production is not only creditable to him as a workman 
it is beautiful ; and his association with it enhances his 
personality. He may feel that he is worthy of honour, and 
perhaps that he deserves to be honoured. It is also true of 
course that too such reflection upon this kind of thing may 
adversely affect his art. 
4(I UNITY AND ART 
The work of art, we have said, involves the development of 
an aesthetic object to the point at which it possesses self:.. 
subsistent unity. Any perceived object which can be con- 
templated imaginatively is in one sense an aesthetic object.: 
But it may, whilst possessing suggestiveness on account of 
some of its perceived qualities, fail to carry out its sugges- 
tions in other parts. It may promise and break its promise, 
it may let us down with a crash.-se that we have to idealise 
in seeing it. If we are artists, we may represent it' with 
modification and supplementations, such modifications and 
supplementations leading to the construction of a unified 
whole, an object which is completely satisfying, which 
possesses beauty. In practice only the artist primarily, and 
the technical critic secondarily, are able to say what modi- 
fications and supplementations should occur, what con- 
structions are necessary in order that this particular whole 
shall grow on to completeness. In practice, abstract general 
principles are no necessary part of the contents of the artist's 
mind. But we have a right, in a theoretical investigation, to 
Ga. oLu 
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ask what the unity of the work of art really means. This is 
our business now. 
Generally speaking, unity is a category which applies 
to anything whatever. The possession of unity is therefore no 
criterion of the aesthetic. A flash of light, a fragment of 
stone or of sound, is, in the most general sense, as much a 
unity, as much one, as a mountain or a triangle or a rose or 
a symphony. But the unity which is relevant to our problems 
is of course not this bare unity, but something more organi- 
cally related to its content ; it is what is sometimes called the 
unity of complexity', or the `unity of variety'. Here, again, 
however, the possession of unity is not an aesthetic criterion, 
for many things possess unity -of- variety which are not, in 
any sense we have described, aesthetic objects. Thus a human 
character or a philosophical system or a machine' may have 
unity -of- variety. Anything which .,is a complete system 
possesses it, and we 'have not found the essence of the 
aesthetic to lie in system, in unity-of-variety, but rather in 
expressiveness. It is true, of course, that many aesthetic 
objects do possess unity -of- variety, and that unity -of- variety 
is probably always a characteristic of the most highly 
significant aesthetic objects. I shall argue that this unity 
is, in the end, just the completeness or perfection of the 
working out of the expressiveness, so that the expressiveness 
becomes perfectly organised and self -contained, and without 
ragged edges. The aesthetic object in its perfection, then, 
possesses unity, unity -of- variety, but it is aesthetic unity which 
it possesses, and aesthetic unity can only be understood if we 
have previously understood the meaning of aesthetic expres- 
sion. We cannot differentiate the aesthetic object merely by 
saying it possesses (any) unity of variety, for other things 
also do that. 
I am thinking of these as facts. It is conceivable, as we said in Chapter I, 
that aesthetic experience of these things is possible. I am only contending 
now that the fact of their unity -of- variety is not sufficient to constitute 
them aesthetic objects. 
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I do not suggest, in saying these things, that unity is in 
itself not a value, and an important one, and one whose 
aesthetic embodiment gives to the aesthetic object a real and 
striking importance. Unity is a value, cks red for ;t' pwn 
am lEer or--at .east- t-we -r . In the first place, it 
is an aid to the fulfilment of tendency, both bodily and 
mental. We function best and most easily by means of 
system. (We shall see in a moment how this is illustrated in 
the case of perception.) In the second place, the systematic 
is the comply; it is that whose potentialities are wholly 
fulfilled. And the contemplation of it satisfies that funda- 
mental urge in us which craves for all completeness nd 
perfection. Unity is the most important of 
values we know, and the aesthetic object gets much of its 
importance from its embodiment of unity. This is all true. 
But it is also true that the unity of the aesthetic object is 
aesthetic unity, and that its irreducibly aesthetic character 
must be recognised. 
q- 
X\T. UNITY IN PERCEPTION 
The aesthetic experience, with which we are concerned, is 
ultimately perceptual experience, though of a special kind. 
The general laws, therefore, which determine for us the 
unity of the object as ordinarily perceived, may be expected 
to have a great deal of bearing upon the problem of the unity 
of the aesthetically perceived object. 
The facts about the unity of attention in relation to per- 
ceived objects are familiar. Whenever we have to attend to 
a number of.things at once, we must, if our attention is to 
be efficient, attend to them as a connected whole. When a 
number of diverse items appear upon the field of perception, 
we either fail to grasp them all at once, or we grasp them 
by means of imagining them to form some pattern. Or the 
many details not grasped at first, may be grasped later 
through certain groups of them being formed into patterns, 
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these patterns in turn being formed into larger patterns. 
This process of apperception may enable us in time to 
apprehend the most complex objects as single wholes. Thus:, 
though we cannot simultaneously apprehend, so as to be 
able to count them, more than about five or six momentarily 
exposed visual entities (dots, for example), and though we 
cannot apprehend together, without counting, more than 
about eight sounds succeeding one another at regular 
intervals of a quarter of a second, much larger groups can 
be perceived if they are taken as groups of groups (or groups 
of groups of groups, etc.) of units. Or again, if the points be 
regarded as salient features of some interesting pattern, such 
as a picture in the fire, or Orion in his heavens, or if the 
sounds, say, of the moving train, or the beats of a drum, be 
given interesting meaning (be made, i.e., into a `tune'), 
the same building up process is possible. Of the psychological 
processes concerned in such building up of apperception we 
need not speak. It is sufficient to say that Unification is 
necessary. When it appears not to occur, as for instance when 
we talk and play the piano simultaneously, there is probably 
rapid oscillation of attention from one activity to the other, 
the process which is not actually being attended to at the 
moment proceeding automatically. But the fact that such a 
performance tends to produce restlessness and irritability 
shows that it is an exception to some normal rule, 
PI Ma. UNIFYING DEVICES IN VISUAL ART 
In the arts many devices are employed to enable complex 
data to be apprehended as single and complete units. 
Perhaps there is to be found some excuse for those who have 
run to death the idea of unity -of- variety as an aesthetic 
principle, in the fact that great works of art, such as a drama 
or a symphony, do manage to integrate data from such an 
immense variety of sources. It is of course no proof, -awl the 
ccmplexities which are united in the arts are certainly no 
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greater than the complexities unified in living organisms and: 
in minds themsf Ives. But great complexities there are, . and 
the devices for ensuring unity of attention are many. I do not 
propose to attempt to classify them or to discuss them fully: 
That indeed would mean a treatise with illustrations on each 
of the arts, and to write such treatises is, luckily, no .part of 
philosophy. I shall content myself by citing simply one or 
two illustrations ink r rom painting, where they are most 
easily grasped. 
Devices' which may be mentioned are; the interest of a 
subject, the binding effect of lines, the binding effect of 
suggested movements, the emphasis, by special treatment, 
upon the focus of interest, the use of symmetry and composi- 
tion or complex balance. These are some of the more 
important. They are not necessarily exclusive of one another, 
and theyare selected at random. Books on pictorial composi- 
tion will yield many more and with many interesting 
illustrations. 
Interest in the subject may be an important unifying factor. 
'We see the colours and shapes related as a single whole 
.because of the subject they depict. A familiar and striking 
example of this process actually coming into operation is 
the case of the puzzle picture. `Puzzle ; find the dog in the 
picture.' Before the puzzle has been solved, the lines may 
appear to have little meaning or relation. Afterwards it is 
hardly possible to see them out of relation. So, quite apart 
from the `thoughts' which subject- paintings may suggest, 
nearly all painting -except perhaps some extreme forms of 
cubism and vorticism; ' and of course all merely decorative 
work -gains pictorial unity from subject sources. 
The binding effects of lines is a vague phrase, which, 
interpreted literally, denotes a considerable part of pictorial 
composition. It includes the use of line both on the surface 
of the picture 'and as suggesting depth through imaging. 
For a fuller general account of these see Langfeld, The-Aesthetic Attitude, 
Chapter VIII sq. To this work I am indebted in the following passages. 
,r c.4-i-714;47-4 
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The very boundaries, again, of the picture itself possess a 
unifying effect. An example of the binding effect of lines 
combined with the effect of a circular frame is Raphael's 
well -known Madonna della Sedia in the Pitti Palace, Florence. 
Again, lines may suggest connections between the parts of 
a complex picture. In many early Italian pictures of the 
Coronation of the Virgin, we get simply two pictures, one of 
earth, the other of heaven. Later, connecting lines are intro- 
duced, or the picture is bound together by suggested 
movements or by the direction of the gaze of the adoring saints. 
(These latter really come under a different heading. _) Again, 
architectural backgrounds are frequently used to give unity 
to the various items of interest in the picture. An example of 
almost total lack of any unity is the picture, by Pieter 
Brueghel the elder, of Christ carrying the Cross. Here there are 
dozens of incidents tending to disperse the attention. The 
happy use of architecture for this purpose of unity is seen 
in Andrea del Sarto's Annunciation in the Pitti Gallery. 
Lines frequently suggest movement. Some of the most 
vivid compositions are those in which movement -suggesting 
lines give unity to what would otherwise be separated items. 
A good example of this is Michelangelo's Creation of Man 
in the Sistine Chapel, where the line of the arms of God 
and of Adam not only joins the two portions of the picture, 
but suggests movement and by it unity. Another example of 
the unifying effect of suggested movement is the gestures of 
the figures at the edge of the picture towards the figure of 
Christ in Leonardo's Last Supper. Again, there is Volterra's 
rather melodramatic Descent from the Cross in the Church of 
Santa Trinita de' Monti, Rome. 
A good example cf unity obtained by special emphasis of 
the object of interest would be many of the portraits of Rem- 
brandt and of Velasquez where the head stands out from a 
darker n: ass of cclour. And in all pictures composition is 
involved whether it be the more naïve symmetrical corn- 
, See below A.-Z.-II 
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position of so many of the Italian Madonna-and-child 
paintings (with standing saints) or the more complex and 
more interesting 'hidden balance' of composition. All- these 
devices and 444.9.a*, many more are subject, as everyone 
knows, not for paragraphs but for mar-books. I 
I shall not go on to cite examples of unifying factors in 
arts other than painting: It is sufficient to point out that they 
exist, that each art-music, poetry, drama, and so on-has 
its own ways of securing unity. 
XVII. FORM 
The unifying devices that have been cited are mainly what , 
would be called 'formal' factors. Formal factors within the 
work of art may, for the purposes of discussion, quite 
legitimately be distinguished. The parts of the work have 
`fcirm' and the whole has 'form' which is its unity of the 
parts. There is real significance in such uses of the term 
'form', and it may be said that in a sense form is one of the 
chief factors in art. In a sense it is true that expressions "can 
only become artistic by the addition of another essential 
element, not present in play nor in the activity that stimu- 
lates art of the animals, and this element may be described 
generally as Order, under which main idea are included 
such manifestations of the principle as Rhythm, Measure, 
Proportion, and all those modes of arrangement used by 
artists may be summarised as composition. . . . Schiller uses 
a good phrase when he asks, What is man before . . . the 
Serene Form tames the wildness of life? It is, indeed, ond 
of the notable facts of human nature that in art this free 
pleasurable activity of self-expression obeys a certain inner 
control, that transforms it from a mere animal effervescence 
into a rational product of ordered parts in a clearly defined 
unity." 
On the other hand, it would be erroneous to take literally 
i Baldwin Brown, The Fine Arts, p..4.2. 
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the idea of the `imposition' of form. Form and expression are 
not related as k:_ ' - `- Procruste (The unifying devices 
of farrrrs to which we have referred are not merely so many 
moulds impressed, as it were, upon a matter which is foreign 
to them; they must, if the work in which they occur is to be 
art at all, be true fulfilments of the aesthetic expression of 
the picture. That, aesthetically fide forms are just the 
manifestations of the expression, and that the Final Form 
of the Unity of the whole is just the completion or self -con- 
containedness of the perfection of expression, is a fact which 
it is of the first importance to grasp. It is so important, and 
form is so often conceived as a kind of imposition, that it is 
worth while discussing for a little the general idea of form. 
Form, we know, is always inseparable literally from 
matter, though distinguishable in thought. st 
approximation tokeparation of form and matter occurs 
when we think of a thing's shape, e.g. an odd piece of iron, 
as distinct from the stuff of which it is made. It is true that 
we cannot pull the shape away from the stuff. But the shape 
has in such a case no very intimate connection with the 
stuff, and does not reveal the nature of the stuff. But even 
this is only true relatively, for the way in which a piece of 
iron or stone will break, or the shape it will in time assume 
through weathering, is partly due to its `stuff'. And if we 
look more closely, say through a microscope, we shall discover 
that its shapes, more accurately seen, are very much deter- 
mined by its st . Co trzµe the process to its molecular 
structure, this more true. And so on. Though the 
distinction between `s ape' and `stuffs real, the relation, 
even as regards the physical shape inorganic matter tends 
to be intimate. The intimacy of relation is far more easily 
seen, on the other hand, if we take as our example the shape 
of an organism -of a flower or an animal. The general 
shapes or the forms of these are profoundly significant of the 
organism's nature. And if we dissect the flower or the animal 
we see that the stuff of the shape is in its turn the form of 
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a further stuff, which is in turn the form of something else. 
And so on. This is all, since Aristotle, perfectly familiar, 
though it is often forgotten. Form and matter, ' though 
distinguishable, are always relative to one another, and, 
sometimes, very significantly so. 
`Form' in art may mean several things. Among .possi-ble- 
meanings are ('r) the `body' as opposed to the what or 
content which is `embodied'. In the case of visual art this 
would include both shapes and colours, as opposed to the 
meanings whic th se express. If form 17,14 means body as 
opposed to n, and if we say that the-form reveals-le 
matter, we are only then saying that in aesthetic embodiment 
the body is truly expressive of its content. The colours being 
bright, mean cheerfulness ; the arrangement of the volumes 
is expressive -of whatever it does express : solemn moods are 
embodied in solemn movements or sounds or colours. 
And so on. 
(2) `Form' may meat-141a `formal' sidetas opposed to sensa: 
e.g. shapejas 
structure, of a melody as opposed to the sound -values of 
which it is built up. In the plastic arts generally it will mean 
the `shapes' as opposed to the materials or medium (in this 
restricted sense), and what is true generally of the relation 
between matter and shape, will be true in a special way of 
art. If you make the statue in marble, its forms will have to 
be markedly different from the `same' statue made in clay 
or plaster. And this will affect the concrete character of the 
aesthetic expressiveness. 
(g) Or `Form' may mean something rather More general 
than this particular form or that within a particular work of 
art. It may mean a class of forms, of which instances are to 
be found in many works of art. Examples of such are, 
iambic or trochaic feet, common measure, four -four time 
in music. Or forms may be the forms of certain classes of 
works of art as a whole, such as the epic or the sonnet ; the 
fantasia, the suite, the symphony, the fugue, or the sonata. 
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. FORMS AND EXPRESSION IN ART 
Pc- aa..44. 
to realise ab. form in it is 
general truth which has been already incidentally ated. 
It is that form or forms, of whatever kind, are, in 
all genuine art, just the revelation -in -a- bodyS of art's content 
(or matter) . Traditionally we have certain art -forms. In 
music we have the madrigal, the fantasia, the fugue or the 
sonata or the symphony. In architecture we have the 
Classic, the Romanesque, the Gothic, the Baroque; in 
poetry the sonnet, the Spenserian stanza, the triolet. An 
artist may set out to construct a work in one or other of the 
set forms. If he is inexpert, the form may appear to him 
difficult, even clumsy, fitting ill with the matter of his 
experience. Suppose he is a poet. It may be that, although 
he is a craftsman of merit, his experience in the end simply 
will not find its outlet through any of the set forms. On the 
other hand, it may: He may discover that in the sonnet or 
in the Spenserian stanza his aesthetic experience comes to 
possess an ordered significance which it could not have 
possessed h he chosen to an fa tur - some ;Sr f. rm ¡. 
of his own. - h t - a n ` ... _ ti 
modification which is development and discos ery. The reason 
for this will be, not the ready -made form has been 
imposed like a mould and successfully force upon the 
matter, but that the matter has, through its relation to the 
form, grown to a new organic completeness. There is a certain 
analogy, I suppose, between this and the development of a 
fruit tree, as the result of 
r 
judicious pruning. The reason, 
why the ready -given form is able to condition such fruitful . 
fulfilment of the artist's aesthetic experience, is that, though 
ready- given, it is form which has been discovered' in the 
course of long experience and experiment, by similar living 
minds in the past. The forms which have achieved per - 
.manence, which have become typical, are just those forms 
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which aesthetic experience of certain important types have 
naturally tended to assume. Their crystallisation is of course 
helped by tradition. And when the poet discovers, in using 
the form, a new unity with -his experience, he is simply 
sharing in an empirical discovery of other minds in the past. 
This is perhaps even more vividly illustrated in rhythms 
and metres, than in types of unity as a whole. The form 
or the trochee is not something imposed upon certain types 
of feeling ; it is this feeling's most natural spontaneous 
embodiment. 
In all cases, Form, as described in a general phrase, is of 
course only a rough approximation to the actual form which 
any artist uses. The `sonnet' or the `Spenserian stanza', or 
the `trochaic' or `iambic' measures, or the `sonata' or the 
`fugue', stand merely as general types ; they imply a general 
anatomy of which this or that work is the living embodiment, 
varying in every case from standard. The standard guides 
the artist. And it guides the attention of the appreciating 
mind. But, beyond that, the individual imagination must do 
its work freely. Expression is the primary notion, not form. 
But though expression, not form, is in this sense the primary 
notion, that is only because we are thinking at the moment 
of form [in sense (3) above] as if it were external to expres- 
sion. The true aesthetic form, on the other hand, as we have 
been arguing, is expressive form, and 44- fteRsc form 
expression. For aesthetic expression is embodied expres- 
sion. It is not mere content, but imaginatively apprehended 
content- in- a- ernec body. It can never be stressed too much 
that neither body nor meaning is our main concern in 
aesthetics, but embodied- meaning. This is the aesthetic 
object, and the unity of the whole is just the complete 
concrete self- containedness, not of a physical `picture' or 
`symphony' or `poem' for the organism, nor yet of a set of 
disembodied contents ; but of the contents- embodied, or the 
embodiment -of- content. And this, which lives before imagina- 
tive perception only, is perhaps the greatest perfection that 
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man knows. It is neither merely sensuous, nor is it other- 
worldly ; it is an ideal world in this world of sense. The 
experience of art is the mysticism of the world of sense. And 
being such, it awakens neither gross) nor other- worldly 
longings, but is itself all- sufficient. 
XIX `DISCOVERY' VERSUS `TRANSLATION' IN ART 
The truth of this seems to be overlooked by those who 
regard art as a translation, for the purposes of communica- 
tion, of a spiritual experience. If we are right, there is, as 
we have said, no `translation' of spiritual experience, or of 
an einspirationn, in art. The point is well brought out by 
contrasting two points of view on the matter the point of 
view, on the one hand, of Professor Lascelles Abercrombie, 
and, on the other, of Professor Alexander. 
Mr. Abercrombie, writing of poetry, says : "The moment 
of imaginative experience which possesses our minds the 
instant the poem is finished possessed the poet's mind the 
instant the poem began. For as soon as there flashed into 
complete existence in his mind this many -coloured ex- 
perience, with all its complex passion, the poem which we 
know was conceived as an inspiration. Whatever event in 
the poet's life generated it, this is the first thing we can take 
hold of in the composition of the poem, and it existed before 
the verbal art of the poem was commenced just as it exists 
in us after the verbal art has finished.... So that it is also 
possible to consider the inspiration of the poem as dis- 
tinguishable from the verbal art to it : namely, as that which 
the verbal art exists to convey and which can be distinctly 
known as such, however impossible it may be to describe it 
or express it at all in any other words than those of the poet." 
He goes on to cite four poems, of Drummond, Herrick, 
Wordsworth, and Whitman, all on the subject of mortality. 
He contends that, although they have a common subject, 
The Theory of Poetry, p. 58. Martin Seeker. 
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the inspirations are uniquely different, and each is distinct 
from its corresponding poem. "In the first place, each 
inspiration is something self -contained and self -sufficient, 
a complete and entire whole : and, in the second place, each 
inspiration is something which did not, and could not, 
originally exist as words."' The words are simply transla- 
tions into external symbols of an inner experience which by 
itself and before such translation was a perfect and self- 
complete whole in all its details. "Every inspiration' has its 
own unity, and every poem should have its own form, since 
the . form must be the efficient equivalent of the unity. "2 
Mr. Abercrombie makes this the centre of his whole argument. 
Professor Alexander holds exactly the opposite view: He 
says : "I suggest that the artist's work proceeds not from a 
finished imaginative experience to which the work of art 
`áeorresponds, . but from passionate excitement about the 
subject- matter; that 14,re poet sings as the bird sings, because 
he must; that the poem is wrung from him by the subject 
which excites him, and that he possesses the imaginative 
experience embodied in his words just in so far as he has 
spoken them. In no sense is the poem the translation of his 
state of mind, for he does not know till he has said it4either 
what he wants to say or how he shall say it -two things 
which are admittedly one. The imaginative experience 
supposed to be in his mind does not exist there. What does 
exist is the subject- matter which detains him and fixes his 
thoughts and feeds his interest, giving a colour to his excite- 
ment which would be different with a different subject - 
matter. " 3 In short, the artistic experience is a discovery or 
revelation4 which takes place in and through the act of 
expression. 
There is no doubt truth in both of these statements. But 
Mr. Alexander, I believe, is far more right than Mr. Aber- 
crombie. Putting it dogmatically, Mr. Abercrombie is 
1 The Theory of Poetry, p. 62. Martin Seeker. 
_3 Op. Lill, pp. II, I2. .. 
2 Ibid., p. 74. 
4' Ibid., p. fg. 
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correct enough in saying that `inspiration' in his sense did 
4.not "exist in words ". "Nor was it in words that the mind of 
Wordsworth had [in Lucy] that entranced experience of 
becoming one with the unconscious speed of the spinning 
earth. "* But then inspiration in his sense is just not poetic 
inspiration ; it is an experience prior to the existence of poetic 
inspiration. Poetic inspiration means the inspiration of 
poetry, and implies the formation of images and words and 
phrases which are the beginning of the poem. If Mr. Aber- 
, crombie supposes that poetry is the `translation' of a com- 
plete but non -poetic experience, it is not much wondejthat 
he speaks of the shortcomings and `defects' of languagC And 
implies that poetry's translation is always a little inferior to 
the real original thing which is unsaid. But the real thing 
for poetry is not unsaid. Poetry is spoken. Mr. Alexander, 
though he frankly admits that he overstates sometimes 
is entirely right. The poet possesses his entire imaginative 
(poetic) experience so far as he has spoken the words. It does 
not exist till then. There is no `inferiority' or `defect' about 
language, if it is poetry of which we are thinking. Words- 
worth's actual living experience of the spinning earth was 
personal and private, and we can only understand it, if we 
do, through sympathy and imagination, aided no doubt by 
descriptive words. But this is certainly not what "possesses 
our minds the instant the poem is finished ". Wordsworth's 
wordless experience may have been the 'subject' of (part of) 
the poem and its occasion. But what possesses our minds is 
not this experience of Wordsworth before, perhaps long 
before, he even thought of the poem, but Wordsworth's 
experience-in- the -completed -words( 
"No motion has she now, no force ; 
She neither hears nor sees 
Rolled round in earth's diurnal course 
With rocks and stones and trees." 
3 The Theory of Poetry, p.13Q, 3 2 Op. eit., p. 
HI, ls 
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Before we decide, then, whether expression in language (or 
other medium) is a gain or a loss, or whether it is possible 
to say absolutely that it is ̀ either, we must distinguish 
between an `inspiring experience' (a) in a more general, and 
(b) in a more particular and specifically artistic sense. (a) An 
`inspiring experience' in the general sense may be perfectly 
harmonious and satisfying in itself, and, as such, will demand 
no completion beyond itself. Mystics have claimed that a 
single moment of mystic rapture is worth the struggles and 
defeats of a lifetime, and that this is an end in itself. We can 
each of us recall some experience, religious, aesthetic, or 
otherwise, when to breathe this finer air so satisfied us that 
anything beyond the moment (e.g. a verbal description) 
seemed superfluous and trivial. (b) But with certain persons 
(i.e. artists), at certain times, rapturous . experiences do j 
kdernand complement, do demand aesthetic expression in one 
medium or another, as we have seed he experience is . 
inspiring to a certain form of activity, artistic activity. 
If we are referring to (a), it is true that no artistic embodi- 
ment can ever fully convey this kind of inspiration in its 
private simple directness and in its utter perfection. If we 
are thinking of (b), then not only is a medium such as words 
not `defective', but it is the only means through which the 
experience in its fullness can be discovered and possessed. 
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I. FACTORS IN THE AESTHETIC OBJECT ANALYSED 
We have been working, so far, upon the belief that the 
aesthetic object is a unity of two factors, the content, or the 
what, which is embodied, and the body in which, it appears. 
The whole we have called `Embodiment'. Aesthetic Embodi- 
ment is a fusion by imagination of content with body, and 
we at once get into difficulties if we try to separate the 
content from the body, or vice versa. I.f we do, we get either,, 
or both, of two things which are not aesthetic at all. Yet, on 
the other hand, it is of paramount importance to realise that 
the aesthetic object is a fusion of two factors. If it is, it will . 
follow that the concrete character, the character as a whole, 
of the aesthetic embodiment or unit, will vary, (I) with the 
nature of the parts, (2) with the relative importance 
given to one part or to another, and perhaps, (3) with the 
thoroughness or lack of thoroughness of their fusion. 
'I'hese are, formally, three possibilities, not necessarily, 
mutually exclusive. 
Let us consider for a moment what these three things 
mean, taking them according to their formal division, in 
spite of some obvious overlapping. 
(I) The nature of the concrete aesthetic whole will be 
different as the nature of its components vary. On the one 
hand, (a) its what or content will contribute to determine 
the nature of the whole. The subject of the picture or poem, 
the characters and activities of persons in a drama, are part 
of the meaning of the whole. One picture or poem or novel 
or drama obviously differs from another in this respect. 
Or again, the fact whether the content is trifling or important 
or profound, or even perhaps whether what is represented is 
in some way disgusting or repulsive or evil, will affect the 
meaning of the whole. On the other hand, (b) the nature of 
the material of the `body' will obviously affect the whole. 
If words are the material we get one kind of art; if colours, 
another ; if solid forms, a third ; if sounds, a fourth, and so on. 
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On the nature of the material will, to some extent, depend 
the fact whether or not the art is `representative'. Thus 
painting tends to be `representative', whilst music Marchi- a"'J 
tecture do not, the materials of which they are composed 
helping to determine their characters. 
(2) The relative importance given to content or to body 
will affect the kind of aesthetic whole. This will partly depend 
upon (I) and partly upon ourselves. The nature of the content, 
or of the body, will sometimes determine whether the 
content -side or the body -side is likely to be given most 
attention by the aesthetic percipient. A dramatic subject 
may suggest dramatic treatment ; this tends to direct our 
interest to content, and this in turn affects the aesthetic 
whole. Or a revolting subject may attract attention to itself. 
Or a trifling subject may, indirectly, turn a'attention to the "AA 
cleverness of treatment in the medium -these things, once 
again, affecting what is to be the total aesthetic object for 
us. Or take the influence of `body'. Where the medium is, 
for example, music, the focus of interest tends to be on the 
combinations of perceived sounds themselves, rather than 
upon any meanings= suggested. Where the medium is words, 
on the other hand, the art will tend to be `representative', 
with a corresponding increase in the attention to the 
meanings which the words convey. The same is true, with 
some modifications, of certain sorts of painting (and sculp- 
ture). Neither poetry nor painting is merely representative 
in the sense that it is intended to convey our thoughts away 
from embodiment to non -aesthetic subject- matter. But the 
content -side may very well be much more marked, more 
clear and distinct, than it is, say, in abstract music or in 
architecture, this determining a difference in the nature of 
the concrete aesthetic whole. 
These are tendencies only, and to all of them there are 
= I do not intend to suggest that music does not possess `meanings' which 
can be apprehended. The above are only approximate general statements 
to which I hope to give point later, ì he el tos Seep eo4 
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exceptions. Music may be representative -to some degree. 
And words and colours may delight us, compelling interest 
through the sheer loveliness of their texture. 
(3) Of the thoroughness or otherwise of the fusion -of 
--body and content I shall say nothing at the moment. 
Implications of the question will-ecr later in this chapter, 
and I shall return to the subject in Chapter Twelve (on 
"The Competition of Interests in the Work of Art ") . There 
I shall ask such questions as, Can there, in Opera, be a real 
fusion of interests? or is Opera to be reckoned a `composite' 
art? Must we concentrate either on the drama or on the 
music? Orman sonX Can there be) true fusion between the 
meanings of words, the appeal of word- sounds, and the 
,appeal of the music? 
II. How THIS ANALYSIS BEARS UPON OUR FUTURE PROBLÉIIÌS 
These rather abstract distinctions of content and body and 
their relations are, though in themselves not particularly 
interesting, of considerable importance in .their implications. 
Most, perhaps all, of the problems which we shall discuss in 
the next four chapters, would appear to arise out of them. 
In this chapter we shall find that the notions of `significance' 
and `perfection', as applied to art- theory, are largely, though 
not merely, applications of the idea of aesthetic - fusion 
[(3) above]. The notion of greatness, on the other hand, 
appears to arise from the side of content. As for future 
chapters, under heading (I) above might perhaps be 
placed some of the general problems of `kinds' of beaut jr 
(Chapter Thirteen) . The nature or kind of content will affect 
the question whether a piece of art is, say, tragic or comic or 
sublime. Differences of body will, obviously enough, deter- 
mine -whether a work of art is to be classed as painting, or 
music, or poetry, and so on. Again, the questions of the 
relation of art to moral values (Chapter Eleven), as well as of 
the relation of art to what is commonly called the `true' and 
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the `real' (Chapter Ten), will arise mainly, though again not 
éxc üsively, from consideration of the content -side. Or we 
might place under (2) the problem of the classic and the 
romantic (Chapter Thirteen), which is, on one side of it at 
least, a question of the emphasis on form, or on spirit or 
content. 
These are some of the problems which arise out of (I), (2), 
and (3). The question under which heading each should go 
is not of much importance, for the classification is not water- 
tight : possibly a case might be made out for each problem 
being placed under every heading in turn. All that is neces- 
sary now is that we should be clear that our main concern 
for some time will be with the nature and the relations of 
content and of body, and of the effects of these things upon 
the nature of concrete wholes, the best examples of which 
are to be found in works of art. In this hapter I shall be 
concerned with the general ideas of per ection and imper- 
fection (Beauty and Ugliness), and in the next with 
subject -matter, greatness, and the standards of these. In the 
following two I shall discuss the relation of art to reality and 
truth, and to morals. In Chapter Twelve we shall meet with 
some c )ncrete problems of apparent conflict between different 
elements in works of art, whilst in Chapter Thirteen will be 
raised the question of `kinds' of art, with discussion of one or 
two important `kinds'. 
III. THE DENIAL THAT THERE IS ANY U GLINESS 
Let us begin, then, with the notion of perfection: In order 
that aesthetic expression shall exist there are required; as 
we know, three fundamental factors, a `body' or material, 
a content (which possesses significance or valúable meaning), 
and an imaginative mind -with -its -organism (fusing `content' 
to `body' in `embodiment') . The significance possessed'by 
the content may sometimes, as we saw, be stated in general 
and abstract terns. Thus the music means 'joy' or `sorroW'"or 
f' _ 
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`power' or `tenderness'. But su 
saw, is never fully the significanc 
cance is not just significance in ge 
to imagination of this particular b 
to imagination, completely (i.e. 
fluity) express meaning, we 
eteness 
significance, as we also 
embodied, for the signifi- 
erai, but the significance 
dy. And when body does, 
without defect or super - 
-essi.on. 
of expression; an perfec- 
the con srnrn tjen- af--- the. 
y' 
The nature of beauty is thus simply. described. But there is 
a certain underlying difficulty, which may now be discussed 
briefly, before going on examine more in detail whatperfect 
expressiveness means in simpler and more complex cases. 
It may be quite true to say that if body appears to imagina- 
tive mind completely to express meaning, it is perfect, 
-eatitrfur. But w at body? What kind of body? Any body? 
Or are some bo ies intrinsically incapable of appearing to 
any imaginative mind as - beautif ui-? Or, Is the burden of 
aesthetic expressiveness to be thrown wholly on the side of 
imaginative mind? Can imaginative mind see the most 
perfect beauty., in trashy poems, pictures, tunes, in trashy 
-fie, suburban villas? Or, if we have been right in insisting 
that aesthetic expression always has a `body' aspect, must 
we not suppose that the qualities and forms of the body 
really do determine, at least partly, whether can 
or cannot be called beautiful? If we do not accept this 
conclusion, does it not at least look as if the distinction 
between beauty and ugliness were like to fade away? 
. If any body, however hideous it appears to us, can appear 
ä eirlr to someone else, how have `beautiful' and `ugly' 
any objective meaning? 
It must be confessed that there is a strong tendency to -day 
among artists and aestheticians to deny -or at least to appear 
to deny -the distinction between beauty and ugliness. "It is 
now taken ", writes Mrs. Gilbert,' "as aesthetic innocence to 
I Gp, =eity, p. 162. 
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apply the word. ̀ ugly' to the .portraits of wrinkled old 
women, cácophaliy in poetry, discords in music, angularity 
in drawing, or roughness of dramatic utterance. The ' 
shrinking from complex and uningratiati ng representation, ' 
if there is something powerful offered, is imputed to the 
timidity or intellectual narrowness of the spectator. But the 
new attitude ", she goes on, "raises a problem. If you extend 
the term `beauty' beyond the merely agreeable so that it 
will include everything that is in any sense aesthetically 
moving, how much territory do you leave to the ugly? 
The tendency is to say, `nothing'. Just as it is said regarding 
morality that `tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner,' . so it 
is said of the world of semblances that to take in any presen- 
tation adequately involves giving it a positive worth. This, 
Sáintsbury says, is the spirit of the new literary criticism: 
Your new critic `must constantly compare books, authors, 
literatures, indeed, to see in what each differs from each,' 
but never in order to dislike one because it is not the other:'' 
And Bosanquèt with all his austerity and insistence on 
distinctions of value admits that he is much inclined to the 
view that there is no such thing as invincible ugliness." 
Croce and his followers, again, often appear to deny 'that 
the term `ugliness' has any real meaning. "This problem" 
(that of the ugly in art), writes Croce, "is without meaning 
for us" who do not recognise any ugliness save the anti 
aesthetic or inexpressive, which can never form part of the' 
aesthetic fact, being, on the contrary, its antithesis.. "7 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
These are serious views. We may find in them much to agree 
with. I do not wish' to discuss them as such at the morte'it, 
but will make one or two comments on the isst;fewhiah h as 
been set forth. 
The main questions we raised may be classified as follows. 
Aestketic; p. 88 
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We asked : (a) Are some bodies intrinsically incapable of 
appearing to any imaginative mind as 4 e tttifaF? (b) Is the 
burden of aesthetic expressiveness to be thrown wholly on the 
side of imaginative mind -and -body? (e) Can imaginative 
mind- and -body do anything aesthetically with such things 
as trashy gems, pictures, tunes, suburban villas? (d) Or, if 
_Y body can be . - --` r tr rj, what becomes of the 
distinction between beauty and ugliness? These four ques- 
tions refer of course merely to closely related aspects of the 
same thing, but it will be convenient to try to answer them.. 
in order. 
"(á) We certainly cannot say that some bodies are intrinsi -. 
cally incapable of appearing to mind as We may . 
say that they are now, and perhaps will be always, incapable 
of appearing as beautiful to us, to x or to y or to z ; and 
possibly (though with less certainty), to anyone of this time 
and generation and culture. We can say, and we can give . 
reasons, why this or that body, regarded aesthetically, . 
hopelessly breaks down before our apprehending minds... 
But we certainly cannot say with complete certainty that . 
the very same body might not at some time appear to some 
mind as truly and completely expressive. Different minds- 
and-bodies at different times, owing to different backgrounds . 
and associations, and perhaps owing to differences in mental 
and organic/ structure, may get quite different meanings 
out of perceived forms. 
(b) From this it does not follow that the burden is all 
thrown upon , imaginative mind -and -body, and that the 
forms and material of the aesthetic object are indifferent to 
aesthetic expressiveness. The material with its forms is an 
essential component, but what it suggests to one mind, by 
reason of the differences just- mentioned, is simply different 
from what it suggests to another mind. The aesthetic object 
= It is possible, for example, that differences of pigmentation, of cutaneous 
structure and the position of the nerve-endings, may affect our aesthetic 
experien a as compared with those, say, of the yellow or Negro races. 
o 
. Af .-c 
40-.4 
rov` 
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must have a `body' ; aesthetic experience is not a matter of 
; but one imagination -will imagine very f'L444-41 
w.Z4, different meanings relevant to a given object than will 
another. 
(c) The trashy poem, picture, tune, suburban villa, is 
genuinely trashy, i.e. aesthetically inferior, for the dis- 
criminating minds of our generation. These things really are 
so, for us. They have their meanings, and their breakdowns 
of meaning, from which they cannot escape -our perceptual 
systems and associations being what they are. And to find 
some of the works of Miss Wilcox or Mr. Marcus Stone or 
Mr. Ethelbert Nevin or Mr. Speculative Builder as laeftet 
would require a semplett revolution in the associations of 
our life ..of words, moral traditions, of sounds,kisual 
shapes. The change required would be so complete that we 
certainly cannot imagine it, though we may conceive it as 
a remote and indefinitely unlikely possibility. If we could 
come upon these things as visitors from another planet, it is 
/Y_ conceivable that we might find some of them beautiful, forte 
some of them might happen to an entirely different 
system of organic experiences and associations. It would be 
like finding beauty unexpectedly in some eddy of chance, 
as when pressing the eye -ball we discover a pretty pattern 
of colour, or see beauty in a rubbish -heap or a congeries 
of enamelled advertisements. But much of the `accidental' 
{-tom - `a b txty which in this life we happen upon, has more possi- 
bility of aesthetic meaning than the sham decorations on a 
suburban villa or on cheap furniture, because it is often 
the revelation of the order of some natural process. We talk 
of the `accidental' formation of clouds, or of the beauty of 
petrol in a puddle, or of the forms in a coal -fire. But if these 
appear beautiful they usually do seem to express (at least) 
some unity and coherent pattern. They have some 'func- 
tional' beauty. The applied carvings on a cheap wardrobe, 
on the other hand, have no coherent meaning whatsoever, 
and it is therefore impossible to imagine how any dis- 
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criminating person could ever find them beautiful as he 
literally= sees them. We must say for accuracy's sake that it 
is not inconceivable that some differentteing might see in 
them meaning expressed for him. We must say, for accuracy's 
*sake, that it is not inconceivable that there is no such thing 
as the impossibility of -thing's appearing beautiful to 
someone. But that is all, in such cases, we can say. No `body' 
can accurately be said to be absolutely incapable of appear- 
ing as expressive to anyone. But there are probably many 
bodies which never will so appear because of their forms. 
It is to be observed that the `seeing' by, say, visitors from 
Mars, of the works of the authors mentioned as `beautiful', 
would not prove their authors to be artists, or their works to 
be aesthetically excellent to their authors or to-their admirers. 
For their authors are not from another planet. They are very 
like ourselves in some frames of mind, or perhaps at some 
earlier stage which we should like to forget. We know The 
Rosary is a wretched thing because we can understand the 
wretched thing so well. We know that imitation- timbering is 
bad because we know the motives to which it appeals. We 
find out the defects of these things because of our knowledge 
of what they try, and fail, to express. It is because our 
judgment is based on aesthetic knowledge that we can say 
with some confidence that the pleasure some people get 
out of such objects is other than aesthetic pleasure. For the 
visitor from Mars it might be different. 
In all these instances I am assuming the existence of 
expert aesthetic judgment. Much of course that appears ugly 
appears so because it is, to begin with at least, too difficult 
for us, and we wrongly suppose that the artist has failed ; 
whereas it is ourselves. Or perceiving a thing as really 
expressive, we may condemn it for some non -aesthetic 
reason, such as that it suggests something unpalatable or 
unpleasant. 
Ike- -might idealise -might select, omit, supplement -in seeing, or in 
painting, but that would be another matter. 
A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
(d) The distinction between beauty and ugliness does not 
:disappear because 
beauty and 
ugliness depend upon meanings imagined by some particular 
mind with its articular histor . and experience If wsapose 
is Beauty e.-be perfection of expressiveness, a . Ugliness ,tom 
Jaw failure in expressiveness, then, if any body really appears 
to any -imaginative mind to be perfectly expressive of 
meaning (strictly in the sense of expression which we have 
. ... _ though there be but one mind 
in the world which sees it so. The same applies, mutatis 
. mutandis, to ugliness. Beauty and ugliness are real and 
objective notions, real and objective qualities, distinct from 
one another and never identical. The fact that the very 
same `body' may appear to X as ugly, and to Y as beautiful, 
makes no difference whatever to the real existence of real 
ugliness and real beauty in the one case and in the other. 
To these topics I shall return a little later (pp. ) . 
in order to make the problems and their suggested solutions 
rather more definite, in order in particular to see more 
clearly why there is a considerable community of opinion 
regarding the things we call beautiful and ugly, let us now 
examine the idea of aesthetic perfection a little more closely. 
V. GREATER, AND SMALLER, VARIATIONS OF AESTHETIC 
MEANING IN SIMPLE DATA AND IN WORKS OF ART 
In any one generation the variety of possible interpretations 
of an. aesthetic `body', the variety of meanings which may be 
.got out of it by different minds, is probably very much 
smaller in the case of some kinds of aesthetic bodies than 
it is in others. It is probably smaller in the case of very 
complex works of art, where the aesthetic 
. meaning to the 
expert is made definite by the coherence and contextuality 
of the whole. (On the other hand, of course, complexity 
makes for difficulty, and resulting difference of interpreta 
Ly 
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tion.) And it is probably larger in the very simplest aesthetic 
bodies, such as sense data or uncomplicated forms. In order 
to see concretely what expressiveness may mean in these 
two cases let us discuss them both, beginning with the 
simpler. 
Examples of simple objects are sense data, e.g. simple 
sounds and colours. Take colours. The meanings which a 
simple= uniform surface of'colour may appear, aesthetically, 
to possess to different minds, and even to the same mind at 
different times, are very various. Various relatively, I mean, 
when we consider how poor is the . perceived object in its 
potentiality of suggestiveness. Variations in organic structure 
and in private associations, particularly the latter, conduce 
to this result, although once again similarities in organic 
structure, and community of experience and tradition, 
must make for limitation of variety, for considerable com- 
munity of interpretation. But the variety is patent. Yellow 
may appear `sunshiny' to A, `bilious' to B; green may appear 
`jealous' to C, `springy' to D, deep like the sea to E. And 
so. on. Provided the seen colours appear to possess the 
qualities imputed to them, and if the other conditions of 
aesthetic experience are present, we cannot but call the 
colours aesthetically expressive. The variety of individual 
meanings makes no difference. 
There is, then, relatively, a great variety of possible 
aesthetic meanings to be obtained from the perception of 
simple sense data by different percipients. It is true that, 
imagining the imputed values to belong to a sense datum, 
we instinctively expect others to see them these. We say 
"Can't you see, how `cheerful' ... how `lugubrious' .. . 
how `false', the colour is ?" But aesthetically, as we have 
argued, this desire for community is, strictly speaking, 
irrelevant. Community, or privacy, it is aesthetically- no 
matter, and the fact that half a dózen or a hundred, or 
Reservations as to `simple' data have already been made (above, 
PP' ) 
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ten million people, get the same (or a similar) meaning out 
of a perceived object, makes it not one whit the more 
`aesthetic'- though community may affect the content of an 
aesthetic object. 
Such aesthetic meanings may depend upon whim, upon 
purely individual, private, and subjective experience. This 
is bound to be less so in complex aesthetic unities like works 
of art. The work of art is a complex whole in which the 
meaning of every part is determined in relation to the rest. 
And it follows that for one race, generation, and culture the 
aesthetic meanings of the parts must be relatively, and in 
spite of variations of interpretation, more fixed than are the 
aesthetic meanings of detached sense qualities. Just as, to 
get definite meaning out of a phrase or a sentence in a 
philosophical argument, we have to take it in its context, so 
in art definiteness and contextuality go together. A colour 
or sound, a word in poetry, a bar in music, may, when 
detached, suggest to different persons an indefinite variety 
of meanings; when in the picture or sonata or poem the 
meaning becomes relatively (though only relatively) fixed. 
To take but the crudest examples, the meanings of the 
yellow in the desert -painting, or of the green in the sea- 
scape, will be limited to values the picture relevant to 
these. The words, "0 cursed spite,' in Hamlet's mouth, have 
an aesthetic significance determined by their context in the 
play. And, the meanings being relatively fixed, it is obviously 
more likely that the same meanings will be shared by a 
number of expert minds- though, because of difficulties 
arising through complexity, experts will always dispute. 
Once again, however, this fact of community, though 
ethically and socially important, is aesthetically irrelevant. 
The artist, as we saw, primarily develops and constructs for 
his own fulfilment, and in so doing he makes his meanings 
more definite, more fixed, more unambiguous, more 
`objective', less dependent on his passing whim. His sociality 
may indefinitely encourage and develop this process. 
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VI. PERFECTOIN, AND DEGREES OF EXPRESSION 
The perfection of expressiveness of a sense datum is a simple 
kind of perfection, because the complexity of the aesthetic 
object is slight, and it is not difficult to discern where lie 
the elements of aesthetic harmony or (if there is imperfection) 
disharmony,,, relevance, or irrelevance. The perfection cf 
works of art is exactly the same in principle, except that the 
aesthetic object is indefinitely more complex. In the case of 
sense data the `body' side, for example, is simple : in the case 
of works of art it is anything but simple. A simple colour, 
regarded as colour, has no parts : a picture has. The picture 
is a complex with a body in space, the poem or the symphony 
are complexes with bodies in time, and perfection of expres- 
sion implies that every part contributes -a--u14.a-ni rg in 
harmony with the rest and with the whole. Where -there 
fulfil what, aestheti 
fulfil, there is (following the definition we 
that extent ugliness or lack of beauty 
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lly, it ought to 
ave assumed) to 
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existed independently, would have seemed, most recalcitrant 
to expression ". 
Of the first sense we may say that it implies greater 
complexity both of body and of content, but not necessarily 
any difference in degree of expressiveness, although there 
may in some cases be such. A single word, or, better, a 
sentence, may be perfectly expressive may contain a com- 
plete meaning, .perfectly`embodiejsthetically. Such per- 
" fection is no less perfection than the possible perfection of a 
whole poem. In fact a sentence may be more perfectly expressive 
than the whole poem, if one account of perfection has been 
right. Of course, if the single sentence is imaginatively 
conceived as part of a whole poem, then, as a part, it is in 
itself incomplete, and in that sense, not `perfect' : for only 
the whole is complete and in that sense perfect. But this is 
only assuming over again that the degree is a degree of 
complexity (and not a degree of "expressiveness "). For the 
less complex part of a more complex whole, though itself as 
a part, less complexé and in that sense -in Croce's and 
Carritt s term -less "expressive') may yet attain in itself 
complete perfection of expression (in our sense). It is very 
often the case that parts of works of art- selected parts, not 
pieces hacked out at random -are in themselves perfectly 
expressive. Milton's address to Light at the beginning of the 
Third Book of Paradise Lost is an example. So are the 
innumerable lyrical passages in Shakespeare. So may be 
separate movements in musical structures, or parts of groups 
of sculpture or of architectural wholes. Perfection of expres- 
sion of parts, taken in themselves, is not in the least incom- 
patible with incompleteness when the parts are taken in 
relation to a more complex whole. Degrees of "extension ", 
iii-etiferwertis, have no sort of necessary relation to degrees, 
of perfection of expression.= They may, on the other hand, 
I am not suggesting that Mr. Cariitt would necesEarily disagree with . 
much of this conclusbn. 
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very well have some sort of relation to `depth q, ̀ .greatness' 
of significance. A slow movement, though, perfect, is more 
profoundly significant in the context of the whole symphony. 
But degrees of `depth' or `greatness' of significance are, I 
shall suggest, . quite a different matter from degrees = of 
expressiveness. 
(z) The instance of the two drafts of Hyperion is, it 
seems to me, a genuine example of degrees of perfection, 
presuming, of course, that the second is a `better' draft than 
the first. I do not think Mr. Carritt is quite accurate in 
saying that the revised draft is a better expression "of the 
very same feeling ", I for the "feeling ". is the feeling embodied, 
and is different in the second case from the first. But letting 
that pass, we may cordially agree that a work of art may 
be more or less expressive, in. the .sense that it may be less 
pr more patchy. It does not, as one would sometimes imagine 
from reading Croce, completely and absolutely bar itself 
out from the aesthetic sphere in being here and there less 
than absolutely perfect or beautiful. The work of art being, 
,e4," unlike 
144 f ' er oiázcrc. Partial failure does not mean total failure. 
iBut so far as it is imperfect, the work is, admittedly, failing 
avA n beauty; and it is thus far ugly. 
(3) With Mr. Carritt's third heading I shall deal very 
9Y shortly when I come to discuss the ideas of `greatness' and 
`difficulty'. 
VII. BEAUTY AND UGLINESS 
Beauty, according to the assumption we have been making, 
is just perfection of expression; ugliness is some failure or 
breakdown or obstruction of expression. And as we have 
seen, there are, in some sense, degrees in these things. 
Ought we to say that here are degrees of beauty? Or 
degrees of ugliness? Or Both? Croce (for his own reasons) 
I Op. cit., p. 215. 
i_C'_ 
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argues= that though there may be degrees of ugliness- 
"from the rather ugly (or almost beautiful) to the extremely 
ugly " --there cannot be degrees of beauty. Croce's view we 
have already discussed, and we need not concern ourselves 
with it now. But leaving him, what is the right usage? 
Strictly speaking, if beauty is perfection of expression, 
i.e. complete perfection, there can be no degrees. of it. 
Perfection is always perfect perfection. On the other hand, 
there may be degrees of approximation to it, i.e. degrees of 
ugliness. But although this is strictly so, it would be pedantic 
to insist on it. In common usage, when the object reveals a 
relatively high degree of aesthetic expressiveness we say, 
`This is more, or less, beautiful than that.' And, where there 
is much failure in expressiveness, we say, `This is more, or 
less, ugly than that.' Similarly we often say `more perfect' 
or `less perfect' or `more imperfect' or `less imperfect'. If we. 
are clear in our mind there need be no difficulty in this. 
We may, then, I think, follow common usage here and speak 
of degrees of beauty and perfection (when we are thinking 
of the ideal which is beauty) or of degrees of ugliness or 
imperfection (when we are thinking of failures to reach the 
ideal) . 
Let it be noted, however, that beauty is the ideal, and 
ugliness failure or obstruction of beauty. Beauty is the' 
absolute ideal, of perfect expressiveness, and ugliness would 
have no meaning except in relation to this ideal. It 'would 
not be possible to set up ugliness as another absolute but 
negative ideal, for, ugliness being defined in relation to 
beauty, there could be no such thing as absolute ugliness. 
Absolute ugliness, if it could mean anything, would mean 
absolute failure to attain expressiveness at all, and this, 
being the non -expressive, would be the non -aesthetic. And, 
clearly, the non -aesthetic is not what we mean by the ugly. 
`Seven plus five is twelve' ; `my Airedale is fifteen months 
old' -these are non -aesthetic facts, but are certainly not 
I Aesthetic, p. 79. 
v 
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ugly. Ugliness falls within the aesthetic : it involves some 
degree of aesthetic expressiveness, and, in the sense we have 
described, some degree, however slight, of beauty. This is 
probably all very familiar to the reader, for it is no new 
doctrine. 
Ñ74% 
VIII. WHETHER CAN EXIST 
But it is wrong to let enthusiasm for this undoubted truth 
lead us to jump to the conclusion that nothing ugly exists. 
Sometimes this is said sincerely, sometimes it is said because 
it is fashionable to say it. It has, of course, its grain of truth, 
but taken by itself it is, I think, false. In the first place it is 
ambiguous. It may mean (a) `nothing relatively ugly exists', 
or (b) `nothing absolutely ugly exists'. If `nothing ugly 
exists' means (a), then (if we are right) it is demonstrably 
false, and we should he chary of being led astray by specious 
paradox. Of course Simon Lee is u lier than Tintern 
If, on the other hand, `not .ing ugly exists' means 
(b), `nothing absolutely ugly exists', the case is more difficult. 
It certainly looks as if it followed, from what we have said, 
that nothing absolutely ugly can exist. This is the conclusion 
that Bosanquet inclines to.' Is he right? The question is 
difficult, and one hesitates to speak dogmatically. Yet, 
searching our experience, can we not all conceive, or perhaps 
remember, certain visual objects (for example) which seem 
to be wholly hideous, "invincibly ugly "? Are not some 
advertisement hoardings, some pieces of furniture, or 
architecture, wholly ugly? I certainly seem to remember 
portions of highways in America and of main roads in this 
country where could be found what seemed to be ugliness, 
absolute ugliness, in almost every direction.2 But how is this 
_ Three Lectures in Aesthetic, p. 99. 
2 do not suggest that an artist painting these things might not by 
selection make a beautiful picture out of them. But if he took the shapes 
and colours exactly as he found them, could he find them expressive? 
. 
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reconciled with the statement that ugliness implies some 
expressiveness, and therefore some degree of beauty? 
It might be reconciled, I think, by distinguishing between 
beauty actually embodied and beauty which is only imagined 
or suggested as an ideal, perhaps by contrast, to the mind 
of the beholder. When I see a hideous horsehair sofa with 
apparently no relieving features, no portion of expressiveness 
anywhere, I think of the function of sofas, and of the thing 
the sofa might be, a thing clean and expressive and simple. 
So, the machine -made imitation carved wardrobe may 
actually be, as a whole, wholly_ hideous, but I have in my 
mind what a wardrobe ought to be like. The object suggests 
to my mind a possible ideal beauty. If it suggested nothing 
of the kind it would not even appear ugly. Here perhaps 
enters the element of expressiveness, of the degree of beauty 
which is required. There need not necessarily be any actual 
beauty. Similarly, on returning after many years to a spot 
which used to be rural and lovely, and is now made loath- 
some by unregulated industrial developments, I cannot help 
seeing in my mind's eye what might have been there, or how 
development might have been regulated. 
This class of case it is convenient, I suggest, to contrast 
with the class of case (perhaps more frequent) where 
expressiveness is present here or there, but fails to organise 
itself completely, or where one kind of beauty, so far corn- - " 
plete in itself, jars with another kind in a larger whole. 
Bosanquet gives as an example of this the hypothetical case 
of the beautiful silky ear of a dachshund replacing the ear of 
a beautiful human face.' Bosanquet's own view is, by the 
way, that "the principal region in which to look for insuper- 
able ugliness is that of conscious attempts at beautiful 
expression -in a word, the region of insincere and affected 
art. Mere you necessarily have the very root of ugliness -the 
pretension to pure expression, which alon can have a clear 
and positive failure. "= With reservations garding the cases 
I Three Lectures in Aesthetic, p. i o2. 2 Ibid., p. io6. 
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in which beauty is only present ideally in mental imagery, 
I am in agreement with this. 
We do often, it is true, think of the slum -areas of great 
industrial cities, with their grime and colourlessness and 
general dreariness, as examples ofthe most unrelieved ugliness. 
There need be no `pretension' present. It may be, however, 
that here, too, we think of what, aesthetically, might have 
been. °R *t `i. __ i afteir ̀  efty to --be misled into 
confusing the general depression which such scenes cause 
in our minds- and -bodies with aesthetic ugliness. In some 
cases these grim and dreary buildings are relatively expres- 
sive of what they are, of their own values. It is what they 
express that we cannot abide. 
IX. 'LIFFICULT' BEAUTY 
R 
Genuine ugliness should be distinguished clearly from what 
Bosanquet calls `difficult' beauty. This is necessary because 
it is, I think, a failure to make this distinction which leads 
some modern thinkers to try to do away with the term 
`beauty' on account of its limited meaning. When they do, 
they usually mean by beauty the gasil diry, the pretty, the 
pleasant. And when they say that great art is not always 
`beautiful', but is often `ugly', they mean by `ugliness' what 
is in fact a kind of beauty not facile or obvious. 
Bosanquet has settled this distinction once and for all, 
and I have to quote him once again at some length. For 
Bosanquet, easy or facile beauty coincides "with that which, 
on grounds which cannot be pronounced unaesthetic, is 
prima facie pleasant to practically everyone. A simple tune; 
a simple spatial rhythm, like that of the tiles in one's fire- 
place; a rose; a youthful faces or the human form in its 
primeiA-all these afford a plain, straightforward pleasure 
to the( ordinary `body- and - mind'. There is no use in 
lengthening the list." 
Three Lectures in Aesthetic, p. 85. 
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It is true that some of the highest types of beauty have 
simple aspects which have a wide appeal, but Bosanquet is 
not thinking of this when he speaks of `easy' beauty. In fact 
he distinguishes "between the easier types of beauty and 
what might be called simple victorious or triumphant 
beauty; between the Venus dei Medici and the Venus of 
Milo ; between the opening of Marmion and the first chorus 
of the Agamemnon ".' 
Of `difficult' beauty, of that which amounts with some 
persons to what is repellent, Bosanquet suggests three forms. 
He calls them (a) Intricacy, (b) Tension, (c) Width.2 
(a) Intricacy is self -explanatory. It is easy to explain the 
revulsionrst acquaintance with a pattern too 
"tiíficùlt for us he can apprehend pieces here and 
there, but the whole we cannot as yet grasp. It is thus natural 
that we should give vent to the erroneous judgment, `bad'. 
Of course so far as our interpretation of it goes, it is bad, for 
we do not grasp its expressiveness. But the point is that in 
criticism it is our business to enter into the artist's point of 
view as far as we can. 
(b) Tension. This means high tension of feeling for which 
human nature is inclined to lack the capacity, or which it is 
inclined to shirk. Aristotle speaks of "the weakness of the 
spectators" which shrinks from the essence of tragedy. The 
common mind "resents any great effort or concentration, 
and for the same reason resents the simple and severe forms 
which are often the only fitting embodiment of such a 
concentration -forms which promise, as Pater says, a great 
expressiveness, but only on condition of being received with 
a great attentiveness. The kind of effort required is not 
exactly an intellectual effort ; it is something more, it is an 
imaginative effort, that is to say, as we saw, one in which the 
body -and -mind, without resting upon a fixed system like that 
of accepted conventional knowledge, has to frame for itself as 
a whole an experience in which it can `live' the embodiment 
I Three Lectures in Aesthetic, p. 86. 2 Ibid., p. 87. 
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before it. When King John says to Hubert the single word 
`death', the word is, in a sense, easily apprehended ; but the 
state of the whole man behind the broken utterance may 
take some complete transformation of mental attitude to 
enter into. And such a transformation may not be at all 
easy or comfortable ; it may be even terrible, so that in 
Aristotle's phrase the weakness of the spectator shrinks 
from it. And this is very apt to apply, on one ground or 
another, to all great art, or indeed to all that is great of any 
kind. There is no doubt a resentment against what is great, 
if we cannot rise to it. "I 
(c) Width. There are genuine lovers of beauty, says 
Bosanquet, well equipped in scholarship, who cannot really 
enjoy Aristophanes or Rabelais or the Falstaff scenes of 
Shakespeare. This again, he thinks, is a weakness of the 
spectator.- So-with strong humour the conventional world is 
destroyed ; the comic spirit enjoys itself at the expense of 
everything. "The gods are starved out and brought to 
terms by the birds' command of the air, cutting off the 
vapour of sacrifice on which they lived ; Titania falls in 
love with Bottom the weaver; Falstaff makes a fool of the 
Lord Chief Justice of England. 
"All this demands a peculiar strength to encompass with 
sympathy its whole width. You must feel a liberation in it 
all; it is partly like a holiday in the mountains or a voyage 
at sea ; the customary scale of everything is changed, and 
you yourself perhaps are revealed to yourself as a trifling 
insect or a moral prig.... Comedy always shocks many 
people. "2 
i Three Lectures in Aesthetic, p. go. 2 Ibid., p. 92. 
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I. GREATNESS :. THE PERILOUSNESS OF THE QUEST 
'We have now spoken at some length of expressiveness and 
of its degrees, or, what is the same thing, of degrees of 
perfection of expressiveness, or degrees of beauty (or degrees 
of imperfection of expressiveness or degrees of ugliness) . % 
In common usage the term `perfection' has a fairly definite 
meaning, and it is a meaning which is quite distinct from 
the meaning of the term `greatness'. We talk of a perfect 
lyric, and we mean something different from what we mean 
when we say, `This is a great poeno(or drama or symphony . 
The two terms are not incompatible, for what is perfect may . 
be great, and vice versa. We should all probably agree that 
a work of art may be great without being perfect (e.g. 
se er --ail of 'Shakespeare's plays), or perfect without t 10a 
being great (e.g. a large number of the seventeenth- century 
lyrics) . 
What is it that constitutes greatness? This is an extra- 
ordinarily difficult question to answer accurately, and a very 
dangerous one to ask. I propose in what follows to defend 
the view that greatness corms from the content side of art, 
and that; roughly, art is `great' in so far as it is expressive 
of the `great' values of life. But even to say this is to steer 
suddenly into violent, treacherous, and narrow waters 
between rock -bound coasts. We shall have to have all our 
wits about us. For although, in taking up this view, we may 
be able to avoid the Scylla of abstraction --of cutting art 
away from its relation to life, we shall certainly, one other 
hand, run risk of foundering on the equally deadly C:4iárybdis 
of mere moralism, of mere artistic realism, of judging art by 
standards external to it. 
II. ART AND LIFE : VARIOUS VIEWS 
That the waters are indeed dangerous may be shown merely 
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temporary writers on this matter. They fall mainly on two 
sides. On the one side we may cite Mr. I. A. Richards, 
The Principles, óf Literary Criticism. I shall take him second. 
On the other side, which is larger, is to be found Mr. A. C. 
Bradley, with whom we may begin. 
Speaking of poetry, Mr. Bradley writes :I "First, this 
experience is an end in itself, is worth having on its own 
account, has an intrinsic value. Next, its poetic value is this 
intrinsic worth alone ... its nature is to be not a party, 
nor yet a copy of the real world (as we commonly under- 
band that phrase), but .tt. be a world by itself, independent, 
complete, autonomous." 'Now hear Mr. Roger Fry and 
tjl Mr. Clive Bell. Mr. Fry writes/ :2 "Mr. Bell's sharp challenge 
(( to the usually accepted view of art as expressing the 
emotions of life has been of great value. It has led to an 
o 
attempt to isolate the purely aesthetic feeling from the whole 
complex of feelings which may and generally do accompany 
the aesthetic feeling when we regard a work of art." And, 
again : "I hope to show certain reasons why we should 
regard our responses to works of art as distinct from our 
responses to other situations.' Mr. Bell says :4 "The repre- 
sentative element in a work of art may or may not be 
harmful; always it is irrelevant. For to appreciate a work of 
art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge 
of its ideas or affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art 
transports us from the world of man's activity to a world of 
aesthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from 
human interests." "He who contemplates a work of art, 
inhabitfja world with an intense and peculiar significance of 
its own ; that significance is unrelated o the significance of 
life. In this world the emotions of life find no place. It is a 
world with emotions of its own. "5 And he speaks with 
= Oxford Lectures on Poetry, p. 5. 
2 Vision and Design, p. 296. Phoenix Library. 
3 Transformations, p. 2. Chatto & Windus. 
4 Art, p. 23. Phoenix Library. 
5 Ibid., pp. 26 and 27. P4eer4mnq. I 
a./ 
yÓu. 
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eloquence/ of "the austere and thrilling raptures of those % 
who have climbed the cold white peaks of art. "' 
Leaving the pure critics and coming to Croce and his 
followers, one finds a certain difficulty in representing them 
fairly. On one side of him Croce holds precisely the opposite 
point of view from that just quoted, for he says= that one of 
the principal reasons which have prevented aesthetic from s/ 
revealing the real roots of art_.in human nature "has been 
its-eeparaytion from the general spiritual life, the having made 
of it a sort of special function or aristocratic club ". Yet - 
though for entirely different reasons from those of Fry and 
Bell -he also supports the view that the "content" of art is 
of no aesthetic importance. "The impossibility of choice of 
content completes the theorem of the independence of art, and 
is also the only legitimate meaning of the expression: art 
for art's salve. Art is independent both of science and of the 
useful and the moral. "3 Beauty is "expression and nothing 
more ".4 Mr. Collingwood writes :5 "Every work of art is 
a monad.... Nothing can go into it or come out of it; 
whatever is in it must have arisen from the creative act 
which constitutes it." 
Mr. Richards is all against the aristocratic and esoteric 
view of art, and urges that its content is a part of and is 
continuous with life. "When we look at a picture, or read 
a poem, or listen to music, we are not doing something quite 
unlike what we were doing on our way to the Gallery or 
when we dressed in the morning. "6 Again/the gulf between 
a poem and wirí - aeem "is no greater thanAbetween A /e/ 
the impulses which direct the pen and those which conduct 
the pipe of a man who is smoking and writing at once.' 
A n ! And he speaks8 of "the myth of a `transmutation' or 
`poetisation' of experience and that other myth of the 
`contemplative' or `aesthetic' attitude." Whether Mr. 
Art, p. 33. Phoenix Library. 2 Aesthetic, p. 14. 3 Ibid. p. 52. 
4 Ibid., p.,.7g. 5 Outlines of a Philosophy of Art, p. 24. 
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Richards is right or not, he truly points out, = "the `moral' 
theory of art (it would be better to call it the `ordinary 
values' . theory) has the most great minds behind. it. Until 
Whistler came to start the critical movements of the last 
half- century, few poets, artists/ or critics had ever doubted 
that the value of art experiences was to be judged as other 
values are." 
Quotations are seldom-quite fair. Those which I have 
given do seem to me to represent extracts of two radically 
opposed views. But there are, of course, individual iiiifferettees 
in the background. I have referred to the difficulty . of 
representing Croce. Among the critics, Mr. Bell is perhaps 
the most consistently downright and is therefore the easier 
to quote. Mr. Bradley is judicial, particularly if his work is 
taken as a whole, and one of the many charms of Mr. Fry's 
writing is his willingness to modify or change his views in 
the light of concrete experience. In view of this, and in view 
of trends in the remarkable first essay in his Transformations, 
I feel that Mr. Fry is ready to be persuaded that the 
significance of content or subject -matter is more important 
than he sometimes says it is. He wrote, for example, in an 
early essay (1 goo) on Beardsley's drawings :2 "The finest 
qualities of design can never be appropriated to the expres- 
sion of such perverted and morbid ideals ; nobility and 
geniality of design are attained only by those who, whatever 
their actual temperament, cherish these qualities in their 
imagination." I believe that there are grounds at least for an 
armistice between the opposing armies, if not for permanent 
peace. Ip,this statement perhaps we must except Croce, whose 
view of expression is more radical. 
But if future agreement is possible, it is because both 
sides are so indubitably right in so much of what they assert. 
Their mistakes appear to consist chiefly in over -statements. 
As against Mr. Richards, surely we may urge that the 
significance and the value of art are to be judged "from 
= Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 71. = Lbtel., p. 236. 
Jia. I 46'044w, 
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within ", and not by standards imported bodilr from life. '. y 
Ate-/ IsAthe "finer organisation of ordinary experiences ",I which 'S.' 
ert he admits, 4P9.tritISI the "new and different kind of thing"' 
I which he denies? How can he maintain that in a poetic 
b.ß. <a,, unity.alues do notbecome "poetised"? And this without 
postulating any isolated "aesthetic faculty" on the §objective 
a'Y' Imp , 
)/ side,And yet, on the other hand, as against Mr. Bell's point of view, 'how can we step suddenly out of life and cut our- 
selves off from it? Surely here are avoidable misunder- 
standings? Surely the exploration of what Mr. Bradley calls 
"the underground connection" between art and . life . will 
afford some clue to the mystery? 
h 
III. `SUBJECT- MATTER' IN ART 
I have said that I propose to defend the view that the 
greatness of art comes from the content side, that there is 
some "underground connection" between art and life. 
As the term `content'. 'is in ordinary usage taken as( very k be/ 
much the same thing as `subject- matter', and as the idea of 
`!subject- matter' is apt to be full of co fusion, I shall try tot; 
analyse it first, before going on to 'the question of greatness. 
The term `subject- matter' (of a work of art) ipay, mean 
h; five distinct things, the majorlt }' of which are best illustrated - perhaps can only be illustrated -by the `representative', 
arts. .In'.the first place, (I) there are the external objectsz 
or events, the ideas, or even the mental states, regarded as 
independent, ontological facts, and .,thought of as being . 
entirely distinct from all knowledge of them (though they 
are not of course unknowable). These may be called the . 
ontological subject- matter. Regarded( as independent and.A 4.41.*/ 
distinct, i t-ef coüz sa r ally `subj ct- matter' at all, for lá7 Aid 400. 
this term seems to. involve the idea of nation to some one's 
attitude or treatment. But for simplicity's sake let the ..teava LMd 
pass. The other `subject- matters' which we shall discuss arc, 
= Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 16. 2 Including persons. 
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in their turn, not literally different subject- matters from this, 
but are thl!s ontological subject -matter' viewed by different 
minds and bodieAin différent perspectives, and with different 
interests in view, the different perspectives ,.and interests 
determining difference in what is immediately apprehended. 
The first of_ these perspectives is 41 ontological-#bjeet ò / 
/as eogni ed ordinarily by Tom, Dick, or Harry, and known 
to be the sort of thing which artists do take as their subject- A4 
matter'. Artists paint `landscapes', they write about' women' 
or about `duty' or about `the desire for immortality'. Any 
intelligent person knows what these things mean, and any 
intelligent person can see what is meant by saying that a 
picture or a poem is `of' or `about' this or that. The things 
`about' which pictures and poems are made are in this sense 
`common' to all of us, and we do not need to be in the least 
`aesthetic' to recognise the objects which have happened to 
interest artists, or to know the fact that artists have been 
interested in them. Anyone above an idiot can see Helvellyn, 
and can know that Wordsworth wrote a poem about it. 
it This s`á'bject- matter, aesthetically indifferent, approximately 
`common' to everyone, I will call neutral subject- matter. 
The tl' "g. J,,'t in relation to the artist, in his ordinary 
¡ everyday life - and not in relation to any and every Tom, 
p,,/ Dick, .ate Harry -I will call4primary subject- matter. The 47 
(( landscape, as seen ordinarily /and without aesthetic interest 
by the painter, is the primary subject- matter of his picture. 
Lucy's death, as Wordsworth primarily experienced it, was 
the primary subject -matter of Wordsworth's poem, Lucy; his 
general idea of Duty the primary subject- matter of his Ode. 
A cognised mental state, in an artist, of joie -de -vivre or of 
sadness, may be the primary subject -matter of a lyric or a 
:-piece of music. By primary subject -matter I mean just facts 
,/ 14;4; cognised by the artis rcgarclett.as independent of all aesthetic interest (though^n independent of other, perhaps very 
profound, interests), which do nevertheless occasion aesthetic 
feeling and aesthetic expression, and which the artist, later, 
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tries to represent. It may be that such facts as those of which_ 
wé have spoken have never been regarded entirely without 
aesthetic interest by the artist. It may be that the painter 
always saw the landscape which he subsequently paints, with. 
his `painter's eye'. In such a case there would be no primary 
subject- matter, properly speaking. ='But it is extremely likely 
that t ere often is such primary subject -matter. And the 
fact that many things and events which do seem to. have 
no aesthetic significance at the time are, possible;'`subjects' 
for art makes it the more probable. Even, however, if 
primary subject- matter did not exist in an absolutely pure 
form, the distinction would be useful as marking out a 
stá 
The term "primary" here has, of course, no connection 
with "primary" in the phrase "primary qualities ". It is not 
the bare physical world independent of the conscious 
organism which is primary subject- matter (though this 
might be `ontological' subject- matter), but the concrete 
world of which the artist is ordinarily aware and in which 
he is interested, although he is not at the instant aesthetically 
interested in it. Anything whatever which is going to interest 
an artist aesthetically, and which, wheex it is interesting to A 
him, orrhas interested himmcan be thought of as the inde 
sw 
enflent occasion of aesthetic interest, kak 
erefttp is primary subject- matter. It i 
called `subject -matter', because he will, in some way, try to 
represent it in the subsequent work of art. But our interest 
in it is interest rather in history or in biography than in 
aesthetic fact. For this reason primary subject- matter is not 
of central interest in aesthetics, though, as I shall show, it is 
important to distinguish it just because it is liable to be 
confused with what is of central importance. 
Because primary subject -matter is historical or biographical 
it is not possible to discover it in the work of art, though 
' There wottlitisonly be the `ontological' landscape viewed in such a way, 
as to givewhat I am going to call in a moment `secondary' subject- matter. 
Ag. 
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examination of the work may in many cases give us a good 
idea of what it was. In `representative' arts, like painting or 
sculpture or poetry, if a landscape or a person is `represented' 
in visual form or by means of words, we suppose that facts 
in some degree similar were what stimulated the artist. 
In so supposing we leave behind for the time being our 
aesthetic experience. In less `representative' arts like music 
and architecture, on the other hand, the primary subject 
matter is often quite impossible to determine. And there is 
no need to suppose that primary subject- matter existed at all. 
It may have, and it may not. Often all that we are given is 
the unique and complete aesthetic fact of the music or the 
i+ architecture, which suggests no hint at all of a subject 
,p,,42, outside itself. Even the artist himself may find it impo iblc 
to tell what it was. We need not, however, conclude From 
this that primary subject- matter was necessarily non- 
existent, though it may have been. 
Primary subject- matter is called `subject'- matter -(e ?r1 i 
because it does awaken aesthetic interest, and is afterwards / 
represented', though it is defined as being unqualified by 
^aesthetic interest. As soon as aesthetic interest is awakened, 
the object of interest loses its aesthetic neutrality and becomes. 
" n aesthetically qualified;. The object so qualified I will call (iv). 
secondary subject- matter. . 
'-By `aesthetically qualified' I means reply that the artist 
begins to regard the object with arA*iew to `representing'I 
it artistically in this or that medium. If he is a poet, then,' 
as he contemplates his subject- matter, words and rhythms 
and appropriate images come crowding into his mind. If he 
is a painter, he begins to `see' imaginatively, to select and 
modify, perhaps to set in hand the work of blocking out a 
picture. The secondary subject- matter is the subject- matter 
aesthetically regarded at the beginning of the production of 
a work of art. 
(v) What I am going to call the tertiary subject -matter is 
On reservations 'regarding `representation', cf. p.. below. 
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the subject- matter as it finally appears when the whole 
embodiment is complete. Tertiary subject- matter is simply 
the content side of the work of art. It is subject- matter 
imaginatively experienced in the work of art, still dis- 
tinguishable but now inseparable from its `body'. 
Secondary and tertiary subject -matter mark respectively 
the limits of a continuous and progressive aesthetic process:_ 
A simple illustration might be given of the different 'subject- 
matters'; and their relations. Suppose the subject- matter in 
general is a mountain to be painted. The 'ontological'. 
subject- matter will be the physical mountain with all its. 
qualities. The `neutral' subject -matter will be some rough 
idea or image or perception of the mountain sufficient to 
distinguish it from other things. The primary subject -matter 
may approximate to the neutral subject -matter, or it may be 
qualified by particular, but non -aesthetic, interests in the 
painter. The secondary subject -matter will be the mountain 
as the painter begins to see it imaginatively, sekcting a_ d a* I4.a 54. 
to paint it in his mind. The. tertiary subject- tr l "` sI 
matter... will be the perspective of the mountain as revealed 
in his completed painting as the artist sees it. 
So much for the distinction between ontological, neutral, 
primary, secondary, ' and tertiary `subject- matter' of the 
work of art. The distinctions are. simple, ' but, T' believe, 
important. If we dq not know precisely what we mean by 
`subject'. when, e.g., we talk of the relation which the 
`subject' of '.a picture or a: poem has to the work as a whole 
or to the artist, we shall arrive nowhere. Examples make 
it clear that `subject' in ordinary usage may refer to several, 
or TO one or two only, of the Meanings. The `subject' . of á 
portrait may mean the sitter as . he is, or as anyone may see 
him Or her, or as a friend of the artist's, or it may mean the 
`.sitter- aesthetically -seemr before painting, or the co ent -of. 
the -work. When we talk of the `subject' in music, we mean 
normally the aesthetic subject, the content- aspect of the 
completed work. When we say, "Music has no subject 
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matter ", we refer to ontological or to neutral, or to primary 
subject -matter. 
It is important again to be clear about the nature of 
subject- matter when we dispute ábout the possibility 
of `translation' from one medium, or from one language, 
into another. Strictly speaking, translation is utterly impos- 
sible, because the same tertiary subject -matter can never . 
exist related to different `bodies'. It is only when `subject 
matter' is interpreted non -aesthetically (i.e. as ontological, 
or neutral, or primary subject- matter) that `translation 
appears in the least plausible. In reality, `translation' of art 
is completely self -contradictory, and belief in it the result 
of false abstraction. 
IV. TERTIARY SUBJECT -MATTER, AND `CONTENT' 
It will be apparent that the difference between the more 
`representative' arts, such as painting, and the less 'repre- 
sentative' ones, such as music, make it nowLçonvenieiat to use 
the term (tertiary) `subject- matter' and now Ito 
use the term `content'. 
The terms are different, and what term we use is partly 
a matter of convenience. But the terminology is not unsug- 
gestive of ideas which are of the most vital importance. The 
term `subject- matter', even when guarded by the adjective 
`tertiary', does suggest an element of representation, some- 
thing distinct from the `body', and even tending to separate 
itself off from the body. `Content', on the other hand, suggests 
what is `contained' rather than what. is `represented'. 
The naming or the verbal description of subject- matter is 
always, of course, as we have already pointed out, but a 
rougher approximation. This may, if for examplenthe case It' d4ÿ 
of a picture, be suggested by its title. Nevertheless, in ! C 
`representative' arts like painting and sculpture, dramaAand A .2/ 
sometimes poetry, there does exist a subject aspect which is 
very clearly distinct from the body aspectf -and which can f 
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indeed be made the focus of attention -though it must 
always be taken in its aesthetic context. Thus Leonardo' 
certainly does depict the Last Supper, Myron does 
eats/ the disc -thrower, Shakespeare does depict in Hamlet a very 
real character; and i t is possible to concentrate our attention 
on the subject without overlooking its aesthetic context. 
On the other hand. arts like music and architecture cannot 
be said normally to have `a subject' in this sense. All that 
such arts can be said to possess is a content which is just one 
aspect of the embodiment. The content of music or of 
architecture is just the complex of values, direct or indirect, 
-of which the body is expressive. The complex values in these 
cases '4 not unified for us by the giving of a name, by the 
calling up to mind of some definite, already integrated 
subject- matter. The unity or integration, or systematisation 
-of value- meanings, is achieved by means of the structure of 
the body itself, so that the content seems to be in the body 
in an even more intimate way than it is in the case of the 
representative arts. It is so bound up with it that it is only 
with difficulty that the content -aspect is distinguished and 
focused at all. 
But although this is true, the other side is also true. 
We shall err if we think of the integration of a piece of 
`representative' art as being achieved merely by the subject - 
matter, say `The Last Supper' or `a disc -thrower'. If it were 
/ ` so, we should not have art but mere reproduction. The genius 
of the representative artist is revealed by the way in which 
he can blend and fuse the integrating interest of his subject - 
matter with the integrating interest of his body -forms. Thus 
in Verocchio's Colleoni statue there is the integrating interest 
in the terrifically vigorous personality of a general on a 
spirited horse. But there is also the integrative interest of 
the composition, of the arched neck of the horse, of his taut, 
muscular legs, of his rigid tail, of the fierce posture of the 
rider with his magnificent, barbaric head. You can easily. 
distinguish `subject' aspect from `body' aspect, but you can 
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hardly think of them apart, for the `body' integrates the 
value- meanings. So in any great work. The ideal for repre- 
sentative art isnthat subject- matter should be as expressively 
fused with its body -forms as the content of music or archi- 
tecture is fused ter its body. Pater was right when he said 
that all art constantly aspires to the condition of music,' for 
/here is found a perfect unity of meaning and form. This 
Ought not to mean, as it is sometimes taken to imply, that 
values brought from outside sources in representative . 
art should be set aside, for to do that would be to impoverish 
the art. To say, wisely, that all art should aspire to the con- 
dition of music, is only to emphasise the vital necepity of 
fusion. We must not attempt to cut off any of the sources of 
the supply of value which come from subject- sources in real. 
life: Much `from outside' does enter art. It is the nature of . 
representative art, not only that subject should be dis- 
tinguishable, but that it should enrich -- though, once again, 
its enrichment must be aesthetically achieved. 
The realisation that `subject -matter' must become ̀ content', 
and also that the content of arts like music and architec- 
ture is simply the values which they embody, will 
help us to realise afresh and in a new light another truth 
about art, which is familiar to us. This is that art is not, 
intrinsically, a representation of subject-matter at all (though 
it may involve some imitation sometimes), but is, through 
its forms, an imaginative embodiment of voues. It is the . old 
story. The, painter may (with reservations) imitate what he 
sees, but he imitates what he sees because what he sees fulfils . 
and satisfies his needs. It is values, not bare facts, which 
appear in the arts. 
The danger in representative art, we have said, is that 
in distinguishing subject from body, in naming it, and in 
focusing our attention upon it, we are apt to regard it for 
its own sake and to separate it from its body in embodiment. 
The danger in non- representative arts like music, on the 
= The Renaissance, Essay on "The School of Giorgione". 
f 
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other hand, is that we may forget, in our enthusiasm for their 
forms, that these forms are expressive of content. We may 
become mere formalists, and . find that gradually the stem 
that joins the flowers of art with its roots in the earth, the 
earth of common experience, is being shrivelled away. In 
representative arts the danger is of forgetting art altogether 
through too great interest in life : in the other case we forget 
life. It is difficult to say which of the two evils is worse. 
Is it better, or is it worse, to degenerate into thick -skinned, 
thick- fingered, un- sensitive realism? Or into the over- 
fastidious, over -delicate un -vital life of/ hot -house? 
The relation between the terms `tertiary subject- matter,' 
and `content' should now be clear. It is more appropriate 
to apply the term `tertiary subject- matter' to the `representa- 
tive' arts where a subject -matter can readily be distinguished. 
The term `content', on the other hand, applies more 
appropriately to `non- representative' arts like architecture 
and music. But in principle the two are the same, tertiary 
subject- matter "aspiring to the condition" of content. 
Keeping all this in mind, we may return to our original 
'proposition that greatness comes from the side of tertiary 
subject- matter, or from the content -side of art. 
V. GREATNESS 
What do we mean by greatness? Greatness is difficult, to 
define, though as to what it is in actuality, there is a certain 
body of agreement. We all recognise to some degree 'the 
distinction between the great and the trifling, in art. We 
recognise that the passage where Samson cries, 
"O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon ", 
is `greater' than the last lyric of Comus, That Beethoven's 
Hammerklavier Sonata is `greater' than his first, that the 
reclining Theseus of Pheidi as on the Parthenpn is `greater' 
than the Hermes of Praxiteles, that Shakespeare's Macbeth is 
238 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
`greater' than his A Midsummer Night's Dream, or any lyric 
in it. 
But can we say what we mean by the comparative 'greater'? 
In the first place, we seem to mean at least expressiveness of 
the `great' values of life. As the question of greatness is easier 
to discuss in the case of an art like poetry, where ideas are 
more readily discernible, I shall select my examples mainly 
from poetry. This does not mean that, if true, our answers 
should not apply to arts like music and architecture. Cer- 
tainly they ought. But for general reasons already made 
clear, the elements of greatness are always far harder to 
analyse in these cases. 
It is very difficult, as has been said, and dangerous, to try 
to define greatness, to say exactly why what we call the tta.Qs/ 
`great' values of life are called `great', and what precisely 
constitutes their greatness. We do naturally assume that 
some values are `greater' than others. They are, I suppose, 
generally speaking, those values which, positively regarded, 
are the fulfilments of tendencies which are not only marked 
and strong, but profound and lofty and broad and far - 
reaching in the complexity of their implications. Great 
values are, probably, the fulfilments of those tendencies 
which are most important on the highest emergent plane 
with which we are acquainted,' the intricate life of man. 
Animal passions are strong, and strength is one character of 
greatness. But more than strength is needed. Greatness 
cannot be conceived without also thinking of this wide e/ 
system of implications een or hidden, of the fine organisation 
of a questing spirit, v hich reveals the universality of man's 
nature, which marks him off from the local animal, which 
reveals "the piece of work" that he is when he is most man. 
It must be, approximately, for these reasons that the 
: It does not follow that there may not exist in the universe values higher 
and greater than these, or that the values cognised for example in great 
tragedy or through religion are not superhuman values. We are con- 
cerned with `greater' and not with `greatest'. 
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spectacles of human love, hate, mortality, courage, romance, 
religious experience, cosm irrn-ï=t, the strife óf man v 
with himself, or his fellows, or nature, are spectacles which, 
as we say, netrate tò1the roots of our being'. 
That greatness in art consists at least in expression of the 
great values of life4is seen in a44 the4 m examples we en, /t^ 
tom; it is seen in extracts from larger works, as well as in M - 
whole and complete works. This quality of greatness may 
even be realised in the very simplest cases : we may realise 
something of it in viewing the massive pylons, crude and 
yet imposing, of an ancient Egyptian Temple. We may get 
it even in the contemplation of some simple sense datum, 
such as a patch of colour. It may be that a patch of grey- 
white may express] to me eat y carrying with it the flavour "1 -I 
of all mortality. Or a patch of blue may express the infinite 
distances of blue skies, of cosmic sublimity. It may be that 
even in the apprehension of such extremely simple objects 
as these there is satisfied in some measure that longing for 
greatness of which Longinus speaks. "Nature ... from the 
first implanted in our souls an invincible yearning for all 
that is great, all that is diviner than ourselves.... And that 
is why nature prompts us to admire, not the clearness and 
usefulness of a little stream, but the Nile, the Danube, the 
Rhine, and, far beyond all, the Ocean." Our minds yearn 
for these `Ocean'- experiences, and we are glad when we 
get them. 
But though greatness, in the sense of expression of what 
we call the great values 'of life, can certainly he found 
extremely simple.. aesthetic objects, and although such 
expression technically satisfies the conditions of aesthetic 
expressiveness, this is certainly not all, or even most, of 
what we mean when we speak of artistic `greatness'. For one 
thing, as we know, the expressiveness of such simple data is 
relatively `subjective' /private, and lacking in community: 
ace -444,034, an extract from .a work of art: may exhibit greatness of 
2/21 ,qualit} eflavvn -, but to say, "This extract has `greatness' 
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in it" is very different from saying, `This is a great work of 
art.' Mr. Lascelles Abercrombie has this in mind when he 
distinguishes between great `moments' of poetry, or 'great 
d.s4bees ) poetry' ; and a `great poem'.= In moments of poetic experience 
we get "the accent or 'tone of greatness : it is matter so 
concentrated and organised as to effect an unusual richness 
and intensity of impression". In the great poem, on the 
other hand, there is more than this. "When we have some 
notable range and variety of richly compacted experience 
brought wholly into the final harmony of complex impression 
given us by a completed poem; with its perfect system of 
significances uniting into one significance, then we may 
expect to feel ourselves in the presence of great poetry; and 
the greater the range, the richer the harmony of its total 
significance, and the more evident our sense of its greatness. 
A similar effect may be given by a series of poems, when some 
connection of theme, in idea or mood, some relatedness in 
the kind of harmony effected over things, enables our minds 
to fuse the several impressions into one inclusive impression ; 
but the effect can hardly be so decisive as when our minds 
are, without interruption, dominated by the single form of 
one poem."z 
In the extract from the poem or in the simple sense datum 
which appears to express something great, or profound,, or 
mysterious, or momentous, there is, as has been said, com- 
plexity of implication. Nevertheless, in such cases, their 
complexity and the depth of their penetration is rather 
1)42e:4/ implicit than explicit. It is not asset in the body nor is 
it worked out in any detail. No one would dream of calling 
`great' a simple patch of colour -to take an extreme example 
which verges on absurdity -even though it appeared 
genuinely expressive to him of great value. And the extract 
contains suggestions and possibilities, rather than any- 
thing else. But we want more than this in art ; we want 
more than a flavour; we want a greatness made explicit, 
Ibid., p. 3 The Idea of Great Poetry, p. 60. = . 72. 
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expressed, embodied in a body, and worked out in some 
detail. 
A considerable complexity of embodiment is, then, 
:required in works of art which are to be called `great'. 
The great works of the . great poets, Sophocles, Dante, 
Milton, Shakespeare, are organised embodiments of a large 
variety of human experience. And, being organisations of 
considerable complexity of human experience, they require 
for their development a certain space of `canvas', a certain 
length. Perhaps I may be allowed once more to quote a short 
passage from Mr. Abercrombie, for he puts the matter, as 
usual, with charming concreteness. 
"Length ", he says,' "in itself is nothing; but the plain 
fact is that a long poem, if it really is a poem (as for example 
The Iliad or The Divine Comedy, Paradise Loss or Hamlet, are Si 
poems), enables a remarkable range, not merely of ex- 
periences, but of kinds of experience, to be collected into 
singlefinality of harmonious impression : a vast plenty of 
.things has been accepted as a single version of the ideal 
world, as a unity of significance. As far as unity is concerned, 
no less than as far as splendour of imagination is concerned, 
a sonnet by Wordsworth may be just as unmistakably an 
aspect of the ideal world ; and it is a marvel, the range of 
matter in, for example, the sonnet to Toussaint l'Ouverture. 
But as for greatness, think for an instant of The Iliad as a 
whole, or The Divine Comedy. The thing simply is, that Homer 
and Dante can achieve an inclusive moment of final unity 
out of a whole series of moments as remarkable as that 
single one of Wordsworth's : obviously, then, irrespective of 
._poetic quality as such, that final intricate harmony of theirs 
will be far richer, and so greater, than his -though by 
means of a unity far less direct than his, and a form less 
immediately impressive and therefore, no doubt, less 
lovely." 
. The character of complexity, of width and comprehensive- 
= The Idea of Great Poetry, pp. 72 -74 
1r1 
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ness, is a character of greatness which is of course not confined 
to the arts. In the realm of thought, we call him great who 
has the grasp of a wide and complex field of knowledge, and 
who has so organised his knowledge that any particular 
proposition readily falls into place in the system of the whole. 
Of the man of affairs who, in his realm, is also called great, 
the same is true : he too has capacity for comprehension of 
the complex, and he too has insight into the bearing of the 
whole upon this or that problem of practice. All real great- 
ness seems to imply this grasp of the complex, with a sense 
of proportion and relevance. 
The difference between thought and practice, on the one 
hand, and art on the other, is the difference between 
thought- and -practice -ends, and art -ends. The special situa- 
tion upon which the complex system of knowledge must 
Ìconverge is a knowledge- situation, a problem, say, to be 
solved and understood. So knowledge of the system of 
1,4E/ practice converges upon some problem of practice. The 
situation upon which the systematised aesthetic complex 
must converge, on the other hand, is an embodied value- 
situation. It is an embodied value to be savoured and enjoyed. 
And further, in `great' art, the embodied value to be 
savoured is what we have called a `great' value, or group of 
great values. The thinker, or the man of affairs, must in one 
sense possess `a sense of values', for he has, as we have said, 
a sense of proportion ; and what is that but a sense of values? 
J 1Pis/ But it is a sense of values relevant to facts to be understood, it, f or 2.Eted upon, whereas in the case of the work of art the 
complexity apprehended is relevant to enjoyment or appre- 
,;,tdo / ciation of value. In great art it is relevant to enjoyment or 
appreciation of great value or values. So that, whilst great- 
1/42/ 
ness of intellectnor of practica. lity4implies only great power 
of grasping the complex, with a sense of proportion and 
relevance, and has in itself nothing to do with capacity to 
discern and to savour and enjoy and appreciate what we 
have called the `great' values as such, the greatness of the 
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great artist does involve possession of both these powers. 
What, for example, has a great physicist or a great mathe- 
matician or a great strategist to do with the appreciation of 
mortality or love or mystic rapture? (The physicist, or 
mathematician, or strategist, qua these things, I mean, not 
qua human beings or as possible artists.) The answer is, He 
has nothing to do with them. = - = X41' ' 
just the artist's very province, so far as they are ; /1 4e. 0 
embodied. The function of art is expression of content in a cif 
body. The content, we have seen, is a content of values, 
and the content of great art, of great values. We may con- 
clude then, that when great value or values are embodied in 
and through the complex whole of a work of art, then the 
work is great. And the greater the values, and the more of 
great values we have, provided they are united into one 
coherent meaning, the greater is the work. 
This account, if at all true, ought to hold good of all art.. 
It is far more difficult, as has been said, to work out and to 
illustrate in such cases as music and architecture and to 
prove that it really works in these cases we should require 
to refer to a long series of experiments which have not, as 
far as I know, been made. We have: therefore to fall back on 
a. certain dogmatism, on a certain body of educated opinion, . 
which says that in art these things are so. In some of Bach's 
Chorales and in some of his great Passion music, as well as 
in some of Beethoven's later work (to cite but two names)., 
bur intuition tells us that there is embodied this range and 
comprehensiveness of experience convergent upon, and 
making vivid and real, some of the profoundest values of 
human life. We cannot prove it ; we can only say that our 
intuitions, our deepest feelings, our whole being of body -and- 
mind, tell us that it is so. If anyone says us nay, we have no 
very clear answer to give in reply. But r it.hfw laa° he e1ß r P.ek 4t, Our present impotence at least does not prove b 
us wrong. And we have on our side the prestige of the. 
greatest and most distinguished minds. 
k 
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We have now discussed, inter alia, the ideas of perfection 
and imperfection of expression (beauty and ugliness) and 
of greatness. Perfection of expressiveness, or beauty, is an 
end which art should always achieve -or lose something - 
though failure here and there does not mean total failure, 
and we may have to choose between less beauty and more 
greatness. But degrees of greatness may vary indefinitely and 
wé cannot say that art should always be great. We do not 
always desire greatness as we always desire perfection. /here 
is a place for the slight, for the fanciful, for the whimsical, 
in artA/here is no place for genuine ugliness, for final, 
Unresolved self -contradiction or incoherence, in a work of 
art as a whole/ 
VI. STANDARDS, IDIOM, CRITICISM, AND TRADITION 
Perfection, Imperfection, Beauty, Ugliness, Greatness -all 
these ideas are themselves norms or standards, or imply them. 
At the beginning of the last chapter I made some remarks 
about the difficulties of establishing standards, and con- 
eluded in effect that, although for philosophical aesthetics 
such notions as beauty and ugliness are perfectly definite, 
varuQ,a,,, objective, unchangeable,.,aterY :rx, ___ _ __ .. s relative 
wa pLís u#/ to particular minds. We can therefore say, "There is definite 
beauty, and definite ugliness', but not, `This perceptual 
object is, and will always remain, beautiful (or ugly) to `' 
anyone who perceives it.' For though expert and critical 
minds of one place and generation may agree substantially ' 
about what is beautiful, expert minds brought up in a 
different tradition, with a different background, and, per- 
haps, even possessing a different sort of organism/ may 
genuinely fail to agree about the very same objects. Because, 
in art, the `greatness' of values must be embodied, the same 
gertral statements are true of greatness. 
For these reasons it is only half true to say, as4is often 
said, that `Time will show', or `The true critical test is 'the 
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test of time.' What time does show is the. lasting power and 
.the importance of that art which is of such a nature that it 
can be widely `communicated'. But it is not, of course, the 
,wideness -or the length -of its appeal which in itself 
constitutes the test, but the particular nature 'or kind of the 
experience which (in this case) is widely felt. The true test 
of objective aesthetic worth, in other words, is only to be 
foúnd through intensive analysis, never through extensive 
reference. Of course, if many experts, each competent in the 
discrimination of true aesthetic experience, are agreed, so . 
much greater is the probability that the private analysis of 
each has been a true one. 
Let us now return to the question of the influence of 
tradition upon art. 
How tradition affects embodiment might be endlessly 
illustrated. We see it in the artistic idiom of a period, in, for 
example, the elongated oval faces of early Italian Madonnas, 
in the height of the in proportion to the size of the 
head, in the conventional figures, facial expressions, and 
haloes of angels, in the definite and constricted form of the 
altar- piece. We see it in the th figures ofjchild -like Greek 
mythology,, in the influence of the allegorical symbolism of 
the Romance of the Rose, or of the literature of the trouba- 
dour, in the classical background in Milton, ' in the Vice 
and the Fool:. in drama, in the established and conven- 
tionalised forms of music from time to time. Unless we can 
understand and sympathetically enter into these conven- 
- tions, they .will tend to appear to us crude or affected or 
obscure, and, impossible of comprehension. It is extremely 
difficult, for example, for _anyone who does not understand 
the kind of thing which Cezanne was trying to do, who 
does not know his background, or that against which he 
' reacted, to appreciate the aesthetic expressiveness of his work. 
;Again, it is the fact of being brought up in a certain tradition, 
with a certain background of interest and technique, which 
accounts for the difficulty which an older generation may 
404.10/ 
4'I 
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experience in adapting themselves to new forms of art. 
The older generation has become used to certain con - 
- ventions, certain idioms, which it takes for granted. 
The new idioms come strangely to the old, but they do 
not come strangely to the young who have grown up with 
them, and have no need to learn them painfully and 
consciously. 
Changes or developments of aesthetic idiom are signs of 
vitality, of the very life, not only of art, but of a generation. 
Theoretically, and from the point of view of `pure' aesthetic 
experience, there are no objections to change, however 
frequent, however sudden, however apparently whimsical 
and subjective it may be. If, that is to say, an artist living by 
himself, out of touch with his society, discovers and uses 
unheard-of idioms whose meaning is known only to himself, 
there is, from his point of view, theoretically no objection. 
His experience is anesthetic one, though no one shares it 
with him. But, in the first place, though his expression may 
be perfect, his content will be impoverished. For a full 
experience, is1as we have urged, always and largely social. 
And, in the second place, not only content will be affected, 
but control of the medium and the quality of his idiom itself. 
For artistic sociality is a part of the larger human sociality, 
and the (hypothetical) artist who turns a blind eye to all 
artistic traditions impoverishes his manner as well as his 
matter. In the third place, though art is not primarily and 
in essence social, it is nearly always to some degree social 
in its effects. In some arts it is much more so than others. 
A poet or a musician or a painter of pictures might con - 
ceivably express to himself, for himself only, in his own 
aesthetic language. But in an art, for example, like archi- 
tecture, which is social art if anything ever was, sudden 
transitions in idiom may prove very undesirable. As it is 
often said, bad architecture is bad manners. We may modify 
this, and say that architecture totally incomprehensible 
because subjective in idiomnwould be bad manners, for our 
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hypothetical= architect has no business to flaunt before us . 
his stuffy private individuality. If the `subjective' poet bores 
us, we can fling the book away. Not so with architecture. 
In architecture of all arts there are the strongest reasons for 
a certain continuity in tradition, though this is perfectly 
consonant with experiment, novelty, vitality. Here let me 
quote the words of an architect2 on this matter of the 
importance of tradition. 
"All that we know of the development of architecture 
combines to refute the contention that recent discoveries in . 
material make anachronistic the continued use of detail 
motives which have hitherto been associated with stone, 
brick, or wood. The lithic architecture of /(ncient Egypt is 
characterised to the very end by the use of shapes and . 
profiles that were unquestionably derived from mudf and( 
reed construction. If, as would not seem probable, the Greek 
Doric order owed less to wooden prototypes than was once 
supposed, the evidence for the timber origin of the forms of 
the Ionic temples of Asia Minor is increased rather than 
diminished. And Roman Imperial architecture, which 
developed so largely the use of concrete and brick, per- 
petuated the practice of the Greeks in much of the . detailed 
articulation of its conceptions. For the truth is that the 
elements of architectural form are not always governed by 
construction to such an extent that a change in material is 
instantly echoed by a change in form. The response is often 
far from being so immediate; sometimes it is only partial; 
sometimes it never takes place at all; whenever it does 
occur it is always gradual, an affair of imperceptible modifica- 
tions. If it were not so, the formal vocabularies of the various 
languages of architecture would always have been in such 
a state of flux, so much at the mercy of every shift and 
I He is hypothetical. It would be extremely difficult for any real working 
architect so to develop the worst vices of the recluse. He can hardly 
escape from tradition, even if he would. 
2 Lionel B. Budden, "An Introduction to the Theory of Architecture ", 
Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects, Third Series, vol. xxx, No. 8 
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change and discovery in materials and construction, that 
no coherent " utterance would have been possible in any 
of them. The stylistic conventions, Classic, Byzantine, 
Mediaeval, Renaissance, would, as we know them, never 
have matured." 
In all these things, then, once again, the philosophy of 
beauty has to do with the definite, the unchanging, with, 
in Plato's language, `the eternal', Philosophy may fail to 
grasp truly the nature of beauty, or ugliness, or greatness, 
or the rest, but these things are what they áre, and remäin 
so. The task of criticism, on the other hand, is to grasp 
this or that manifestation of beauty. Its task is beset with 
difficulties. For though Beauty is One and Eternal, beauties' 
are many and come into being and pass away with the 
turning of a head or the twinkling of an eye. And criticism,' 
to be successful, must know what is in the head, and what 
thoughts and desires and experiences lie behind the eye 
that twinkles. Criticism may fail at any instant through 
breakdown in sympathy or knowledge or breadth of ex -' 
perience. It may miss the significance of an idiom, it may 
misjudge the difficult as ugly, it may confuse the morally' 
evil with the aesthetically bad. 
Of the former two errors we have said enough. As for the'. 
last, it involves certain problems which will be briefly' 
dealt with in the next chapter but one. In the meantime P 
wish to ask what is meant when it is said, as it is often said,' 
that art is `true' or `real'. 
CHAPTER TEN 
ART, TRUTH, AND REALITY 
I. THE CLAIM THAT ART IS IN SOME SENSE TRUE' : ITS VARIOUS 
MEANINGS 
II. PROPOSITIONS, AND THEIR TRUTH AND FALSITY 
III. PROPOSITIONS AND WORKS OF ART 
IV. ART, TRUTH, AND THE REVELATION OF REALITY 
V. ART AS REVELATION OF 'THE UNIVERSAL' 
VI. THE CASE OF DRAMA 
VII. THE CASE OF MUSIC 
VIII. CONCLUSION : POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY 
I. THE CLAIM THAT ART IS IN SOME SENSE TRUE' : ITS 
VARIOUS MEANINGS 
There is a deep -seated conviction among lovers of art in 
its various forms that art may be said to be in some sense 
`true'. This is particularly the case with the more `represen- 
tative' forms of art. Drama -for example tragedy -has, since 
Aristotle, constantly been made the subject of such a claim. 
"Some other forms of art may be merely beautiful ; by 
Tragedy, I think, we imply also something fundamentally 
true to life. It need not be the whole truth, but it must be 
true."' But not only representative arts, but even arts like 
music, may lay claim to a kind of knowledge, or truth. 
There are Browning's lines in Abt Vogler about "we musicians" 
knowing. 
What is meant by ar* being `true' is not commonly stated, 
and this is the more confusing because there are certainly a 
number of distinct senses in which the word may be inter- 
preted, as is shown in diverse instances in which it is used. 
Sometimes truth has meant simply correspondence with factt tI It appears to mean this to the `holding- the -mirror -tor 
nature -school'.' Sometimes it has meant the mirroring of 
some ideal; sometimes it has meant the efficient translation 
into an external medium of an inner and spiritual vision. 
In these three cases truth may at least be supposed to consist 
in some kind of correspondence of a work of art with an 
entity or entities other than itself. Sometimes, on the other 
hand, `truth' in art may be taken to mean the internal 
coherence of art, and falsity its incoherence. When used thus, 
`truth' and `falsity' become synonymous with `beauty' and 
`ugliness'. Thus a `false' note is a note which does not fit 
= F. L. Lucas, Tragedy, p. 53. Hogarth Press. 
2 It means this in theory. But in fact even such a `photographic' picture as 
Millais' Christ in the House of His Parents shows much selection and 
emphasis. And the same Ruskin who applies his magnifying -glass with 
approval to Turner's pictures admits that the artist's painting must be 
guided by love of what he sees. 
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into the expressive whole, it is a note which jars upon us, 
which is ugly. A `false' character in a play is,,fnot merely a 
character which does not correspond to real life, buVf a 
character who is falsely drawn in the sense that it . is not 
consistently worked out. Sentimentality may enter ; what 
ought to be tragedy may be given a `happy' but incon- 
gruous ending. If this is `falsity', `truth' will be the har- 
monious tension of mutually : fulfilling parts ; it will be 
expressiveness, beauty. Again, `truth' and `falsity' may refer 
to what is called the `sincerity' or the `insincerity' revealed 
(or said to be revealed) in a work. Or `truth' may be used 
to denote `deep significance', or greatness. We say, How 
true ! meaning simply, How great ! The `truest' work, of art 
in this sense is that which is most profound, in the experience 
of which as a whole we are aware of a deep sense of `reality' 
(as the saying is) And often it will happen. that in this 
harmonious satisfaction of our profoundest impulses we feel 
a tremendous conviction of knowledge, which is accom- 
panied sometimes by a sense of the superiority of such 
knowledge to other forms of it. Our conviction is closely 
akin to the conviction of the mystic. "My soul swims in 
the Being of God as a fish in water." `Here is knowledge 
indeed !' It is the mood of Browning's musician. In such 
moments the riddle of existence seems to be solved ; we 
experience the perfect moment; we feel' intensely `real' ; and, 
feeling so, we feel also that we are intuiting objective reality, 
as it were from the inside. If knowledge can be in any 
sense true,' and the experience of art is the occasion of .a 
knowledge -claim such as this, then, on account of its prestige 
and authority, it would seem as though there were some 
kind of prima facie justification for saying that art is true. 
All these uses of the term `truth' may be countered by the 
philosopher who urges that art is not true, but simply 
valuable, that only propositions can be true, and that to 
I And the philosopher, I am assuming at the moment, would normally 
distinguish knowledge from truth. See below, p. woe. 264, 
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say otherwise is to make confusion. Personally I think that 
the philosophers are probably verbally right, but that their 
conviction about the correct use of words very often misleads 
them into overlooking an important truth in the claims that 
are made to the contrary. Such claims, sustained by great 
minds in the past, are not lightly to be set aside. Whether 
art can be said literally and in strict terminology to be true, 
or not, it unquestionably seems in some sense true and real, 
and there must be some strong motive for the use of such 
terms as `true' and `real', a use which is a kind of claim for 
the importance of art in the scheme of human experience. 
Ft is therefore vital for any theory of art that it should take 
these claims very seriously indeed, and that it should attempt 
to sift the grain from the chaff. This I propose tentatively to 
try to do, expecting to find more grain than chaff in the 
`truth' and `reality' claims. 
Let us begin by asking what the terms `truth' and `falsity' 
ought to mean in their admittedly legitimate sphere, the 
sphere of propositions. It will be necessary to go into this 
question in some detail, but the time will not be wasted, 
as it is perfectly useless to talk glibly of the `truth of art' and 
to go on asserting art to be true, when we have no clear 
idea of what we mean by the truth of a simple proposition. 
II. PROPOSITIONS, AND THEIR TRUTH AND FALSITY 
The currently accepted theories of the truth and falsity of 
propositions really reduce themselves to two in number, 
the `correspondence' view and the `coherence' view. The 
coherence view I believe to be thoroughly unsatisfactory, 
whilst the correspondence theory, in some of its forms, 
involves certain dangers. I shall try to state a view which 
might perhaps be said to, be a form of the correspondence 
one, though the term `correspondence' is e. 
It is necessar,3r first to say a few words on correspondence "' 
and coherence. 
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We may begin with coherence, for the sake of dismissing 
it from our minds. We must dismiss it, not in the least 
because it is insignificant or . unimportant, but because 
(unless we intend to come down in favour of it) it is too 
large a subject. The doctrine is an integral part of the 
philosophy of Absolute Idealism, which cannot be stated or 
evaluated in a few sentences. It is the view that Truth is 
coherence, unity, system, or, even, the unity of, the self - 
transcending immediate experience of the Absolute. Ob- 
viously these statements involve a whole metaphysics. 
We may content ourselves here by saying, rather obviously, 
and without proof, that while ;all true propositions may/ 
jjps 
.M p form a coherent system, `truth' does not conszst. 
(in .coherence. Again, art may possess internal coherence, 
but it does not therefore follow that . it, is rightly called 
`true'. . 
Correspondence pis a.,, less esoteric doctrine. Probably 
everyone an first : reflection, accepts some form of The 
crudest: form of `correspondence'' is the theory that truth is 
some, kind of copping of reality. But as it is almost impossible 
to give a satisfactory. account of what .`.çopies' reality,' I will 
only refer to correspondence in the form in which it does not 
mean this. In the correspondence theory, generally speaking, 
truth,is.thought to consist in a, relation between propositions 
and pan independent 'reality to which they refer, whereas 
on the coherence theory truth consisted of a self- contained, 
systems :(or super -system), which refers to no reality beyond 
itself; but in the end, is Reality. Correspondence implies 
reference, beyond, coherence implies self -completion. 
Correspondence, it has just beers, said is a theory which 
is the outcome .of a.:common-sense view_ The man in the 
street may, have no theory of truth, but, if questioned, he 
would probably be quite ready to agree that when,; in the ,. 
' The most intelligible account of the copy- theory which' know is to 
be found in Mr. Bertrand Russell's Ana,sis Of Mind. For a, critical account 
of this, compare my Knowledge and Truth,:p. 94.sgq., and especially i i o.sgq. 
er 
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witness -box, he says that he met the prisoner at 5 p.m 
with a bottle labelled `arsenic' in his hand, the truth of his 
statement means that his statement corresponds with the 
facts. The idea of a reference between one entity and. another 
J entity/and a relation between the two is clearly involved. 
It is, -fiowever, when we begin to ask what correspondence 
really means that the difficulty shows itself. If we reject the 
(41 crud op theory, the relation, it would seem, must be 
correspondence between a symbolic entity (a statement or 
proposition) on the one hand, and a portion of reality on the 
other. But the terms `symbolic entity', `statement', 'proposi- 
tion', are ambiguous. If the proposition is one made in 
words, the correspondence might be between the words, 
and reality, or between the meaning or meanings which the 
words symbolise, and reality. Obviously the former alterna- 
tive cannot hold good, for no one supposes the verbal noises 
of propositions to correspond with the facts, and even if 
they did, their correspondence would be totally irrelevant 
to the problem. On the other hand, if it is the meaning or 
meanings which correspond, we are faced with the difficulty 
that what we `mean' in propositions, what we refer to when 
we make statements, is reality. We do not have before our 
minds meanings wlich correspond to real facts, in the sense of 
some tertium quid. We are dealing directly with real facts 
from first to last. If it is still insisted that we have before our 
mind something other than real facts, we may well ask 
whether it is possible to give a coherent account of what 
the something is. And how can we know when correspondence 
does, and when it does not, take place, unless we knDw the 
facts also? And if we know the facts also, why not first as 
well as last? And if first as well as last, why correspondence 
in this sense? 
On the other hand, correspondence in some form has 
this appareñt advantage that, if it could be made plausible, 
it would seem to account for error, and it is difficult to 
account for error except on some sort of correspondence 
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assumption. For if I say that, when I make a proposition, 
- I am referring to and am thinking of reality and not Of 
anything `correspondent' with it, how am I to explain. 
error? If the witness says that he met the prisoner with the 
arsenic bottle in his hand, and the witness did nothing of 
the kind, surely what is before the witness's mind is in some 
sense not real? It is not `real', it is not a fact, that he so met 
the prisoner. It seems much more plausible to say that he 
has before his mind something distinct from the fact, and 
which is not `correspondent' with the fact. This question of 
the status of error is of course a very old difficulty, and dates 
back as-far-at-14.14=0c Plato. - 
This, then, is the position. Let us now try to construct a 
positive theory. In order to construct this theory it is 
necessary to define our terms and conceptions rather 
carefully. 
In the following pages I shall have in mind our knowledge 
of, and our judgments and propositions about, the external 
world which we know in perception. What is the case about 
truth in this sphere generally I shall assume is the case in 
spheres other than that of perception. Further, I shall here 
discuss categorical propositions only, assuming without any 
proof that the theory of truth which I shall defend holds 
good, mutatis mutandis, of other types of proposition. 
(i) Let us begin by taking it for granted that there exists 
a world of fact, existentially independent of the mind, though 
capable of being cognised by it. The world of fact, of course, 
consists of many facts, of substances and qualities related to 
one another in various ways by relations (e.g. the relation of 
cause and effect) which are as much facts (though they may 
be a different kind of fact) as the terms which they relate. 
This world may here he called indifferently `fact' or `facts', 
or `existence' or `reality' or `the real world', or `the inde- 
pendent world' or `the outside world'. It is to be noted 
that in the world of perceived fact, as such, although there 
May be many kinds of relations, there exists no assertiveness. 
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The world which can be perceived is what it is, and, though 
we can interpret it as being so and so, or say, `This is so and 
so' (e.g. `grass is green'), there is no assertiveness in the 
objects we perceive. We cannot possibly express its existence 
without saying `It is'; but perceived reality never says that 
it is. It simply is. `Green -grass', and not, `grass (taken) as 
green' or `grass is green', is the nearest way in which we can 
express this ineffable factuality of reality. Let us symbolise 
this by the letter F. 
(2) We cannot of course sense, or perceive, or think of; 
or in any way apprehend, this world_ of fact without being 
in a cognitive relation to it. If `r' symbolises relation and 
M symbolises the apprehending mind, then what exists in 
any cognitive situation is never F only, but F (r M) 
p 
`r M' %1 
is bracketed because it is F in which we are normally 
interested. M falls into the background. Our minds are not 
identical with cognised fact, they are in some sense in external 
relation to it. Further, being finite, they are in some sense 
localised, so that we apprehend fact in a place from our place 
(or, more generally, "in -a- place- from -a- place "). In other 
- words, what exists in a cognitive situation, being not bare 
fact, but fact in relation to some localised finite mind, may 
be called a perspective of fact, or fact -in- perspective. I am 
here using the term `perspective' in a very wide sense, to 
include not only the perspective .of perception, but any fact 
as apprehended by any (finite) mind. And it is of course in 
no wise implied that because all facts whatever are viewed 
in perspective (in this very wide sense), they are therefore 
never known as they are. `True' knowledge is not a being of 
its object as it is, but it is a knowing of it as it is. Sometimes 
facts in perspective are apprehended as they are ; sometimes, 
as, e.g., in some cases of erroneous perception, they are 
apprehended as they are not. 
(3) It is a matter of some dispute whether F (r M), 
whether Fact in relation to cognitive mind, always involves 
some interpretation on the part of cognitive mind. In other 
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words, Is there such a thing as sheer acquaintance ?I I am 
inclined to believe that there is, that, for example, there exist 
states between sleeping and waking when we are simply aware 
without interpreting at all. These states may not be relatively 
very numerous, and it is probably . true that during by far 
the larger part of our experience we are making active 
interpretations, but such states do seem to occur. And 
further, whether acquaintance exists by itself or not, 
acquaintance may be said to be present in all knowledge 
and to be presupposed in it. This latter, however; is rather a 
different point, and might be admitted by those who deny 
,. that sheer acquaintance is found by itself. 
It is not, for present' purposes, necessary to decide this 
question one way or the other. For in considering truth and 
error we are concerned not with any possible acquaintance; 
but with interpretation. This, it is generally agreed, is taking 
place (at least) most of the time. Interpretation implies at 
least2 a `taking -as', and is thus contrasted with factuality 
(as also with acquaintance, if there is such a thing) . Factu- 
ality is represented by `green- grass'. The interpretation of 
a perspective is represented (at least)/ by grass- taken -as- q 
green, so that, symbolically, F (r M) amounts actually to 
' '(r M) taken as X or Y,... . There is, in other words 
ialways at least an assumption or presumption or implicit 
judgment regarding fact. For example, when I walk 'across 
the room or drive a car, I make such assumptions or presump- 
tions or implicit judgments about the geography of the 
perceived world; as my actions show. I am not necessarily 
conscious of, so doing and certainly I do not necessarily 
make explicit propositions. But I do take the room or the 
road as being, e.g., of such and such a shape. 
(q,) Yet the implicit process is always on the point of 
I To which, incidentally, the adjectives `true' or `false' could not with 
significance be applied. . 
2 In its later development it implies `isness' or assertion, as we shall see. 
R 
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wakening to explicitness. When it does so we get the making 
of symbolic propositions. The proposition is a direct expres- 
sion of the mind when it becomes aware of objects to the 
extent, not merely of taking them as so and so, but of 
asserting that they are so and so. We get, not F (r M) taken 
as X or Y but F (r M) asserted to be X or Y. Proposition- 
making is merely the explicit expression of an interpretation 
which exists before it is made explicit. It is the development 
of an interpretation to its completion. 
Our four stages, then, have been F; F r M; F (r M) taken 
as X or Y .. ,F (r M) asserted to be X or Y. A A" / 
The proposition itself may be analysed as follows/ It is Q,Í 
(a) the outcome of a proposing or asserting activity of mind. I 
(b) This activity of mind is always activity in relation to a 
content. The content is identical with the content of some 
perspective so far as it is interpreted and is not merely 
`taken as', but contains an explicit assertion of the form. 
`F is. X or Y ...' The content of the proposing or asserting 
activity is a perspective viewed assertively, or, if preferred, 
it is perspective analysed and synthesised in an assertion. 
Thus the fact `this green- grass', is apprehended analytically,. 
as, `this grass' (particular)_ .and `green' (universal) ; and it 
is synthesised as `gree is grass'. Following a usage not my 
own, I will call what is asserted, or the content of the asser- 
tion, the assertuymor propositum.1 
(c) The propositum or assertum is expressed in symbols 
of which, for present purposes, I will take words as typical. 
Words are noises or marks which by convention refer to 
items in proposita or asserta. What the word -symbols refer 
to may be called the `referents' of the symbols, one referent 
corresponding to each symbol. Thus in the propositions 
`this grass is green', or, `the door is to the left of the window', 
If these terms raise difficulties in the mind of the reader, let them pass 
for they may do so without substantially affecting the main argument. 
here. It does imply, of course, that interpreting always takes us beyond 
sensing. An interpreted perspective implore than .a physical looking.: 
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`grass' and `green' and `door' and `window' and '`to the 
left of' are noises or narks which by convention refer to their 
various referents, which are perspected' facts. 
The only exception to this account is the word `is'. Since 
`is' in the proposition stands for. assertiveness, and assertive- 
ness is due to mind, and assertiveness, is not to be discovered 
in the facts perspected, it will follow that the noise `is' does 
not refer to a part of the proposition in the same sense as the 
other symbols refer to . parts of it. I am not of course sug- 
gesting that `is' refers to a merely mental entity, in the 
sense of a purely subjective state. `Is' is what, binds subject 
to predicate in the propositum4and the propositum which A 
contains `is' is an integral part of it, is an object of mind. 
Being an integral part of such an objective propositum, 
is to that extent objective. Yet, though `is' `binds' subject to 
predicate, it does not `bind' in the same sense as other 
relations `bind', which are parts of proposita. It does not 
bind as `to the left of' binds, or as causal relations between 
the substance grass and the colour green/ bind these two 
things together. For though these . latter relations can be 
supposed to .exist or subsist apart from all mind, `is' sym- 
bolises assertion, and assertion cannot be conceived apart 
from the active thinking together, the living active syn 
thesising of a mind.. There is no assertiveness, as we -.said, 
in bare Fact. So that, whilst the word ` -is' certainly, does not 
refer to a mere subjective process going on inside the mind 
as it were, it does not; on_the other hand, refer to a fact which 
could conceivably exist apart from mind. We must take both 
things together. The only possible way, Of grasping the real 
meaning of `is' is to intuit the synthetic, activity of a mind 
miiting, in thought_ that which. _transcends it, namely, its 
;objects. .The mind,, in making a :proposition,; contemplates 
I It has to be kept in mind that `perspective' is being used in a wide sense 
which includes conceibing às well as perceiving Thus to the left of'- is 
perspected, in a different sense from which: ̀  door' and, `.window'.irh, per- ` c 
spected. *+Asstrin fonthe. nmPnt that.gp gei,slite 17 . eerrr 
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a propositum whose unity is the product of its own com- 
bining activity. Of that activity it is not itself necessarily 
aware : its interest is in what is united. The activity is not 
its object as that which it unites is its object. But when, in 
the theory of knowledge, we ask how the unification sym- 
bolised by `is' comes to take place, we must always go back 
to the active asserting mind which is its sustaining cause. 
The verbal proposition, then, is composed of symbols 
which (with reservations in the case of the copula) refer to 
referrents which are always `real' terms and relations as . 
viewed by mind. It is not unimportant to add (or to realise) 
that they are `viewed by mind'. What is viewed is `real' 
facts, and what we are interested in, in making propositions, 
is facts. We are not concerned with our viewing or with our 
activity of synthesising. And, as regards the constituent 
items of the proposition in themselves, it is not specially 
important to remember that they are viewed facts (though 
it is the case that they are). For the meaning of the con - 
stituent items is, in proposition -making, taken for granted, 
and what matters is the meaning of the proposition as a 
whole. But when we come to this latter, the `viewing' factc r 
begins to matter seriously, as we very soon find out in the 
case of error. If trrepeoitie4s were mere facts, error would47t.e 
be as `real' as truth. But if they are viewed facts, it is possible p4*h0 
that error arises in the `viewing', as we shall see. 
The proposituni, then, is composed of real (viewed) refer - 
rents, which are asserted= to be related to one another in a 
certain way. Thus, the door is asserted as being related to 
the window in a relation of ̀ to the left of' in a certain `sense'.z 
`Grass' is asserted to be in the relation of possessing greenness 
as a quality. For brevity's sake we may say that the proposi- 
S lav/ turn or assertum is /assertecY , though strictly speaking it is 
not the whole assertum which is asserted; its parts are "a 
asserted to have certain relations to one another. 
' I am o. ly considering assertion here, but the theory can easily be 
`worked ou in the case of negative propositions. 
= I.e. the d or, not the window, is `to the left of'. 
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Truth and error may now be defined. If the terms and 
relations which, asserted, form the complex propositu are . q ,l 
related in real fact (independently of relation to min as 
the proposition asserts them to be, then the proposition is 
true. If the terms and relations which, asserted, form the 
complex .propositum, are not related in real fact, as the .. 
proposition asserts them to be, then the proposition is false. 
If, for example, I say `grass is green', and `grass' and `green' 
are in fact related as they are stated to be, the proposition 
is true. If, the facts being the same, I say, `grass is red', the 
proposition is false, for there is no such relation of ̀ grass' and 
`red' in real. fact. The complex propositum in the case of 
a true proposition is an undistorted perspective (taken 
assertively) of a complex fact or reality; the complex 
propositum, in the case of a false proposition, is a distorted 
perspective (taken assertively) of a complex fact or reality. 
In Professor Alexander's happy metaphor, in error, we 
squint. We squint at the real. Only we squint actively, 
aggressively, assertively. The terms and relations which we 
apprehend both in true and in false proposition -making are 
real terms and relations (apprehended, of course) . `Gras$', 
`red', `green', `possessing', are all equally real. But the 
erroneous proposition as a whole is expressive of what we 
see when we squint, when we, apprehend real things in. the 
wrong places and in the wrong relations, asserting them to 
be so. The fact that error is possible, that this mixing tup, 
this fictitiousness, can occur, is simply of course the outcome 
of the mind's power of analysis and synthesis of real contents,. 
of interpretation, of taking as, and of asserting. And thus 
the difficulty of error being in a. sense non -existent, and in a 
sense existent is solved. As a complex unity, the erroneous 
proposition is unreal; that is, it is a distorted perspective 
(taken assertively) and therefore is not, as a whole, a per- 
spective of a- single complex of fact or reality. Yet on the 
other hand it is in every part a perspective of facts or realities, 
but a distorted one. 
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The difficulties of a certain type of correspondence, too, 
are avoided. The proposition which is true or false is, on 
the view that is being put forward, the direct expression of 
an act of interpretative apprehension of reality by a living 
mind. The propositum is not a tertium quid, or a Zwischending, 
which comes between us and reality; it simply is reality 
itself, viewed, analysed, and interpreted in assertion. If I 
look down an avenue of trees and see the lines appearing to 
converge towards a point in the distance, what I see is the 
reality (of an avenue consisting of two lines of trees which 
are parallel) in perspective.= Not the bare fact, but certainly 
the fact viewed from -a- place -to -a- place. If I get above the 
avenue in an aeroplane and see that the lines are parallel, 
it is still not bare fact, but fact -viewed. Only in this case 
there is but negligible distortion, whilst in the other case 
my point of view materially affects what I see. However this 
be, in both cases it is the real thing which we apprehend in 
perspective. It is not something which corresponds, or 
does not correspond, with reality. And so it is, I believe, 
with knowledge in general. If this be kept in mind, as 
also the fact that the proposition is the expression of 
a living act of knowledge, it will be seen that this kind 
of correspondence is a vicious, though seductive, meta- 
phor, involving 'all the diseases of "representative per- 
ception ". 
On the other hand, the view we have put forward might 
quite well be expressed in terms of a different sort of corre- 
pondence. For in truth the asserted unity of the proposition ' 
corresponds with the unity of the bare fact or reality. In 
error it does not. But correspondence is so dangerous a term 
that it is perhaps better to avoid it. Knowledge may in one 
aspect exhibit correspondence as a symptom. But knowledge' 
itself is just knowledge, and it is inexpressible in terms of 
= There are many problems, fascinating ones,. about the relation of the 
content to the physical objects. I hope I may be praised, rather than 
forgiven, for avoiding them here. 
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any metaphor. We interpret, sometimes rightly, and some- 
times wrongly. And that is all. 
Our view is based, as was said, on the assumption that 
perspectives do not necessarily involve distortion. If they 
did do so, then knowledge would be impossible, since the 
knowledge with which we are concerned= is, in a very wide 
sense of the term, knowledge in perspective. But though 
h umait minds must know from a point of view, this need 
ot.IüaAr -itin some cases.frem-lagiag quite true knowledge 
` of things as they are. In the realm of perception a single 
perspective taken by itself will very often yield distorted 
knowledge of `real' shapes as, e.g., when I look along the 
avenue of trees. But it need not always be so, as when h look 
down on a circular penny from above. So, again, our 
heredity and our environment: and education tend to bias 
us on intellectual and especially on moral questions, but 
only sometimes and to some extent. It seems to me that 'I 
can apprehend a simple proposition in Euclid, or the proposi- 
tion that 2 + 2 = 4, or the ' Law of Contradiction, in a 
perfectly char and undistorted way. I cannot of course ever 
be absolutely certain that what I apprehend may not partly 
be an illusion owing to some trick of my finiteness : that we 
can know thingv as they are is always in the last resort an 
assumption which cannot strictly be proved. 
On the:other hand,: although knowledge is knowledge: in 
perspective, we should of course he very much mistaken if 
we conceived all knowledge- on the model of a 'single/ 
perspective in perception, as if we were, so to speak, tied tó 
one point in space with our eyes fixed in one direction:' If 
knowledge is ,knowledge in perspective, perspective may 
be perspectivef of} perspectives. Just as, in the physical 
world, we can walk round an object and get different views 
= There is another kind of knowledge, `immediate' knowledge, which is 
not knowledge (of objects ontologically independent) in perspective, but 
rather' knowlédge óf perspeétives. With this immediate knowledge, 
however, 'we-need not concern ourselves further here. 
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of it, thus transcending any single perspective and building 
up by means of comparison and construction a knowledge 
of the solid object as it is, so in all knowledge. We do not, 
in knowledge, trust to single perspectives or propositions; 
and we know that feeling of certainty is no criterion of 
ìundistortedness of vision. This is of course only repeating the 
familiar truth that knowledge is, as far as we can tell, a 
system, and that the greater the coherence of propositions in 
the widest possible spiere of reference, the more likely it is 
that each of the cohering propositions is true. Thus if mature 
knowledge is knowledge in perspective, it is an extremely 
complex perspective, in which a great many individual 
perspectives have been united, fused, assimilated. 
The question arises as to what strictly we ought to call 
`true' and `false'. 1 have taken it that truth and falsity apply 
to the proposition, and that a proposition is the expression 
of the living interpretative apprehension by mind of reality. 
Can we say that the apprehension is true or false? This is 
partly a matter of terminology; we have to keep in mind 
two opposite truths. The first is that interpretative apprehen- 
sion is only made clear and explicit in propositions, and 
therefore we can only clearly say that truth or falsity apply 
if we have a precisely expressed propositum. Truth and 
falsity therefore most clearly apply to proposita, and truth 
can only so far be proved by clear comparison (etc.) of clear 
proposita. On the other hand, propositions are the direct 
expression of acts of apprehension, and such apprehension 
is interpretative. So that although we cannot say `true' or 
`false', until we have an explicit proposition, the fact that 
mind, in apprehending, interprets, and is always tending to 
break into propositions, makes it natural to apply the terms 
`true' or `false' to apprehension. There is no difference 
between apprehension (which is anything more than 
acquaintance) and the proposition, except in degree of 
explicitness, and if truth applies to the proposition which 
springs from apprehension, then apprehension may be 
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called true or false, although not yet explicitly so. Really, 
and in fact, once the stage of proposition -making has been 
reached, we cannot say that truth and falsity apply either to 
the proposition by itself; or to the act of apprehension by 
itself. For one is part of, and cannot exist without the other. 
If we remember this, then it is indifferent whetHer we say 
that the apprehension of reality is true or false, or reality 
apprehended interpretatively in a propositum is true or false. 
III. PROPOSITIONS AND WORKS OF ART 
al 
We may now consider the question of the truth of art. t Can 
A 
truth be applied to art? A A 
Compare the proposition with the work of art. The 
proposition, like the work of art, has a `body'- and a meaning; 
the `body' being the words, and the meaning being, indi- 
vidually, the referrents, sand, as a whole, the propositum. 
Whereas, however, in the proposition the body is merely 
symbolic, in the sense of pointing to a meaning outside 
itself, the words as such having in themselves no importance 
whatever, in the aesthetic object the body does not merely 
point to a reality outside itself. It is itself essentially part of 
the real in which we are interested. Our attention is directed 
to it. It is also true, of course, that our attention is directed 
to it, not for itself alone, but for the content which it em- 
bodies : there is n the bodjrevealed aesthetically a m eanin 
But the point of course is that in art the meaning just is 
embodied in the embodiment. As regards propositions, 
there is no such genuine embodiment. 
We have, then, in art an embodiment which is the reality 
in which we are interested, whereas in propositions the 
reality is only symbolised by the body. But further, the 
reality symbolised by the body of the proposition, i.e. the 
propositum, is a perspected reality which is asserted, whereas . 
the reality of the work of art, though it is a perspected 
reality, is not an asserted perspected reality, is not an asserted 
r 
r~ 
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perspective. Art is not a proposition, or system or a series 
of propositions. It is not assertive as a proposition is, though 
of course works of art like poetry may contain propositions 
and assertions as well as things that look like them. An 
essential characteristic of the proposition, however, is the 
copula, and what can there possibly be corresponding to the 
copula in a piece of architecture or in a fugue? .That such 
things may contain a kind of assertiveness, a challenging 
assertiveness, which stirs us to the depths of our being, I do 
not for one moment doubt. But such metaphorical assertive- 
ness, such synthesis as is found in architecture, and music, 
is a very different thing from the synthesis of subject and 
predicate in a proposition. 
Again, I am not of course suggesting that the reality which 
is the work of art can be produced apart from all judgment, 
or even apart from proposition -making. I am only saying 
that the work of art is not, as such, logically assertive; as 
propositions are assertive. Judgment. of course, enters both 
into the making of the work and into our appreciation of it. 
The work is a construction involving much selection, and 
the artist is probably judging implicitly most of the time, 
and judging explicitly the rest of it. If he is a painter he 
may say to himself, `This colour should be laid on, so, here'. 
'This mass must be so put to balance that.' Or he may simply 
do it. If he is a poet he may say to himself, `That is the 
right word', or, `No, that won't quite do.' Or he may just 
write and score out. Again, when we apprehend the finished 
work we certainly make implicit, and often explicit, judg- 
ments ; we are actively discriminating, we are continually 
analysing and synthesising. And, so far as there is assertive- 
ness both in the artist's case and in our own, there is of 
course thesossibility of truth and error. But this is incidental. 
and . by the way. What is essential is not the matter of the 
truth or error, of propositions that may be made about the 
reality which is the work of art : what is essential, what is 
-central, is the selection or construction itself, and the kind. 
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of experience it gives us. The construction is an embodiment 
of value, and what_ matters is the kind of embodiment of 
value it is., the kind of thing which we contemplate and 
appreciate and enjoy. 
IV. ART, TRUTH, AND THE REVELATION OF REALITY 
Although, then, the work of art is the product of a mental 
process which involves judgments both about facts and 
about values, it is not itself a judgment or proposition or 
assertion. It is a perspective, a finely organised perspective, . 
in which certain values are brought out in . a systematic 
expressive whole. In experiencing the work of art, we are 
experiencing a perspective of reality of an interesting and 
vivid. kind. The work of art -not being in essence assertive, 
or a proposition -is not as such true or false; it is reality, 
or rather it is a revelation of reality, of a very special kind. 
In the experience of art we experience the knowledge which 
is vision, only it is vision, as we know, nottfacts as facts, 4 
but of facts selected with a view to their expressiveness of 
value. To this point, in a new setting, I shall return shortly. 
I wish meanwhile to consider a view -.which "is, in some 
respects at least, the opposite of the one which has been 
stated. It is the view defended by Mr. I. A. Richards, that 
in experience of art we do not have real knowledge, or 
revelation of reality, but just feeling. 
Mr. Richards rightly holds (he is, of course, speaking of 
poetry) that art is not in essence assertive; it has, he, says, 
no. reference beyond itself. In: Mr. Richards' words :1 "There 
is a suppressed conditional c_ lause implicit in all poetry. If 
things were such and such then . '.. and so the response 
develops. The amplitude and fineness of this response, its 
sanction and authority, in other words, depend upon this 
freedom from actual, assertion in all cases in which the belief 
is questionable on any ground whatsoever. For any such , 
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assertion involves suppressions, of indefinite extent, which 
may be fatal to the wholeness, the integrity of the experience. 
And the assertion is almost always unnecessary; if we look 
closely we find that the greatest poets, as poets, though 
frequently not as critics, refrain from assertion." Assertion is 
not essential ; art does not refer beyond itself and so cannot 
be said to be true or false. 
What then of the claim that poetry is a revelation? Mr. 
Richards examines it very carefully, but considers that it 
cannot be maintained. He finds that the claim arises sub- 
stantially through the confusion between the feeling of 
certainty and conviction on the one hand, and the feeling of 
satisfaction which we experience in apprehending a work of 
art on the other. The difference between the work of art and 
the proposition is, he says, that the latter refers outside itself 
and the former does not. But with regard to the feeling of 
belie f4the proposition and the work of art have such similar 
effects that we wrongly suppose that the belief -feeling 
attached to the work of art has an object beyond it, as the 
proposition has an object beyond it. In believing a proposi- 
tion, we assent, our impulses are harmoniously organised ; 
a work of art, our impulses are har- 
moniously stimulated so that we receives we accept, and we 
feel that we believe. This feeling of belief is especially marked 
in an art like poetry, which contains propositions, and it is 
easy to suppose quite wrongly that in assentingly enjoying 
poetry we are assenting to the truth of the propositions, in 
poetry. But we are wrong, because, though poetry can con- 
tain assertions, its assertions do not, if taken aesthetically, 
point to something which is outside the work of art. They 
have no such object or reference/ but the confusion easily 
arises. In enjoying Adonais we are left in a strong emotional 
attitude which feels _like belief, when it is only too easy to 
think that we are "believing in immortality or survival, 
or in something else capable of statement, and fatally easy 
also to attribute the value of the poem to the alleged 
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effect. ... "= These objectless beliefs in poetry (which may 
be paralleled by the belief-feelingsA which will attach them- ij y 
selves to almost any reference produced by certain doses of A It 
alcohol, hashish, and nitrous oxide) are, says Mr. Richards, 
not difficult to explain. "Some system of impulses not 
ordinarily in adjustment within itself or adjusted to the 
world finds something which orders it or gives it fit exercise. 
Then follows the peculiar sense of ease, of restfulness, of 
free, unimpeded activity, and the feeling of acceptance, of 
.something more positive than acquiescence. This feeling 
is the reason why such states may be called beliefs. They 
'share this feeling with, for example, the state which follows 
the conclusive answering of a question. Most attitude - 
adjustments which are successful possess it in some degree,. 
-but those which are very regular and familiar, such as sitting 
down to meat . or stretching out in bed, naturally tend to 
lose it. But when the required attitude has been long needed, 
,where its coming is unforeseen and the manner in which it 
is brought about complicated and inexplicable, where we 
know no more than that formerly we were unready and 
that now we are ready for life in some particular phase, the 
feeling which results may be intense. Such are the occasions 
upon which the arts seem to lift away the burden of existence, 
and we seem ourselves to be looking into the heart of things. 
.To be s°eing whatever it is as it really is, to be cleared in 
vision and to be recipients of a revelation. "z 
This is an ingenious explanation. If my statement appears 
unconvincing, I would refer my readers to Mr. Richards' 
much fuller and highly suggestive statement. His 'view is 
based upon the idea that the function of art is emotive, is to 
evoke feeling or emotion. "Poetry is the supreme form of 
emotive language." 3 It is for this reason that Mr. Richards 
emphasises so strongly the feeling of satisfaction, certainty, 
and conviction. 
= Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 279. 
2 Opseit., p. 283. 3 Ap -eis., p. 273. 
91;.a. 94a, 
1 
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We may agree with him up to a point. Certainly if we 
have to choose between taking poetry as a series of proposi- 
tions true or false by reason of some `reference beyond' 
themselves, and the emotive view, the latter is to be preferred. 
We may sympathise with Mr. Richards' complaint : "The 
people who say `How True !' at intervals while reading 
.Shakespeare are misusing his work and,, comparatively 
speaking, wasting their time. "' But though poetry (and, if 
not poetry, surely the less so any other art) ;s not true in any 
sense which involves a `pointing' of poetry beyond itself, 
nor yet true in the sense in which I have tried to describe 
truth, yet surely and certainly poetry and the other arts are 
`real'2, and are in their own way believed in, and, surely in 
.some sense they imply what is beyond themselves. They are 
real in the sense that the perceived body which is an essen- 
tial part of them is real, and they are real in that the body 
embodies a meaning and a reality which transcends the 
body, and which in one sense certainly lies beyond it, 
though it is fused . into it. Mr. Richards is so engaged in 
refuting the `pointer -' or the `mirror- theory' of art that he 
tends to go to the other extreme. The logical outcome of his 
view is that art has no objective meaning at all, that the 
words of poetry are real, perhaps, but that their function is 
merely to call up certain emotions. 
This is altogether too narrow. We may agree that one 
function of words in poetry (or any other material in any 
other art) is to call up emotion, and I suppose Mr. Richards 
would agree that our emotions depend upon the conditions 
and relations of our impulses. Thus far there is certainly 
something in common between the effect of words and the 
production of emotions by the action on the body of such 
things as . alcohol, hashish, or nitrous oxide. These latter 
Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 273. 
2 The reader will find a summary of four relevant senses of the word 
`real' on fereec. It may, on the other hand, be better, in the meantime, 
to let the c ntext reveal, if it will, the kind of meaning which is intended. 
fr1,, lra,.3. 
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`drugged' emotions, as Mr. Richards reminds us, readily 
attach themselves to almost any reference beyond themselves. 
But there is also a vast difference between the two kinds. 
An `objectless' emotion can be produced by the action of 
drugs upon the body, and words and music may so far act 
as drugs or stimulants. But whereas a genuinely drugged 
emotion will, as has been said, attach itself to almost any 
object, the emotions produced by the, effects upon us of 
poetry, music, and other arts attach themselves properly 
only to the `significant forms' of the arts in question. In the 
nature of aesthetic fact they cannot, be objectless, but must 
be relevant to a special object or reality. In this object, and 
in this only, can they live. And, further, the reality of the 
object is more than the reality of a specialised stimulant 
of organic function. Even if, e.g., music greatly stirs, the 
organism, its stirrings are so subtly arranged by the genius 
,of the musician that they carry with them a world of signifi- 
cant meanings which are not limited to the body, but which 
are charged with a richness of human experience in the 
widest sense. In other words, music embodies values, some- 
times the greatest values of human experience. Likewise 
with poetry. Our emotional experience which has its bodily 
aspect, is (far from being objectless) just our experience of a 
reality in which the values of life are gathered together, 
focused, unified in a body. I'n poetry it may be the values of 
ideas, perhaps great ideas, which are embodied in a body. 
Our emotions in poetry are simply the experiences of these 
things, affectively or subjectively regarded. 
Art, then, is a special revelation of reality, whose nature 
and structure is determined, by the principle of value- 
appreciation. Because of this determination r- eleeti . d 
by the principle of value- appreciation. 
it follows that there is always distortion and never a literal 
mirroring. We never get a literal reflection of reality; we get 
those aspects of it which reveal value as seen by the artist. 
The artist squints (and he squints without asserting), but he 
C.j./ 
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squints happily (if the metaphor will pass) . If he is a painter, 
he does not copy (though he may think he does) ; if he is 
an architect or a musician, he does not imitate life wholesale, 
but by his intuition selects and constructs those forms which 
embody values and which fit into the scheme of a perceived 
unity. This is, of course, perfectly familiar. 
The values embodied, we know also, are of varying im- 
portance. They may be extremely light and insignificant, 
though perhaps charming. "Where the bee sucks, there suck 
I." The values expressed here are real enough, and our 
enjoyment of them may be quite vivid. But our natural 
exclamation is not, . `How real !' or How true !' but rather 
`How delightful'. Again, a work as a whole may be a work 
of pure fancy, as Alice in. Wonderland or A Midsummer Night's 
Dream. Or it may be a play of Robots. Even in these cases, 
although the works as a whole are, as we say, `unreal', the 
values embodied are real enough of their kind. And their 
unification in the several works is itself a value. The `squint' 
of reality we get is charming, onat least in some way pleasing. 
On the other hand, the `squinting' may reveal a vista of 
values to which it would be inappropriate to apply., the 
terms `charming' or even `pleasing'. It may reveal a vision 
which profoundly moves and profoundl satisfies us. This 
`great' art does. And in proportion as befor- the comment 
`How real !' `How true !' wa nappropriate, so now it is 
felt to be fitting. In great art the artist `squints' so as to 
bring out in a related whole the great values of life ese atAp1 
}4e experience them x exe vividly e- -erel na y-1 4e , 4.44, 
The word `real' is extremely ambiguous, as the reader c/```6 __nn , 
will have been appreciating, with cumulative force. The 
senses of it which are here relevant may be now enumerated. 
`Real' and 'reality' may, for present purposes, be -con- 
sidered to have four senses. My use of the term `real' may 
include one or more of them. (I) `Reality' may mean the 
solid world of facts and values of which we have convincing 
experience in our ordinary life. This reality is something 
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which is regarded as opposed to mere fancy or fiction or 
figment of the imagination. (2) The term `reality' may 
include both solid fact and fancies fictions and figments. 
In this sense everything is as real as everything else. 
(3) `Reality' mày mean a vividness and intensity and 
4 vitality which is experienced directly. Anything experienced 
very vividly appears in this sense\very `real'. (q.) `Reality' 
may mean importance and comprehensiveness : in the scheme of 
existence as apprehended by human experience. If `great' 
art is said to be `real', it is principally this kind of reality 
which is meant, though the others cannot be exclu ed. 
Values in great art, or in any art, are of course not merely 
collections of values which are transported from real life. 
They are, as we saw, unified and given new meaning in an 
aesthetic context. And further, in some examples of some 
arts at least= the structure of the aesthetic whole is such as 
to bring out the value of some important aspect of real 
life as a whole. In such a case life, or some focused image of 
life, appears revealed in a vision which both expresses the 
a,...)/ logic -ac. the psychologic -of real life, and at the same time 
t transcends it in a kind of perfection which is higher than 
real life, and which avoids its mere contingency. 
V. ART AS REVELATION OF `THE UNIVERSAL' 
This looks, at first sight anyhow, something like those doc- 
trines which, after Aristotle, assert that in art (for example, 
poetry) we have an imitation of the universal. Poetry 
imitates the universal, Aristotle thought,2 not the par- 
ticular ; it imitates the form which an actual thing is tending 
to he, its ideal form, as it would be when complete and 
freed from contradictions. The universal, though conceived 
as distinct from the matter of the thing of sense, is not 
As we have seen generally, the following statement is specially` làrd to 
demonstrate in the case of an art like music, even if it be true in some 
cases. See below, p. seep 2 ry sq, 2 Poetics, passim. v s 
1131 
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regarded by Aristotle as separate from its embodiment, as 
à thing apart, but rather as in the things 
purified and purged from "all that sá 
irrelevant. It is the universal in the particular, revealing the an u
true nature of the particular. Again, he thinks that poetry,pI 
the highest form of imitative art, imitates not nature but 
human qualities, the dispositions, the emotions, and actions 
regarded as an expression of moral will. And, the form or 
universal being an ideal, that which an actual individual is 
tending to be, in the case o human characters what is 
imitate is something whiek.ie finer and better than what g we meet4inAeveryday experience. This does not mean that 
the dramatic character (for example) is an impossible 
paragon of virtue. Aristotle specifically tells us that in 
tragedy the character must lie between two extremes;. 
between "that of a person neither eminently virtuous nor 
just, nor yet involved in misfortune by deliberate vice or 
villainy, but by some error of human frailty."' But the 
character must reveal the essential qualities of human. 
nature, on a big scale, freed from irrelevance. The best, in 
other words, is the type of what fundamental human nature 
really is. It is not average humanity, nor perfect humanity, 
but large humanity. The characters and events in poetry 
and drama may never have existed- though it is not 
impossible that they should have existed, or skeuhl exist - /,e447%{/ 
but they are more `real' than mere existents. Because art 
brings out the essential, it is more real than real life, and 
the mere fact of a thing's having occurred or not is immaterial. 
Both the epic poet and the tragedian should prefer "plausible 
impossibilities to improbable possibilities '.2 
It is no part of my purpose to criticise -and hardly to 
expound -Aristotle. But we may at least agree generally 
that, in our own terms, reality {chiefly in sense (i) above, 
p. ,eesi] in this or that perspective is revealed, and revealed 
vividly in some examples of some arts at, least, and that the. 
' Poetics, chap. ii i. K ¡ % 2 Ibid., chap. xxiv. 
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perspective of reality revealed has more of essence, and less 
of accident in it, than the perspectives of everyday experience. 
And ' course, or u the value- aspects of this or that ` l 
perspecti ;e. of reality which, are principally revealed. 
If it sounds timid to say in some examples of some arts at 
least ", it is necessary, because restraint is necessary. All 
good art is `essential' (and in that sense `universal') in that 
it is complex and complete and perfect, without self 
contradiction and irrelevance, in that it is, in a word, 
beautiful. But Aristotle, at least, means much more than 
this. He speaks of imitation of the universal, and the universal 
of which he is thinking is something which lies, in some 
sense, in the life beyond art, though of course it enters 
intimately into art in being treated by the artist. And if we 
too are referring (as we are) to a reality "in some sense" 
beyond art, to a perspective of reality which has an `essential' 
quality in it, we must be chary of generalising. All art does 
not appear to reveal an `essential' perspective of reality. 
Even `representative' art, if charming and fanciful and 
light, . It may offer us images igaj 4..; 
which are delightful, but which are wholly un- plausible, mss, /"`7 
wholly improbable, wholly impossible. Edward Lear's / 
rhymes, for example., The individual values embodied are 4 ( % 
of course `real', and the thing may as a whole have the kind 
of reality, the kind of essentiality which is beauty. But that, 
as has been said, is another matter. Again, it is always A) 
difficult to argue with conviction about non -representative 
arts like music and architecture. We may feel often that they 
embody stretches of Inman .experience which have a 
`universal' and `essential' quality, but such judgments of 
feeling are not easy to establish as valid. The kind of case 
which does seem fairly clear is that which Aristotle takes, 
the case of great tragedy. No doubt there are others. Some 
landscape- painting, for example, appears to capture the 
essentials of natural landscape structures, and to stir in us 
a delight in their fulfilments. 
Aa 
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VI. THE CASE ` OF DRAMA 
It may be worth while .to consider a very littlè fariñer the 
contrasting cases of tragedy and music, the one being typic- 
ally `representative', the other relatively `non -representative'. 
As we know, in the representative arts it is easier to name 
the subject- matter -though this is only possible approxi- 
mately- because the subject- matter of representative art is 
arrived at from a treatment of some definite subject -matter 
in real life which is `represented'. In non -representative art, 
as we also know, the subject- matter or content is only dis- 
tinguishable at all by a very determined effort at analysis 4 y 
because it really has no existenc as a w o e 'n anything like 
its final form until it is embodie. Description of superficial j 
aspects is possible : we can say t at music is joyous, or sad 
or stirring, but musical joy or sadness or stirringness far 
less approximately resembles the unmusical counterparts of 
these things than do, say, the qualities of the hero in a 
good realistic drama resemble the qualities of a person in 
real life. 
In drama, the individual values which form part of the 
whole are more vividly realised than they normally are in 
real life. Conflict, weakness, determination, courage, love, 
triumph, despair -these and many other values/ positive 
and negative, are, upon the stage, intensified. I do not 
mean that they are necessarily stronger/than as they appear 
in real life, although for the many who live in a humdrum 
civilisation it may often be so. Butt because the values 
embodied are in the play, they are Contemplated and are 
appreciated as they seldom are appreciated in real life. 
They are suitably `distanced'. We stand off from them as 
spectators, and we appreciate and savour and enjoy them as 
only spectators can. It is, to repeat an old illustration, like 
standing on one's head in order to see the colours of nature 
more vividly. The individual values appear more vividly, 
f 
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and are in that sense (at least) more `real', more `alive', 
than are the values of everyday life. It should be unnecessary 
-to repeat that they are not merely literal transcriptions, but 
that they are modified by their context in the aesthetic 
whole. They are also modified by the nature of the material ; 
or medium. The conditions of acting upon a stage, for 
example, prescribe their own necessities. The actor must 
get his meaning `across' ; he is limited by time and space, 
by his stage, his setting, and by the audience in front of him. , 
If the values to be expressed are subtle ones, they may have 
to be specially treated so as to be apprehended by an 
audience. Mere translation of what `might happen' in real 
life wfIFi tin many cases be good enough. Still, we may k / 
say broadly that it is the values of real life which are revealed, 
and vividly so, in this medium of acting. The very aim of the 
special treatment of. `real' values in acting is to make them 
appear the more real. 
But, in the second place, not only are the individual 
values of life vividly revealed, but, in great drama, large 
aspects of human character and human life (sometimes, in 
the greatest works, very large aspects indeed) may be 
revealed. We see reality not only more vividly, but more 
comprehensively. One reason for this is the same as that 
which s,.been mentirnna4. What we see is `distanced', and, teats 
because it is distanced, it appears strange and wonderful.: "1 
It is seen as a whole, as we are hardly able to see it when 
jimmersed in the turmoil of life's affairs. But this appearance 
is of course also due to the artist's treatment. We see because 
he has seen; and his perspective, as that of a great dramatic 
artist, is a perspective which results from a subtle and dis- 
criminating selection of what is important for the theme of 
the drama. The `subject' of great drama is, normally, a 
section of real life, and what is important for the theme of 
the drama is (drama being thus, as is said, `representative' of 
life) substantially what is important for real life. The per- 
spectives are identical -- subject to reservations about the 
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modifications which are demanded by aesthetic context and 
unity. Or; it might perhaps be said, the perspective of such 
drama is just a perspective of real life, aesthetically selected, 
the selection in this case being determined both by the . 
important and essential and universal things in real life 
(with a special view to emphasising their value -aspects) and 
by the aesthetic need for roundness and completion of vision. 
The perspective as a whole is of course individual, and the 
, 
characters are individuals, though purged of the ' ccl.. n j 
Drama reveals, as we have seen, nò mere abstract types, no 
unearthly and flawless perfections. But we do apprehend 
in great drama, in the right sense of the words, a purified and 
essential vision of individual persons and actions ; and I do 
not suppose that anyone who has grasped what Aristotle 
really means would feel inclined to deny its truth. There are 
differences, of course, as everyone knows, between Aristotle's . 
view and our views to -day. The type of character selected is 
different. For Aristotle the highest type of dramatic character 
is a person of standing. The person "neither eminently 
ev virtuous or just" should "also be someone of high fame and 
// flourishing prosperity. For example, Oedipus, Thyestes, or 
other illustrious men of such families.... These principles 
are confirmed by experience, for poets, formerly, admitted 
almost any story into the number of tragic subjects ; but 
now the subjects of the best tragedies are confined to a 
few families - -"to Alcmaeon, Oedipus, Orestes, Meleager, 
Thyestes, Telephus, and others, the sufferers or the authors 
of some terrible calamity. "= We to -day are not so inclined 
thus to limit our selection in drama. The development of 
the novel, too, has shown that the finest characterisation and 
drawing of the most moving situations may be applied; ta° 
people of most ordinary rank. We need only think of Jeanie 
Deans, of Richard Carson, of Adam Bede, of Hetty, or of 
Tess. 
Poetics, " chap. xiii. 
h 
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VII. THE CASE OF MUSIC 
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Music is in detail very different, though it appears to be, in 
certain fundamentals, like drama. The individual values 
which form parts of a musical whole have `reality' in several 
senses. They have it in the trifling sense [sense (2) above] 
in which everything is `real'.'They have reality in the sense 
that the proper experience of them is a vivid experience 
:[sense (3)], an experience of something which `feels real'. 
They do not, however, share with :drama, the quality of 
possessing reality in the sense in which reality means being 
a fact or value off ordinary :lifeA[sense$' (I) bay. p»T -eea . 4 et.eay bail 
n dratna, as we have seen, although the values are modified 
in some degree by intensification, by the material and by 
their context in the aesthetic whole, they are substantially 
the values of real life, love, hate, courage, etc. In music, on 
the other hand, the nature of.the medium is such that it 
radically transforms the real. (extra -musical) values which it 
embodies. It does not merely . modify them as dramatic 
acting does. They become, in musical embodiment, quite 
untranslatable except into the ' crudest language. We feel î, 
the music, through our body -and -mind, a series of values 
which are certainly human values, but resemble little of 
anything outside music. Were it not for aesthetic construc- 
tion itself the values of music would have no existence at 
all, and we should be limited to the expressiveness of natural 
sounds. 
It is not that in the case of drama the material is of no 
importance, and that in the case of music it is of importance. 
It is rather that, in music, the material .. and the construe+ 
tions of the material are the focus of our attention. Not the 
Mere material or body, of course, but the material : ai 
embodying or expressing. In drama, on the other hand, the 
medium'. is transparent, as it were: we look through it at 
life. But,..to extend the metaphor, its transparency is the 
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transparency of a lens which alters, and in its own way 
perfects, the appearance of what we see. In music, if the 
metaphor may be pushed to the point of its breaking -down, 
it is the lens itself which seems to contain and reveal and 
shape, in its characteristically `glassy' way, what we see: 
It is for all the world like the things we see in crystals. But 
for the danger of such metaphors it might be interesting to 
compare the various media of the arts to a series of lenses, 
ranging from the almost Oak, lenses of some drama, which 4,0-1 
reveal essences of the values of real life to us, to the spherical 
crystal of music, which seems, as we experience it, to create 
its own life. But it creates it in a fluid, progressive way which 
no comparison with a crystal can express. 
As regards the values of the whole perspective which is 
music, can we say that it possesses the `reality' which is 
comprehensiveness, the, reality in which there is revealed 
an essential vision of human life, or some vision of reality 
in its comprehensiveness? This is a difficult question, which 
has been met in part by the metaphor just given. But one 
or two comments may be added. 
Music, it is often said, has no `subject- matter' in real 
life : it représents nothing, in the sense in which drama 
`represents'. Yet of course music is significant. Music is, in 
a special sense which was long ago discussed, an embodiment 
of the values of life which exist outside music (as well as of 
the values which come into being only when music has 
been constructed) . And, if individual human values which 
were originally outside music (and which have become 
transformed in relation to the sounds) can enter into 
music, why not a relation of them, why not a `drama' of 
them? And this music is : we have not merely `energy', 
`resolution', `dignity', `romance', `solemnity', which may 
be described, very approximately, as entering into music, 
but we have the relations of these. We may have all of them 
and many more, working out in a connected whole which 
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revelation, like drama, of the human values and their 
working out, but transformed by relation to musical sounds 
and their construction. 
Again, as drama both intensifies and selects what is 
essential in human experience, so it seems likely that in great 
music we have both intensification and selection of what is 
essential. Beethoven in his Fifth Symphony speaks for all, and' 
we recognise in the quality of this whole `drama' a musical 
embodiment of profound human experience. It is impossible, 
by ordinary methods, anyhow, to pin it down, and it is 
entirely wrong- headed, as we know, to regard music as a 
series of pictures or other representations. Music is not thus 
translatable into general terms, even to the extent that 
drama is. We could only prove that music is/ in some ways/ Ail 
comparable to drama by a careful set of experiments upon 9I 
many individual subjects of discernment and - waiving. ejcp1K4Actey 
Possibly by some such technique as that of psycho -analysis 
we might discover= just what human values are dramatised 
;S SI in music Ohort of this, we can erhy say, in general terms, O 
that music is a revelation, and thatA in our experience of great^ s 
4 i/ rnusic4 t --loast, we -eccm t have emotionalacontact with "sti 
valuesswlrieh mom ..us in á. way which is comparable -with 4,¡ /Lase] 
admittedly large differences -to the ways in which we are lI 
moved in other great revelatory experiences. In its own 
special way music seems to reveal something which feels very 
like the `essential' or the `universal' of great drama. This 
í* may b5ta lame, conclusion. But there it is. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY of> 
These, then, are some suggestions on the difficult question 
whether art can be said to be a revelation of reality. Art is 
not true as propositions are true, but, like the knowledge of 
;.It is quite possible that this has been done. A good many of the dis- 
cussions of these things which I happen to have seenave appeared to me 4 !/ 
to be limited by preoccupation with one type of experience. 
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which propositions are an expression, art is a revelation. 
The aim . of its revelation, however, is not simply knowledge 
and the assertion of knowledge (though art's revelation. 
implies knowledge and may contain assertions). Its aim is 
appreciation of value. So that, when propositions occur 
in an art like poetry, we have to remember that, as poetry, 
they are revelations of value, and are not primarily, and as 
such, of scientific or philosophic importance. When Robert 
Bridges writes, in The Growth of Love, 
"For beauty being the best of all we know 
Sums up the unsearchable and secret aims 
Of nature, and on joys whose earthly names 
Were never told can form and sense bestow. 
be is not merely, or, as poet, primarily, making a philo- 
sophical statement about the Universal in beauty. He is, by 
his words, making us feel the graciousness of the truth that 
is expressed. 
Yet a truth is expressed.. Or a proposition is made -- about 
sot tr.. something very like Aristotle's doctrine of the Universal. 4" And this proposition is true or claims..truth.,rjupositions in - 
&,.;:.L poetry íñaubitably occurl which claim truth. And, a circum- 
stance which is ,irrelevant to that we have been discussing, 
appreciation may have something to offer to science and 
philosophy. Out of the process of poetry, for example, may 
arise propositions which have their value for discursive 
knowledge. The propositions in poetry may /Aused, it is true, 
ep 
h 
in a non -aesthetic war) give us at least "the 
finer breath' of some knowledge. In poetry -and in their own 
ways in other `representative 'arts -]ife is seen from an angle 
unusual in ordinary experience. In the ecstasy of imagination 
we see things together as new wholes. From this vision the 
philosopher and even the scientist may learn much. 
Poetry and certain other kinds of arts may provide food 
for reflection. But it is only food. As poetry is not philosophy 
(or other pure knowledge), so neither can philosophy: accept 
T'^--r'°' 
ART, TRUTH, AND REALITY 283 
the criteria of poetrÿ.-The criteribñ öf.tr'üe knowledge is the 
criterion of coherence.' All that poetry can do because of its 
unusual point öf view, because of its unusual perspective 
which avoids the usual practical and other prejudices of 
everyday life, is to present a prima facie case to knowledge. 
Poetry and Philosophy do well to observe the mutual 
courtesies of respect and esteem. But they meet like coin- 
peets, p nc eakh 4 utói 
is his own. 
bus within, a king;do w içj1 
', . . . v .4/ 7 
I This statement does not in the least imply acceptance of what is called 
the `coherence- theöry' of truth. Truth is not coherence, though a 
criterion of truth may be coherence. 
,/ 
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I, THE PROBLEM OF ART AND MORALS -AND PREJUDICES 
ABOUT IT 
In Chapter Nine we discussed the general question of the nt 
effect of content upon the greatness of the work of art. r 
In the last chapter we spoke of a special instance of the 
problem of content in art, of art's `truth' and its `reality'. 
In the present chapter I ii i to consider yet another aspect 
1 /L °04¡ 
of the same general problem. 
Our title is, `Art and Moral Values'. I wish, however, also 
to discuss certain problems of the relation of art to values, 
and particularly to negative values, without the qualification 
`moral'. Our theme is a well -worn one, but the matter cannot 
by any means be regarded as settled. I shall mainly confine 
myself here, as hitherto, to consideration of the representative 
arts. It is in such arts that the question of the relations 
between art and morality becomes most urgent. This is not 
to say that the problem has no existence in the case of an 
art like music, as wide evidenced from the Iasi. chapter. ¿a.4 / faistim7i 
To dub Wagner's Venusberg music plain `immoral', to 
say that it should bring blushes to maiden cheeks, may be, 
possibly, merely silly; but it is not selj;evidently absurd to 
contend that music may express bodily excitements which 
have a connection not very remote from sexual functions. 
If music is an expression of values which transcend it, and 
morality is a general regulation of values, then there must 
be some connection between music and morals, as there is 
some connection between literature and morals. 
Or at least this is the supposition. But we ought to begin, 
perhaps, by putting the general question. It is, Have moral 
`values anything to do with art as such, or is art something 
which transcends morals, to which moral categories are not 
applicable? 
In one sense the answer is obvious. If morality is, not 
three -fourths, but the whole of life, art and its production 
and enjoyment must be part of morality and subject to its 
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jurisdiction. But this too obvious answer is hardly an answer 
to a sufficiently significant interpretation of the question. 
For the serious -and the real -problem still remains, Is the 
production and enjoyment of: art, and is the- :content of art 
which we enjoy, properly subject to ordinary moral judg, 
ments? Morality may determine when we ought to begin, and 
when we aught. to leave off, producing and enjoying, in 
consonance with other duties = and other obligations. But 
once we have begun to produce and to enjoy, do not moral 
judgments about our activities and their content always 
fall wide of their mark? Are aesthetic judgments not; in 
themselves perfectly adequate in such regions? On the other 
hand, do we not experience a vague uneasiness in appearing 
to set aside so lightly the long and weighty tradition which 
has intimately joined art and morals? 
We should be careful to avoid tempting but shallow 
prejudice in this matter. A great part of the common 
objection to allowing morals any intrinsic relation with, art 
is due _tothe narrow interpretatie of the term: `morals'. 
In this matter I am in hearty agreement with Mr. Richards:1' 
Arguing against the separation of morals from art, he says 
4'A s1/A(%t"/ 
that whatAis4serious; that the indiscretions, vulgarities, and 
o absurdities of those who are supposed competent to deal. 
with the morality which (on the theory he is opposing) is 
A 
1A/ supposed to be outside art:- ncourag - the view that morals 
have little or nothing to do with the arts, and the even more 
unfortunate opinion that the arts have no connection with 
morality. The ineptitudes of censors, their choice . of censor 
able objects, ignoble blasphemy, such as that which declared 
Esther Waters an impure book, displays .. of such intelligence - 
as considered Madame Bovary an apology for adulterous wrong;, 
innumerable comic, stupefying-, enraging interferences fully, - 
explain this attitude, but they do not justify it. 
"The common avoidance of all discussion of the wider 
social and moral aspects of the arts by people of steady; 
= Op. cit., chap. v. 
 y -. ------..---- - 
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judgment and strong heads is a misfortune, for it leaves the 
field free for folly, and cramps the scope of good critics 
unduly. So loath have they been to be thought at large with 
the wild asses that they have virtually shut themselves up 
in a paddock. If the competent are to refrain because of the 
antics of the unqualified, an evil and a loss which are neither 
temporary nor trivial increase continually. It is as though 
medical men were all to retire because of the impudence of 
quacks. For the critic is as closely occupied with the health 
of the mind as the doctor -with the health of the body. 
In a different way, it is true, and with wider and subtler 
definition of health, by which the healthiest mind is that 
capable of securing the greatest amount of value." I 
This is all too true. A large part of the objection to art's: 
having cei3xeetien with. `morals' is due to the perfectly Q»o l 
childish and convention-bound ideas of what `morals' means. 
Mr. Richards has done a service in reminding his readers: 
of the wisdom. of Plato, that morals is concerned with the 
health of the soul. 
II. PLAN OF PROCEDURE 
But setting aside prejudice, what is the relation, if any, 
between aesthetic and certain non -aesthetic values, including 
moral values? 
This question is not altogether easy to answer, and it is 
at the best a complex one. It will perhaps help matters if 
we divide the -problem into three parts, considering: first 
(d), how the quality of values (e.g. their pleasantness or 
unpleasantness; or their `morality') with which the artist has 
contact before he makes his work of arty affects the artist 
in the process of his production. We may consider (2), the 
problem of how the quality of such values affects and 
qualifies the work itself as an aesthetic whole -if it affects 
it at all. In the third place (3) we may discuss briefly the 
= Op. cit., p. 35 
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moral and other effects (if any) of art upon the lives of tfie 
human beings who experience it. The last question, although t/ interesting, is rather one of ethics than of aesthetics. The 
I first two questions- which, by the way, are so intimately 
related that their separation is only a matter of convenience- 
are intrinsically aesthetic ones. 
The general statement that art, though a distinct and 
specialised phase of life, is not something which is isolable 
from the rest of life, needs scarcely to be repeated here. 
ea µ l &e..a.L/ Though there ß l be no 13e importation of values from 
I 
1 the sphere of the moral life outside art into art itself, art is 
a transformation of life's values. And the quality of life's 
values which are transformed through expression must 
surely affect in some way the quality of the work. The 
general truth, by this time, seems plain. 
The special questions which I wish to discuss under the 
first heading are two. The first, (a) is a psychological one 
Can the artist come to embody values which are negative 
in the sense of being unpleasant even to himself ? And if so, 
how? This might otherwise be expressed, How do negative 
values become embodied in art? (b) How does the morality 
of the values which the artist expresses affect the quality of 
the artist's vision and his creation? I do not mean merely the 
morality of the values in general out of their special relation 
to the artist, as when we say generally, `cruelty is evil', 
`courage is good'. `Cruelty' or `courage' in general may be 
70/ the f neutraF'' subject -matter of .a work of art. But this is, e;j not eeeug . What we are concerned with .e+w- is with the % 
1 effect of the morality of the values of what we have called d 
`primary' subject- matter. That is, with the values as viewed 
or seen by the artist in his non -aesthetic moments. The 
moral quality of what, at such moments, he, sees, the moral 
quality of his primary subject - matter, will depend mainly 
upon two things, upon the morality of the values which 
are his `neutral' subject- matter, and upon his own moral 
character. Thus, if he is, a cruel person, he may regard 
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cruelty with relish. The moral value which he may express 
in a work in which `cruelty' appears will not be `cruelty' 
merely, but `cruelty- relished'. If he is a humane and gentle 
person, the moral flavour of his expression of `neutral' 
subject- matter, cruelty, will be totally different. What we 
are mainly= concerned with under heading ( /b), then, 
amounts to this : How does the attitude and character of the 
artist affect his artistic vision? Our interest is not in some 
general morality, but in morality as it is lived and trans- 
formed by the artist's personality, and in the possible 
effects of this upon him as an artist. 
III. How ARE NEGATIVE VALUES EMBODIED? 
C (a) The first question was, c s the 'artist come to 
/ embody values which are negative, which are unpleasant, 
even to himself? The answer is partly a matter of conjecture, 
since examination of works of art themselves tells us nothing 
directly about the artist's experience of the subject- matter 
which he embodies: But we may conjecture with some chance 
of being right. 
That negative values may characterise' 'ontological or 
neutral or primary or secondary or tertiary subject- matter 
is fairly obvious. But it is also not unimportant to recognise 
that the process of artistic expression may modify the. quality 
of a value in one direction or another. A primary subject - 
matter, for example, which to an artist in non- aesthetic 
mood appears revolting, may appear quite otherwise when 
it becomes secondary subject- matter, i.e. when he begins to 
look at it and paint it, or. write about it. Interest' in expres- 
sion erases the first horror. Similarly; when completely 
embodied as tertiary subject- matter or content,. it may well 
contain little repulsiveness, if regarded aesthetically. One 
can/ at least( conceive Rembrandt regarding the dead body 
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which he painted in his Lesson in Anatomy as horrible to begin 
with, and as losing this horror as he began and continued 
to paint. And to us it is not necessarily horrible. Or again, 
it might happen that something which, rewded anaes- 
thetically as tertiary subject- matter, appears xeu I 7 or 
exciting, ap mss, when regarded aesthetically, -as ht) l e 
disappointing and empty. Or a thing may grow more 
horrible to the artist as it is expressed. It is possible that 
De Quincey's experience of horror grew as he wrote his 
story of the Mail Coach- though it was a horror which 
fascinated. Or it may be horrible from beginning to end of 
expression, as for instance Shelley's description of decay in 
the Sensitive Plant: 
. . prickly, and pulpous, and blistering and blue, 
Livid, and starred with a lurid dew. 
And ageerucs, and fungi, with mildew and mould. .74 
Pale, fleshy, as if the decaying dead 
With the spirit of growth had been animated." 
It is very hard to give convincing examples, as we have 
to depend either upon sympath and inference, or on the . 
rather scanty evidence of artist descriptions of their own 
experiences. But if we have even a little artistic imagination 
we may he able each to supplement it for.likimse 01444101-1/ 
Our question is, How do negative values become em- 
bodied? How do they affect the artist? How can they become 
embodied by him if he regards them as repulsive? 
The difficulty involved here s really very slight. For an 
incom- 
t patible with its being interesting. It may be, for example, 1111; that the object arouses disgust, and interests us in this way, 
and that the fulfilment of the natural instinctive tendency 
to withdraw is accompanied by its own peculiar pleàsure.. 
This pleasure may, in morbid persons, be cultivated for 
ß['l'+ , C/3, l C¢.c a « C/ C sLcu-P 
vg/ 
141,0c4 '
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its own sake. Again, the attention to an object possessing 
negative value may itself possess positive value because it is 
the fulfilment òf a specific need or tendency to attend to such 
objects. The moralist may be interested in vice because of 
his intellectual needs. The object may repel him . because 
of its intrinsic quality, and yet interest him. Or a morbid 
person may be interested in sin or in what disgusts him 
physically because of a need which is perhaps born . of 
starvation and repression. Or, it may be, the need which is 
so far fulfilled in the apprehension of what is horrible, 
arises through some quite natural process of development. 
In adolescence, for example, the needs of the awakening 
body- and -mind may lead to experiment in thrills and new 
experiences of all kinds. These thrills may have . to be 
obtained by dwelling on forbidden or gruesome subjects. 
Or again, there may be interest in the horrible, not for its 
own sake, but for the sake of an ideal or positive value 
which it reveals by contrast. But this case, and the cases 
where the unpleasant is a fitting part of a larger aesthetic 
whole, rather take us beyond our present purpose, which is 
consideration of delight in the unpleasant for its own sake. 
'This delight is clearly possible, and being thus possible, sits 
aesthetic expression is no more of a problem than the 
expression of any positive value. ' We shall consider briefly 
at a later stage= the effect of the expression of the unpleasant 
upon art. 
IV. DOES THE ARTIST'S MORALITY AFFECT HIS' VISION? 
( I ) (b) Our 'next :question-was, How do moral, values affect 
thé quality of artistic vision? This chiefly amounted, as we 
saw, to the question, What is the effect of the moral character 
of the artist upon his artistic vision ?. The moral character of 
the artist comprises the whole of- his moral. life : - for the 
moment /we are concerned, with that, part of it which lies 
11 
I Sere p/ '. 
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Outside art. How, then, does the moral character which the 
artist develops independently of his art affect his vision? 
This is a question which we might try to answer in two 
Ways. We might try to answer it by a reference to fact -to the 
actual lives of artists and to the possible effects of their lives 
Ipon their art. Or we might infer generally that because 
art is of such and such a nature, we should expect such and 
such a character to affect art in this way or in that. 
If we adopt the first method we are very liable to be 
misled by our prejudices about what is `moral', by the 
difficulty of getting real evidence, and of interpreting it 
with sympathy understanding, and wisdom -both `moral' 
and `aesthetic-when we have got it. 
It is said, in the first place, that artists most certainly have 
not always been `good' men. They have the repute, in fact, 
of being loose, if not evil, livers. There is no need to adduce 
evidence for this opinion, which is familiar. 
The rejoinders to it are fairly trite and obvious. It may be 
said in the first place that, as the artist is a person of very 
delicate nervous organisation, his balance is extremely 
liable to be upset. His true life is a "watch and a vision", 
and the real inconsequences and accidents of ordinary life 
may fret him into irritation. Again, the artist is often, by 
reason of his gifts, impulsive, and impulsiveness may lead . 
him to actions which a more sober view of responsibility 
could hardly justify. And the combination of sensitiveness. 
and impulsiveness may result in a certain instability in, for 
example, his sexual life. It has to be kept in mind, too, that 
it has become, in certain places, something of a tradition 
and a convention that artists should be `Bohemian', a fact 
which almost certainly tends to exaggerate, if it does not 
Create, . these tendencies. But it is probable that when we 
commonly talk of `morality' and `immorality' we lay far 
too much stress upon sexual virtue and vice, as if sex were 
the chief factor in . moral life. Important it obviously is, in 
its strength and in its personal and social responsibilitiesé 
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%ut we ought, in estimating a person's morality or im- 
morality, to take into account and consider as seriously, if 
not more seriously, the other viçes and virtues which any au-di Christian, .filp any decent, system of ethics regards as impor- 
tant. I mean of course qualities like the virtue of generosity 
and the vice of meanness, the virtue of unselfishness and the 
vice of self -centredness, the virtue of _charity and the vice 
of maliciousness and backbiting, the virtues of . sincerity, 
broadmindedness, toleration, courage, and so on. When we 
remember that `morality' contains all these virtues and 
many others, when we get rid of our too narrow preoccupa- 
tions with sex, we shall see how foolish it is to jump to 
conclusions about the morality of artists, and how difficult 
to generalise about their `moral' inferiority (or superiority) 
to other men. Even when we do take a broad and generous 
view of morality, we know that it is hard enough to estimate 
fairly' morality in our personal friends and acquaintances. 
If this is so, how much ^' pe ;t so o f the ram -ality of which /7 
we know only at a distance4 or by hearsay, or from the ses 
reading of biographies which are but the perspectives of -- 
the-biographers? Are artists, on the whole and in the balance 
of things, worse, or better, than other men? Or are they 
very much the same? There appears to be no sufficient 
evidence to form anything like a stable conclusion. We may 
have our opinions, based on our personal experience. But 
-that is about the most that can be said. 
If. we start from general principles about art, we may 
perhaps arrive at certain general conclusions about the 
effect of morality upon the artist. But they must be take /t- 
with caution. 
As we saw in the last two chapters, in some great art, at 
least, there is revealed a perspective of life and ,reality in 
which the great values stand out more vividly and clearly 
than they do in ordinary experience. ;If art is but a :moment 
of a larger life, and such great art implies a certain wisdom 
of vision and insight, and if ;true morality implies, as it 
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certainly does, a similar vision and insight to that revealed 
in some great art, then we should rather expect the vision 
implied in morality to qualify the vision implied in the art.. 
And again, because art is an expression of a larger life, and 
the artist, in such great art, employs his human capacities, 
we should expect, further, that without moral vision artistic 
vision would be impoverished. 
I am inclined to believe that in these matters our expecta- 
tions are justified, though it is difficult to prove, and almost 
indefinitely difficult to generalise our conclusions, and to 
say they must apply to all forms of all the arts. Drama and 
poetry, if they are great, seem to imply moral wisdom or 
insight into what is important and into the difference between 
the important and the trifling. (About arts like music, on 
the other hand, as we know, it is difficult to be quite certain, 
although it is not unlikely that the same general principles 
hold good of great music.) Surely at least the creators of the 
greatest tragedies may be said to reveal in their work /which 
is the only medium through which we can intimately know 
it/ that breadth of vision, that sense of the relative values of 
the great and the small, of the essential and fortuitous, 
which is also the mark of moral genius. 
It is not suggested that because Euripides wrote Orestes, 
or Shakespeare Lear, either was necessarily a great moral 
genius in the sense in which Buddha and Jesus were great 
moral geniuses. It is only suggested that they were men of 
`great' vision, and of the vision which is of the same genus 
as that which is an essential part of moral equipment. It is 
suggested simply that the great artist (at any rate, the great 
dramatic or poetic artists) must be able to see greatly, and 
that this vision is, essentially, moral vision. The translation 
of what is seen in moral vision into terms of a practical life 
taking three score years and ten to live, is an entirely 
different matter- though it is probably true that vision and 
practice reciprocate, and vision without works is likely to 
become dim. What we look for in the great poet or dramatist 
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is sympathy and understanding, sense of proportion and 
sense of relevance. These are demanded by the art, and they 
can hardly be present in the art if they are entirely absent 
in the life outside art. And -because good practice fosters' 
wise vision -if the practical life outside the Art is such as to 
encourage their free and generous development, if that is 
to say, the artist's life is lived on a broad basis of wide: 
sympathy and understanding, and with a sense of propor- 
tion, then it augurs all the better for his art. If he is narrow 
or grudging or cruel, if he is cynical or bitter and warped, 
all the worse for his art. There is, of course, bitterness and 
bitterness, that which is small, and that which is the reverse 
side of a great idealism. But that is another story. If we may 
quote again from the Defence of Poetry, "a man to be greatly 
good must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must 
put himself in the place of another and of many others; the 
pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. 
The great instrument of moral good is the imagination ; and 
poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause ". 
If these things are true of great `representative' art, and 
perhaps of great `non- representative' art, they are much 
less true of the art which we call perfect but not great. An 
artist who has little integrity, who has little moral insight into 
life as a whole, who has some vividness, intensity of ex- 
perience, but little sense of the large proportions of things, 
may, it is very likely, produce the perfect and the exquisite 
in. art. Reality is not wholly comprised in the sweep of the 
starry heavens : it contains also the starry flowers by the way- 
side. There is fancy as well as imagination, there is the joy of 
the whimsical and the evanescent, as well as the deeper joys 
of the serious and the permanent. It is only representative 
art on the scale of greatness that will at all clearly reveal 
any sort of positive relation between art and morals. An 
artist needs a large scope and a long period in which to 
reveal his true self. This is not necessarily to deny that he 
does reveal' himself in small things. It is only to say that it 
W....-,..-,,..---.,__ ._-...._-, _...__-__v._, _,.,,_.. _ _.... _.__ _ . , . .....,,,,,~ad" -^'- 
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requires transcendent and perhaps superhuman genius to 
discern what is hidden in the carving of the cherry- stone. 
SINCERITY AND ART 
One special moral quality is often supposed to be particularly 
necessary for the artist. It is the virtue of sincerity. Sincerity 
may mean (a) moral sincerity, or (b) aesthetic sincerity. 
(a) It is not always clear what is meant by moral sincerity 
in common speech ; but one familiar meaning is exemplified 
when we say that a sincere person is a person who never 
consciously deceives himself or others. If deception of others 
is in question, there will be no special reason for taking note 
of its effects on art. Desire to deceive others may occasionally 
enter into the creation of a work of art, making it spurious 
and ugly. And a habit of social insincerity will, no doubt, 
in time affect the artist's work, as other vices may. But it 
need not affect it more than a number of other vices. An 
artist's insincerity with himself; on the other hand, is a 
more serious matter. Insincerity with oneself is a deadly 
fault which is likely to be a canker at the root of all activities, 
including artistic ones. The artist who is fundamentally and 
habitually insincere with himself as a man can hardly be 
anything but a fraud as an artist. 
(Another meaning which can be given to moral `insin- 
cerity' is inconsistency and incoherence which is conscious 
anti is consciously tolerated. The sincere person is steadfast, . 
or endeavours to be so, the insincere are this here and that 
there, and they have no conscience about it. This sense is 
not necessarily exclusive of the first, and the similar general 
remarks apply.) 
(ó) The notion of insincerity as deception, if we mean the 
deception of others, is not of great aesthetic importance. 
It has little relevance; for though, as was said, the desire 
tó deceive others may lead to aesthetic falsification, so may 
the desire not to deceive. Wordsworth at his prosiest suffers 
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from this terrible desire to be plain with his readers. As if 
his readers mattered. Aesthetic expression is not, essentially, 
communication, and social insincerity or sincerity in art is, 
therefore, very strictly speaking, irrelevant. On the other 
hand, if aesthetic sincerity means honesty with oneself in 
aesthetic activity, then sincerity is not one of the aesthetic 
virtues, it is the aesthetic virtue. The artist must be true to 
what he sees, he must express what he feels impelled to 
express, and he must do it with all the honesty he possesses; 
or he is no artist. The other side of the same thing (following 
a rough parallel between this and morals) is that the artist, 
if he is an artist, must work out his expression as consistently 
and coherently as he can : his business is to achieve beauty 
if he has the gift. If he does not, he is guilty of ugliness, 
whether it be sentimental ugliness or any other sort. When 
George Eliot gives to Adam Bede a happy ending she is 
insincere, and her insincerity is identical with her failure at 
that point as an artist. 
Sincerity, an affair of the will, is not of course the whole 
of art. Failure as an artist may be due to artistic incom- 
petence, and incompetence does not in the least imply 
insincerity. But it may be due also to slackness, to lack of 
courage and persistence in imagination, which things are 
conditions of a kind of insincerity. The most positive sort 
of insincerity, however, is probably due to some external, 
non -artistic motive, such as the desire to make one's readers 
feel pleased with themselves, or to make money, or to be 
famous, or to be a propagandist. It should be added, 
however, that an extrinsic motive needs to be strong to 
tempt a true artist from the path of artistic virtue. For, in 
their own way, and in their own sphere, the real artists are 
a class of men whose devotion, whose sincerity and integrity, 
can have little superior elsewhere. Conversely, an artist who 
deliberately allows an extrinsic motive to interfere with his 
artistic integrity is unequivocally condemned as an artistic 
scoundrel. Aesthetically speaking, because sincerity is the 
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prime condition of the existence of art, its absence is the 
unforgivable sin. And, morally speaking, and as regards a 
wider range of life, the gift of artistic vision is so great and 
so rare that to obscure it (except, just conceivably, for the 
sake of some even greater obligation) we rightly regard as 
a major evil. 
Our second main question was, How does the quality of 
the values embodied affect the quality of the work of art 
in which they are embodied? We may divide it into two 
parts, corresponding to the two parts of the first. We may 
consider (a) the effect of unpleasantness upon the quality of 
art, and (b) the effect upon the art of the `morality' or the 
`immorality' (if such terms can rightly be used) of values 
embodied. (a) and (b) are not, of course, as was said, com- 
pletely exclusive of one another, for the immoral may be 
felt to be unpleasant, and what is unpleasant may be judged 
to be immoral. Or, both being taken as unpleasant, it may 
be said that the unpleasantness of the immoral is a more 
far -reaching kind of unpleasantness than the merely 
unpleasant. But in any case it is legitimate enough to con- 
sider the pleasant and the unpleasant separately from the 
moral and the immoral. 
Vh CAN `PLEASANTNESS 'AND `UNPLEASANTNESS', `MORALITY' 
AND `IMMORALITY; REALLY. CHARACTERISE ART? 
But before we discuss (a) and (b), there is a very important 
general question to be settled. It is indeed just a special form 
of the main problem of this chapter. It is the question, raised 
in parenthesis in the last paragraph, whether the terms 
`pleasant' and `unpleasant', `moral' and `immoral' can be 
said to apply, as such, to art. It may be argued that at the 
Ievel of aesthetic expression these terms become inadequate. 
The unpleasant expressed, it may be said, is delightful. The 
immoral, expressed, loses its immorality. 
Expression, no doubt, transforms what is expressed, in the 
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expressing. But, though transformed, is the whole quality 
of it lost thereby? Is it really true that the qualities of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness, of morality or immorality, 
simply disappear in being expressed? 
Surely not. Let us take morality first. We do in fact judge 
art in moral terms, within the conditions of its perspective;. 
we do jtidge that Lear's daughters behaved despicably, 
that Macbeth was a traitor, that Antony in his love for 
Cleopatra neglected his other duties, that Brutus was an 
idealist. And, though with less precision, we do apply terms 
of appraisal that have a moral flavour to painting and 
sometimes even to music. We speak of ̀ dignity' and `breadth' 
and `graciousness' and `peace'. In music, it may be argued, 
the moral terms we use are only metaphors. But if it be 
agreed that morality enters into an art like drama, the 
principle has been admitted of art. And from all we have 
seen, it is probable that the principle, with modifications, 
applies even to an art like music. 
We evaluate morally the individual parts in a work of art,, 
though the parts must be taken in their context. We evaluate 
King John's action in ordering Arthur's eyes to be put out, 
or Henry V's courage on the eve of Agincourt; we evaluate 
Wolsey's attitude in defeat. We may also in some sense 
evaluate morally a work as a whole; we may feel that in the 
whole (which is of course a complex of parts) there is revealed 
moral worth, perhaps moral greatness. 
We evaluate morally at least some works of art as parts 
and as wholes, but there is a difference between our judg- 
ments here and our moral judgments in ordinary life. Moral 
judgments in ordinary life have a practical bias, they arise 
out of the practical moral tenets of the society in which we 
live, and such judgments have some practical intent however 
indirect, if it only be, `Let such things be cultivated --or 
avoided.' But the work of art is a whole which is a complete 
world in itself; and our moral judgments of the work of art 
share in this quality of aesthetic isolations Our indignation- 
17- 
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may be aroused by an incident in a play; injustice may have 
been done and injustice must be set right ; we may feel 
vividly about it. But our feeling is an aesthetic feeling ; 
the injustice must be set right within the play, or be left 
as it is -as with some kinds of tragedy. The injustice contem- 
plated aesthetically in the play does not stir us to go our- 
selves to set things right, except perhaps as imaginary 
actors within the play. Our moral attitude is an attitude of 
appreciation simply, without any suggestion of external 
conative activity. Our appreciation of moral quality is of 
course directly derived from our experience of practical 
moral life, and the reflections that we bring to bear upon the 
play are the result perhaps of general reflective thinking 
about moral questions. But though derived from practical 
sources, and from reflection, perhaps abstract reflection, 
moral judgment of an aesthetic object is neither practical 
nor abstractly reflective : it is an immediate appreciation 
in which these other factors have become absorbed and 
assimilated. 
V, THOUGHT, PRACTICE, AND APPRECIATION 
In illustration of the relation of appreciation to practice 
and to thought, it may be interesting to set out formally 
the relations between thought, practice, and appreciation: 
(I) Thinking about morals, carried to its full development, 
is the activity which produces the system we call ethics. 
The ideal of ethics is to be scientific, taking the term 
`scientific' in a broad sense. But we cannot study ethics 
without experiencing for ourselves the values of moral 
conduct in actual practice; we cannot know what ethics is 
about without trying to live the good life, without indeed 
experiencing some of the zeal of the reformer. For ethics 
practice is essential. And as ethical thinking implies practice, 
so, likewise, practice carries along with it an appreciation, 
a savouring, and a tasting of moral quality. (2) Beginning 
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from the side of practice, we may say that to be properly 
moral implies some degree of reflection. Moral conduct which 
is not the product of reflection lacks full morality. Again, as 
has just been said, morality implies appreciation or tasting of 
moral quality. (3) Appreciation, in its turn, is the fruit 
both of some reflection and of some practice. Thus, to sum up, 
the thinking about moral practice, practice itself, and the 
appreciation of moral values, all imply one another, and when 
we speak of `ethics', or of `practice', or of /appreciation', we 
are merely emphasising one side or another. 
When, in particular, we speak of art, we are speaking of 
something in which appreciation is predominant- s-though 
to define appreciation is not to define aesthetic experience, 
the latter being a special and self -contained mode of appre- 
ciation. But aesthetic experience is primarily appreciative 
experience. In the last chapter we saw that, although art 
reveals reality, its primary aim is not knowledge or cognition, 
but appreciation of the values that cognition reveals. So 
here, although art (at any rate some art) reveals moral 
values, the end of art is not alteration of morality or practicer 
but rather the presentation of moral values to be appreciated 
and savoured. They are genuinely appreciated, genuinely 
savoured, as moral,' but the conditions of aesthetic contem- 
plation, and of autonomy and completeness within art, 
ensure that this end of appreciation, without practical or . 
cognitive interest in anything which lies outside the work, 
shall be maintained. Cognitive ends and practical ends alike 
are assimilated within the work. 
If this is true of moral values, it should also be true of 
the values which would not normally be called moral, . 
e.g. the values of the unpleasantness which we have dis- 
cussed. Unpleasantness may certainly exist in art, but our 
reactions to the unpleasantness should not be, as they ar: 
in ordinary life, reactions of practical revolt, of turning aw .y 
Morality, it has to be remembered, is being interpreted in a gener , us 
sense. 
c 
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from, or of effacing, the unpleasant object. Our reaction 
must find its place within the aesthetic experience ; the 
flavour of the pleasant or unpleasant must be appreciated 
within its context. The pleasant, the unpleasant, the moral, 
and the immoral may enter into art. But our reactions to 
them are special aesthetic reactions. 
Granting, then, that such values can enter into art, we 
may now return to our main question, namely, What are 
the effects of the qualities of the values embodied upon the 
art? Let us consider very briefly the special cases, first, of 
unpleasantness, and, second, of negative moral values. 
I 
VII. How THE QUALITY OF THE VALUES EXPRESSED AFFECTS 
THE QUALITY OF THE ART 
When we consider the influence of unpleasantness upon art, 
we must think of what is genuinely unpleasant to a normal, 
healthy, experienced, sophisticated, and well- develope mind. 
There is, of course, much variety of opinion about hat is 
unpleasant : the capacity for being shocked varies greatly 
with sophistication and experience. Again, in considering the 
aesthetic effects of unpleasantness /it is better to take cases 
in which unpleasantness is expressed for the sake of its 
unpleasantness, rather than those cases in which unpleasant - 
ness has as its aim the revelation of a larger value. Probably 
the lines quoted above from Shélley's Sensitive Plant would 
fit these requirements. Shelley's expression of the repulsive 
is doubtless a part of a larger whole, but we do feel that he 
rather rejoices in the unpleasantness for its own sake, and 
that in doing so he is unhealthy. Or we might take'a piece 
öf verse like Rupert Brooke's A Channel Passage, which is a 
good deal concerned (again not wholly) with the physical 
details of sea -sickness. Again, in some sculpture of the 
`downward slope', like the Laocoön, or in some periods ` of 
painting, there is revealed a certain love of suffering. ,In our 
own day there appear from time to time cults of the deformed 
.7L 
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and the diseased. These things may be expressed with a 
certain vigour and much frankness; but do they make for 
very highly significant art? 
The answer seems fairly plain. Our intuitions and our 
theories coincide. We do not feel that the exploitation of the 
unpleasant for its own sake is particularly significant. It may 
be the outcome of a protest which is significant. It may arise ` " 
from a rightful and praiseworthy revolt against prudery and 
false delicacy of various kinds. As the expression of the desire 
to look all facts, pleasant or unpleasant, in thé face, it 
merits nothing but commendation. It has its strength, and 
even its. greatness. But if it stops half -way, and -bgse. s- 10.14 
artistic expression of mere brooding on the painful or the il 
repulsive, our instincts tell us that this art must be art of 
an essentially minor sort. We may admire its expressiveness, 
but it is expression of a barren content. The merely un- 
pleasant is not even interesting, except to the morbid. And 
it is, on a large view, unimportant. Those physiological 
details of life, for example, which are unpleasant not merely 
because we are shocked by them through some artificial 
system of education, but because there is a good biological 
reason for it (e.g. the unpleasant details of sea- sickness), are 
simply not of major importance in the scheme of the values 
of human -life. No amount of attention to them, and no 
aesthetic expression= of their values, however vigorous, can 
make them so. It is true, further, there are probably some 
things which are so horrible that it would be impossible to 
have an aesthetic reaction to them. They are too `near'.. 
What of the representation of a man's foot being cut off by 
a railway train? Or of some scenes in the Grand Guignol? 
Surely here, our reactions are practical, not aesthetic? 
We may conclude, then, that (though there is no objection 
in aesthetic principle to the aesthetic expression of un -- 
And of course they can (subject to the provision in the next sentences) 
be expressed aesthetically, just as well as major values, and they are 
perfectly legitimate content for art. 
Ck.4J 
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pleasantness as such) artistic treatment in the hands of a 
sane, normal, and well -balanced artist is likely to devote 
itself in the main to subject- matter which is more important 
and significant than that of the merely unpleasant. 
The same generally seems to be true of the values we call 
moral or immoral. It is, as has been said, hard to draw a 
line between this and the previous case. But we should 
agree, I suppose, that hideous cruelty, Nix sexual lust, 
which I /not merely animal but /anti- human, are `immoral' 
values. How do such values affect the quality of the art 
which treats of them? Once again let us consider such 
' negative moral values as being expressed for their own sakes, 
and not for the sake of revealing some positive value. 
The answer seems to be similar to the last, namely, that 
art which merely expresses negative moral values is simply 
not very significant. Or, better, it is significant of something 
which is poor and barren. Art can express moral evil -at 
least within certain limits- -for its own sake, but it will be 
a small, an empty, and a negligible art, if indeed examples 
of it exist. Negative moral values demand their positives in 
art as in life. In `real' life moral evil may achieve the 
importance of a focal interest, but only because it is associated 
with good. It may assume a large importance, for example, 
because it has to be combated, because it awakens positive 
combative passions, and because it has to be `overcome with 
good'. Again, moral evil is sometimes associated - though 
not so often as we like to imagine -with an energy and 
vitality, for which it is impossible not to have some apprecia- 
tion, even if a sneaking appreciation. There are heroic vices, 
or vices associated with heroic qualities. But genuine moral 
evil, in itself -- cruelty, anti -human lust, selfishness, meanness, 
dishonesty --are in and for themselves barren topics, and 
barren topics for art. To be interesting, they require to be 
associated with positive values, to which by contrast they 
may give some flavour. But this is a very different matter 
from cultivating them for themselves. The `romantic' vice 
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We all secretly love is a different matter from the reality 
of the dreary failure of the human misfit. So in art, mere 
;vice by itself is a tedious business. Or, as with the unpleasant 
in art, if it is not tedious, it may be so shocking that, if our 
impulses are not allowed some outlet within the experience 
of the work (which is excluded by agreement in the case 
we are now considering) they will give rise to practical and 
non -aesthetic protest. Once again, the possible limitations 
of subject- matter are determined nottby a priori 
general aesthetic principles, but by the test of aesthetic 
experience itself. 
. PORNOGRAPHY AND ART 
We have been considering `immoral' values as : they are 
aesthetically embodied in art. This problem is of course 
totally distinct from the problem of any possible immoral 
effects which such values, apprehended aesthetically in art, 
may have in the beholder.. (That question we shall discuss 
a little later.) It is also totally distinct from the problem of 
the `immorality' of which `pornography' is an example. 
Let us discuss pornography for a moment. We are not 
concerned with the question whether .pornography is in fact 
moral or immoral, but with its relation -or rather its non - 
relation-to art. Let us assume that the thing called 
pornography -exists, and that it is, as it is alleged to be, in 
some sense immoral. 
The relation between art and pornography is a negative 
one. Pornography cannot be art, and ' art cannot be. 
pornography, not because that with which pornography 
deals is a supposedly `immoral' passion --for art may express 
the immoral -but because pornography is, I take it; 
definable as something which stimulates the sex- instinct of 
the percipient in 'a way which makes him subject to practical 
sexual desire. Pornography does not provide for completion 
of the impulses awakened as art does. Of course an ,artist 
u 
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may be pornographic at times, or he may start with porno- 
graphic intention and end by producing a pure work of 
art. And again, a genuine work of art may be taken porno- 
graphically. Pornography, like art itself, is not a quality of 
the bare object, but implies the interpretation of a mind. 
But these things do not affect the fact that pornography 
and art are in essence mutually exclusive, that pornography 
has a practical aim outside art, or at least a practical effect, 
whilst art satisfies the impulses it awakens. In this one 
respect art is like the Absolute which is the lion's den to 
which all tracks lead, and from which none eves out. 
Any impulse whatever, or very nearly any impulse,' may 
enter into aesthetic experience. In entering in it becomes 
transformed by its new context. And one aspect of its 
transformation is that it becomes part of a perfect and 
complete whole. A work of art which contained porno- 
graphic elements would be, to that extent, ugly. 
IX. THE EFFECTS OF ART UPON MORAL LIFE 
(3) Our third problem concerns the effect of art upon 
morals. That this question is strictly speaking irrelevant to 
aesthetics, is by now obvious. Art has no interest in effects 
outside itself. "Art for art's sake" is in this sense a common- 
place truth which no one but the aesthetically untutored or 
the morally raw or the intellectually inept would nowadays 
deny. Yet though consideration of effects lies outside the 
region of aesthetics, effects must exist, for that art -ex- ()ty 
perience should have absolutely no effects as inconceivable. / 
We cannot possess any experience, much less any intense 
experience, without its affecting us, and this is true of art. 
Setting aside such incidental though immediate effects as 
the nervous reactions produced as the result of apprehending 
works of art, e.g. the irritability which we may feel upon 
The exceptions being those impulses associated with the excessively 
horrible or immoraa 
,tea 6,ry. 
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the transition from the perfection of music or poetry to the 
prosaic world of fact and our next -door neighbour, we may 
ask, What are the after- effects of experience of certain kinds 
of embodied values? 
The e ct must b_ the effects of the values taken aestheti- 
cally. This means that the values must be taken as parts of 
an expressive whole, which have their meaning in the 
whole and are not fully comprehensible apart from it. 
It is not, therefore, strictly speaking, the separate values 
which affect us, but the whole. Indeed, we have seen that 
separate values in a work cannot have effects outside the 
work, if the work is an aesthetic whole and is taken 
aesthetically. It is true that we do, when we think of a 
work's effects, think of the effects of this or that part of it. 
The work indubitably has parts, and the parts indubitably 
contribute real effects. But we are making an abstraction, 
and the parts which are experienced and have the effects 
are experienced aesthetically in a context from which they 
derived some of their meaning. What we are essentially 
concerned with, then, are the extrinsic effects of this aesthetic 
vision as a whole. 
As before, we may keep in our mind's eye the unpleasant 
and the pleasant on the one hand, and the morally evil 
and the morally good on the other. 
The effects of the unpleasant (taken again as expressed 
for its own sake) and the pleasant in art are, I suppose, 
respectively depressing or stimulating in their effects, for 
unp],easure and pleasure correspond to some thwarting or 
some fulfilment. If what is unpleasant to me is pleasant to 
you, then its effects are, I suppose, in some degree stimulating 
to you. But what is genuinely unpleasant is, even though 
satisfying as far as its expression goes, something which one 
would expect would a certain depression. And vice 
versa with pleasure. 
It is true, of course, that the unpleasant may shock, and 
that shock is a stimulus. But if this kind of shock be the 
Cau Lc 
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effect of the apprehension of a work of art, it is a fairly 
clear indication of aesthetic failure somewhere, either in the 
work or in its apprehension. For it is a practical kind of 
shock. Works of art appre ,- nd -, aesthetically as wholes 
affectLthe general tone or :14 uli of .e w subsequent ex- 
perience. The effect of a pleasant work of art is an effect of 
general tonic, not of this 'or that violent particular pleasure.. 
As we have seen, the pleasure results from the whole work. 
So an unpleasant work, apprehended aesthetically, depresses 
rather than shocks. 
Probably the same generally is true of negative and 
positive moral values, except forte fact that as morality 
comprehends th whole o ,the aesthetic 
expression of evil or its own sake may be expected to produce 
depression on a larger scale and the expression of the morally 
great and noble exaltation on a larger scale. This does seem 
to be the case in fact. The moral values revealed in great 
tragedy do stir and stimulate us profoundly; they do not 
in themselves, if perceived aesthetically, directly (or even of 
necessity, indirectly) impel us to "go and do likewise ". But 
it is very improbable that, in the end, ultimately, and in the 
long run, the experience of great art does not affect conduct 
in one way or another. It is, of course, one thing to possess 
trained apprehension of what is noble and great, and quite 
another to possess nobility. Practical moral life implies more 
than feeling and knowing; it implies development of senti- 
ments and character. But one of the conditions of morality 
is vision, and anyone familiar, and in love, with wha is 
seen i for exampl the greatest trage ied s, comes to moral 
life equippe wrt at least this one qualification. It cannot 
but affect him. 
-Rat not only are the effects of this vision not necessarily 
in the end productive of good life (because of the hiatus 
between appreciative knowledge and the volition which is 
the expression of formed character) ; they may even be bad 
rather than good. The vision itself is purifying, but the 
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effect of it upon some temperaments may be to produce a 
fastidious aesthetic other -worldliness which seeks escape in 
the dreams of art from moral problems and the duties of 
real life. The experience of great art is a great good for the 
soul, but the soul may misuse its good, and in this life of 
care there can be too much of this individual good thing or 
that, however great. 
The effects of art upon character will, in fact, depend upon 
character. As appreciation of art is dependent upon; among 
other things, richness of exper'ienCe öutside' art; 'so'gféat art 
will fail, not only in its aesthetic - but in its nonaesthetic.and 
moral effects upon a mind which is immature, or crude, or 
ill- balanced in any way. Only thse in some degree great 
can apprehend and assimilate, aesthetically/ morally, the 
great. Tragedy will` not affect a shallow. mind aesfliëtically, 
nor purge it morally. Agàin cwitifeLttegatrivessitt41. the effects 
of evil in art will similarly depend upon eharäcter,,, , 
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I. COMPETITION AND TTS TYPES 
By the competition of interests in the work of art I mean 
that competition which may tend to arise between interests 
in several parts or sides or aspects of a work of art. The chief 
case so far of such competition, or tendency to it, has been 
the competition, in `representative' arts like painting or 
drama, between the interest in subject- matter and the 
interest in the body -side of embodiment. Theoretically, we 
have argued, `subject- matter' ought to comform to the type 
of `content'. But subject- matter has in fact its natural' 
interest. So has form (or `material' or `body'). And it may 
very easily happen that the two distinct interests may lead' 
to a splitting and breaking -up of an aesthetic experience 
which should be a whole. The topic which the painting or 
drama is supposed (on titg theory) to `mirror' may become 
the exclusive focus of attention. Or, on the other hand, the 
critic of a great painting, poem, or drama, may treat it 
merely as a series of interesting experiments in the manage- 
ment of pigment, in the use of metre, or in the manipulation 
of characters on and off the stage. 
This is one kind of instance of possible competition, and 
we shall discuss problems raised by it, with some illustrations: 
But there are, of course, even more obvious exam spies of 
competition between different interests. Opera is an out- 
standing example. Here there are many claims upon our 
attention. There is orchestral music and vocal music, there 
is dramatic plot, the spectacle of dramatic acting, and 
perhaps the poetry of words. There is . colour and scenery, 
there is the physical movement of the players (as in dancing). 
The Ballet is another and less complex instance of competi 
tion. It is, I think, a fact that we rarely do find critics who 
are equally interested in all aspects of these complex arts.' 
- -The critic tends almost inevitably, to focus upon one factor 
or another, upon the music, or upon the acting, or upon the 
- choreography, or even upon single aspects of these. Is this 
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essential? Are such arts merely compounds? Or is fusion 
possible? We have been assuming that it is. But the matter 
óf.sueh,vital interest that it is worth going into it in some 
detail and even at the cost of some repetition. 
;t Because, in these matters, concreteness is important, 
because it is specially necessary to have examples before our 
mindf, I propose in what follows to refer a great deal to 
M ; )gger Fry's Tran or' ingti as,' particularly to his first 
chapter,;; "Some Questions in Aesthetics ". Mr. Fry, as 
exeryox e knóá, s + is,., a distinguished critic and artist whose 
op:j4i,ops -a,re.;always worth the most serious consideration. 
And Mr.. Fry not only discusses at great length this general 
question of what I: have called `competition', including the . 
cases:of opera and song, but he gives us many actual illustra- 
tions from the sphere of visual art, to which, as they are 
accessible in one volume, it will be convenient and profitable 
to refer, h shall frequently , have to criticise Mr. Fry's con - 
clu4ions, but this in -,r iö;,way,,eonflicts with a deep sense of 
indebtedness to him... 
Mr. Fry, after a preliminary discussion, begins by making 
a distinction between what he calls `pure' and `impure' arts.2 
He says at it nowise invalidates this conception if such 
a thing as an absolutely pure work of art has never been 
created ;the contention is that some works approximate 
much more nearly than others to this ideal construction ". 
I am not absolutely clear what Mr. Fry means by `pure' and 
`impure', for he does not define them specifically. Sometimes . 
it looks as though by `pure' he means `without competition 
of interests' (as in pure music, or pure visual plasticity, 
versus song or opera or representative painting) . At other 
times it looks as though in using the terms `pure' and `impure' 
be were referring, to the perfection, or the failure of perfec- 
tion, of the aesthetic unification or fusion of various competing 
interests in some (perhaps all) works of art. I am inclined to 
= Chatto & Windus. 
2 Transformations; p. 3. 
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think that the` context shows that this latter sense is the sense . 
of which he is really thinking, though on Mr. Fry's view. 
(he is very emphatic about the . difficulty of complete . 
aesthetic fusion in complex arts) the purest arts in the second 
sense tend in fact to approximate to `pure' art in the first 
sense. But the second sense is certainly the more important, 
and its problems occupy the whole of Mr. Fry's first chapter. 
It is the sense which I wish to discuss. 
For convenience /sake we may range the arts roughly in 
a kind of scale, starting with arts like music and architecture 
at one end of the scale, and finishing with opera at the 
other end. The scale will represent a transition from relatively 
`unmixed' arts to very `mixed' ones, and the mixture will be 
mainly= of two kinds, '(a) a mixture of the appeals of different 
sense elements (e.g. of the visual with the auditory in musical 
dancing), and (b) a mixture of the appeals of `body' and of 
subject- matter. It is impossible to make any neat classifica -. 
tion on one basis or the other; there is bound to be frequent 
overlapping. But on the basis of both taken together, we 
might get first -after pure music and architecture (and 
perhaps dancing without music) -such arts as drawing, 
painting, sculpture, acting without words, etc. Here the 
appeal is mainly through one sense, but the element of 
representation enters in. (I say "mainly through one sense" 
because of course in all the cases mentioned imagery of 
other sensations is involved, and, perhaps, other actual 
sensations. But in painting, for example, the main focus of 
attention is upon the visual, and this is what we are at the 
moment concerned with.) In this class also might be placed 
poetry read aloud to oneself (as opposed to poetry spoken 
before us by 'another, where the visual apprehension of 
attitude and gesture would enter in along with the auditory 
= There may be finer gradations of mixture of appeals, as in the competi- 
ton in painting between the appeal of plasticity and that of colour or of 
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appeal of words) . Here too might come#44 read 
drama, the read novel, etc. In the next division of the scale 
we might place arts which appealt(to more senses tF an one,-__ 
-but are not essentially representative, as, for example, some 
musical dancing (visual and auditory) . Here also would 
come representative arts which appeal to more than one 
sense, e.g. recited poetry or acted drama (representation and 
visual and auditory appeal) . Lastly might come arts which 
are mixed almost in the sense of being compound. Compound, 
that is, of separate arts. Song and opera would be examples. 
Thus, song, it might be said, is a compound of poetry and 
music, and opera a compound of many arts. Here again 
(though it has already been included) might come musical 
dancing, a combination of music and dancing. I do not 
think, as I shall show, that to regard one art as a real 
compound of others which can themselves be pursued as 
arts, is in the end satisfactory, but it is at any rate a point 
of view, and is good enough for classification purposes. The 
present attempt to make out a `scale' has no motive but the 
desire to see broadly the extent of a rather far -reaching 
problem. I have no intention here of trying to deal with the 
problem as it arises in all the arts mentioned. I shall merely 
select some instances, and in preference, those which have 
been discussed by Mr. Fry. Let us begin with our familiar 
friends, subject -matter and body. 
II. THE `DRAMATIC' VERSUS THE `PLASTIC' 
Mr. Fry discusses at length in Transformations the tensio 
between psychological or `dramatic' interest In visua art 
on the one hand, and `plastic' interest on the of ter and. 
In a somewhat earlier work, Vision and Design, containing , 
reprinted essays, he has a footnote to a paper on Giotto, in, 
which he criticises a former assumption of his own, that not 
only did dramatic ideas inspire Giotto to the creation of his 
form, but that the value of the form for us is bound up with 
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recognition of the dramatic idea. He adds : r "It now seems 
to me possible by a more searching analysis of our experience 
in front of a work of art to disentangle our reaction to pure 
form from our reaction to implied associated ideas." This 
"more searching analysis" he makes, with great care, in the 
first essay in Transformations. In this essay he takes a large 
number of examples, Pieter Brueghel the elder, Daumier, 
Poussin, Rembrandt, and many others, which he examines 
in a certain order, putting those in which psychological 
interest predominates (e.g. Pieter Brueghel's Christ carrying 
the Cross) at one end. As we proceed, the plastic interest 
increases, till we arrive, in the case of Rembrandt's "Christ 
before Pilate ", at "perhaps as good an instance as one can 
get of co- operation of the dramatic and plastic ex- 
periences in a single picture ". Mr. Fry's thesis is that this 
blend of experiences is rare, and that in most cases there 
occurs not fusion, but tension of interest between thé 
psychological and the plastic. He says, even of Rembrandt's 
work, that we are compelled to focus the two elements 
separately. "Indeed, I cannot see how one is to avoid this. 
How can we keep the attention equally fixed on the spade- 
less world of psychological entities and relations and upon 
,the apprehension of spatial relations? What, in fact, happens 
is that we constantly shift our attention backwards and 
forwards from one to the other. Does the exaltation which 
gratification in one domain gives increase our vigilance and 
receptiveness when we turn to the other, as would be implied 
'by true co- operation? In this case I incline to think it does, 
although I doubt whether this more than compensates for a 
certain discomfort which the perpetual shifting of focus 
inevitably involves."' 
In the case of Rembrandt's picture there is a minimum 
of this (alleged) discomfort. There are examples of well- 
known pictures in which it is very considerable. Mr. Fry 
.cites, in Vision and Design, the instance of Raphael's Trans- 
.Trtnefermetians, p. 13r. b 144447, p. 33. 
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figuration. The whole of the essay on this subject makes 
fascinating reading, and cannot be properly reproduced, 
except as a whole. But the main points of interest for us 
now are as follows. There is (i ) the appeal of the subject - 
matter. "To those who are familiar with the Gospel story 
of Christ it brings together in a single composition two 
different events which occurred simultaneously at different 
places, the Transfiguration of Christ and the unsuccessful 
attempt of the Disciples during His absence to heal the 
lunatic boy. This at once arouses a number of complex 
ideas about which the intellect and feelings may occupy 
themselves."' But in the subject- matter regarded as 
representation there are suggested things which are by no 
means wholly pleasing. If "our Christian spectator has also 
a knowledge of human nature he will be struck by the fact 
that these figures, especially in the lower group, are all 
extremely incongruous with any idea he is likely to have 
formed of the people who surrounded Christ in the Gospel 
narrative. And according to his prepossessions he is likely to 
be shocked or pleased to find, instead of the poor and 
unsophisticated peasants who followed Christ, á number of 
noble, dignified, and academic gentlemen in improbable 
garments and purely theatrical poses. Again /the representa- 
tion merely as representation will set up a number of ,. 
feelings and perhaps of critical thoughts dependent upon 
innumerable associated ideas in the spectator's mind. " 2 
In these things our pleasure and displeasure is, of course, 
affected by our extra -aesthetic knowledge, as well as by our 
general background of taste, training, and tradition. The 
pagan spectator will have a different view from the Christian. 
(2) There is, secondly, the entirely distinct appeal öf 
form, for those who are sensible to its meanings. "Let us 
now take for our spectator a person highly endowed with the 
, special sensibility to form who feels the intervals and 
relations of , and let us suppose him either complet'ë1ÿ 
' Vision and Desig p. 296. _ Ibid. p. 297. 
°.n,..'s 
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ignorant of, or indifferent to, the Gospel story. Such a 
spectator will be likely to be immensely excited by the extra - , ordinari co- ordination of many complex masses in a single 
inevitable whole, by the delicate equilibrium of many 
directions of line. He will at once feel that the apparent 
division into two parts is only apparent, that they are 
co- ordinated by a quite peculiar power of grasping the 
possible correlations. He will almost certainly be immensely 
excited and moved, but his emotion will have nothing to do 
with the emotions which we have discussed hitherto, since 
in this case we have supposed our spectator to have no 
clue to them "= 
III. IS FUSION POSSIBLE? CRITICISMS OF MR. FRY 
These arc examples. And the problem is, in Mr. Fry's words,. 
"Do these form chemical compounds, as it were, in the case, 
of the normal aesthetically gifted spectator, or are they 
merely mixtures due to our confused recognition of what 
goes on in the complex of our emotions ? "z Mr. Fry inclines . 
to think that fusion "of two states of emotion [is] due to my 
imperfect analysis of my own mental state".3 Again, in 
Transformations,4 he concludes : "Our experiments and in -. 
41-1 
quiries have/ then, I hope, given us one result on which 
. we may rely with some confidence /the notion that pictures 
/Jin which representation subserves poetical or dramatic ends 
are not simple works of art, but are in fact cases of the mix- 
ture of two distinct and separate arts; that such pictures 
imply the mixture of the art of illustration and the art of plas- 
tic volumes -the art of Art, our horribly incorrect vocabulary, 
almost forces us to say ". But he is very tentative, and is 
careful not to say that co- operation between the psychological 
and the plastic aspects is impossible or that it never occurs.5 
Vision and Design, p. 298. 3 Ibid., p. 300. 
4 Transformations, p. 27. 
3 Ibid., p. 301. 
5 Ibid., p. 21. 
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And he is ready to admit (in Vision and Design) that perhaps 
the question is one for the experimental psychologist. 
This, then, is our first problem. Is there really true fusion 
of experiences, or is there only, at the very best, an unfused 
`co- operation' of experiences? 
In asking whether fusion is possible, we must go back to 
our early distinction between `psychological' fusion and 
`aesthetic' fusion, or aesthetic relevance. Clearly what is 
meant in this context is chiefly aesthetic fusion. Psychological 
fusion in various degrees may or may not occur; we may, 
that is to say, be less, or more, explicitly conscious of the 
many elements which go to enrich the total significance of 
an aesthetic complex. But what matters, and what Mr. 
Fry is I think chiefly interested in, is whether in certain 
cases a single harmonious (or aesthetically fused) aesthetic 
experience is possible. I believe, indeed, that Mr. Fry often 
wrongly identifies the two in his mind, and thinks that 
because psychological fusion does not, in particular cases, 
occur, that because we have a number of different objects_ 
of interest more or less explicitly before our mind at once, 
therefore aesthetic fusion is impossible. But aesthetic fusion is 
his, and our, main problem, and, unless specified otherwise, 
the term `fusion' will here be taken to mean aesthetic fusion. 
In this matter it is only fair to seek out the best examples. 
It may be that in very many instances of our experience of 
works of art there is some failure of fusion, some disorganised 
shifting about of attention from one element to another. 
Mr. Fry concentrates a great deal of attention on such 
instances (though he does not deny outright the possibility . 
of fusion). But there is a danger in so doing. We may get . 
the problem out of proportion. Because failure often occurs 
in the instances we select, we must not conclude that it . 
always does, or even tends to, for our instances may be too 
specialised; a single instance to the contrary is sufficient to 
disprove any generalisation. I shall try to show later that it 
is probable that there are many instances of fusion. But, in 
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order to find them, we must select; and this is a perfectly 
fair procedure. 
No doubt it is possible to disentangle and analyse elements 
in our aesthetic experience, and this could be done, even in 
the hypothetical cases where fusion occurs. Mr. Fry's later 
point of view when he distinguishes between dramatic and 
formal appeal= is an advance on his earlier. But would it 
not be possible for him to go back to the earlier position, 
only at a higher level of synthesis? Is there not a danger óf 
taking the products of our legitimate analysis as separate 
`parts' which can only co- operate, but can never fuse? In 
analysis always there does lurk this danger, and in the 
analysis of aesthetic experience, where unity is so vitally 
essential, and at the same time so delicately fabricated, it is 
an especial danger. Aesthetic experience may contain many 
different elements, and I have argued that it is a synthesis 
containing many meanings. But is it not also its essence that 
the elements and meanings should be made one and insepar- 
able from the aesthetic whole? And do not the `parts' thus 
resolve themselves either into abstractions from the given 
existing aesthetic whole, or into the elements entering into 
its history or genesis? 
Mr. Fry does appear to be taking the products of his 
analysis of aesthetic experiences as if they were separate 
parts of a composite whole. He does seem to be reinforcing 
this error by emphasis upon special examples in which there 
is at least a great danger of the breakdown of the unity of 
aesthetic experience. And does he speak constantly as if 
neutral, or primary, subject- matter could be an object of 
interest in an aesthetic experience. This can be illustrated 
in two sentences taken from his first essay in Transformations. 
One sentence occurs where he is speaking of the difference 
between interest in psychological, and interest in plastic, 
factors.2 He says "These two kinds of representation are, 
likely enough, governed by different principles, and imply 
= See above, p. Transformations, P. 34. 
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certain differences of emphasis which explains in part the 
great difficulty of conciliating them. For instance, where 
drama is in question minute changes of tone in the face will 
be likely to have a far greater significance than they would 
have on plastic grounds, and it is almost inevitable that the 
dramatic painter should given them ultra- plastic values." 
Ì The other quotation which I will select is a passage where, 
speaking of a drawing of Rouault in which there is both 
plastic and psychological interest, he asks :I "Does he, then, 
provide us with the case of perfect fusion into a single 
expression of the double experience? Or is there not, after 
all, a certain tension set up? Different people will answer 
this question in different ways, according to their ruling 
preoccupation. Perhaps, as in the case of El Greco, in 
process of time the psychological elements will, as it were, 
fade into the second place, and his plastic quality will appear 
almost alone. I do not profess to give an answer. I may note, 
however, in passing this phenomenon of evaporation. I 
believe that in nearly every one, wherever a psychological 
appeal is possible this is more immediately effective, more 
poignant than the plastic, but that with prolonged familiarity 
it tends to evaporate and leave plasticity as a more per- 
manent, less rapidly exhausted, motive force. So that where 
pictures survive for a long period their plastic appeal tends 
to count more and more on each succeeding generation." 
In both the above quotations it is implied that part of the 
work of the artists mentioned has been representation, 
reproduction of extra -aesthetic values. Mr. Fry would be 
quit of it if he could. He writes : "It is a great simplification 
to ... look upon both illustration and plastic as having each 
their proper form, the one psychological, the other spatial. "z 
This desire is natural, for it is the outcome of the supposition 
that the two factors are really at war. But is not the cure 
worse than the disease? Does it not lead to an artificial 
idea of art and does it not impoverish art of much of its 
I Transformations, p. 25. 2 Ibid., p. 27. 
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meaning? Life may be difficult to transform aesthetically, but 
is it impossible? Must we simply abandon the attempt, 
choosing art or life, but not both? 
As regards the first of the above quotations, if the artist 
is interested merely in the `pure' formal relations of the 
human face, if he is interested, that is, simply in the general. 
emotional values of plastic forms and their relations, he is 
not painting a human face at all. His subject- matter is merely 
a general arrangement of plastic forms, which, as it happens, 
bears some resemblance to a human face. It is not a matter 
of the psychological factor being "emphasised" less ; it is a. 
case of the psychological factor not existing at all for the 
artist. But it is a strained and unnatural attitude. Of course 
the painter is interested in the expressiveness of visual forms. 
But he is interested in their expressiveness. The forms are 
`significant'. And what does a human face express more 
definitely than human character? Surely the artist has more 
before him than `lines, planes, and volumes'. Surely, if he is 
not ridden by theories, he is interested in character. Not 
the disembodied, purely mental character which is the object 
of the psychologist, but, once again, character plastically 
expressed in a face which interests him. If this interest can 
in4some sense be called dramatic, it will not be true to say 
that the "dramatic" painter will give emphasis to ultra 
plastic values, in the sense of values outside and independent 
of the plasticity. Rather, psychological values will become 
apprehended plastically. This continually happens. We do 
not see a face, and its character. We see character in the facet 
There is not a better -or commoner- example of aesthetic 
expressiveness anywhere than this 
The character transforms the aesthetic expressiveness of 
the plasticity. It is not that we are interested in two things, 
side by side. Introspection of art experience makes this fairly 
clear. ' When I look aesthetically at Verocchio's Colleoni 
I am not in the least interested in the character which the 
gentleman òn the' horse 'originally possessed. Yet I cannot 
X 
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but feel braced up and inspired by the intense vigour of 
character which is embodied in every inch of horse and man. 
Or when I see the fresco (in the Arena Chapel at Padua) of 
Joachim retiring to the theep-fold, it may be that my first 
interest is psychological, or it may be that it is plastic (in my 
own case it was the latter) . But in a full appreciation I cannot 
possibly cut out one or other element. In the whole, each 
becomes transformed. There is not, to repeat, when the 
experience is complete and mature, psychological interest 
and plastic interest. There is just the plastic -psychological 
expressiveness of the forms of the dignified old man with 
head bent, enwrapt in his mantle, in contrast to the different 
plastic -psychological expressiveness of the naïve -looking 
shepherds who come to meet him. Our object is plastic 
psychology, plastic drama. One does not need to know the 
original story in order to appreciate the delightful expressive- 
ness of the forms, though doubtless knowledge of the story 
assimilated into the aesthetic experience would enrich it. 
Aesthetic assimilation is essential, not only here, but always. 
All representative pictures require external knowledge. Some 
of it is common to everyone, some of it has to be specially 
acquired. Who could fully appreciate Leonardo's Last 
Supper without. external knowledge? But the knowledge 
must have become familiar, assimilated. The danger is, 
always, of its remaining external, for aesthetic assimilation 
is not easy. 
Exactly parallel reasonings hold good of the second 
quotation. It is only if the psychological interest in paintings 
is an extrinsic interest, an interest in primary subject- matter, 
it is only where there are elements of external allusion and 
mere illustration, that psychological elements will tend to 
"evaporate ". If the artist has imagined his way through to 
the end, the psychological interest will not evaporate because 
it will be intrinsic to the painting : the psychology is plastic 
psychology. 
Introspection of actual aesthetic experience certainly does 
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to show that there can be aesthetic fusion. And this 
seems to be possible, not only in the relatively simple cases 
taken, but in more complex ones. Speaking for myself, I do 
not experience the continual "shifting of attention" of which 
Mr. Fry speaks, in appreciation of works of art of the type 
of Rembrandt's Christ before. Pilate, or still more of his 
drawing of The Hidden Talent.' There is, of course, 
always a stage when we are coming to comprehend the 
picture, in which we have to attend to this, and then that, 
and then something else. And it is not suggested that it is 
easy to attain perfection of apprehension, or that an alterna- 
tion of attention can always be overcome. But perfection 
can, it is probable, be attained, and it is always the ideal of 
aesthetic experience. To fall short of it is to fail. 
IV. FUSION IN SIMPLE¡A.ND MORE COMPLEX CASES 
Mr. Fry, I think, must assume that fusion occurs in the case 
of ̀ pure' form, for he approves,, I take it, of Mr. Bell's phrase 
°significant form'. But whether Mr. Fry does or does not 
admit fusion in the case of ̀ pure' form, we have at least seen 
for ourselves= that fusion does exist here. There is, strictly 
speaking, no such thing, aesthetically, as `pure' form. In 
terms of Bell's,Thrase, form, even in the most `abstract' of 
art, is always, for aesthetic experience, significant, whether of 
organic or ideal values, whether of values directly or in- 
directly apprehended. These values are aesthetically fused 
with the form as we apprehend them aesthetically, or 
aesthetic experience does not exist at all. 
If fusion of meaning is possible in the case of `pure' form, 
why not in the case of mixed, e.g. `representative', arts? 
Introspection, we have seen, suggests that fusion in such 
cases is possible, though it may be difficult. The aesthetic 
theory we have been defending -and, I should imagine, any 
I Transformations, (facing) 24. 
Chapter , pp. 
R 
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aesthetic theory -takes it as absolutely essential that fusion 
should occur, if they are to be aesthetic experiences at all. 
Is there any possible theoretical objection to the possibility of 
its existence in these cases, beyond the admitted fact that it 
is difficult to achieve? 
I cannot see that there is. We must not, of course, allow 
metaphors to run away with us, and think of aesthetic fusion 
as if meanings melted together in our minds like bits of lead 
in a ladle. Neither must we think of aesthetic as if it were 
psychologicallfusion. Mr. Fry, I think, is sometimes guilty 
of seeking after a too great simplicity of aesthetic experience. 
The aesthetic experience is (even when `pure') a complex 
experience and, even when much psychological fusion occurs, 
a complexity of meaning remains. This complexity must be 
fused and unified aesthetically, but aesthetic fusion does not 
mean the disappearance of the parts. The aesthetic fusion, or 
assimilation or unification of parts, must simply be accepted 
as a fact, which is irreducible. 
To say all this is not to deny that the emphasis in different 
works may be on different things, or that in the same work 
the focus of our interest may shift about. Indubitìbly the 
focus does shift. This does not mean the same thing as that 
of which Mr. Fry is speaking when he speaks of the "shifting 
of attention ". In poetry the images and ideas may be an 
'accompaniment of the delightful words : or the ideas and 
i _Wages may be the focus, and the sound of the words their 
accompaniment. In representative painting we m w now be 
interested in the character- aspect of the content, and now in 
the formal aspect of the body -side. But the `shifting' is not 
from mere `dramatic', mere `psychological' interest, to mere 
formal interest. It is only, if the experience be an aesthetic 
one, an emphasis on aspects of a whole, in which one aspect 
modifies and colours the others. In other words, and to 
Irepeat, emphasis upon /attention to/ this or that, is not 
incompatible with this aesthetic fusion. But enough. 
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V. THE IMPORTANCE, FOR FUSION, OF THE ARTIST'S INTERESTS 
From the point off view of the artist's creation, .. it is of course 
necessary, if fusion is to ocur, that all the items of 
, 
his 
interest should be imagined in terms of his material. If the 
artist's choice of subject is a spontaneous one, if, in his 
restless searching after expression, he comes to a subject 
naturally, and comes to it aesthetically, seeing (if he is a 
painter or sculptor) the characters of his subject in plastic 
terms, then there is for him of course no conscious problem 
of assimilation, no conscious conflict, between character or 
dramatic subject, and form. We feel,, for example, of Rem - 
brandt's Hidden Talent ' that the subject- interest and the 
plastic interest must be for the artist one throughout. Indeed, 
where fusion has finally been successfully accomplished, it is 
difficult to feel that there ever has been conflict. We feel this 
spontaneous fusion of interest in many of the paleolithiç. 
cave -drawings of animals, in many catacomb paintings, in 
CiDtto,in much Dutch domestic painting -in all subject -work, 
in fact, which is genuinely good. 
In work like Raphael's Transfiguration, on the other 
hand, already discussed, we do not feel nearly so certain. 
It is good in this or in that aspect, but not as a whole. We 
feel that the subject or character -side has never interested 
the painter, and so why should he have painted it? Because 
of tradition, convention, commissions? Much of the religious 
painting of the Renaissance must have been carried out 
without great spontaneous interest in the subject - matter. 
Similarly, painting of portraits,flor commissions) of unin- fz 
teresting subjects is often a compromise. Ideally speaking, the 
subject should choose the artist. If it does, he may be relied 
on to reveal it plastically. If it does not, and he is compelled, 
for non- artistic reasons, to paint it, we shall get compromise 
for better or for worse. 
Transformations, plate vi. 
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We have now discussed at some length the general problem 
of aesthetic fusion. This has been illustrated by consideration 
of the question of the competition between the interests of 
subject- matter and of body. It may be of - iMefest ^^ore 
Willy to discuss briefly, with the help of Mr. Fry, some 
,nthnr kinds of ̀ competition' which may arise. The first group 
4-e 0.44 of cases which I shall select lie within the realm of painting, 
the competition arising between certain of the visual elements 
in painting. The second group is the group of the so- called 
`compound arts', which includes song, ballet, opera. 
VI. OTHER 'COMPETITIONS'. `DECORATIVE' AND 'PLASTIC' 
USE OF COLOUR 
The first question, that of the competition, or "tension" (as 
Mr. Fry calls it), between the `decorative' and the `plastic' 
use of colour, can only be suggested. It is a highly technical 
problem in which only the expert is really entitled to speak. 
Mr. Fry gives an interesting account of the development of 
,the plastic use of colour,' showing how, at the time of 
Cellini, colour was merely an addition, an ornament, filling 
in the frame of the drawing. And he shows the way in which, 
gradually, colour came to be used as expression of form. 
This, i.e., is a `tension' which has really been overcome, and 
which in good painting (which is not merely decorative) 
must always be overcome. It is but one more example of the 
necessity that all the components of art should be assimilated 
to one another. The realisation that the world of three 
dimensions is visually apprehended in terms of colour,2 i.e. 
that colour is not something which is painted upon forms 
already perceived as such, is at the same time a realisation 
of the prime condition of painting, that forms seen must be 
= Transformations, pp. 213 sqq. 
a I am aware that this is not beyond controversy, that it is said that 
visual space is coloured and not colour that is extended; but to discuss 
this would be to digress. 
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painted as they are seen, not as coloured shapes, but as 
shaping colours. Mr. Fry, here and below, does not argue a 
fundamental tension, as with subject- matter, but only .a 
difficulty in practice in the use of plastic colour. Two - 
dimensional colour is the actual material of painting, and it 
must be transformed so as to be expressive of three dimen- 
sions, plus other things. 
VII. LINE AND THREE- DIMENSIONAL VOLUME 
The next `competition' to be hex- is that of line and 
three -dimensional volume. Actually, as everyone knows, 
"there are no lines in nature ", there are only shapes appre- 
hended in terms of colour. But line is a characteristic and 
recognised medium of expression, and we have to consider 
how far it may be expressive, and more particularly how far, 
if at all, there may be conflict between the directional char- 
acter of the line and its character of bounding figures and 
suggesting volumes. The problem is well put by Mr. Fry in 
the following passage.' "For whatever reasons, the imagina- 
tion is only strongly affected through vision by the vivid 
realisation of plastic forms, and the great trouble with the 
drawn contour is that it tends to check that realisation. For 
one thing, the drawn line tends to carry the eye along its 
course; indeed, there here comes in, to conflict with this 
plastic expression, one of the very beauties of the art of 
drawing, namely, the interest excited in us by the rhythmic 
flow of the line as we follow its movements along. For the 
drawn line is a perfect record of a certain gesture, and all 
gesture, as we see in the dance and the drama, has a strong 
evocative power over the imagination. In handwriting, 
where the lines do not even suggest plastic relief, our whole 
attention is fixed, in so far as we contemplate it aesthetically, 
on these traces made by gestures, and we deduce from them 
I Transformations, p. 200. 
.. 
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very strong impressions of the character and mood of which 
these gestures are the outcome.4 
"This purely abstract rhythmical attraction of the line is 
still more potent in a drawing, and we may call it, by 
analogy with handwriting, the calligraphic quality of a' 
drawing. But, as we have seen, this very quality tends to 
divert our attention from the cross -sections of disappearing 
planes and fixes it on the continuous movement of their 
summation in the line. It is one aspect of the eternal conflict 
in the graphic arts of thé'organisation on the surface of the 
picture and its organisation as an ideated three -dimensional 
space occupied by volumes. The conciliation of these two 
opposing tendencies, accomplished by innumerable different 
devices at different periods, may almost be said to be the . 
material of any intimate technical criticism of pictorial art." 
Mr. Fry goes on to contrast the "calligraphic"' quality of 
a drawing, which possesses its perfect easy rhythmic con- 
tinuity and coherence only when we are not fully conscious 
of it, with another method of drawing which has spontaneity 
and unconsciousness of a different kind. This other method 
occurs when before an actual appearance, the artist 
"becomes so concentrated upon the interpretation of a 
contour as to be unconscious of what goes on between his 
hand and the paper. The ideal of such a situation is that he 
should never actually look at the paper. This, of course, is a 
L counsel of perfection." /For, if he never looks at the paper, 
the proportions are likely to go astray, though the rhythmic 
quality is likely to be excellent. I suppose that the caricaturist 
who draws faces inside his pocket would be an instance of the 
`intention' of this kind of drawing. Mr. Fry says that the 
rhythm which it possesses is "due to the concentration on 
the actual vision."/ The tendency of "calligraphic" rhythm 
is, on the whole, to be flowing, and there is a danger of 
This has of course no reference here to historical fact, such as that 
Byzantine art was affected by Arabic calligraphy. 
2 Transformations, p. 202. 3 Ibid. 
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achieving a certain easy but too obvious elegance of 
gesture. 
The other kind of drawing tends to be more expressive, 
and, Mr. Fry thinks, more preoccupied "with the plasticity 
and varying emphasis of the contour than with its continuity. 
This may be seen to perfection in Rembrandt's, and very 
strikingly, too, in Browyer's, drawings (Plates VI and XXXI 
of Transformations) where the volumes are indicated by 
broken lines which, by their continually varied quality, 
suggest the variations of contrast which the line is intended 
to express in various parts of its course. Rembrandt, par- 
ticularly in his preoccupation with volumes, frequently gives 
several slightly different versions of the contour for fear of 
preventing us by any one too precise and over definite. 
statement .front realising the movement of the disappearing 
planes." 
All this is another example of the fusion of several interests., 
Mr. Fry's term `calligraphic' marks out drawing at its . 
simplest and least complex stage. When, on the other hand, 
the lines have the rhythm due to "concentration on the 
actual vision ", the interests in subject and in three - 
dimensional plasticity enter in. As regards the latter, 
although three dimensions has to be expressed in terms of 
two,/ and this is a task to be overcome by the artist, there 
is no essential conflict or competition in drawing between 
two dimensions and three. If drawing is of the calligraphic 
sort simply, and avows nothing else (the nearest case would 
be .pure arabesque), tilt question does not arise. If it is more 
than calligraphic, there is a problem. But it is a practical . 
one for the artist and -if our general arguments are sound- 
raises no difficulties of aesthetic principle. 
' Taking the line not as mere mathematical line (in which case .it would 
be one dimension), but as an area -a special case of colour. 
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VIII . OPERA, SONG, . BALLET 
We may now consider briefly the case of those arts which may 
be called `compound' in the sense that they may be alleged 
to be composed of `parts' which are in themselves arts. 
Examples of such are opera (`composed' of music -orchestral 
and vocal- acting, poetry, stagecraft), song (a blend of 
poetry and music), and the ballet (music and dancing) . 
The problem, particularly as regards opera, is a very real 
one, and one which has troubled lovers of the arts, philo- 
sophic and unphilosophic, perhaps more than any other. 
Is opera the richest of all the arts, or is opera perfectly 
impossible, being an evil mixture of essentially incompatible 
ingredients, something tolerated by one person for the sake 
of music, by another for the sake of the poetry or the acting, 
and so on? Similarly, in ballet, can we attend only to the 
music or to the dancing, one at a time, or can there be a 
true unity of the two in a third art, which we simply call 
`ballet'? It is the same question over again/as we have been 
discussing throughout this chapter, in a fresh form. 
As before, we ought to distinguish between the actual and 
the ideal. If ever aesthetic fusion is difficult, it is so in an 
art like opera. For the same reason perfect fusion may seldom 
be found. Our view of opera will therefore depend upon 
whether we are thinking of opera as it is, or opera as it 
may be, or opera as it ought to be. If we are empiricists and 
if we like opera, we shall probably be forced, if we are 
honest, to conclude from our most frequent experience of 
the actual, that opera on the whole is just a mixture of 
several arts, and that it is not a bad thing at that. If we are 
empiricists and dislike opera, we shall condemn it because 
it leaves us flustered. If we are idealists in this matter, 
believing in the possibility of fusion, and dislike opera, we 
shall condemn it coldly for its many faults, whilst if we are 
idealists and like it, we shall see in it the noble ideal of the 
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rich unity which it is striving continually to attain. We shall 
regard it as fuller of potentiality than any of the other arts. 
Mr. Fry might be classed as an idealistic empiricist, with 
the inclination to believe that fusion is sometimes, but not 
always, possible. He suggests that where there is emotion at 
a high pitch of tension, fusion in opera is not possible* -..as "conflict was far less in the Meistersingers1 and 
disappeared altogether in great parts of Mozart's operas, 
where the tension, was lower, and most of all where the 
treatment was most playful and least intense ".I 
Mr. Fry may be right. But he is, I fancy, jumping to a 
rather too pessimistic general conclusion when, on the basis 
of the experience of Handel's Semele he says : 
"But there was enough to make Iv see what Opera may 
safely be, and what, I rather guess, human limitations being 
what they are, it can scarcely transcend.'ZHe may be. right. 
Personally as a sympathetic disliker of _ opera: with an 
idealistic strain, I find it very difficult to say. No one is fit 
to pronounce on opera unless he has sometimes, and often, 
loved it. It may be that fusion is only possible when the 
tension of feeling is low. A priori this may be questioned. 
Certainly there is theoretically no barrier, except the extreme 
artistic difficulty of managing $uch complex materials. 
One would expect the difficulties to be specially great when 
feeling is at a high tension. But nothing more. If fusion is 
possible in the simpler cases, it is in theory, and very likely 
in practice, possible in the more complex ones, for no new 
principle is introduced. And as we have seen that fusion is 
possible in the simplest cases, we may conclude that opera is, 
potentially at least, the richest of all the arts. 
If in opera fusion is at least ideally possible, each part will 
of course no longer be a separately existing entity, but will 
be transformed by its relation to the other parts in the 
aesthetic whole. This, in other words, means that it is inac- 
curate and misleading to speak of ̀ compound' arts. Mr. Fry 
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is, I suspect, wrong when, speaking of song, he says : "Is there 
really any such thing as a true song? That is to say, such a 
setting of words, in themselves t esthetically moving, to music, 
also in itself esthetically significant, that both are appre- 
hended at once, not only in their full significance, but 
mutually exalted by the co- operation of the other. It is 
fairly clear that anything at all like great poetry must be 
lessened by any other way of pronouncing the words than 
that of beautiful speech. In that direction, there must be loss 
of poetical beauty, however the words are set, since the 
intonation of music must always distort in . some way the 
rhythmic quality of verse and the speech emphasis of words. 
A probable explanation of the song, then, may be that the 
words are to some extent sacrificed to the music."! Here a 
slight error in the putting of the question occurs, because of 
the answer which he knows he is going to give. For the 
problem is not, Can spoken poetry and sung music, each 
with independent beauty, combine harmoniously with one 
another? If the question is put in this way the only possible 
answer is that they cannot, for each is complete. Sung poetry 
can never be the same as spoken poetry, and poetry is meant 
to be spoken and not sung. The real problem is, Can words 
(including their meanings) be beautiful in song? Can music 
be beautiful in song with words? It may happen that beautiful 
poetry is written down in the same identical words as the 
words of a song. But the community of the written word 
should not lead us to suppose that there is necessarily any 
community of aesthetic standards in judging the value of 
spoken and sung words. The words as sung have a wholly 
different aesthetic value, but not necessarily an inferior one, 
in fact not strictly a comparable one at all. For even if the 
`same' words used in song are "spoiled as poetry in the 
song ", it is not because they are spoiled poetry that they are 
bad, but because they do not fit in with the music -are in, 
fact, bad song- words. Song is not `music' plus `poetry' ; it is 
= Transformations, p. 29. 
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'words -sung', and its beauty is a new `emergent" beauty 
which is judgeable by its own intrinsic standards and not by . 
the standards of music or ofpoetry as they exist independently. 
Só there is, strictly, no `sacrifice' of words to music, though 
song -words may, taken out of their context, appear less 
`poetical'. It is, as a rule, when we have known and loved a 
poem first, and then hear it as the words of a song, that we 
regard it as a `spoilt poem': Until we forget it as a poem 
we cannot judge the aesthetic value of the words of a song. 
Precisely the same things are true of the opera and the 
ballet. Opera requires many talents to appreciate it, and 
more to create it, but it does not, if it is good, consist of 
a number of arts compounded together. Each element is 
transformed by its relation to a complex aesthetic whole, 
`opera'. It is recorded of a distinguished French musical 
critic= that before he was acquainted with the story of 
Tristan, be understood "nothing at all, nothing, absolutely 
nothing" of the music. Arc we to conclude from this that 
the music as music is bad, or that the music is simply the 
illustration and illumination of a verbal story? Surely not. 
But we may very well say, once again, that opera is an art 
into which, for full enjoyment, must be fused two different 
orders of experience. Opera is the concrete fusion. So, 
likewise, the critics of Stravinsky's ballet music3 misinterpret 
the function of ballet as a whole when they criticise his 
music as music, independently of its relation to the ballet. 
To say these things is not, once again, to deny that different 
elements in the (badly named) `compound' art may have 
different degrees of importance and prominence in different, 
works. The elements must be judged in relation to the 
compound art as a whole, but, given this, one or another 
element may claim the lion's share of interest. In the 
= Professor Lloyd Morgan 
Alexander not. 
' Albert Lavignac- quoted 
Cleather and Crump. 
would admit this term here, Professor 
in introduction to Tristan and Isolde, by 
3 el3 -cit., P. 33- 
/it4{ 0,/034a 
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recitative, the words may be of major, and the music of 
minor and accompanying, importance. Or the words may 
be a mere fa- la -la, and the music -interest in the foreground. 
In ballet the fascination of complex expressive movement 
may hold us, the music but keeping the rhythm together. 
Or we may get a complex development, in which each 
seems equally stressed. Opera is by tradition an art in which 
music has assumed a large importance. Musical critics 
write about it, and if we were to take a census of their 
opinions one would find, I strongly suspect, that they usually 
either assume, or openly assert, that the drama and poetry 
aspects must always be subservient to the music. It may 
turn out to be so in fact, for there is no theoretical objection 
to its happening. But only the actual practice of these things 
is of importance. Categorical statements -or imperatives 
are out of place. 
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into general schemes to suit the fancy or the interest of 
the moment. 
But the preliminary question is, Are there `kinds' of beauty 
at all, such as the sublime, the humorous, the tragic, and 
so on? Or do these kinds fall outside beauty, giving us 
beauty and these other `kinds'. Or is beauty something 
which, as it were, absorbs all these other `kinds' into its own 
nature? Is beauty, in Mr. Carritt's words' (as he interprets 
Croce), "a universal which contains individuals, but no 
species ?" The meaning of these questions will appear more 
clearly if we consider Croce's denial of `kinds'. 
Croce offers us two main reasons for his denial of `kinds'. 
One is per accidens, and the other follows from the nature of 
his philosophy. The reason per accidens is, in effect, the actual 
failure in fact, of classifications of the arts. The other, the 
essential reason, is that of the individuality and indivisi- 
bility of intuition. 
The first point' is not a very telling one. It may be 
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to make a neat and com- 
plete classification of all the arts. And, as has been said, it is 
not necessary for us to try. But this difficulty, or impossi- 
bility, is. no indication that there are not real kinds3 of beauty. 
(It is rather like saying that because there can be no com- 
pletely `objective' classification of books in a library, therefore 
there are no kinds of books.) And to ask whether there are 
differences., and what, if there are, may be some of the bases 
of the differences, is to ask perfectly intelligent and intelli- 
gible questions. Mr. Carritt, for example, allows his 
.enthusiasm against classification to carry him too far when 
3 he says "To ask in .face of'a work of art whether it is a 
religious painting or a portrait, a problem play or a melo- 
drama; post- cubist or pre- futurist, is as ingenuous a confes- 
sion of aesthetic bankruptcy as to demand its title or its 
subject. The true motive of such a quest has always been the 
The Theory of Beauty, p. 2 56 . 
= See Croce, Aesthetic, chapter xii. 3 Lbiiel., p. 204. 
338 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
discovery of rules and canons which shall save ús the trouble 
of a candid impression ; for without rules there are no kinds 
and without kinds no rules. The result has always been 
sterility and dullness." But the question can be rightly, as it 
¡can be wrongly, asked. At the very moment of aesthetic 
j,U+ ¡experience it is, __* _;a, totally irrelevant both to ask 
yy whetq a work of art is `this' or `that', and what is the 
difference between `this' and `that'. But it is not always, and 
on every occasion, out of place. 
The positive philosophic basis of Croce's argument is more 
important, but we need not delay over it, as the ground has 
already been covered. The nerve of the argument is th 
Nz content 
y 
ical form= (ox ody') aretnett 
essential or the aesthet of beauty, 3,6411144 is simply 
expression. 
If this is true, then certainly there can be no kinds. Beauty 
will be the single indivisible spiritual activity of expression, 
and talk of `parts' or `kinds' or `classes' will be beside the 
point. We have, however, been arguing throughout for a 
very different kind of view, for the reality and importance in 
beauty of both content and physical body, properly inter- 
preted. f-we -h ve-- b=o- -_i ht Cro a is wrong. It is a 
matter of choosing between one philosophy and another. 
On the view which has been defended here, there can be 
`kinds' and the `kinds' will vary with content and body. 
We ought, however, to be clear about our terminology. 
Beauty for us, as for Croce, is expression, is perfection of 
expression, whatever the content and whatever the body. 
The lyric may be as `beautiful' as the drama, the symphony 
as the cathedral. For beauty anywhere, perfection of 
expression only is demanded. In this sense, beauty is forever 
the same, and there can be no kinds. But this is an abstract 
sense, and beauty is in this sense regarded as an abstract 
universal. It is not, however, the abstract universal which 
I Aesthetic, 15, 16, 98. The above statement is, of course, subject to 
the qualifications and reservations discussed in Chapter , pp. 
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we apprehend in and by itself when we have an aesthetic 
experience. What we apprehend is not bare `expressiveness; 
but the expression of a content -in -a -body. Beauty, the universal, 
is the same everywhere because it is itself nowhere. What 
we apprehend in actual aesthetic experiences are instances, 
in a spatio -temporal context. These are `beauties' or `beauti- 
ful things', or `beautiful objects', and these are the data for 
aesthetics. Logically, when we speak of `kinds of beauty' we 
are speaking only approximately, for there are no kinds of 
beauty, but one. But we need hardly apologise- except to 
logicians -for using language thus approximately. For no 
one -but the logician -is interested in abstract beauty. Our 
interest is in the things, the pictures, the poems, the 
symphonies. 
And yet we are half logicians. We are aesthetic logicians. 
The business of the theory of aesthetics is to be continually 
in touch with individual beauties, and at the same time - 
or subsequently -to keep an eye on their general characters 
and similarities and classes. This we must do now. Keeping 
in mind, as always, that every instance of `beauty' is an 
individual, we must ask (the way to it being clear) what it 
is which broadly distinguishes some `kinds' of beautiful 
objects from others. The differences, as we said, will be 
dependent always on differences of content and body, with 
varying emphases. We shall mention in turn the sublime, 
the tragic, the comic, the humorous and the witty, and the 
classical and the romantic. Our treatment must obviously 
be brief and inadequate and will lay claim to little originality. 
But some reference to these important topics is necessary. 
II. A NOTE ON THE SUBLIME 
The concept of sublimity I shall not attempt to analyse in 
detail. The literature of the subject is large, but not always 
profitable, for it often concerns itself with disputes about the 
use of a word. In view of Mr. Carritt's recent analysis in 
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The Theory of Beauty (Chapter IX) it would be wasteful to 
attempt to examine the history of this term. I shall therefore 
content myself with the briefest and most dogmatic state- 
ment of opinion as to what the word should mean, and 
principally as to what I shall mean by it. 
Sublimity and greatness are closely akin. Sublimity, like 
greatness, is not primarily an aesthetic concept, but is rather 
' a quality coming largely from the subject -side, which may 
or may not be embodied in an aesthetic object, and which 
may characterise objects which are not aesthetic. Thus a 
poem or a piece of music may be sublime, or not sublime, 
and sublimity may be a quality of an earthquake, or of 
ideas like time and infinity and mutability and power, which 
are not necessarily aesthetically embodied. 
Sublimity and greatness are closely akin, but they are 
distinguishable as classes, the first being larger than the 
second. Greatness we have ascribed to those values (and of 
course to their related objects) which are the fulfilments of 
tendencies which are not *only marked and strong, but are 
also profound and lofty and far -reaching in the complexity 
of their implications. Great values, we said in effect, are 
those which arise at a level at least as high as the highest 
emergent plane with which we are acquainted, the intricate 
life of man. The concept of sublimity, on the other hand, is 
wider than, and is inclusive of this. The truly great is in some 
degree sublime, but the sublime need not be great in the 
sense in which we have used the term. Clearly so, for natural 
objects- thunder- storms, sea -storms, cataracts, earthquakes, 
sunrises, the starry heavens -may be apprehended as 
sublime without any necessary imputation of human or super- 
human qualities. What we explicitly call the `brute strength' 
of the ocean or the lightning or the thunder or the immense 
machine, may both terrify and inspire us, and yet lack what 
may roughly be named any `moral' quality. 
Sublimity may then be described as a characteristic of any 
object, artificial or natural, which inspires us by its greatness 
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or by its strength or poweT/or its size, or its expansiveness r 
its suggestion of infinity 6'f smallness or greatness, and the" 
mystery and strangeness arising out of these. It may be 
added that 'inspiration'-our admiration, respect, uplift, 
feeling of expansiveness --may, but need not, be preceded 
or accompanied or followed by negative feelings such as 
those of terror or repulsion. These latter have sometimes 
been regarded as an essential element in sublime experience. 
But it would appear that they are not invariably present 
in genuine experiences of sublimity. Positive feelings, or- 
'inspiration', do, on the other hand, appear to be essential. 
Once again, in matters of terminology, it is hard to corn 
mand general agreement. The above summary account does' 
seem to me to express what is most generally meant by- 
sublimity and the experience of it. -0.the,r4 will certainly 
disagree. 
III. TRAGEDY -SOME . `AD HOC' PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES 
Great tragedy is one manifestation of sublimity, but tragedy 
has its peculiar structure which demands attention, and' 
which has always received it. As before, we can do a large. 
subject but scant justice. 
We shall be concerned in the main with tragedy as i't 
is seen in drama. Drama, we have agreed, is a specially 
selected perspective which often gives us {roughly speaking) 
something approximating to real life, expressed in a `body'. 
Tragic drama in particular is a revelation of the real, or it 
is nothing. Therefore, in dealing with dramatic tragedy, we 
shall be dealing /by implication with the tragedy of 'rear' 
life, with the difference that in dramatic tragedy we see 
tragedy isolated, and in its most perfect, and essential/ and of 
least accidental form. `Perfect' tragedy may occur in real life, 
and we as spectators may see it in its completeness. But if it 
does, we tend to call it `dramatic' ; and we tell how we could 
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stuff of tragedy is the stuff of real life, but we shall not do 
real life much injustice if we confine ourselves mainly to the 
tragedies seen on stages. 
Tragedy is a spectacle which calls out vivid, striking, and 
complex responses. It is consequently not unnatural, par- 
ticularly in an age of psychology, that attempts should often 
be made to understand the nature of the tragic object in 
terms of t impulses which the contemplation of it satisfjf ii.,, 
and pleas . And it will not be surprising to find the enjoy- 
ment of tragedy reduced to terms of this particular impulse or 
that. It will perhaps help us to work our way to a positive 
conclusion if we consider some floating ideas about the 
nature of tragedy. 
It is alleged, for example, that the origin of our love of 
tragedy is to be found in our sadistic tendencies, in a certain 
rejoicing that we have in the sufferings of others. Tragedy, 
it is said, is a legitimate outlet for, a canalisation of, a ten- 
dency/in itself unpleasant to regard. Or, again, it is asserted 
with equal (if any) cogency that our joy in tragedy is 
masochistic, that in seeing the depicted sufferings of others 
what we enjoy is the laceration of our own feelings. Yeti il 
again, it is said that our pleasure lies neither in the one nor 
in the other exclusively, but in the fact that we can enjoy 
the thrills of other people's suffering and of our own, and 
yet know that we are safe in so doing. `It's only a play.'. 
There is a little sadism or a little masochism (or both), but 
the pleasure lies largely, though again not of course exclu- 
sively, in the safety of the process. We can be a little cruel if 
we will, and it is not a crime, or we can indulge in a little 
self -laceration, but it does not hurt.áea-fplur.i; it has enough '''-n-ip 
the flavour of reality to season it, but` not too much.. 
Perhaps, again, the pleasure of the knowledge that stage 
suffering is not `real' is flavoured by a little altruism, which, 
is enjoyable to experience, and perhaps our own `safe' 
suffering flatters our egoism a little. 
But however true the facts of safe detachment may be,. 
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they will not, taken at their plain face- value, at all explain 
dramatic tragedy. Dramatic characters must be, as we say, 
`real'. The essential enjoyment of tragedy cannot come from 
its unreality. One important aesthetic condition of the 
%njyment of dramatic tragedy is indeed, as we shams -see, 
that we are spectators of it, that we look on, and do not take 
part in the action, as we might, feel compelled to in real life. 
But that is merely an essential condition for the appreciation 
of it as a whole. What we appreciate is none the less `real'. 
It is a play, but it is not only a play. Arguments based on 
'unreality will not work. 
Neither will the technical terms of the `new' psychology 
serve as an explanation of tragedy. It is not disputed that in 
many phases of human life the pleasures of which we have 
spoken are frequently enjoyed. Most of us read `shockers' 
and tales of adventure. We enjoy vicarious experience' and . 
danger; we enjoy being shocked. We need not be very 
unhealthy to enjoy reading about tortures, so long as the 
thing is not too near to real life.. The agonies of Bulldog 
Drummond are `enjoyed', and not only by `low- brows'. 
Most thrills are up to a point pleasant. Again, although in 
this case perhaps the `low- brows' are more in question, there 
is a certain enjoyment in real disasters the attitude of 
attraction -repulsion, sympathy -_ antipathy, to the street 
accident, is familiar. And although the more developed mind 
definitely does arrive at a stage when such happenings are 
no longer in any way interestinge, the stage at 
which accounts of idents and divorce court proceedings 
appear either saddening or as a bore, it may well be that 
substitutes arise and that scandals of a less unsophisticated 
kind have their charm. 
But if we ask, What is the bearing of these things upon 
dramatic tragedy? and if we demand a definite positive or 
negative answer, the answer must be that these things have 
no bearing on dramatic tragedy. Yet the answer cannot 
really be made quite so simply. It is as human beings that 
k-] 
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we come to the appreciation of tragedy ; pity, terror, and . 
the feelings of human relief that this is a spectacle only, may 
form a kind of basis for our attitude. But it is a basis rather 
in the sense of a superseded stage, a stage through which we 
have passed, than something which enters into and is 
incorporated untransformed into the aesthetic experience... 
Tragedy demands capacities for a different kind of interest, 
and the stage of any sort of mere sensationalism must be 
transcended before there is the faintest possibility of our 
beginning to understand real tragedy. The comment of an 
old servant after seeing Lear, "It was all about a lot of people 
putting an old man's eyes out ", is an illustration in point. 
The ordinary emotions which we have mentioned are 
irrelevant to dramatic tragedy, not in the sense that a kind of 
enjoyment in the spectacle of the sufferings of others, a kind 
of enjoyment of our own painful feelings, a kind of relief that 
we are only spectators of a spectacle, are not involved, but 
in that the emotions we experience in the contemplation of 
dramatic tragedy are wholly transformed by their relation 
to their context. In aesthetic relation to their context they 
form what some might call an `emergent' whole, possessing 
qualities in the whole which are different from their qualities 
outside it, and which are unpredictable from the lower level. 
If this is the case it rather makes nonsense of the attempt to 
reduce the appreciation of tragedy to terms of its soparate 
rrA, ¡¡ 
element. /, a z Y 
t 
IV. THE Two TYPES OF DRAMATIC TRAGEDY 
In dramatic tragedy the interest is never merely in suffering, 
misfortune, disaster, though tragedy must include some form 
of these. Street accidents and murders are not in themselves 
tragedies, as newspapers would have us to suppose. The 
mainspring of our interest in tragedy would appear to be 
not in mere evil, but in some good which must arise in its . 
very essence through evil. This interest in good -through -evil 
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may min two main ways, to which, correspond two main 
types of tragedy. In the first, the interest tends to be centred 
on man and on his response to . evil circumstances. In the 
second, circumstance or Fate itself draws the attention and 
interest. We may consider these briefly in turn. 
In the first type of tragedy evil is endured by the sort of 
character which can at least be called 'strong', and which 
may be `great'. The quality of this tragedy is that it seems 
to reveal the fundamental stamina of humanity, its nobility, 
the ritattifieent-creattrre. man can be. 
In this tragedy, Fate, or character itself in the guise of 
Fate, may hurt, may crush, may lacerate, but it never quite 
defeats. No disaster can quench it. Such tragedy is the nearest 
example we have of irresistible force meeting insurmountable 
resistance. And its vitality Itftragedy arises from recognition 
by the dramatist of the equal importance of both sides. 
Such tragedy consists not in simple events, then, but in a 
tension of events having a structure. Structure is essential in 
all full -grown aesthetic forms, but its necessity is almost more 
patent in this kind of tragedy than anywhere else. Suffering 
taken out of its context in the whole simply ceases to possess 
its quality. It may still have the intensest emotional interest, 
but this is quite distinct from the peculiar appeal of dramatic 
tragedy. A good instance of this is given by Mr. Fry in his 
Transformations.= He describes how he was present at a film 
which recorded the work of rescue from a ship (a real ship) 
wrecked off the coast of Portugal. "One saw at a considerable 
distance the hull of the vessel stranded on a flat shore and in 
between crest after crest of huge waves. In the foreground 
men were working desperately pulling at a rope which ever 
so slowly drew away from the distant ship a small black 
,obj °ct which swayed and swung from the guide -rope. Again 
and again the waves washed over it in its slow progress 
shorewards. It was not till it was near shore that one realised 
that this was a basket with a human being in it. When it was 
= Pp. 9-Io. 
23 to-0Z4 
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finally landed the men rushed to it and took out -a. man or 
a corpse, according to the luck of the passage or the resis- 
tance of the individual. The fact that one was watching a 
film cut off all those activities which, in the real situation, 
might have been a vent and mitigation of one's emotions. 
One was a pure, helplessly detached spectator, and yet a 
spectator of a real event with the real, not merely the simu- 
lated, issue of life and death. 
"For this reason no situation on the stage could be half so 
poignant, could grip the emotions of pity and terror half so 
tensely. If to do this were the end and purpose of drama, 
according to Aristotle's purgation theory, and not a means to 
some other and different end, then the cinema had surpassed 
the greatest tragedians. But, in point of fact, the experience, 
though it was far more acute and.poignant, was recognisably 
distinct and was judged at once as of far less value and 
significance than the experience of a great tragic drama. 
And it became evident to me that the essential of great 
tragedy was not the emotional intensity of the events por- 
trayed, but the vivid sense of the inevitability of their 
unfolding, the significance of the curve of crescendo and 
diminuendo which their sequence describes, together with 
all the myriad subsidiary evocations which, at each point, 
poctic language can bring in to give fullness and density to 
the whole organic unity." 
This tragedy consists of a peculiar structure in which, 
through conflict, there is brought out some tremendous and 
permanent value, which is a defiance to the attacks of time, 
place, and circumstance. It is an equilibrium. But although 
this is true, it is of the greatest importance not to mistake 
the character of the equilibrium. It is very easy to overstress 
one side or the other, to think too exclusively of the disaster 
on the one hand, or of the triumph over disaster on the 
other. The first, of which we have spoken, fails to reach the 
level of true tragedy at all. The second sentimentalises it. 
A very reasonable balance between the two extremes is 
ñ) 
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achieved by Mr. Lascelles Abercrombie in his The Idea of 
Great Poetry. 
There are two kinds of poetry, Mr. Abercrombie urges :1 
There is on the one hand what we may call the poetry of 
refuge, and on the other hand the poetry of interpretation. 
The poetry of refuge is exemplified in Boccaccio's Decameron. 
Here many painful elements enter, but we escape "from the 
infected, disordered city, into ten days of delight in quiet 
gardens- feasting, singing, lute -playing, dancing, strolling 
and, above all, story -telling : and the world of bitter reali . 
is effectually shut out and forgotten Another instance of 
the poetry of refuge is the Faerie Queen. The poetry of inter- 
pretation is exemplified in Prometheus Unbound. "When, by 
whatever means, some sense of the whole possibility of life - 
its good and its evil, its joys and its misfortunes -is presented 
under the condition of poetry, it becomes thereby an 
interpretation of life: "3 This poetry of interpretation it is 
which is the truly great poetry. 
Traged , u.. se r. Abercrombie would sa 1 of the 
type of the poetry of interpretation. "This is the real problem 
of tragedy : ow do we come to enjoy what seems a version 
of the mere evil of life? Nay, how is it that tragic art gives 
us the loftiest, though the severest, delight we can have in 
poetry? It cannot simply b«because evil has become in it 
orderly and systematic. There might be a kind of maniacal 
aesthetic enjoyment in a vision of the world as an affair 
wholly organised for evil; but that would be nothing like 
the enduring satisfaction which is the ground of tragic 
enjoyment. Indeed, there is no surer sign of a healthy mind 
than the enjoyment of tragedy. There must, then, be good 
as well as evil in it; and out of the final harmony of the two, 
here, as elsewhere, will come the sense of the significance of 
evil overriding its injury -the sense that evil is no longer the 
intrusion of irresponsible and useless malignity, but the 
servant of universal law .which is the essence of the tragic 
The Idea of Great Poetry, p. 75 sq. 2 Ibid., p. 77. 3 Ibid. p. g6. 
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satisfaction. Our aesthetic enjoyment of the spectacle of evil 
(which is certainly present in tragedy) is always accompanied 
by implicit assurance that we are not merely assisting at its 
triumph. But when we ask whence tragic poetry is to provide 
itself with good to match its evil, the answer can only be, 
that the good must arise out of the evil. This is what the 
peculiarity of tragedy comes to : out of things evil it must 
elicit good." 
And to the question, `From whence is the good elicited in 
this kind of tragedy ?' the answer is, `In character'. This is the 
type of Shakespearean tragedy. In much Shakespearean 
tragedy (though of course not in all dramatic tragedy), 
character both faces the evil and sets going the events which 
conspire to it. We may select, with Mr. Abercrombie, the 
very striking case of Macbeth. Here there is evil, the most 
devilish evil, prophesied and destined almost from the first 
line : 
"Fair is foul and foul is fair 
Hover through the fog and filthy air." 
Macbeth acts, gets his paltry wishes, sustains his ambition by 
his crimes, and is damned by the torture of his own sensitive 
imagination. That is one side, apparently unmitigated evil. 
But it is only one side, only half the tale. The other side is 
symbolised in his last address to Macduff: 
"I'll not yield 
before my body 
I throw my warlike shield. Lay on, Macduff: 
And damn'd be him that first cries, `Hold, enough !' " 
Symbolised, because Macduff, "being of no woman born ",.' a - 
is his Fate; is Macbeth's gesture, "" 
Ç his moral stance, as it were, even. in 4144 face of the infinitely 
greater evil of his soul's disaster. As Mr. Abercrombie finely 
puts it, "When Lady Macbeth dies, and he realises that he 
is alone in the dreadful world he lias created for himself, the 
I The Idea of Great Poetry, pp. 169 -I 7o. 
ti 1..c!-, 
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unspeakable abyss suddenly opens beneath him. He 'has 
staked everything and lost; he has damned himself for 
nothing; his world suddenly turns into a blank of imbecile 
futility. And he seizes on the appalling moment and masters 
even this : he masters it by knowing it absolutely and com- 
pletely, and by forcing even this quintessence of all possible 
evil to live before him with the zest and terrible splendour 
of his own unquenchable mind : 
"To- morrow, and to- morrow, and to- morrow, 
Creepsjin this petty pace from day to day, 
To the last syllable of recorded time; 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle ! 
Life 's but a walking shadow; a poor player, 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more : it is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing." 
There is no depth below that; that is the bottom. Tragedy 
can lay hold of no evil worse than the conviction that life is 
an affair of absolute inconsequence. There is no meaning any- 
where : that is the final disaster; death is nothing after that. 
And precisely by laying hold of this and relishing its fear- 
fulness to the utmost, Macbeth's personality towers into its 
loftiest grandeur. Misfortune and personality have been 
until this a continual discord : but now each has reached its 
perfection, and they unite. And the whole tragic action 
which is thus incarnate in the life of Macbeth -what is it 
but the very polar opposite to the thing he proclaims? For we 
see not only what he feels, but the personality that feels it; 
and in the very act of proclaiming that life is "a tale told by 
an idiot, signifying nothing ", personal life announces its 
virtue, and superbly signifies itself".1 
Here is an interpretation of one kind of tragedy which/up 
to a point/ we accept. But, once again, it is necessary to 
/. T1i Idea of Great Poetry, pp. 176 -178. 
hay 
35o A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
guard against misunderstanding. There is evil, and there is 
good, and it is said that good comes out of evil. But this is 
misleading, for only in a relatively superficial sense is there 
`before' and `after' in tragedy. Things do not come right in 
the end, evil is still evil, staring us starkly in the face. Other- 
wise tragedy disappears. Nor is the good in the evil, for again, 
evil is evil. What is in fact true is that the tragedy we are 
considering, though it takes place in time, is, in another 
sense, a timeless structure, or, if the phrase be preferred, a 
time -transcending structure, which is complex, which con- 
tains opposing elements that must be apprehended in the 
grasp of a single vision. Evil is evil, and the value of character 
is the value of character : in the drama they exist side by side 
as distinguishable elements in a whole. But not as separate 
entities. For this particular good in this particular tragedy 
could never come out but for this particular evil. In dramatic 
tragedy such as Macbeth great human quality is revealed 
through the crushing efficacy of sheer force. Of course the 
capacities must be in the characters first and of course there 
must be sheer evil, whether of character itself or in indepen- 
dent circumstance. But such tragedy is the union of the 
two and our appreciation must contain the apprehension of 
both in their special relationship. So, if we speak of tragedy 
as a `harmony' of good and evil, we must realise that its 
beauty is not `easy' beauty, but that it is `difficult'. It is 
better, I think, to say that our enjoyment is the enjoyment 
of a tension, of the meeting of two great forces of the uni- 
verse. For the same general reasons, if we say with Mr. 
Abercrombie that Macbeth in a sense "relishes" the final 
evil which he sees, and that the splendour of his character is 
shown just in this, we must realise that it is sheer blank evil 
to Macbeth as he faces it first, that there is no goodness in it, 
that he has to create his own fine response to it, and that we, 
as spectators, apprehending both sides, not only see, but 
probably get a far greater enjoyment out of this fearful game 
than Macbeth who sees mainly one side, the evil. I do not 
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suggest that the tragic character savours nothing of its own 
nobility, but if that savouring goes beyond a certain very 
definite point (known only to aesthetic and moral imagina- 
tion) it becomes windy, sententious, sentimental. It is, as' 
we have said, blank unmitigated evil which Macbeth himself 
sees first, but as he speaks there must be imagined to be 
present. in him a limited and restricted enjoyment of his 
own response. But the tragic figure can hardly apprehend 
the full significance of tragedy as we can who as spectators 
discerningly contemplate it in its context in the whole. 
But all this represents only one type of tragedy. The 
positive value in tragedy may also arise, objectively, out of 
the very objective evil itself, rather than out of the victim's 
response to it (though there may be nobility in this as well). .h And-the positive value may, though it need not, be savoured 
by the very victim of the evil himself. Mr. Abercrombie is 
right, I think, as far as he goes (with the qualifications I have 
mentioned) . But the element of good in tragedy need not 
appear to be situated in the character of the victim of evil 
at all: it may seem to characterise the events, fulfilling the 
qualification that it is the kind of good which could not 
have appeared but for thk very evil. In real life, perhaps this 
is the most common type of true tragedy, though Macbeth 
represents another type. One species of it is seen in the 
bereavement (as for example the loss of a child) which - 
after the first awful pangs have passed- brings out a beauty 
in the beloved thing that is lost which could never have 
existed but for the losing. This is a special case of valuing 
things most when we have them not, or when their possession 
is threatened, but it must be imagined in its best and most 
real and most genuine examples. We shall do no justice to 
this idea if we confuse it ipte with the 441arx senti -' 
mental self-comfort which it may too easily become. Sweet- 
ness may enter in, but comfort is not of its essence. And the 
sweetness is not sweet, but bitter -sweet, It is poignancy, 
it is almost mystical fixation upon an unattainable and 
p/ 
lA/'!l.1, 
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unearthly beauty which had no existence till the distancing 
gulf had been fixed. Or if the beauty is here, as it is in the 
play translated as The Unknown Warrior, it is made strangely 
precious by the underlying fear of its disruption. 
I will cite but one example of this tragedy of loss, taken 
from Edith Wharton's novel, The Children, a drama which is 
intensely `real'. In this book we have the story of a man 
in late middle life who has fallen in love with a girl whom, 
with her brothers and sisters, he has been fathering -or 
`guardianing' -in a friendly sort of way. His friendship has . 
grown to a hungering love. She has no idea of it and treats 
him affectionately as a companion. 
" `If things went wrong, and you were very lonely and a 
fellow asked you to marry him "Who asked, me ?' He 
(Boyne) laughed again. 'HI did.' For a moment she (Judith) 
looked at him perplexedly; then her eyes cleared, and for 
the first time she joined in his laugh. Hers seemed to bubble 
up, fresh and limpid from the very depths of her little 
girlhood. `Well, that would be funny', she said. 
There was a bottomless silence. `Yes -wouldn't it ?' Boyne 
grinned. He stared at her without speaking; then, like 
blind man feeling his way" he picked up his hat and mackin- 
tosh, said : `Where's my umbrella? Oh, outside ' and 
walked out stiffly into the passage." 
There follows the story of defeat, lonelinesss, hurt, growing 
old.: Once he is asleep in a chair` on board ship, and dreams 
of her. The steward comes, and wakens him with, " `Tea, 
ham sandwiches, Sir.' Life's futility is scarcely elearer in 
Macbeth itself. And later still, long after; there is the return 
from futility. He sees her through the window of a hotel, 
dancing. She is beautiful, and his, and yet he is a million 
years away. Such beauty could not be for him, but for his 
defeat by time. And yet he secs the "beauty plainly. It is 
there, and the complete tale is not simply the-tale of sorrow. 
The tragedy here is real enough. But the most `objective' 
type of tragedy is perhaps that in which cosmic circumstance 
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itself, overwhelming human desires, interplaying often with 
human frailty, is the very source of a difficult good.: This is 
to be found in Greek, rather than in Shakespearean, tragedy, 
where Fate, as a power or powers over human lives, is the 
tremendous force determining finite affairs to its inevitable 
ends. In Greek Tragedy the positive element, the sublimity 
of feeling which appears even through the feelings of pity 
arid terror, is reinforced by religious sentiment. Fate is not 
mere chance, it is not merely blind, and if Fate on the other 
hand were conceived as merely malign or petty, such 
tragedy would lose most of its significance. Fate is conceived 
not simply as terrible, but as awful and majestic. It appears 
to the spectator to possess positive value. In spite of the 
havoc it works, it draws out admiration and even worship, 
though worship from afar; and not the loving worship of a 
familiar friend. This quality, which, as has just been said, 
may be called in the widest sense religious, appears in the 
works themselves, and some religious sentiment determines 
the proper appreciation of their tragedy. 
It is not suggested that we need possess an explicit religion, 
or a religious philosophy, in. order to enjoy such tragedy. 
And, in particular, Fate must not be -conceived as benignity 
in disguise. The admiration is directed to the inevitability of 
the workings of cosmic process, and is in the end a free and 
unreserved acceptance (though in a sense a compelled one) 
of the cosmos as it is. This attitude is (in one aspect) a 
`scientific' one, and it is of this which Mr. Whitehead is 
thinking when he writes : "The pilgrim fathers of the scientific 
imagination as it exists to -day, are the great tragedians of 
ancient Athens, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides. Their 
vision of fate, remorseless and indifferent, urging a tragic 
incident to its inevitable issue, is the vision possessed by 
science. Fate in Greek Tragedy becomes the order of nature 
in modern thought. The absorbing interest in the particular 
heroic incidents, as an example and a verification of the 
workings of fate, reappears in our epoch as concentration of 
z 
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interest on the crucial experiments. It was my good fortune 
to be present at the meeting of the Royal Society in London . 
when the Astronomer Royal for England announced that 
the photographic plates of the famous eclipse, as measured 
by his colleagues in Greenwich Observatory, had verified 
the prediction of Einstein that rays of light are bent as they 
pass in the neighbourhood of the sun. The whole atmosphere 
of tense interest was exactly that of the Greek drama; we 
were the chorus commenting on the decree of destiny as 
disclosed in the development of a supreme incident. 
". . . Let me here remind you that the essence of dramatic 
tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the 
remorseless working/ of things. This inevitableness of destiny 
can only be illustrated in terms of human life by incidents 
which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them 
that the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama. 
This remorseless inevitableness is what pervades scientific 
thought. The laws of physics are the decrees of fate."' 
On the other hand, though such Fate possesses the 
negative qualities of remorselessness and indifference, this is 
not the whole story. Nor is the reference to science, with its 
dispassionate viewpoint, more than an analogy. There is a 
solemnity, there is a grandeur, there is a sublimity in the 
unfolding of things, with which science, as such, has no 
concern. Mr. Whitehead writes here not as scientist, but as 
aesthetic critic and as philosopher. Science is but a part of 
life, and the scientific attitude is not in itself sufficient to 
account for appreciation even of this sternest sort of tragedy. 
The thing must move us -and move us as having positive 
value. And, as has been suggested, mere blind chance or 
law, or, on the other hand, mere malignity, could hardly do 
this -at least to any human being with blood in his veins. 
It is therefore difficult to see (though this may be due to 
prejudice) how any purely naturalistic philosophy based on 
science 'ould be compatible with or adequate to the 
I Science and the Modern World pi 3. 
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acceptance of real tragedy of this kind. If the cosmos is 
merely blind, merely impersonal, merely natural, then how 
can it be `grand', how can it be expressive of these values of 
which intuition, in its dark ways, tells us that they are great 
enough even to balance human agony? How could we 
admire such a cosmos, except as the victims of some illusion, 
perhaps an aesthetic illusion? An idealist might logically 
accept both the transcendenceJby the cosmoA of human 
interest l; and its great and positive good. But how, without 
sentimentality, could a naturalistic philosopher account for 
the latter? And how, without it, could this tragedy be other 
than mere futility? It might be terrible and fearful, but how 
could it in any sense be positively worth while? If the 
naturalist is right, would it not follow that the only kind of 
tragedy which could exist would be that of which we spoke 
earlier, in which the great positive values arise through the 
struggles, or the acquiescence, of noble human character? 
(Or, if the world were regarded as an affair mainly organised 
for evil -a view to which naturalists, in their human disap- 
pointment, are on occasion inconsistently led -the only 
alternative would be struggle against ..tl thiskorder. 
Acquiescence, acceptance, enjoyment, would be impossible 
-or mad. It would be what Mr. Abercrombie calls 
`maniacal'.) The naturalist, it would seem, must forget for 
the time being his naturalism when he enjoys the type of 
tragedy of which we have been recently speaking. He must 
admire, he must see good in, he must appreciate as sublime, 
that inevitable Nature of Things which for him is in strictness 
neither sublime nor good nor' bad, except in some sub- human. 
sense. Leaving theories behind him he may so appreciate it. 
For the non- naturalist, on the other hand, it is at least an 
open question whether cosmic values outside human life are 
or are not higher or lower than human values. He is free 
to follow his intuitions. He may, if he has the capacity, 
achieve the supreme faith of religion, "Though He slay me, 
yet will I trust Him." 
l4,d 
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In great tragic experience there resides always a paradox. 
It is to be found in both of the types which we have discussed, 
for both of them seem to focus, in different ways, a larger 
meaning which is part of a larger mystery of the Universe. 
Mr. Bradley, although in the greatest of his essays he deals 
with one type only -that exemplified in Shakespearean 
Tragedy -makes very clear that human tragedy is the 
symbol of a wider cosmic situation. "We seem to have before 
us a type of the mystery of the whole world, the tragic fact 
which extends far beyond the limits of tragedy." I Sometimes, 
trUe, it is the fibre of human quality which seems to us all - 
important. "Sometimes from the very furnace of affliction á 
conviction seems to come to us that somehow, if we could 
see it, this agony counts as nothing against the heroism and 
love which appear in it and thrill our hearts. Sometimes we 
are driven to cry out that these mighty or heavenly spirits 
who perish are too great for the little space in which they 
move, and that they vanish not into nothingness but into 
freedom. Sometimes from these sources and .from others 
comes a presentiment, formless but haunting and even 
profound, that all the fury of conflict, with its waste and 
woe, is less than half the truth, even an illusion, `such stuff 
as dreams are made on !' "2 But even such convictions do 
not suffice to solve the mystery. .. These faint and 
scattered intimations that the tragic world, being but a 
fragment of a whole beyond our vision, must needs be a 
contradiction and no ultimate truth, avail nothing to 
interpret the mystery. We remain confronted with the 
inexplicable fact, or the no less inexplicable appearance, of 
a world travailling for perfection, but bringing to birth, 
together with glorious good, an evil which it is able to 
overcome only by self -torture and self -waste. And this fact 
or appearance is tragedy. "3 
= Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 23. 
2 Ibid., p. 38-39. 3 Ibid. 
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V. TRAGEDY AND CATHARSIS 
What is the relation of our interpretation of dramatic tragedy 
to the theory of catharsis or purgation? It is regarded as 
barely decent to write about tragedy without devoting a 
certain space to Aristotle, or to developments of his theory 
of tragedy. In the present case let the space be 'a small one. 
If Aristotle, influenced by his familiarity with the effects 
of certain kinds of music and dancing upon the emotions, 
really meant that the main function of tragedy was to achieve 
purgation, analigous to medical purgation, of socially 
dangerous pity and fear by harmless excitation of them in the 
theatre, then there is very little to be said in favour of the 
theory. This is not, as has often been said, why we go to 
see tragedy : if it were true, it would not sufficiently account 
for our enjoyment, and it is certainly very doubtful whether 
mere exercise of the emotions, as such, ever purges us of 
them. Exercise of the emotions may encourage more 
exercise ; and, further, that is not of course in itself necessarily 
a bad thing. It is true that some modern psycho- therapists 
(e.g. William Brown) do advocate the expression of repressed 
emotions as a means of getting rid of repressions. But it seems 
to me that on this matter McDougall is right, and that 
mental equilibrium is restored not by mere `abreaction' or 
purgation, but by reassociation of the repressed impulse or 
impulses with the rest of conscious life. It is, of course quite 
possible to apply this psychological theory to tragedy and to 
say that in the drama repressed interests do not merely find 
an outlet in expression but become linked with the rest of 
conscious life. 
° This is, I take it; the kind of view taken by Mr. I. A . 
Richards in his Principles of Literary Criticism. "In the full 
tragic experience ", he says,' "there is no suppression. The 
mind does not shy away from anything, it does not protect 
Op. cit., p._046. 
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itself with any illusion, it stands uncomforted, unintimidated, 
alone and self -reliant." The test of its success is whether we 
can respond to it without subterfuges. "Suppressions and 
sublimations alike are devices by which we endeavour to 
avoid issues which might bewilder us. The essence of 
Tragedy is that it forces us to live for a moment without them. 
When we succeed we find, as usual, that there is no difficulty; 
the difficulty came from the suppressions and sublimations." 
True. Tragedy is an extraordinarily stable experience, it is 
"perhaps the most general, all- accepting, all- ordering 
experience known. It can take anything into its organisation, 
modifying it so that it finds a place. It is invulnerable...." 
All this -if we dissociate it from the behaviouristic type 
of psychology which Mr. Richards thinks it necessary to 
drag in'- appears to be unquestionably true so far as it goes. 
If this is to be called `catharsis' at all it is not of course the 
original rather negative catharsis with which we began, a 
mere getting rid of something, but is distinctly a development 
of it. It is a development of it not merely in the sense that it 
substitutes reassociation for mere abreaction or purgation, 
but in that it specifically recognises the ordered or formal or 
structural character of tragedy. There is also implied, I think, 
a recognition of thefactor of ̀ psychical distance', though this 
has to be searched for in the context of Mr. Richard's writings. 
To return to Aristotle. We began by saying that if 
Aristotle meant mere purgation, there was not much to be 
said for his theory. But there is no reason for thinking that 
he did mean merely this. There is no doubt that he was 
perfectly aware of the aesthetic character of tragic apprecia- 
tion, of its difference from the practical attitude, of the 
`distance' of the object and of its organised form. 
Take `distance' first. Aristotle is re*'- r-tly, aware of the 
importance of `psychical distance', though he does not use 
' As when he says: "The joy which is so strangely the heart of the 
experience is ... an indication that all is right here and now in the 
nervous system." The nervous system, perhaps. But how much more? 
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the term. The tragic character must lie, as we saw in another 
context, between two extremes ; it must be "that of aperson 
neither eminently virtuous or just, nor yet involved in 
misfortune by deliberate vice or villainy, but by some error of 
human frailty."' His `distance' from us must not be too 
great, which would prevent us from feeling with him, but 
it must not be too small, and for this reason the tragic 
character should be one of "high fame and flourishing 
prosperity". 
Aristotle again, we have seen, is of course perfectly aware 
that the happenings in tragedy are not indiscriminate slices 
from real life, but that tragedy shows us an ideal possessing 
form and structure which réal life does not ordinarily show. 
f Art imitates not the particular and the accidental, but the 
universal, and Aristotle is continually telling us of the unity 
and inevitability of the dramatic plot. This is the objective 
side of his theory which must be put side by side with his 
psychologism if we are to have the whole picture. If we 
keep this objective side of his theory in mind, we may be 
quite certain Aristotle himself did not regard tragedy as a 
mere getting rid of anything, though this admittedly, enters 
into his ideas. Tragedy was for him also a positive purification 
(as opposed to the `aperient' sense of purgation) in that it 
is an elevating and enobling experience which lifts us out of 
the world of practice on to another plane of reality. Ïn 
saying these things we may sustain ourselves by the knowledge 
that we have the support of the great authority of Butcher. 
"If ", says Butcher,2 "it is objected that the notion of 
universalising the emotions and ridding them of an intrusive 
element that belongs to the sphere of the accidental and 
, individua is a modern conception; which we have no f 
warrant f-or attributing to Aristotle, we, may reply that if 
/this is not what Aristotle mean, it is at least the natural 
' outcome of his doctrine." 
Poetics, chap. xiii. 
2 Aristotle Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, pp. 268 and 269. 
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VI. THE COMIC, THE HUMOROUS, AND THE WITTY 
The ridiculous' is usually contrasted with the sublime and 
the tragic. There are philosophers who, disbelieving in 
`kinds' of beauty, would unite the sublime with the ridicu- 
lous and would call the synthesis beauty. We, however, are 
not committed to any such view, and we may consider the 
concept of the ridiculous in and for itself. It may be that in 
this life of change the experience of sublimity is often unstable 
and that, toppling over, we and things become ridiculous. 
But, though alternations may occur in real life and in drama, . 
and thoug being human, tZ0 often need relief from high 
tensions, the moments of the alternations are distinct and 
each has its own nature. And. even though it may be found 
that the ridiculous implies the serious, the' ridiculous and the 
serious are still distinct. 
The sublime, we said, may possibly exist in forms which, are 
not specifically aesthetic. Sublimity may ,Ii :re4 char - 
acteróthe mystical experienceemaypossess the uplift and ex- 
pansiveness which qualifies t e sublime experience, without 
the objects possessing the clear and definite form which is 
aesthetically expressive. With the tragic, as we saw, this is 
less easy : the perfect tragic situation has definite structure 
and is anything but vague. In this respect the comic would 
seem to resemble the tragic ; the comic situation is, in its 
perfection, clear and unvague and embodied ; it has, when it 
most pleases us, a neatness and a finish which is so finely 
organised that the least thing will destroy its stability. 
What, then, are the main characteristics of the comic? 
The experience of the comic would seem to contain two 
fundamental elements : (I) a sudden psycho -physical shock,` 
followed by a sudden relief or relaxation by means of the 
shock from a tension which existed before the shock. (2) This 
' Or the funny. I am using the term, here in a broad, inclusive, and per- 
haps inaccurate sense, as including (at least) the comic and the humorous. 
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is accompanied or followed by 
more analytical/ appreciation, not 
the relief, but lso of the situation which gives rise to these. 
The shock stirst(and relieves, and both are pleasant, buf J ? f 
ow, 4404;A-the cognition we become aware of the significance of 
the whole situation. We relish the thing discerningly, we 
turn it over in our minds, as we may relish good food or 
good drink. 
The comic situation which we relish seems to involve the 
I juxtaposition of opposites by a sudden: transition from one 
to another. We may for convenience call the opposites the 
`first term' and the `second term' respectively. The first 
term would appear to be an entity possessing some serious, 
solemn, dignified, or massive quality, and the comedy occurs 
when such qualities are suddenly undone, from one cause or 
Y another, producing the effects described. To take the crudest 
type of comedy -on which Bergson in his essay on Laughter 
lays so much stress -there is comedy on the stage when the 
solemn and dignified fat man suddenly slips and falls. Here 
is a human being, as Bergson might say, suddenly trans- 
formed into a puppet or an automaton. 
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giddily like an india- rubber ball, that this high personage is 
but clay like the rest of mankind. 
Vft*L- 
- It is essential that.in4h comic situation we should 
not be too sympathetic with the first term so that we are 
I unable to relish the second, and the transition to the second. 
, If our sympathies are too much with the first term, with, 
for; example, the serious as against any relaxation from it, 
we shall fail to appreciate the joke, which may then appear 
as foolish, or as disgusting, or as in bad taste, or as scandalous, 
or as pathetic, or even as tragic. Stories of lunatics who 
believe themselves to be poached eggs looking for their , 
pieces of toast seem comic only if our sympathy for the 1 
lunatic as a human being is not at the moment very 
' prominent; ' if it is ' very prominent we may think of 
laughter at the joke as in bad taste, and the situa- 
ti 
ion may appear merely pathetic to us. So the antics 
of drun4men may appear on different occasons as funny ,. 
or foolish or 'pathetic or scandalous. _ It depends upon 
where our sympathies lie. 'So to joke about holy things when 
,, 
the cultivation of reverence is regarded as important becomes ,(1 I 
profane and sacriligious, and not funny. And there are p i 
probably things which are so serious that they can never be 
suscessfully joked about -for example, suffering or Cruelty. 
s,¡, Our ap reciation consists, as wet aid, in more thaí C' 
IT t in #tee - releásing or relaxing shock. It consist /,{j 
in a move leisurely and contemplative 3- We> 
the value of the relation _and unity an'f'rieridliness 
1 eveñ of apparent incompatibles. Our sympathies must be 
properly located, but what we relish is not merely -the 0164-1 
-MM i but the revelationkthrough the 'synthesis of d( ) 
opposites` f the values of relations which we do not ordinarily di 
see. Solemnity is _ 
Gvfwil, Am-- 
1494.40314466401444456Xaajr. feel That a world which 
contains both solemnity and relaxation is a good world, s- 
etter world than one which should contain only solemnity. 
rt NOr 6-Cok/t. . 1f-47 Pl-it We 
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`Laugh and grow fat', the saying is, and we have a deep 
instinct that a real sense of the comic is a sign of health and.. 
sanity and the antidote to priggishness and sententiousness. 
The man who fancies himself a god becomes intolerable 
the tolerable thing is h n nature, and h man nature has 
, legs that trip and fall. human natur n many moods - 
has the gift even of enjoying this without cruelty and with . 
innocent relish. 
There are, of course, types of the comic, but it would take 
far too much space to go on to . enumerate them. We may 
content ourselves by saying..., e1ry generally that th tykes 
will e . tbv y with the 4F . proportion of 
n In cruder sorts of thomic /the emphasis on 
"Y 
) is signified lie physical need, in order to get 
,X' relief, for a larger proportion of loud and explosive laughter. I 
The ponderous fat man bumps down, and there is a delighted= 
roar from the audience. It is largely organic. `Laugh and 
grow (physically) fat.' In the subtler sorts of comedy s 
more prominent. There is drier and more intellectual relish, 
of the complex situation and of its wider significance. This 
may be signified in a quieter sort of laughter or even in the 
slow, peaceful smile. 
Humour overlaps the comic : the humorous is the comic, 
with a difference. The difference seems to lie in the presence 
of a certain degree of kindly feeling of human sympathy. 
In the comic our attitude is more eitjeot4=ie ;. the comic 
situation is much more a spectacle. Humour, on the other 
hand,'seems to contain an element of kindly humanity; our 
smiles are softer and more friendly. As we said before, our 
sympathies with the first term must not be too great, or the 
comic element will not appear. But some sympathy definitely 
is present, and this keeps our attitude from being uncon- 
sciously cruel, as it may be when we see a thing as merely 
comic. 
Because sympathy is a part of humour, the participants in 
a humorous situation must be things with which it is possible 
q\f 
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to feel sympathy, namely, human beings and animals (or 
analogues of these). The sight of a very heavy ball rolling 
ponderously and slowly towards the edge of a plane, and then 
bouncing off suddenly, might be comic, but could scarcely 
be humorous. It might be said, in such a case, that even 
its comic character was dependent on thinking of the ball m 
imagination to be a person or an animal. This may be so, 
though it is very doubtful. But even if it is so, we should 
hardly feel the kindly sympathy which we should feel were 
it a real person or animal: it would be, i.e., comic rather 
than humorous. 
The same thing might be expressed in terms of `psychical 
distance'. In comedy the distance is greater, Tn humour it is )e 
less. When we apprehend things as comic we are certain 
not consciously cruel, as we may be in satire, but the object 
is at a considerable distance from us. The difficulty of seeing 
ourselves as purely comic is partly the difficulty of distancing 
ourselves, of regarding ourselves impersonally as objects. 
It is considerably easier to be humorous about ourselves, to 
see ourselves (though this is a gift) in a humorous light; our 
natural kindly disposition towards ourselves does not conflict 
with it. Yet both comedy and humour do involve, of course, 7c 
in different degrees, a considerable distancing. 
It has been said that in enjoying comedy we show our 
sanity, and that in comedy there is revealed the happy 
relation betwen things which are ordinarily thought of as 
distinct. It may be urged that there is something of the 
`universal' in this, that the humorous and the comic reveal 
the universal, as tragedy does. This is indeed Butcher's 
contention. In his "Essay on the Generalising Power of 
Comedy' he concludes, "Greek tragedy, on the other 
hand, like all tragedy of the highest order, combines in one 
harmonious representation the individual and the universal. 
Whereas comedy tends to merge the individual in the type, 
tragedy manifests the type through the individual. In brief,. 
' Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, p. 387. 
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it may be said that comedy, in its unmixed sportive form, 
creates personified ideals, tragedy creates idealised persons." 
In this there seems to be great truth. We , 
seeing ourselves or others as unique/ and very .important /) 
individuals. The shock comes, and we &c.;.-ow-selves as types, ray" 
as parts in a very large whole. If our attitude is not just right, 
we may suffer humiliation. And humiliation may do us good. 
But comedy is, though never "positive y\quite kind, less s7-0Of4054"r1), 
unkind, and in its own way' fro+Af . ... :. ... r 
e/ astcd, o - _ - - o / / isd, 
The concept of the, witty is much less complex that/ /t rese Ai a1,,sL 
of comedy-aael- humour. The witty need not be funny, though 4o eok4A 
it may be. If it is funny, its funniness will share in the general 
characteristics of the comic and the humorous. In the witty 
Ou.c. 
there is neatness and there is aptness, quickly seized upon by o 
the witty mind, and there is an element of the unexpected 
and of surprise. In these things the witty has much in 
common with the comic. Again, like the comic, the witty 
depends upon some chance conjunction of entities usually 
regarded as distinct, and.e ttt-ef this it derives meaning. But 
in the case of wit the chance conjunction seems essentially 
to lie in some superficial association cf words or of ideas. 
The witty cannot consist, for example, of scenes of clownish- 
ness. The witty object is verbal or intellectual or, in some 
sense, both. Its materials are -the products of mind. Again, 
,^ ,demands considerable penetration 
of intellect. Superficial association of words or of ideas is 
one part of all wit, but wit demands also a quick insight into 
the suggested significance of the synthesis, which has been 
effected by superficial /association. It is for this reason that 
punning has been rightly called the 'lowest form' of wit. 
Indeed punning, being merely a play on verbal associations, 
is but half -wit. For wit implies a certain genuine a et/ 51 
of 
/ connections between groups of ideas not usually thought of. 
l Gi,t.,i, c,clfri,c, (%444-4,4 i.«/.' na.1 A. 
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as -sertneetecl. Wit, in the best examples, is discovery of truth 
through the inspired use of the accidental. Wit, in a word, is 
the discovery of the profound through the superficial, but 
.,always with an approximately equal emphasis on both. 
Both are seen together in a single vision. The approximately 
equal emphasis is necessary, and their presence together is 
necessary, because just as the superficial association by itself 
is not wit, so neither is profound insight the thing which we 
usually= call wit. Our delight ,is not in the superficialjor in /t- 
' the profound, but simply in the union of the two. Gréat wit 
is a kind of paradox, for it is intellectual emancipation 
through the delightful click and glitter and assonance of the 
trivial. 
In terms of `distance', the witty is about as `distant' as 
anything can be. The comic is distant, but the witty is even 
more distant, since wit can be enjoyed `coldly', and involves 
a minimum,sympathy. The difference of distance between 
wit and humour on the one hand, and wit and satire on the 
other, is approximately the same, but for opposite reasons. 
Whilst both satire and humour are unlike wit (and comedy) 
in being relatively `near', the nearness of satire has negative, 
whereas the nearness of humour has positive value. The 
element of dislikejand possibly of crueltyyin satire, that is, 
prevent /it from being quite impersonal, just as the sympathy 
which is 'a characteristic of humorous appreciatiorrprevents 
complete impersonality /` 
1.44 !(tug 
VII. CLASSIC AND ROMANTIC 
In this subject we are again embarrassed by the variety of 
literature dealing with the question. If we do not ignore it, 
or rather, take it for granted, we shall quickly lose ourselves. 
We may, 'therefore, lbe contented with a few general state- 
ments which for brevity's sake must be put dogmatically. 
' The word can be used in this way. We speak of `great witL But our 
concern here is with the witty, or wittiness. 
I 
1/ 
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Perhaps the most commonly accepted ideas about the 
classic and romantic are that the one stands for perfection: 
of design, form, structure, balance, ;Composition, whilst the 
other stands for an emphasis upon content and upon spirit, 
upon emotion and inspiration, at, some expense, perhaps, of. 
form. Classicism, it is often supposed, is a spirit of order, 
romanticism of a delightful disorder which is not merely 
negative, but the symbol of the living spirit of man. 
If there is anyone who lightly says that classicism is all 
form and romanticism all for content and spirit, he may 
be lightly ignored. For he is holding something which is 
obviously false. If classicism were regard., for mere form, 
classicism could have no aesthetic value, for aesthetic. value 
arises, not out of mere form, but out of significant form. 
And actual experience bears out that the art we call 
`classical' never possesses merely formal interest, but is 
expressive of significant content. Neither, on the other hand, 
is romanticism interest in mere content cr spirit; it must, to 
be aesthetic, be interest in what has body and form. When 
it is said, therefore, that classicism stands for form and 
romanticism for spirit or content, all that can be meant is 
that this or that side is stressed, or perhaps that the danger 
of classicism is mere formality, and the danger of romanticism 
mere content without form. The wind of classicism, it may 
be said, blows in one direction, the wind of romanticism 
in another. 
These things may be so, but there must be a great deal 
more than this in the antithesis between classicism and 
romanticism. Generally speaking, we may venture to 
speculate that the contrast is not primarily one between 
different stresses on form, .cr on spirit, bu t is rather between 
one kind of spirit expressed and another kind of spirit ex- 
pressed. The spiri naturall *,,,of course, affect the form, 
so that we may expect differences of form in classicism and 
in romanticism. 
What the 'classical and the romantic `spirits' are is a 
_. 
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problem of very great difficulty, because of the immense 
variety of modes in which these two hypothetical `spirits' 
manifest themselves. And, as everyone knows, classicism or 
romanticism are not qualities which can be indiscriminately 
applied to any school which we label `classical' or `romantic', 
nor can they be applied to any individual artist at all times, 
nor even to all parts of individual works of art. Classicism 
and romanticism, it would seem, are moments of aesthetic 
experience which may, either of them, occur almost any- 
where, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to find unbreak- 
able rules for their discovery in this or that period. The 
romantic wild flower may blossom, with the air of perfect 
naturalness, in the walled garden of any classical period, 
and the perfect bloom of classicism may be found in the 
meadow or on the open hillside. "Homer, who so delighted 
the Romantics, is, we feel, in some ways less classical than 
Sophocles and Virgil ; there is no greater romance in certain 
essential qualities of romance than the Odyssey; and yet, 
again, Virgil in the fourth book of the Aeneid is more roman- 
tic in another way than Homer. Dido is one of the saints 
of Mediaeval romance. Euripides is more romantic than 
Sophocles." 1 Of an art like music it is more difficult to 
speak, because of its elusiveness. But doubtless the same 
generalisations are true. What of J. S. Bach and Beethoven? 
Who can say whether they are `classical' or `romantic' ? For 
which of the thousand Bachs and Beethovens do we mean? 
The terms `classical' and `romantic' are indeed so full of 
obscurity that it is little wonder that some would have us 
abandon them altogether. Yet their continual recurrence is 
surely a sign that they stand for something fundamental and 
real, so that discussion, though 'difficult, cannot be wholly 
unfruitful. 
Mr. Lascelles Abercrombie in his book, Romanticism,2 
suggests that the real antithesis is not so much between 
3 H. J. C. Grierson, Classiccl and Romantic, Leslie Stephen Lectures, 
Cambridge, 1923. ' Martin Secker. 
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romanticism and classicism as between romanticism and 
realism. "Nothing ", he says, "has done more to obscure this 
question than the common assumption that there is an 
antithesis between romanticism and classicism. The anti- 
thesis is wholly . improper, because classicism is of a quite 
different order of things from romanticism."' The true 
antithesis is between romanticism and realism. Classicism, 
he says, is the "health" of art, the just proportion, as it were, 
of -the elemental "humours" in it, two important humours 
being realism and romanticism. As for romanticism, one of- 
its most important characteristics consists in a kind of retreat 
from the external world to an `inner' world. Realism "loves 
tó. go out into the world, and live confidently and busily in 
the stirring multitude of external things ".2 Romanticism is 
at least a withdrawal from these outer things into inner 
experience. Roughly and approximately it is a transition 
from "perception" to "conception ". (These terms are used . 
advisedly in a loose way.) 
How far we may accept this view will be seen in 
follows. It may be questioned whether there is not a certain 
ambiguity of words in saying that romanticism enters into 
all art, as an element in it; for the word romanticism usually 
stands for a general tendency of art rather than for an 
element in it, and it does not in that sense enter into all art. 
There is danger in asserting the close relationship between 
the classical and the romantic, of overdoing it and of 
denying their real distinction. But this is a matter we may 
adjust for ourselves. We shall return to it. A similar slight 
confusion is seen when Mr. Abercrombie says that classicism 
is the "health" of art. Classicism may, perhaps, be the health 
of a spirit which is expressed in art. Health, that is, may 
belong to content. But surely classicism can hardly be the - 
health of art, for the health of art is its perfection and its 
perfection is its beauty, and romanticism has its own proper 
perfection, or health, or beauty, which is not, as such, 
I Romanticism., p. 3s. 2 Ibid., p. 5o.. 
AA 
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classicism. Classicism is not just beauty, and beauty is not 
the same thing as classicism. Classical art may, possibly, 
be a `greater' kind of art than romantic art; but this is again 
a matter of content, We shall find it useful, however, in 
discussing the classic and the romantic, to follow Mr. 
Abercrombie in keeping in mind the relation of both to 
realism. 
Mr. Abercrombie is, I think, right when he speaks of the 
spirit of romance as a retreat from "perception to con- 
ception", or, more broadly speaking, from the world 
outside us to an `inner' life. Interpreting for ourselves, we 
may think of the world "outside us" as including society, 
nature, and the cosmos. But it is essential in speaking of 
romanticism to think of these in relation to our retreat from 
them. `Outside' is a relative term, relative to our attitude, to 
our retreat. It would not be true to say, for example, that 
nature, or the cosmos, always stands for an `outside' world. 
For a romantic movement, as we know, may consist in a 
retreat to nature from society (e.g. from the life of cities and 
academies). Or it might be in a kind of mystical retreat, say, 
from society, to contact with the cosmos, a doing of some- 
thing with one's own solitariness. Again, the retreat might 
be, not from society, but from nature itself, to the super- 
natural, to, e.g., the magical or the religious. Or it might be 
from a religion become conventional to the freedom of 
thought, or even from the stern necessity of the cosmos to 
an assertion of individual independence. The conception of 
romanticism is thus in a sense= a bi -polar one, and the only 
general statement we can make about the positive= pole is 
that its `externality' implies something accepted, or estab- 
lished, which is reacted against by the individual. What is 
accepted or- established, what is reacted against, may vary 
greatly : hence the difficulty of identifying romanticism with 
= Romanticism is in a sense `bipolar'. This metaphor, as we shall sec, 
has a limited value, for the `negative' pole is not merely negative. 
Romanticism implies faith as well as retreat. 
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such movements as `the return to nature', or with its opposite, . 
the cult of fairies.' 
Romanticism is thus a reaction from something. This 
reaction is also an individual enterprise, an adventure. The 
expression of the romantic is, 
"Most roads lead men homewards, 
My road leads me forth ..." 
or 
"Not for us are content, and quiet, and peace of mind, 
For we go seeking a city that we shall never find. 
There is no solace on earth for us -for such as we 
Who search for a hidden city that we shall never see. 
Only the road and the dawn, the sun, the wind, and the rain,, 
And the watch -fire under stars, and sleep, and the road again. "3 
Romanticism seems thus to imply a feeling for mystery. This 
feeling may range from its least developed form, a sheer love 
of mystery- called `mystery -mongering' by the unsympa- 
thetic-to a more positive seeking for good along mysterious 
ways. Romanticism in its best forms is a faith, a faith in a. 
world to which we are retreating from the world of established 
things. The mature romantic -if romantics can ever be 
called mature -retreats from the known to the relatively 
unknown, but he is possessed of a "substance of things 
hoped for ",'and an "evidence of things not seen ". It is half- 
true to say that for the romanticto travel hopefully is better 
than to arrivi. The movement of travelling, with its positive / 
joys, may in itself be a `retreat'. But so may journey's end. 
The romantic is not, as such, necessarily afraid of arriving 
anywhere. 
Of realism, likewise, it is not easy to conceive, except in . 
bi -polar terms. Realism too is a reaction.4 Realism is not 
merely the habit of mind which lives "confidently and busily 
in the stirring multitude of external things ".5 Realism is. 
I On this, see Mr. Abercrombie, passim. 
z John Masefield, Poems and Ballads. 3 Ibid.. 
4 I do not of course in either case mean `reactionary'. 
5 Op. cit., p. 5o. 
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something which tends to have the air of a purpose and a 
mission. In art it has a creed, and the creed is, briefly, 
belief in `holding the mirror to nature'. Realism in its 
clearest forms is really a protest, explicit or implicit, against 
romanticism, a reaction to hard fact, to the solid world of 
things. Realism tends to despise imagination, and so tends 
to despise art itself, believing sheer reality more impor- 
tant than human spirit. Selectiveness is a rather cowardly 
evasion of fact. 'For sheer realism what matters is just this 
fact, and not beauty. 
There is therefor: o such thing i as sheer realism 
of artistic practice, for the artist selects w ether he knows it 
or not, and whatever his theories. Sheer realism is thus the 
abstract limit of a tendency, and when we say in aesthetic 
criticism `such and such is realistic', we do not mean that 
it is sheerly or completely realistic, but merely that it has 
some tendency in that direction. On the other hand, when 
we talk of realism abstractly, as we are, for the large part, 
doing here, we should think of realism as near its limits as 
possible, as Irk 11 but extremity of a tendency. 
In discussing these questions -which äre so exceptionally 
difficult because in the controversies about them one 
meaning slides unnoticed into another -it is of vital im- 
portance to be clear in our own minds whether we are 
thinking of a concept like: realism in abstracted purity, or 
whether we are thinking of a concrete case with a weaker or 
stronger dash of realism in it. Taken abstractly, such state- 
ments as `there is a realistic romanticism', or, `there is a 
realistic classicism' are self -contradictory, for both romanti- 
cism and classicism are abstractly, and in relation to the 
same objects, definable in opposition to realism. Taken 
concretely they are not nonsense, and may very well be true. 
For the arts which are concretely called `romantic' and 
`classical' are not limits, are not pure and universal concepts. 
They are slabs of real existence, which may pgFfeetly -we l 
contain conflicting tendencies. This is why, in artistic 
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criticism, the labels are so dangerous. It is quite legitimate, 
on the other hand, to ask (on the evidence of much aesthetic 
experience itself) what the pure ideas for which these labels 
stand, really are. This is what we are trying to do here. 
Hence a rather sharp opposition of terms which would be 
out of place in concrete aesthetic criticism. On the other 
hand, we must keep in close touch in our own minds with 
artistic practice itself. 
Classicism, unlike romanticism and realism, is not a 
reaction. It is neither a reaction from accepted or established 
things as they are, nor is it a cultivation of facts at the 
expense of the spirit. The spirit of classicism is a spirit which 
implies the conviction of the unity of our life with the life 
of accepted and established things. If true romance has 
faith in the world to which it retreats from the order, of 
established things, classicism has faith in the order of 
established things themselves- whether these things be social 
and traditional, or natural or cosmic.= Classicism believes 
// 
that in losing itself in things the spirit finds itself, that what. h ,6r 4-6 
is, is the source of what is good s that what is, 
demands as its complement the expression of its spirit 
through our spirit. Classicism has belief in the richness and 
sufficiency of what is. In relation to a social or artistic 
heritage it has respect and faith in tradition and in the 
large potentiality of established forms. In relation to nature, 
classicism believes that an understanding and a judicious 
selection of natural forms will reveal there an expressiveness 
which is amply sufficient to inspire the human spirit. Realism 
is so preoccupied with the mere facts of nature that it 
despises selection and therefore misses the expressiveness of 
the forms of nature when they are distinguished from all 
accident. Romanticism, on the other hand, may sometimes 
tend, in its search for new satisfactions, to abstract and 
distort too much the forms of nature. But classicism brings 
= On Professor Grierson's emphasis on the social and traditional aspect, 
see below, p. teems 
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out, through a wise and judicious discernment of what 
essentially they are, and of what essentially they express, 
the objective values of natural things. So again, in relation 
to the cosmos, it might be said that whilst realism has little 
use for the cosmos, and romanticism tends to be over- 
excited by its escape from a narrower world of fact to that 
larger world, classicism comes to the cosmos as a wanderer 
comes home. Like the wanderer, the greatest classicism 
carries the experience of adventure, and this is part of the 
half -truth of saying that classicism contains romanticism as 
an element. Another part of the half -truth is that in classi- 
cism, as in romanticism, there is an element of great release. 
But it is the release, not so much of an enterprise and 
adventure which leads away from something established, 
as #ithe release of an enterprise which has achieved harmony 
and perfection at last. Romanticism and realism alike 
necessarily imply some suppression, and possibly some 
repression, but in classicism there is neither suppression nor 
repression, but the peace of a faith which is something almost 
more than faith, being 'a faith which is without doubt and 
without fear. 
Another matter of importance arises in discussing the 
statement that all classicism contains an element of romance. 
Romanticism is individualistic movement. But in classicism 
there is no individualism, for the individual is united in 
sympathy with his time or his tradition, or with nature, or 
with whatever is his object. On the other hand, although 
not individualistic, classicism is certainly individual expres- 
sion and embodies in its own way a spirit of enterprise and 
adventure. It is not, like realism, merely an echo or a mirror 
of what is, it is the interpretation by a spirit of what is, and 
we can never reduce the spirit to a mere social consciousness 
or a ,mere objective thing, however much it may express 
the social consciousness or express the nature of the thing. 
That is why, in contemplating the figures on the pediment 
of the Parthenon, or the Parthenon itself, or Bach at his 
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most classiéal, or Wordsworth in his complete union with 
nature,' we feel that here is an enterprise which, though 
objective and shareable and public, is also solitary and 
private and satisfying to the innermost yearnings of the 
individual. Classicism is not, as is so often thought, some- 
thing merely or mainly `formal' and `cold' ; classicism is the 
expression of the profoundest passions, only they are 
`objective' passions, passions in which `cosmic' valueslor the I/ 
`natural' values% or the social or traditional values have /, I, 
found issue through some great individual spirit. It is 
passion, but calm passion, and no passion of revolt. Romanti- 
cism, as we have said, can have, and must have, its beauty 
and its. greatness. (Sheer realism can hardly be great because 
it is not art- though the reality of which it treats may 
arouse great emotions.) But perhaps the greatest beauty of 
all is the beauty of the classical expression when it has 
reached the exact flowering -point of its development. 
Romanticism, it has been argued, is (at least) a retreat 
from the established. In a sense, classicism, or the classical 
spirit, may be said to consist in a harmony between the 
individual and what is established. It is, I think, necessary 
to interpret, as we have been doing, `what is established' in 
a very broad way. One important kind of entity which is 
`established' is the social and aesthetic .tradition which, at 
certain periods of the world's history, becomes markedly 
consolidated. Professor Grierson, in his Leslie Stephen 
Lecture, has shown very clearly the connection between 
classicism and romanticism and the kind of social environ- 
ment of which they tend to be the expression. His view 
indeed is that it is difficult to describe classicism or roman- 
ticism apart from their social and historical context. He 
follows Brunetière's view (with certain important reserva- 
tions) that the essential balance which is to be found in 
classicism is not entirely a product of individual genius, but 
' Mr. Abercrombie very rightly insists on Wordsworth's classicism at 
stich moments. Op. cit., p. 131 -132. . . 
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is a product also of social and intellectual conditions which 
are attained more at some periods of a nation's life than at 
others. Mr. Grierson believes Brunetière to be right in his 
description of the main conditions under which classical 
literature has at different times appeared. "It is the product 
of a nation and a generation which has consciously achieved 
a definite advance, moral, political, intellectual/ and is 
filled with the belief that its view of life is more natural, 
human, universal and wise than that from which it has 
escaped. It has effected a synthesis which enables it to look 
round on life with a sense of its wholeness, its unity in 
variety, and the work of the artist is to give expression to that 
consci6usness, hence the solidity of his work and hence too 
its definiteness, and in the hands of great artists its beauty. 
Literature at such a period is not personal -at least in quite 
the same sense or to the same degree as it is say in Rousseau 
or Byron or Carlyle >or Ibsen, because there is as it were a 
common consciousness throbbing in the mind and heart of 
each individual member of the age, or of the circle for which 
he writes, for one must admit, and this is significant, that 
a classical literature has generally been the product of a 
relatively small society -Athens, Rome, Paris, London. The 
work of the classical artist is to give individual expression, 
the beauty of form, to a body of common sentiments and 
thoughts which he shares with his audience, thoughts and 
views which have for his generation the validity of universal 
truths. His preoccupation with form is not, as with those 
whom Bacon describes, due to disregard of weight of matter 
and worth of subject, but to the fact that the matter is given 
to him by his age, has for him the weight and worth it 
possesses for his audience."' Again, "The differentia of the true 
classic, Sophocles, Virgil in all that is greatest in his poem, 
Racine, Johnson, is that he stands firmly on his own age, is 
consciously and proudly the mouthpiece of his own age 
of reason and enlightenment ".z 
Op. cit., p. 19. 2 Ibid., p. 52. 
I 
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This is all very, true; but it seems to me that perhaps 
Professor Grierson, in bringing out the bearing of social 
and intellectual environments, tends perhaps td thinkjtoo 
exclusively of social and intellectual tradition as the inspiration 
of classicism, and as that from which romanticism is a reac- 
tion. If we are right, : it is not only when he is speaking for 
his own age of reason and enlightenment that an artist . is 
.. classical : he may be the mouthpiece of something which his 
age does not see. He may be the prophet of the ,natural 
or the supernatural or the cosmic. Classicism may be a voice 
crying in the wilderness. Whether it may properly be called 
classical or romantic will really depend upon whether the 
solitary spirit is able to achieve that spirit of quietness and 
repose which is the outcome of faith vindicated in the wórld 
to which he has turned from the life of society. If he is 
mainly in revolt, if his discovery is not merely. individual but 
individualistic, if he has not yet acquired complete stability 
in relation to that world of retreat, we should call him 
romantic. The point is that his classicism and his roman- 
ticism is quite as much, in this case, a matter of his relations 
to the other real world to which he retreats, as to the social 
world from which he retreats. 
If these general statements are true, it is not difficult 
to see why the development of the formal side &f classicism 
tends to greater perfection, whilst the forms of romanticism 
tend to a certain looseness. Classicism in some cases tends 
to . accept the forms which social tradition has: given to it, 
but this cannot be the root explanation. It is rather that the 
spirit of classicism is the spirit of peace and harmony. 
Its emotions are ordered, and being ordered, they exhibit 
themselves in harmonious form. Again, as we said, the 
classical spirit is different from the realistic spirit in that it 
is interested in the forms which elucidate the expressive- 
ness of things, and in so doing satisfy and nourish the spirit. 
Romanticism, on the other hand, tends (but only tends) to 
slackness of form, because it is the expression of a revolt 
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to freedom which may become licence. More positively, 
romanticism tends to be so excited by its emotions in its 
journeyings to new discoveriesLthat its sure vision, and so its ) 
form, tends to be unstable and blurred. 
From the nature of romanticism and realism and classi- 
cism.it can be seen in what, direction decay will tend to set 
in in each. The tendency of romanticism is individualistic. ó 
Romanticism, if i is rjot caref 1, may die of inanition-- e4 An 
se íerrt- though dying may be violent t. 
enough in outward form. It is good to live an inner life : 
it is good to revolt, and the inner life has its positive object 
of faith. But unless romanticism in its very revolt is seeking 
out for a new world in which it will some day find peace, 
unless, in other words, very romanticism itself is a movement 
to a more stable classicism, it will tend towards subjectivism 
and starvation. Art is not like the serpent which can feed on 
its own tail. A danger of romantic retreat is subjectivism. 
Without some healthy contact with real things, of one sort 
or another, romance becomes solipcism, decadence. 
Realism in its turn dies because it was never properly 
alive ; its life is a life borrowed not from the spirit of man - 
although in #be.- s1aopest actual realistic art thisLcan never J1 
avoid showing itself -but from the nature of things. But 
Ì 
things in themselves are not enough ark' the mere mirroring 
of them becomes a tedious and wearisome business. 
Classicism does not so much die as fail to sustain itself 
in equilibrium, being the perfect balance of subject and 
object. Perfect balance is hard to sustain, for life, though 
approving of stability, is essentially unstable. Now the 
balance of classicism, being good, is a thing which inspires 
imitation, and when imitation occurs we get a mere cultiva- 
tion of perfect form without that life the expression of which 
originall gave rise to that perfection of form. Classical art 
is art wi a spirit of, assuredness/ which has been hardly 
won. If assuredness is' imitated, it becomes mere conven- 
tionality, it becomes mere correctness and good manners. 
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True classicism, however, must be the expression of the indi- 
vidual living spirit, for which there can be no substitute. 
When, therefore, a particular form of classicism has outlived 
its span of vital days, when it has degenerated into good 
manners and correctness of behaviour, the only cure for 
the restless spirit of creative art is a fresh spell of romantic 
enterprise, romantic enterprise with its admitted dangers. 
Life being unstable, and being rhythmic, we cannot stay 
at any stage, however classical, however perfect. The 
alternatives are to stagnate, or, to live dangerously. And, life 
being life, the alternative of stagnation is in the long run 
an unreal one. Perhaps the fineness of the following passage 
may justify me in quoting Professor Grierson. once again 
"Classical and romantic -these are the systole and diastole 
of the human heart in history. They represent on the one 
hand our need of order, of synthesis, of a comprehensive yet 
definite, therefore exclusive as well as inclusive, ordering of 
thought and feeling and action ; and on the other hand 
the inevitable finiteness of every human synthesis, the in- 
evitable discovery that, in Carlyle's metaphor, our clothes no 
longer fit us, that the classical has become the conventional& X 1 
that our spiritual aspirations are being starved, or that our ,, 
secular impulses are `cribb'd, cabin'd, and confined' When 1 
this happens, the heart and imagination bursts its cerements 
and reaches out once more to the new life which is the life 
of the romantic. . . !VAnd once again, we might add, the 
new life in its good time achieves, for an instant or two, 
order and stability. Romance, coming home to its reality, 
becomes classical. But only for a brief moment. It is because 
of this, because only a millionth part of life can be perfect, and 
the rest is bursting enterprise, that great romance will always 
outweigh great classicism in bulk, and that it will always 
capture our hearts and our imaginations. Perhaps, for most 
human men, rightly or wrongly, it will continue to outweigh 
the claims even of the most perfect perfection of the classicist. 
Op. cit., p. 55+"6. 
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I. PRELIMINARY 
The argument of this chapter will be found to divide itself 
naturally into three parts. In the first part I shall enumerate 
some of the attitudes which the aesthetic percipient may take 
up towards nature. In the second we shall be concerned with 
certain convictions which the lover of nature may possess 
about the beauty he believes to exist `in' nature. In the third 
we shall try (without attempting to prove these convictions 
true /to see what some of their implications would be if they 
were true, and whether the implications lead, or do not 
lead, to absurdity. The whole subject is full of difficulty, for 
any such conviction/ as, for example, that the beauty of 
- nature exists apart from relation to our mindsAis a belief 
which could not be sustained in regard to the beauty of art._ 
We shall have to leave, with some misgivings, the more 
certain ground of our own experience and venture into the 
dark `regions of general philosophical speculation. Let us be 
perfectly clear at the outset that in such realms we shall only 
be able to move tentatively, and that the chances of being 
in error here -particularly in a brief discussion -are even 
greater than is usual in philosophical reasonings. 
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF ART CONTRASTED WITH THE 
EXPERIENCE OF `NATURE' 
The natural objects= which we perceive- stars, clouds, 
seagulls, trees, the landscape of mountain or plain -are like 
the other objects which we perceive, in that to appear in 
any degree beautiful they must be imaginatively apprehended 
by mind. In this respect natural objects or scenes are in the 
same relation to us as art- objects. One difference, however, 
r The distinction will shortly be made between `nature' approached 
casually as when we glance at a landscape, and `nature' viewed more 
carefully, as a structure or structures. For the moment the context will 
show which of these is meant. 
l 
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between natural and art- objects stands out. The works of 
art which we apprehend are themselves -at any rate as 
regards their form -the product of finite minds ; their struc- 
tures which we perceive have been made like that in order 
that the mind of the artist (and probably other minds) may 
experience, in and through them, organised valuable mean- 
ings. We know this. But of natural objects we do not know 
it. We have no gryindl for believing that nature 
is a work of art _ A o'f r believing thé artist's product 
is such. We may look at nature imaginatively, and see her 
as beautiful, but we do not know, prima facie, that her beauty 
does not arise wholly through our `seeing', as it does not 
arise through our seeing when we apprehend works of art. 
It is true, of course, that when we perceive a work of art 
we have to do our own part in imagining, for unless 
we imagine, the pigments or the words or the sounds will 
remain these things and nothing more. But lama - of, t ± e 
great community of experience `= _ r + s 
ltirûi , _ 'e- 
tween the artist and other men, we are able, if we can and 
do imagine, to enter into anesthetic experience in the work 
of art which is ready given, and ready made for us. We must 
imaginatively apprehend, but imaginative apprehension is 
discovery of something which is, strictly, in the sense de- 
scribed, there already. Our experience and that of the artist 
on completion of the work are probably never quite iden- 
tical,.but our appreciation is approximately a discovery and 
a sharing innready constructed meanings. When we have 
aesthetic apprehension of natural objects, on the other hand, 
we certainly possess no ready -made proof that wé are so 
discovering and sharing. 
The constructie r of art is a completed unity. This unity 
bf art is another aspect of the prima facie dfrezeu e between C 
art as it appears, and a good deal of nature as we casu dly 
approach her. Art is artificial, and nature is natural, and 
one of the most striking differences between appre .iatión 
of nature and appreciation of art is the largeness, the str _ tch- 
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ing infinity, the cosmical context of the former, as opposed 
to the exclusiveness, .enclosedness, artificiality, of the latter, 
(Artificiality as here, used . is of course no term of . abuse.) 
Art reveals reality, but art is ' specific.. and . enclosed and 
perfect. It has the completeness of .a monad or a microcosm. 
The nature which we casually approach, on the other hand, 
being it nothing less than the macrocosm, is, for a `L` 
our finiteness, different before .each one of :us- different at 
every turn of the head, with every step; and every passing 
mood. Art is a selection, but a definite, chosen,,. and com- 
plete .selection ; nature, as we come on her casually, appears 
in perspectives which have, ragged edges, which, are more 
diffuse, which melt into a background' of indefiniteness. If 
beauty consists in perfection of expressiveness, ,then a care- 
less : (though imaginative) glance at nature is unlikely to 
reveal anything like perfect beauty in the whole of any single 
perspective, though it may possibly reveal much expressive- 
ness here or there. In the careless glance we may have an 
aesthetic experience, but, an imperfect and incomplete one. 
Nature, casually seen, has no frames ; she has no beginning, 
no middle, and she is endless. 
III. NATURE` AS BÁCKGROUND THE `ESCAPE' TO NATURE 
There are, in fact, so many attitudes to. nature which may 
be taken up; ; and these. attitudes are often so delicately and 
so subtly ,different from one another' that it wöuld be im- 
possible in anything less than.a treatise .. to give an adequate 
account of them.. In; the next few pages I. propose to con- 
sider 11-ow of these attitudes, but the suggestions which will % 1°2 / 
be thrown . out, though': they may provide a _ convenient 
perspective for our subsequent treatment, will have no 
special ' merit except that of convenience for this special 
purpose. The : expert; in the,,subject will have to supplement 
from his own reading and his Own experience. For the sake 
of rendering an immense subject manageable in a short 
384 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
space, I propose to consider attitudes to nature ranging 
from a stage when nature falls in the background or in the 
margin, to attitudes in which nature becomes the focus of 
several different kinds of interest, culminating in that interest 
in nature which may be called mystical in character. 
In literature, perhaps, the most frequent location for 
nature is in the background. If one confines oneself to 
English poetry= the difficulty is indeed to discover any bulk 
of poetry which is not coloured by the influence of natural 
scenery and atmosphere. Chaucer begins straight away : 
"Whan that Aprille with his shoures soote." Spenser is 
drenched in pastoral atmosphere ; Milton, in his own more 
indirect way, is so also, especially perhaps in the earlier 
works. The backgrounds of Shakespeare with some excep- 
tions, are largely natura , and although in the Romantics 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nature comes 
more into the locus, it is present as background too. Think f 
of the background of the Cenci, for example. Indeed, it is 
impossible to avoid a conviction of absurdity in selecting 
English poets and poems for examples of the presence or 
influence of nature. Our national character is so suffused 
with the atmosphere of the fields and trees and clouds and 
mountains and rivers and meadow -flowers, and gardens and 
garden -flowers, that we come almost to cease to notice it, 
to take it for granted. 
But nature may be attended to, and when attended to 
it may grip the imagination for many reasons. One common 
cause of its hold upon the imagination is that nature is an 
escape from the wear and responsibilities of city -life. The 
contrast of the life of the forest, "exempt from public haunt ", 
is welcome to the jaded nerves of the city -dweller. 
The most recent treatment generalli subject will be found in 
Mr. Edmund Blunden's Nature in Literature. (Hogarth Press.) 
a Periods like certain parts of the eighteenth century excepted. 
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"To one who has been long in city pent, 
'Tis very sweet to look into the fair 
And open face of heaven.:.." 
"How beautiful is the rain." 
Or in a garden, as Marvell sings, 
"Society is all but rude 
To this delicious solitude." 
This craving for escape is one source of what has been called' 
traditionally `pastoral' poetry, and, in more modern times 
the source of the poetry of what has been called the `week -: 
end' tradition. Mr. Gibson, seeing the ice -cart in the streets, 
sees also Greenland's icy mountains. Mr. Yeats and Mr. 
W. H. Davies could, hardly be labelled week -enders, par 
ticularly the latter -but the beauty of the poems of Innisfree, 
or of Leisure, is the outcome of this same civilisation- induced ,, ,; 
Nature as a background, or as Nn escPe, is nature coloured d /J 
by human moods. And a good deal ow delight in nature: 
is delight simply in what reflects, or supplements, ourselves 
-nature being little more to us than a symbol" for what we 
most desire. It is sleep and restfulness when we are jaded, 
vigour and clean strength when we are cloyed with artificial 
living, beckoning mystery when some deep a ge in us calls roC.-4 / 
for answering deep. Poetry is full of the expression ' of . this. Í! 
For the most part the poet is .unanalytic, ready, like a child,: 
to accept what nature gives to him as her message. But on 
occasion doubts will arise. The ghosts of some hinting seep- 
ticism haunt uneasily the dark corners of the mind. Is the 
speech of this message of nature an. illusion? Are /all of 'us/ 1 4v-ii 1 /'/ 
but victims of what has been named, with unconscious, but 
telling, ambiguity, a `pathetic' fallacy? Coleridge -in sortie 
moods -is perhaps one of the ' most outstanding examples 
of a poet beset by this awful fear that ' nature is, after all, 
but a mere physical thing ::the earth a "sterile promontory' 
BB 
386 A STUDY IN AESTHETICS 
and the golden sky but a "foul and pestilential congregation 
of vapours ". All that nature says is said by ourselves: 
"O Lady ! we receive but what we give 
And in our life alone does nature live... . 
Joy is the sweet voice, joy the luminous cloud; 
We in ourselves rejoice !" 
IV. NATURE AS A FIELD FOR ART 
The unanalytical attitude of the poet -and of all of us who 
`discovex nature's moods in consonance with our own -is a 
natural and instinctive attitude which needs no cultivation 
and is certainly not cultivated for some conscious artistic 
purpose. And when doubts arise whether or no we be the 
victims of a fallacy, we feel bereft of a friend, and the joy 
goes out of life, as it did for Coleridge in these blankest 
moods. There is, however, another attitude to nature which 
resembles this one in that it looks at nature as coloured by 
human interests, but differs: from it in that the interests are 
definitely cultivated, and are artistic. The object, in this 
case, becomes really art rather than nature and the sug- 
gestion therefore of ̀ pathetic fallacies' becom1less important, 
, 
and hardly matters even if it is suggested, for nature has 
already ceased to be a friend. This attitude is best exempli- 
fied in the landscape -painter of a certain type, who comes 
to nature, not receptively, in order to take what she has to 
offer, but who approaches nature mainly as offering a field 
of. suggestion for his art. This artist is interested in his 
pictures, in compositions which will fit harmoniously into 
frames. He looks at nature through a post card with a hole 
in it. He is interested in making rather than in discovering. 
And, often enough, he frankly does not expect to find beauty 
in nature as she is. This attitude, in rather an extreme form, 
is. expressed by Croce in the following passage : "The always 
imperfect adaptibility, the fugitive nature, the mutability 
of `natural beauties' also justify the inferior place accorded 
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to them, compared with beauties produced by art. Let us, 
leave it to rhetoricians or the intoxicated to . affirm that a 
beautiful tree, a beautiful river, a sublime mountain, or even 
a beautiful horse or a beautiful human figure, are superior 
to the chisel- stroke of Michelangelo or the versé of Dante; 
but let us say, with greater propriety, that `nature' is stupid 
compared with art, and that she is `mute', if man does not 
make her speak. "I 
This is half -true, and our .painter's attitude to nature 
in its . own . way, a perfectly legitimate attitude. (And the 
passage just quoted is the logical outcome of a philosophy 
of art,) But as an attitude to nature it is `casual' with a 
vengeance. It is hardly an attitude to real nature at all : it 
is an attitude, as has been said, to our own. `art'. And the 
conclusion of Croce's, statement just given is inaccurate, for 
"man" with such an attitude to "nature" could never in 
this life "make her speak ", having no interest in, having 
no humility to understand, nature, being consciously 'in- 
terested only in himself,: his own world, and in his own 
artistic feelings and doings. And further, no one who makes 
no attempt at all to apprehend, and to some extent to under- 
stand, the objective structures of natural objects, will ever be 
in the least competent to say whether, as she is, she may not 
appear :beautiful -much less "make her speak ". Whether 
or not there is beauty `in' nature; we must love nature, and 
with some intelligence, before we can judge whether she has -P e - 
anything to teach us. We have little need to condescend. 
V. A MORE OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE -SYMPATHY AND 
OBSERVATION 
A very different attitude to nature (and to a different 
`nature') which is without arrogance and which is more 
9bjective and more sympathetic, is typified by such poems 
as. The Bull, by Ralph Hodgson, or The Runnable Stag, by 
7 The Essence of Aesthetic, p. 47 
:. 
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James Stephens, or by Masefield's Reynard the Fox. Here the 
subject is animate nature, and the main interest lies not in 
any responsiveness of nature (real or imagined) to our moods, 
nor in the artistic effects which can be adapted from nature, 
but rather in the life, the sufferings, and the joys of animals 
with sentience akin to our own. In the poems I have men- 
tioned there is keen objective observation, there is under- 
standing, there is sympathy (and -in Mr. Hodgson's poem 
anyhow -some sentimentality). And there is also something 
more, a profounder reflection and questioning of the pur- 
poses and plans of nature -with incidental reflections on 
man's humanity or his inhumanity. 
This more `objective' attitude to nature is perhaps most 
commonly understood when the concern is with the life and 
particularly with the feelings of animals. Anyone, or any- 
one whose imagination has not become blunted or distorted, 
must be interested in, and must sympathise with, the fox 
or the bull or the stag. But the objective attitude of appre- 
ciation is possible not only towards animals regarded as 
sentient like ourselves. It is possible to appreciate animals 
-or human beings -as pieces of structure. The deer, or the 
tiger, or the turbot (if we could see it in its setting), the 
bank of moss, the tree, the tulip, reveal intricate functional 
structures to the intelligently appreciative mind. And not 
only animate nature, but inanimate_ nature too- cloud, 
mountain, plain, rock- crystal, atom. Examples of, the ex- 
pression of interest in the structure and functional activity 
of animals are to be found here and there in the poems 
mentioned (in The Bull, and The Runnable Stag, and Reynard 
the Fox) . 
"A chestnut mare with swerves and heaves 
Came plunging, scattering all the crowd, 
She tossed her head and laughed aloud 
And bickered sideways past the meet. 
From pr king ears to mincing feet 
She was all tense with blood and quiver, 
You saw her clipt hide twitch and shiver 
''! Over her netted cords of veins.... 
Or 
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"The fox's nose tipped úp and round, 
Since smell is a part of sight and sound 
Delicate smells were drifting by, 
The sharp nose, Haired them heedfully.... . 
"Like a rocket shot to a ship ashore 
The lean red bolt of his body tore 
Like a ripple of wind running swift on grass 
Like .. . . 
We get it too in Mr. Blunden's The Pike. The structure of 
the tree is sung in Mr. Aldous Huxley's: Song of Poplars, or 
Masefield's The Trees, the poetry ' of flower structure in 
Arnold's The Scholar Gypsy, or T hyrsis, or Bridges' The 
Garden in September, or his poem on a Poppy. These descrip- 
tions are not scientific in any strict sense of the word (and 
they do not follow things in detail Or to their conclusion); 
but they point in that direction in that they are `objective'. 
rather than `subjective' in attitude. 
This objectivity of attitude is perhaps seen more clearly 
,f44.0-4 when the object is inanimate nature. No one has made 
clearer than Ruskin the importance of the co- operation of 
intelligence and aesthetic experience in our attitude to 
nature. In his account of such phenomena as distance, sky, 
water, natural topography, Ruskin is a healthy corrective. 
(though he continually says false things) of the over -`artistic' 
attitude to nature Buskin's position is that of the artist, 
but of the artist ready to learn from nature. Art for him, 
though ark is .the interpretation of natural processes and 
functions. We get something of the same point of view, with 
a definitely scientific bias, and in à very different setting, 
in Hugh Miller's The Old Red Sandstone. 
The scientific attitude to nature is not, of course, in itself 
aesthetic. But it may be, and it is this in which we are 
interested. The scientist as such -and indeed anyone who 
approaches nature. with of understanding -is 
389 
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interested in the nature of structure. But he may also at any 
time apprehend natural structures imaginatively, so that 
they come to appear to express values in their perceived 
forms. We have spoken, in the chapter on functional beauty, 
of what is involved in this aesthetic appreciation of function. 
We saw that the functional value must appear to imagination 
as in the form, and that the appreciation of natural func- 
tional beauty involves imputation of our own bodily and 
I mental states; And so on. It is impossible, we said in effect,- 
to appreciate directly values other than those of our own 
bodies and minds, though we can cognise that these values 
are ; and what they are. We appreciate (by a kind of analogy) 
it the functional beauty of the fling seagull or the springing 
tree or the petals of a flower, rough our organisms, and 
much of our delight in these func Zonal objects is an imputed 
delight in our own bodies and minds. (There is also of 
course the imputed delight in colour, balance, composition, 
and so on.) In aesthetic experience all such factors become 
relevant to the perceived object, so that it appears to embody; 
not only value, but the pleasure in value. 
These things, which are familiar, are true of any func- 
tional object (and indeed of any aesthetic object at all), 
and not only of those we call natural. The sailing -ship, the 
racing motor -car, the well -fashioned knife, are not only 
fitted for a function, but seem, in the aesthetic moment, 
really to embody a kind of delight. The perfect ship or the 
perfect motor -car flies `joyously' along like a living thing, 
the knife cuts with a will ; it is, we may say, a `self -respecting' 
knife. So it is also with natural objects like the seagull or 
the tree or the flower -petal. 
VI. A CONVICTION ARISING OUT OF THE LOVE OF NATURE, 
But just beyond this point a difference between our ex- 
perience of the artifact and that of the natural object see_ ms 
,+to emerge. In all aesthetic experience it is the case that we 
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do apprehend values, including mental values, relevantly 
to the object, as if they were in the object. But a moment's 
reflection shows us that in the case of artifacts our aesthetic 
conviction is not literary true, that in this aesthetic experience 
there is illusion, the illusion that valuable meaning is literally 
embodied. An artificial object like a work of art is, reflection 
tells us, an appearance made for the purpose (at least) of 
awakening and satisfying our needs in a certain aesthetic 
way. Artificial objects like ships and .racing motor-cars are 
not made for this artistic purpose, but --paa.y also seem 
erroneous) to have beauty `in' them. Reflection,' on the 
other hand on the aesthetic experience of natural objects 
seems to suggest rather different conclusions, or at least it 
does not lead so directly and inevitably to the same positive 
conclusions. 
Here is a flower whose perceived detail- for the 
trained eye a functional significance. We can regard this 
as we should regard an artificial object, aesthetically de- 
lighting in the `functional' expressiveness of its forms /as well ,4 
as in its colours, its symmetry, and so on. But at this point 
the difference arises. All aesthetic experience takes the 
appearance 9f an object as expressive. Into the aesthetic 
experience of nature, however, there appears to be fused 
a kind of conviction not in itself aesthetic and often but 
vaguely felt, that somehow or other there is expressiveness, 
not merely in the appearance of the natural object, but in 
its very reality. The real thing, in itself, independently of 
us, seems, and not only at the aesthetic moment, to be 
expressively beautiful. This conviction, although it is fused 
into the aesthetic experience, is not, as I have just said, in 
itself aesthetic. It is a kind of philosophy which, whether 
explicit or not, goes along with a certain kind of aesthetic 
experience of nature, and which is. assumed to be true. It 
is a philosophy which does not, and indeed could not, go 
along with our aesthetic experience of artificial objects. For 
artificial objects (e.g. works of art), though made by minds,, 
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are in themselves non- mental bodies, and are external to 
and independent of the minds which made them. Natural 
objects, on the other hand, exhibit what has sometimes been 
called `internal' teleology. And the internal teleological 
structure of a plant suggests (whether rightly or wrongly 
is not the question here) to many observers the presence 
of purpose and of mind, and of mind in some way im- 
manent in the thing and not merely external to it. It is this 
kind of suggestion which seems to fuse itself with the aesthetic 
experience of natural objects. The flower, for some \inds lw j 
in some moods, is assumed to be structure revealing, in some 
obscure way, not only mental purpose, but beauty which is 
the literal expression of a spirit or mind immanent somehow 
in the flower. Sometimes, it is true, the conviction is merely 
a hint of a Creator beyond, a looking "through nature up 
to nature's God", a learning of lessons from nature ( "One 
lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee "). But often it is more, 
and it is the more which is vitally significant for us here 
in our study of the convictions about natural beauty. In 
some of the intense experiences of nature it is felt that the 
beauty we pp rceive c tainly not merely the function of 
isWap A_, re Ct4'/ cj an aiap a c - ouucc our minds, is certainly not 
merely a reflection of ourselves, nor even a mere product of, 
or appearance to, safe divine external artist,but an aesthetic e la 
expression of some spirit really active and immanent in the r` 
thing. A delight which is not merely our delight seems, not 
only to be "painted" upon the meadow -flower, but to be 
resident in its very growing tissue. This, I say, is a con- 
viction which certainly occurs. 
This conviction is partly supported, as I have said, by 
an . assumed argument from teleology. It is also reinforced 
by the fact that whilst the aesthetic `body' of any artifact 
Js, so to speak, a superficies, the beauty- revealing `bodies'' 
of natural objects are, as it were, many -dimensional, and 
however far we go in our analysis the possibility of the 
beauty of structure to be revealed is never exhausted. The 
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`body' of the picture is a plane surface. Beauty is, in this 
sense, but skin deep. `The body' of a piece of sculpture is 
its perceived shape ; and if we break it up we are left with 
lumps of dead matter. But dissect the flower or the tree, and 
you get layer upon layer of connected structure, and layer 
upon layer of appearing beauty, each yielding to us the 
effect of active immanent expressiveness, and each intri- 
cately interconnected with the beauties that have gone 
before. We can dig down to very matter itself and still there 
is beauty. The only limitation to this process is that beyond 
a certain point we cannot perceive /but can only conceive, 
and, perhaps, imagine. There are, too, some limits to our 
capacities for appreciation. Certain aspects of nature we 
find it difficult to apprehend as beautiful/ for example, the 
turbot or the embryo, or a pregnant so But it is highly 
improbable that these are real exceptions, and we must not 
argue from our own limitations. The generalisation is not 
imperilled. We can say with safety that the wealth of 
appearances of nature which may appear beautiful is, for 
our finite experience, all but unlimited. 
I am not for one moment suggesting that all these things 
in fact prove that nature at every or any point is the aesthetic 
expression of spirit. It may be, for example, that at every 
point, at every perspective, we merely impute meanings, 
as we do to works of art. It may be that nature, to the 
nature -lover who re cts, appears to be full of beauty in 
her very body as does not to the reflective art -lover, 
merely becaus she has more appearances which may appear 
beautiful to us. The effect is cumulative and the multitude of 
possible beautiful appearances suggests immanence. Again; 
arguments from teleology to the presence of mind are very 
open: to dispute. The convictions of nature -lovers are no 
proof. It is merely pointed out that there are such convictions. 
The nature -lover, in other words, may be more than an 
aesthetic experient, and the problem of the aesthetic ex- 
perience of nature may go beyond aesthetics. The lover of 
`r 
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nature is often, in a very broad sense, religious. He has a 
religion of nature, and his religion carries along with it, 
temperamentally, certain fundamental assumptions which 
are theological or philosophical. These assumptions may be 
right or they may be wrong. Whether they are so, or not, 
could only be significantly asserted by embarking on a full 
discussion of pantheism and deism and theism, immanence 
and transcendIncland the union of them. This full 
cussion we cannot possibly enter upon. But we shall have 
to return again shortly from another angle to these con- 
victions of the nature -lover and their implications. 
VII. THE MORE SENSUOUS APPROACH, AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SENSA 
If intelligence, and in particular intelligence assimilated 
1 
iVAt 44 ., into aesthetic experience, is one instrument of revelation (or 
h, apparent revelation / n ,,u2 °-gees, so, in their ówn, 
ways, are the senses instruments of revelation. The best 
a!example of411. sensuous attitude to nature (anddeverything X 4, 
else) is perhaps that of Keats, but we get it also, by his own 
confession, in the "coarser pleasures" and the "glad animal 
movements" of the earlier Wordsworth, and to a lesser extent 
t4,1 i his pleasures "of the eye and ear ". But we may perhaps 
leave the poets alone for a moment and consider directly 
for ourselves this mainly sensuous approach -for it is a 
common experience. It is an approach mainly, but not 
exclusively, sensuous. Experience is not divisible into water- 
tight compartments, and an aesthetic experience of nature 
which is mainly sensuous may contain the apprehension and 
appreciation of natural structures, as well as the effects of 
many general reflections. And it may besr more/than./.4044 
this. The experience, roughly classed as `sensuous', may 
range, in fact, from a lower limit/ where it is little more 2 
than sensuous, to an upper level/ where, mainly through 7 
sensuous Vices, we come to an awareness which may 
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'be (like that of which we have already spoken) definitely 
mystical in character. In these things we are speaking of a 
certain stress on one aspect of experience and of nothing 
'more. 
The lower limit of this type . of experience is little more 
than sensuous. Think, for example, of lying/ upon the 
heather, after bathing, on some hot summer's noonday.The 
bright sky is pleasantly stimulating, the hills are purple and 
blue and green, the heather is both soft and prickly to the 
body, whose chill is warmed deliciously by the hot sun. 
The scents of heather and bracken, the sounds of the insects, 
of whisp..riiig trees, of birds and the distant stream, the very 
taste of the air, combine together to form the complex con- 
tent of a very definite experience of a nature which ex- 
presses something to us. We feel, but our feeling is not all. 
We are vividly aware of the objective nature with its real 
characters, which speak to us through our senses. The 
quality of its sensuous vividness as a whole is in striking 
contrast to the limitations of sensuous experience when, say, 
we look at pictures or listen to music. From his own point 
of view, well may the nature -lover feel contemptuous of 
the stuffy occupation of standing in museums or picture 
galleries, okitting in artificially lighted concert halls with 
*he windows shut. Art has its reality, and its sensuous reality, 
but its reality does not impinge upon the senses to the extent 
that `nature' can. The naked man on the moor experiences 
a stimulation to all, or, at any rate, to a very large number, 
of his senses, which is impossible in the enjoyment of any 
art. We may, at dawn or at dusk, or even at midday, regard 
the distant hills or the distant trees without much organic 
thrill, as we would a picture. But even the enjoyment of 
landscape is commonly accompanièd by light and colour 
many times more stimulating than the brightest colours of 
any picture -apart from the smells and sounds of earth and 
air and animals and the things that grow from the earth 
and fly in the air. 
ro! 
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The markedly sensuous character of much aesthetic ex- 
perience uinature is seen if we contrast the different effects 
of an aesthetic medium, like sound, in art and in nature. 
The nearest correspondent in nature to music is, perhaps, 
the song of birds. Bird -song undoubtedly possesses a certain 
structure, but it is so slight as to be incomparable with 
human music. The sounds of nature appeal to us, when we 
attend to them, chiefly through their timbre and their 
volume (these having of course their organic effects). The 
entrancing sweetness of the blackbird's song resides not so 
much in the music which he makes, which is slight, as in 
the amazingly expressive sounds he produces, the quality 
of which delights us. So too it is the expressive timbre/of the 
wind soughing or whispering, of the breakers upon the 
beach, or of the "murmur of innumerable bees ", which is 
fascinating to us, rather than the musical constructions of 
sounds. Again, the great vornme of the thunder of the 
heavens, or of the stormy ocean, or of the falling cataract, 
gets its expressive effect largely through sensation, and 
contains little form. 
In the aesthetic experience of nature, too, certain sensa- 
may come into active prominence which have little or no 
place in art. In speaking of the number of the sensa which 
are present in the experience of nature we referred in 
1441 1 passing to tactile sensa. These, however, may not merely 
contribute to a general experience, but may themselves, 
as distinct objects, yield significant aesthetic experience. 
Na 
Tactile sensa in art are of little direct importance, though 
in an art like violin- or piano -playing touch may be an 
important instrument. Indirectly, on the other hand, touch 
does, of course, play a very important part in art-appre- 
ciation. The significance of tactic imagery in painting, or 
sculpture, or poetry, -ate familiar. But 'n the aesthetic ex- 
perience of nature, not only may ile sensa have an vim/ 
indirect importance, as when the moss `looks' soft. They may 
also have a direct importance. The moss (as opposed, to, ïá 
1, 
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picture of moss) not only looks, but is soft. We touch it 
and enjoy touching it. The down of the fledgling is soft and 
gently warm. The contours of a peeled chestnut are deli- 
ciously cool and smooth and firm. Brooke writes of "the 
rough male kiss of blankets ", and the "cool kindliness of 
sheets ". The `feeling', again, of the texture of an apple or 
peach or plum, or of jelly or caviare or wine, or of velvet 
or of a cat's fur, or of the petals of a crocus, may yield a 
delight which is sensational, but which is aesthetic also. A 
friend tells me of the profound and far -reaching joy she had 
when a child through touching ferns and feeling the contrast 
between the soft green parts of an unfolding fern, and the 
rougher brown parts. Even snails and worms and, to little 
bare feet, hot tarry roads "like the flesh of a warm chicken 
that has just been plucked" have their aesthetic gifts to 
offer. 
VIII. THE `CONVICTION' AGAIN 
We spoke, in Section V of the conviction of some nature - 
lovers that beauty is in some sense in nature, as beauty is 
not in the work of art. The work of art is an aesthetically 
significant appearance, but works of nature, to such nature - 
lovers, are aesthetically significant realities, whose beauty 
is immanent in them. And we referred to theoretical assump- 
tions involved in this conviction. 
The predon- iaantly sensuous experience of nature involves, 
too, a powerful conviction of reality. In our aesthetic ex- 
perience of nature we are sensuously in contact, not with 
some artificially arranged expressive medium, but with a. 
real nature which we know to be interconnected with a 
system which is nothing less than the whole natural cosmos.. 
We do not, of course, necessarily think consciously of this 
in all our contacts with nature. But the indefinite, the 
(relatively) infinite, context of natural objects, is unques- 
tionably a notable factor in our experience of nature. It is.. 
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part of the basis of the `cosmic' feeling of which we shall 
speak in a moment, and it becomes fused into the aesthetic 
experience. Again, as we have seen, nature in stirring our 
senses, stirs them often more urgently than do works of art. 
And she makes her assaults not merely through this or that 
sense, but through many at once, thus building up a con- 
sciousness almost of being rooted and embedded in the 
.swgetness --of nature as plants and trees are rooted and 
embedded in the earth. 
At the lower end of the scale, we said, our experience 
may not be much more than sensuous. At the upper level 
there may arise, through sensuous experience of nature, an 
awareness which is nothing less than mystical. Even the 
scent of a spray of honeysuckle may seem to embody, not 
only the deep secret good of the physical earth, but a 
transcendent and unearthly meaning which could never 
be conveyed, even in the language of poetry, to anyone 
who had not already known the strange thrill of it. And, 
when nature is assaulting not one sense only, but many, 
this ineffable conviction of a speaking spirit of nature may 
be almost inescapable. 
This conviction that nature is, in some obscure way, a 
Spirit expressing herself in the bodies of natural objects, 
revealing herself through "the language of the sense ", is, 
once again and as before, a kind of religious conviction with 
an attached theology or philosophy which becomes assimi- 
lated into aesthetic experience. Vaughan has the conviction. 
Seeing the moonlit heavens, he sees the infinite 
"I saw Eternity the other night. 
Like a great ring of pure and endless light, 
All calm as it was bright ; 
And round beneath it, Time, in hours, days, years. 
Drivin by the spheres. 
Like a vast shadow moved, in which the world 
And all her train were hurl'd." 
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For S. T. Coleridge, the clouds and " lakes and mountain 
crags are 
"The lovely shapes and sounds intelli ible - 
Of that eternal language, which y God 
Utters...." 
But the classic; and the most perfect, expression of all is of 
course in Wordsworth's Tintern Abbey. It is continually 
quoted, and is in that sense hackneyed, but even popularity 
can hardly destroy its - ga- ea4ess. 
". . . I have felt 
A Presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused 
'Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns 
And the round ocean, and the living air, and the blue sky, 
And in the mind of man ; a motion and a spirit which impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. Therefore am I still 
A lover of the meadows and the woods and mountains, 
And of all that we behold of this green earth, 
Of all the mighty world of eye and ear, 
Both what we half create and what perceive. 
Well pleased to recognise 
In nature and the language of the sense, 
The anchor of my dearest thoughts, the nurse, 
The guide and guardian of my heart...." 
ere is the creed of the nature -lover at one peak of its 
highest development, and complete as any brief statement 
could be. Even when nature is regarded in a more negative 
way, as that which is effortless, even when the mountain 
is felt to be beautiful "because no one has built it, the 
forest because no one has planted it, the snow -flake because 
no silver smith has touched it with hammer and file ",I it 
is difficult for the lover of nature not to conceive such 
effortlessness as a positive value. The effortlessness is not 
1 Collingwood, Outlines ofs4esbleegiee, P. 54. ft . Ni 0. Y 
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a mere negative, it seems rather the expression of an im- 
manent, omnipresent, omnipotent being who is so great that 
effort is no effort. 
. Such convictions, once again, show the discerning lover 
of nature to be more than merely an aesthetic experient. The 
unsympathetic critic may therefore say that since his aes- 
thetic experience is not a `pure' one at all, we should not 
here be troubling ourselves overmuch about the `lover of 
nature'. It is, of course, true that aesthetic experience is 
not philosophy or theology or .religion, and that aesthetics 
is not directly concerned with the nature -lover's opinion 
about these. But it is indirectly concerned, for theories (like 
many other factors) enter by assimilation into the content 
of aesthetic experience. We need not, therefore, in con- 
sidering the nature -lover's convictions, trouble ourselves by 
conscientious scruples about `purity'. 
It is not suggested that the creed of the nature -lover is 
always, or purely, optimistic, or that the manifest evil in 
nature is not a practical and theoretical difficulty, and a 
difficulty which may inspire in some cases a pessimistic 
philosophy. But it has to be kept in mind that the values 
which may be aesthetically expressed can be negative as 
well as positive. On the other hand, a strongly naturalistic 
conviction would render impossible -as will be seen in 
the next paragraph -the belief that nature is beautiful, is 
aesthetically expressive, apart from our minds. It is for 
this reason, and because it is important to consider the 
qua s on of the independent existence of natural beauty, that 
I shall here lay so much stress on the non- naturalistic, or 
`idealistic', assumptions of the nature- lover of a . certain 
type. An additional reason, of course, for considering these 
assumptions is that they are involved in an attitude to 
nature which is of the greatest importance in itself, and 
which is represented by Wordsworth. 
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IX. THE CLAIM THAT NATURE IS BEAUTIFUL INDEPENDENTLY 
OF OUR MINDS, AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this section there is-ef-IiigGe,sr some repetition of former W 
arguments, and a good deal of condensation of ones. lrt 
We know that in order that a thing shall appear beautiful 
it must be imaginatively perceived. And we know that some /(/Ae J f 
perceived objects have to be imaginally= selected and other- 
wise modified by us in `seeing' them, in order that they 
may appear beautiful. The artist, for example, sees, not 
every detail of a landscape, but attends to the forms of it 
which seem essential for the picture. When a perceived 
object, as it stands, appears, without imaginal modification," 
to be beautiful, we say commonly that it is beautiful. This 
means, or -ought in theory to mean, not of course that it 
is beautiful apart from all relation to aesthetic imagination, 
but that, precisely as it stands, it is satisfying to aesthetic, 
imagination and is therefore `beautiful'. Works of art which 
we happen upon, sometimes possess this beauty, and works 
of nature which we happen upon wd also .te- possess. Jr144-4/14 
it, though they do not Always do so. They must be object, 
for example, like a crystal or a wild -rose, which are 
not too complex to apprehend all at once in a single 
view. And we know that the fuller the understanding 
of nature, the greater (aesthetic conditions being equal)' 
the possibilities of nature appearing beautiful to us. Cloud - 
formations to the aesthetic metereologist, land-formations 
to the aesthetic geologist or geographer, the turbot to 
the aesthetic zoologist, may appear beautiful, whilst they 
may appear ugly to the uninitiated. 
When a perceived object is made for the very purpose 
of satisfying aesthetic imagination, we call it a `work of art'. 
We know that what we call works of art are made for this 
purpose, but we do not know with any certainty at all that 
As distinct, of course, from imaginatively. 
cc ....:- - 
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natural objects were made for this purpose, though in 
aesthetic experience itself of course we feel natural objects 
to be in themselves beautiful, just as we feel works of art to 
be in themselves beautiful. Although, however, we do not 
know with any certainty whatever that works of nature were, 
made for an aesthetic purpose, Ike wórks of arsf we have 
seen and we are assuming that the nature -lover frequently 
believes that nature in some sense is a `work of art'. If he put 
his experience into words he might say that, just as when .c 
we happen on a work of art we enter (in some rough and 
approximate sense) into an experience which has already been 
9 experienced by the expressive artist, so in the aesthetic experi-, 
ence of nature we seem to enter `somehow' into an experience 
of some spirit of nature or possibly of some. Supreme Artist. 
Now, if it were the case that nature is the1 `Art of God' 
in exactly the same sense that .4 work of art is the product - 
of an artist, then nature (or at any rate some parts of nature), 
like the work of art/might be beautiful in the now obvious 67 
sense of being, without imaginal modification, aesthetically X 
satisfying. But it would not literallyLe 4 in itself, apart from4 /7 
aiL" 
-» Jrelation to the supposed external mind of the Supreme 
Artist, be in itself beautiful. Like the `bodies' of works of 
Lj°7 
art in isolation; physical nature might be a `body', but it 
could not be out of relation to the imagining Mind external 
to it, an embodiment. 
1)41'3 We have tried to show, however, that the difference 
between our semi -analytical attitude to art, and the attitude 
X to nature of the nature -lover whom we are now considering, 
is just that the nature -lover does believe the beauty to be, I 
somehow, in the body of what he perceives. He not only x + 
feels it at . the moment of aesthetic experience, but he will 
defend it as a conviction. Now, if we are still to hold that 
beauty is dependent upon mind,, as we must, and if the 
semi- analytical conviction of the nature -lover is that not 
only does physical nature appear to be expressive, but that 
nature is literally expressive, that nature is, in fact, a kind 
;- 
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of artist and art all in one, then of course it will immediately 
follow that the imagining mind must be `somehow' in the 
very body of nature herself. The relation of the body of an , 
ordinary work of art to the artist is an external or transcen- 
dent relation ; the relation, on the given assumption, of the 
`work' of nature to the hypothetical Artist is in some sense 
i an `internal' or `immanent' relation. The difference is very $ 
I faintly analogous to the difference between the beauty of 
a picture and the beauty of a dancer, whose beauty in some 
( sense is in her body because her mind is in some sense in 
lier body. But the analogy must not be pressed. The differ- 
ence is, in more abstract terms, something like That between x 
the relation to his world of the purely transcendent designing 
// God of Deism and that of the immanent God of Pantheism. 
Indeed, ther:, is probably srçmething more than analogy lief e; 
a_s we shall see. 
If, then, nature can in any. sense be conceived as the 'art S /¡r+ee-,/ 
of God', the relation of the bódy of natural `art' to the mind A L 
of the artist must be peculiar, and very different from that of S. 
the relation of the body of man -made art to the mind of 
the finite artist. It must be an immanent relation. Yet, 
on the other hand, although (following out the nature -lover's V l 
assumptions) the expressing Mind must be immanent in the 
,< body of nature, it cannot be rnerely immanent, for mere r 
immanence is.. blindness. If Ore Mind were wholly merged, j f 
as it were, in the body and process of nature, it would be I 
difficult, if not impóssible, to conceive of the perfection of 
natural bodies, such as plants . or animals, 44i4,1,. . expressive as it 
they appear to be expressive. If we suppose, for example, 
the Mind which produces the beautiful body of the wild 
rose or the orchid or the star -fish or the tiger to be some 
finite D`mind'b (if we can use such a term), the mind, per- 
haps, of the plant or animal, or even the mind of some 
s purely natural, system, such a mind will be blind, fumbling, 
k dark, purposeless, or all but purposeless. It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to account, on such an hypothesis, for the 
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extraordinarily delicate structures which to the aesthetic 
percipient seem to be expressive of real beauty. This is, of 
,' courz,e, just a form of one main difficulty of pantheism, the 
arguments for and against which are many, and which we, 
t dare not begin to enumerate. Sliding over these and con- 
nected problems rather dangerously, I .. am going to be 
content here with assuming that transcendence alone, or j L immanence alone, is inadequate. Mere transcendence would (, 
not give our particular nature -lover what he wants, since 
he believes that nature literally/ and through and through/ 
i) is `expressive4and not in herself dead and meanin less 
the lump of matter whichhe statue en no one is . seeing t,` 
it. Mere immanence is inadequate, too, for the quality of 
mind allowed by immanence is not sufficiently high, and 
cannot be sufficiently detached, to account for the marvel- 
lousness of the beauty which the nature - lover believes that 
he apprehends. Since both transcendence and immanence, 
however, are up to a point necessary,'s c must take refuge 
in the familiar compromise of theism, and take -44, that if 4.040041 
there is a Mind or Spirit expressing aesthetically in nature, 
it must be both immanent and transcendent. If for short we ¢ 
call this the spirit God, then it will be correct, on the given_ 
assumption, to say that in one sense God is literally and 
actively expressing in, or within, physical nature, and that 
in another sense God is the mind of the artist distinct from 
and transcending all natural ' process. This is a familiar 
mystery of theistic theology: it would be dogmatic to assert 
that it is true. But once again, following 'the method of this 
chapter, I shall assume that it is true ; for, on curiae 
assumptions, nature could by no other hypothesis bé said 
to be beautiful independently of our minds. And Ì shall 
now go on to consider one or two problems involved in the f 
idea that there is a beauty of nature apart 'altogether from 
our experience of it, and in the idea that this beauty is, 
directly, the expression, r the `art' of a God conceived j ci J 
after the manner of theism. 
itAY /1.4- (c.4-4, nedbi-c, 
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X. SOME .OBJECTIONS TÓ THESE. CLAIMS 
For this notion is not without certain obvious difficulties. 
In the first place, the body- aspect of natural beauty might 
be said to be, from God's point of view, .totally different 
from physical nature as we perceive it, or at least so vastly 
different as to 'Make any common meeting-ground impos- 
sible. If physical nature literally is the aesthetic expression 
of God, how can we appreciate its beauty/ for we do not e c4a F 
perceive it) as it is. The shapes, it may be said, which we 
perceive and from which we; get aesthetic experience, are 
essentially 
, 
perspectives determined by our location in this 
or that place. The `point of view' of a God Whom we may 
suppose, in theistic manner, to be omniscient, could not be 
a point of view 4 the finite sense, but would be utterly 
from anything which we can imagine. A similar I¡ 
argument could be put forward as regards temporal forms 
such as. rhythms. These again, it might be argued,, are 
partially functions of finite beings located in a certain span 
of time, and haying, as .Bergson might put it, certain sub -. 
jeçtive `durations'.. When we' 6.pprehend beauty of natural 
rhythms it cannot be God's beauty. Ag?ain, our perception, 
which is the basis of aesthetic experience, is competent to 
apprehend only certain aspects of the external world, whilst. 
God's `perception' -if 'we may speak at the moment of such 
-will presumably include the "perception' of things which 
lie outside our perceptions, -the colourless, soundless/ struc- 
tures of physical objects, the working or electro- magnetic 
systems, and so on How then will the beauty we perceive 
be His? Another argument which concerns but a different Q C 
aspect of the same thing is one regarding the secondary 
qualities. If secondary qualities, as some believe, and as is 
suggested by facts like that of Colour- blindness, come into 
existence only when perceiving organisms (and possibly their 
minds) are in relation to certain other physical objects, then 
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for a Divine Mind it might be saic tha. the qualities would 
not characterise p ysical objects. And if they did not charac- 
terise physical objects they would presumably not enter into 
Divine aesthetic experience. So that, once again, natural 
beauty for us and for God would be profoundly different. 
Generally speaking, if we are thinking of an aesthetic object 
as a perceived object, it will be difficult to think of nature 
as God's aesthetic expression. For perception seems to in- 
, 
votive certain finite conditions and limitations, and these 
/being what they are, it is difficult to conceive of God, per - + ceiving'. 
XI. POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS 
"TheX are not, on the face of it, insuperable difficulties. Two 
general problems emerge. One is, How, God's world being 
so different from our world, can God share in `our' natural 
world and our experience? The other is How can we share 
in God's natural world and God's experience? 
I. The first is easily answered if we assume, as we did 
assume, God's omniscience. For if God is omniscient, his 
knowledge will include all that we know, will include all 
perspectives which are determined by our special points 
of view. On this assumption, God will not know nature 
only sub specie aeternitatis; he will know it also sub specie 
temporis. And, in particular, he will know, not only the world 31 
which ' we call the world of physical objects (independent 
of our organisms) ; he will also know the secondary qualities 
which we are supposing to be dependent partially on our 
organisms. If God is omniscient,Lhe must know also all theL 
contents of our minds. 
2. The question, How can we know God's world? involves, 
in the present context, two further distinguishable questions. 
(a) How can we be said to perceive the physical world which 
is the `body' of natural beauty for God? (b) How can we 
A:" 
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share in Go c' experience so that we apprehend God's 
beauty of nature ?. 
(a) The - ., - :. ive it, .gins- quali- 
ties such as secondary qualities which' we are presuming, 
dó not literally belong to the physical world, and the 1 
physical world contains things which are not perceivable 
by us. And the world which we perceive is the `body' of 
natural beauty for us. How then do we apprehend the same 
physical world that God apprehends? 
The only general answer to this question is the answer 
of a certain brand of realism which seems to me, rightly 
or wrongly, and for many reasons, to be the true answer. 
Put dogmatically, it is the answer simply that we do per- 
ceive the physical world, but partially, imperfectly, and in 
many respects erroneously, and in terms of secondary quali- 
ties. The secondary qualities may be in part dependent 
upon the organism (or even conceivably upon the mind), 
yet they are, realism asserts, in no sense mental, but are 
part of the physical world. We do not perceive electró 
magnetic *systems plainly and) as such¡ electro-magnetic r 
systems appear to us as coloured and resonant and solid. 11 
But though our perception is distorted, and is far 'outstripped 
by our scientific knowledge (which is derived in the first 
instance from perception), it is still the physical world of 
through a medium it 
content of our perception 
God's knowledge are obviously different, 
which we are partiall and imperfec 
and in perspectivya e 
and the content o 
but they do not constitute two totally different worlds. One 
is an aspect of the other. If, then, these contents are respec- 
tively the bodies of ̀ our' natural beauty, and `God's' natural 
beauty, our aesthetic experience of nature will be experience 
of the same nature (though partially and imperfectly seen) 
as God's nature, which is beautiful for him. 
(b) But the `body' of beauty is an abstraction from its 
embodied content. Physical nature, which is the body of 
`God's' . natural beauty, cannot be beautified except as 
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expressive of a content to God's mina. The remaining 
question then is, If nature's literally existent beauty is only 
beauty as expressive of a content of God's omniscient Mind; ? _c 
how can we, being finite, and not omniscient, in any sense 
`share' in that expressiveness, that beauty? How can we, 
in other words, share in the expressed content of God's 
experience? 
We have seen that in the case of finite minds, experiences 
are, strictly speaking, unshareable and incommunicable, 
although for practical purposes we may speak of sharing 
and communication. These are possible because of the 
likeness of finite minds to one another. We can, approxi- 
mately, share in the experience of the artist because he is 
a being like ourselves f'!But God is notku, t Wire, 41ìcn, is ern?" How can we share in God's experience? 
This would be unanswerable if we assumed that God's 
mind is related to our minds in exactly the same way as 
one finite Tind to another. But it is not necessary to assume 
this/ familiar and not an altogetherd way out *Jr -1 
is to say that, since we are creatures, God shares in our 
experiences/ And -mew+ that we j his creatures/ in special 
communion with him/ share in His experience- though in 4. 
a poor and limited way. 
If this were true of our experience in general, it would 
be true of aesthetic experience. If nature, therefore, is 
activ the expression of God's aesthetic imagination (and, 
also, of course, of his joy in aesthetic imagination), it might 11 be that in our `discovery' of natural beauty we are sharing, 
in imperfect measure, in the content of divine aesthetic 
experience, with its joy. 
Such arguments are all, of course, speculative in the 
extreme, and every single assumption that has been stated 
,,pp^rtP by a whole system 
l 
would have to be tested and.... 
of philosophy. The naturalistic philosopher has his point, 
IL of view, and is inclined to make light of all arguments which 
savour of theism. it whether they are valid or not, they 
ia,, 444.4 1144" ivt- 
C,aaz,i i 
1 
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are not quite wholly fantastic, in the light of the experience 
of the lover of nature. For certainly the latter is known to 
Say that in his passionate love of natural beauty he achieves 
a peace and joy which feel® like a sharing in the joy of 
a larger Spirit which is not himself. It is an experience 
which has no perfect analogy in the experience of the work 
of art. 
XII. INTUITIONS AND REASON 
It is but an experience, an intuition. Yet if the claims of 
intuition must be sifted by philosophy, philosophy in turn 
st pay respect to intuition. The intuition of the nature - 
23V contains a Conviction which every serious ontology 
must take into consideration, for it is a conviction, not of 
the morbid and the diseased and the fanatical, but of the 
wisest and sanest human minds. A familiar argument which 
is frequently applied to mystical experience holds good here, 
for the aesthetic love of nature in its profoundest form is 
a kind of mysticism. If the claims of the mystic were the 
,claims of the fanatic /or were like the claims of the man who 
is drugged by hashish, we might safely ignore them. But 
we know that it is not so, that the greatest mystics have 
discovered in their intuitions what harmonises with and 
illumines the living of life in its most gefereus- sense. 
Intuitions prove nothing, and they should try to prove 
nothing, for the method of proof is the method of reason. 
But the sound employment of reason is nota rationalism 
òID 
HJ Hc 
which refuses to admit the existence of what has not jbeen- A' 17 
premed,, perhaps what cannot/be proved. Indeed, the most 
extreme rationalism does in fact always admit some intuitiony á ) 
and it is only a question of how far we are to go. Surely 
we must allow that any fundamental conviction j of those h ' I 
who on other grounds have proved themselves generally- , 
s sane and wise, has a right to be considered? This is obvious 
justice, and is obvious truth. But it is sometimes overlooked 
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by those who -rightly intolerant of speciousness and emo- 
tionalism and humbug -go in fact, without recognising it, 
to the opposite extreme, the extreme of acting on the absurd 
assumption that because nothing can be proved except by 
reason, therefore nothing is true which has not been reasoned 
out. But this is sheer pragmatism. Truth is not made by 
proof. Nor is truth necessarily that -v h can be proved. 
wv /1-) D. it is certain, not only that we live by faith to a-sen- 
greater extent than we live by reason, but that 
v4A,47 rtu tt, faith is, on the whole, a ,/aaa.&i4;1erftbly more reliable basis 
of life than is often in effect realised by the 
It may very well, therefore, give us truth, though it is 
unable to prove it. And the faith of the aesthetic experience 
/ 
of nature is certainly is ', m n li f one of the fundamental 
moments of faith/' s 
Az ct. 
- 
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